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I. INTRODUCTION*
In the last decade the American judicial system has encoun-
tered an unprecedented proliferation of asbestos products litiga-
tion. The number of American workers who have developed or will
develop diseases related to their exposure to asbestos is of unpre-
cedented proportion. These diseased workers, seeking compensa-
tion for their occupational disability, have brought thousands of
suits against asbestos manufacturers and distributors. This vast
* The Vanderbilt Law Review expresses its appreciation to Andrews Publications, Inc.
for furnishing issues of the Asbestos Litigation Reporter. The availability of the Asbestos
Litigation Reporter greatly facilitated the preparation of this Special Project.
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litigation has produced numerous legal, social, and political issues
that may prove too numerous and too complex for the court sys-
tem to handle adequately.
Asbestos is the name of a group of naturally occurring fibrous
minerals' known for their properties of relative indestructibility
and resistance to heat and fire.2 The use of asbestos began in an-
cient times3 and increased considerably during the industrial
revolution of the 1870's.4 During the Second World War the pro-
tective clothing, insulation, and shipbuilding industries created a
dramatic increase in the demand for asbestos.5 At that time most
producers and researchers considered asbestos to be a virtually
harmless, highly valuable ingredient in a variety of products
designed to protect property and human life. Today more than
three thousand products commonly found in the home and work
environments contain asbestos.7 Ironically, experts now regard as-
1. The asbestos family consists of more than 30 different minerals of fibrous structure.
The minerals' physical properties vary so that only six varieties are of substantial economic
value. These six minerals are chrysotile, crocidolite, amosite, anthophyllite, tremolite, and
actinolite. Chrysotile, known for its silky white color, its durability, and its flexibility, is the
most widely used asbestos fiber. Manufacturers use it in the production of asbestos textiles,
cement products, friction materials, insulation, and paper products. It is the least dangerous
of the economically useful fibers. Crocidolite, a harsher, blue fiber, is used in pipes, cement
products, textiles, and felts for plastics. Crocidolite, which is resistant to acids and al-
kalides, is more difficult to process than many of the other fibers and is the most dangerous
of the asbestos fibers. Amosite is a harsh, brown fiber. It is extremely heat resistant, and
manufacturers use it in cement, pipes, refractory tiles, and plastic reinforcement. It is a
moderately dangerous fiber. Anthophyllite is used in cement production and the chemical
industry. Tremolite is used for talc filters and in the chemical industry. Actinolite usually is
not used commercially. Brief for Defendant, Aguilar v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 460769
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 11, 1981), reprinted in ASBEsTos LIM. REP. (ANDREWS) 3891, 3896-97
(Sept. 25, 1981).
2. Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 341-42 (1980); Note, The
Causation Problem in Asbestos Litigation: Is There an Alternative Theory of Liability?, 15
IND. L. REv. 679 (1982).
3. Asbestos was used as a lamp wick as early as the fifth century B.C., and writers
such as Pliny the Younger, Herodotus, and Plutarch made reference to it. The ancient
Greeks and Romans also knew of its propensities and wove it into clothing. Mehafy, supra
note 2, at 342; ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 179 (Apr. 27, 1979).
4. During the 19th Century asbestos initially was used in protective clothing for
firemen. Later, asbestos was used in insulation for steam engines, protective pipe coverings,
and other building materials. By 1904 American manufacturers were producing asbestos ce-
ment and asbestos-cement board. Id.
5. Mehaffy, supra note 2, at 342.
6. Id. at 341; Note, supra note 2 at 679. But see infra notes 114-60 and accompanying
text.
7. ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 179 (Apr. 27, 1979). Primary uses of asbestos in-
clude floor tile; gaskets and packing; friction products; paints; coatings; sealants; plastics;
asbestos-cement pipe; asbestos textiles; asbestos paper; and asbestos-cement sheet.
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bestos as "one of the most dangerous of all natural materials." 8
The disabilities associated with the inhalation of asbestos
fibers manifest themselves primarily in three diseases:9 asbesto-
sis,10 mesothelioma," and pulmonary and bronchogenic carci-
noma-more commonly known as lung cancer. 2 Recent studies es-
Secondary uses of asbestos include flooring; valve, flange, and pump sealants; clutch,
transmission, and brake components; industrial friction materials; automobile coatings; roof
coating and patch; electric motor components; piping; conduits for electric wires; packaging
components; gasket components; heat and fireproof clothing; insulation for wiring; theater
curtains; fireproof drapery; table pads and heat protective mats; molten glass handling
equipment; insulation products; filters for beverages; appliance insulation; hood vents for
corrosive materials; electric switchboards; miscellaneous building materials; appliance com-
ponents; and cooling tower components.
Consumer uses include piping; decorative building panels; plaster and stucco; molded
plastics; acoustical products; asphalt paving; caulking; motor armatures; paints; welding
materials; drip cloths; fire doors; car components; oven and stove insulation; siding; shingles;
floor tiles; chemical tanks; fire hoses; garments; gloves; filter media; boiler insulation; furni-
ture; motion picture screens; roofing; rugs; wallboard; acoustical ceiling materials; insulation;
electrical switches; hair dryers; clothes dryers; toasters; humidifiers; and toothbrushes. Id. at
7; see Mansfield, Asbestos: The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15 FORUM 860, 861
(1980).
The United States has consumed between 608,000 and 876,000 short tons of asbestos
per year in the last decade. The total value of the asbestos and asbestos products used in
this country is in excess of one billion dollars. ASBESTOs LrrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 182-83 (Apr.
27, 1979).
8. Mehaffy, supra note 2, at 341.
9. Asbestos also has been linked to other diseases as well.
10. Asbestosis, the earliest known and most common asbestos-related disease, is a la-
tent disease that manifests itself 10 to 40 years after exposure to significant quantities of
asbestos. Inhalation of asbestos fibers initiates a scarring process that destroys air sacs in
healthy lung tissue. The result is a decrease in pulmonary function and lung volume. Symp-
toms associated with asbestosis include shortness of breath, coughing, chest pains, and club-
bing of fingers. Although the disease is not always fatal, it is progressive and incurable. See
I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE 143-56 (1978); Ingram, Insurance Coverage
Problems in Latent Disease and Injury Cases, 12 EvrrL. L. 320-21 (1982); Mansfield, supra
note 7, at 861-63; Note, Asbestos Litigation: The Insurance Coverage Question, 15 IND. L.
REv. 833 n.15 (1982).
11. Mesothelioma is a malignant tumor of the membrane lining the lungs, chest cavity,
and abdominal cavity. Unlike asbestosis, no relationship between the degree of exposure to
asbestos and development of the disease has been established. Mesothelioma, also a latent
disease, has developed in individuals exposed to minimal quantities of asbestos. Once con-
sidered a rare form of cancer, mesothelioma is occurring with increasing frequency.
Mesothelioma is invariably fatal. See I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 10, at 241-44, 262-66;
Ingram, supra note 10, at 321; Mansfield, supra note 7, at 863-64.
12. Pulmonary and bronchogenic carcinoma, like most cancers, results in an uncon-
trolled multiplication of cells. Unlike most lung cancer, however, this one appears most
often in the lower lobes of the lungs. The incidence of lung cancer among asbestos workers
varies depending on the magnitude and duration of exposure and the type of asbestos in-
haled. Cigarette smoking greatly increases the likelihood that an individual will develop
lung cancer. The disease generally occurs 15 to 35 years after exposure and is incurable. See
I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 10, at 307-21, 326-27; Ingram, supra note 10, at 322; Mans-
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:573
timate that since the beginning of the Second World War between
eleven and thirteen million workers have become exposed to asbes-
tos.13 Projections concerning asbestos-related disability and death
vary greatly: one study has estimated that 8500 people die each
year from asbestos-related disease14 while another has estimated
67,000.15 Experts do not expect the number of deaths caused by
asbestos to level off until the 1990's.1s
The resulting deluge of asbestos-related claims brought
against asbestos manufacturers and the complexity of the legal and
factual issues have presented the American court system with "an
administrative nightmare."' 7  Approximately 30,000 individual
plaintiffs have filed suits against asbestos manufacturers since
1973,18 and industry experts predict that plaintiffs will file an addi-
field, supra note 7, at 863.
13. Estimates of the numbers of individuals occupationally exposed to asbestos vary.
The United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reports: "[B]etween eight
and eleven million workers have been exposed to asbestos in the U.S. since the beginning of
World War II." NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE AND NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH SCIENCES, ESTIMATES OF THE FRACTION OF CANCER INCIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
ATTRIBUTABLE TO OCCUPATIONAL FACTORS 1-2 (draft summary Sept. 11, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE ESTIMATES]. Commercial Union Insurance Companies,
Inc. estimates that since the 1940's over 13 million workers were exposed to asbestos. Occu-
pational Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1982: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 132
(1982) (statement of Mr. Harry Martens, executive vice president, Commercial Union Insur-
ance Companies, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 5735 Hearings].
14. ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREwS) 4362 (Jan. 8, 1982) (Dr. Irving J. Selikoff made
this estimate in a study for the United States Department of Labor).
15. See Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 55 (1982) (citing a statement by Mr. Joseph A. Califano, former Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, reported in Hartford Courant, Sept. 12, 1978, at 1, cols. 7-8).
16. See, e.g., Nicholson, Perkel, Selikoff, & Seidman, Cancer from Occupational Asbes-
tos Exposure Projections 1980-2000 (Cole Spring Harbor Laboratory 1981), reprinted in As-
BESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREwS) 4997 (May 2, 1982); Walker, Projections of Asbestos-Related
Disease 1980-2009 (Epidemiology Resources, Inc. Aug. 2, 1982), reprinted in Oversight
Hearing on the Effect of the Manville and UNR Bankruptcies on Compensation of Asbes-
tos Victims: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-51 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Oversight
Hearing]. One study by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
estimates that more than two million workers will die prematurely as a result of asbestos-
related cancers. Comment, supra note 15, at 55 n.2 (quoting NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE
ESTIMATES, supra note 13).
17. ASBESTOS LIrIG. REP. (ANDREws) 2104 (July 25, 1980). Mr. Harry Martens, first
senior vice president of Commercial Union Assurance Companies, Inc. has stated: "Sud-
denly-almost traumatically-our system is now faced with a plethora of lawsuits of unprec-
edented dimensions and issues, and we cannot wait for years for our system to gradually
develop the capability to accommodate the problem. We must now create methods and pro-
cedures to handle the myriad of complex claims and lawsuits." Id. at 2501 (Oct. 24, 1980).
18. Mehaffy, supra note 2, at 345; Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A. J. 139
580
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tional 500 suits each month."9 This massive litigation has con-
gested court dockets and created unprecedented delays in the liti-
gation process. As a result, legal costs have increased for all parties
to the litigation and injured claimants cannot obtain timely com-
pensation. The tremendous increase in asbestos-related lawsuits
thus poses practical and philosophical problems for the asbestos
industry, insurance companies,20 the federal government, and soci-
ety in general.2 Resolution of these important legal and legislative
issues must balance, among other concerns, the need to compen-
sate fairly the victims of asbestos-related disabilities with the po-
tential bankruptcy of asbestos manufacturers and the subsequent
effects on the economy.22 These issues only partially reflect, how-
ever, the scope and magnitude of the asbestos problem that Con-
gress and the courts recently have begun to confront.
This Special Project examines the most important issues of
the asbestos problem and advocates a congressional solution (1) to
(1981); Note, supra note 2, at 680. According to Mr. William Bailey, chairman of the Task
Force on Cumulative Trauma and senior vice president of Commercial Union Assurance
Companies, Inc., "[t]hose suits may be 'just the tip of the iceberg compared with the people
who may make claims in the 1980's and 1990's.'" Podgers, supra, at 139.
19. H.R. 5735 Hearings, supra note 13, at 240 (statement of Mr. G. Earl Parker, senior
vice president, Manville Corporation).
20. The asbestos litigation poses grave problems for the insurance industry. In a
speech to the American Bar Association at its 1980 Annual Meeting, Mr. Bailey of Commer-
cial Union Assurance Companies, Inc. stated: "The insurance industry presently is poised on
the edge of a fatal precipice, and not nearly enough of us seem to be even aware of that
problem, let alone give a damn if it is pushed over the edge ...." ASBESTOS LITIG. REP.
(ANDREWS) 2501 (Oct. 24, 1980). The incidence and magnitude of insurance recovery in as-
bestos cases could result in diminished recovery in other types of cases, increased premiums,
and greater difficulty in obtaining liability insurance policies. See infra part VII.
21. Studies estimate the social cost of the death and disability resulting from asbestos
disease will be between $39 billion and $74 billion over the next 25 years. New York Acad-
emy of Sciences, Report of a Meeting of the Task Force on Economics of the Asbestos Disa-
bility Compensation Claims Panel, reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4667-70
(Feb. 26, 1982); see Podgers, supra note 18, at 139.
22. In addition to the approximately 30,000 individual plaintiffs pursuing asbestos
claims, more than 165 companies are involved in asbestos litigation as well. ASBESTOS LrNG.
REP. (ANDREWS) 1345 (Feb. 15, 1980). The total contribution by all defendants to dispose of
each case averages $70,000; individual dispositional costs are lower. Id. at 4678 (Mar. 12,
1982) (Mr. David H. Markusson, assistant corporate counsel for Johns-Manville Corpora-
tion). In 1979 Johns-Manville (now Manville Corporation) had to pay an average of $13,000
to each plaintiff; in 1980 that figure rose to $21,600; in 1981 Manville Corporation spent
$15,433 per case. These figures do not include attorney's fees. Manville Corporation esti-
mates its total defense costs to be over one million dollars per month. Id. at 4422 (Jan. 22,
1982). The United States Department of Labor estimates that total current and future as-
bestos-related liabilities could reach $540 billion. Manville's Costs Could Reach $5 Billion
on Asbestos Lawsuits, Study It Ordered Shows, Wall. St. J., Sept. 15, 1982, at 4, col. 2
[hereinafter cited as Manville's Costs].
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relieve the courts of the thousands of present and potential asbes-
tos cases, (2) to protect future claimants' rights to adequate com-
pensation, and (3) to provide for equitable participation by all re-
sponsible parties, which, in addition to asbestos manufacturers,
include the federal government, insurance companies, and the to-
bacco industry. The first six parts of the Special Project examine
the various issues of asbestos litigation: theories of liability in
products liability suits against asbestos manufacturers, causation,
defenses, statutory limitations on actions, collateral estoppel, and
punitive damages. The Special Project then discusses in parts VIII,
IX, and X the methods used by asbestos manufacturers to attempt
to spread their liability through asserting insurer liability, the ex-
clusive remedy of workers' compensation, and indemnity and con-
tribution from the United States. Finally, the Special Project eval-
uates and analyzes recent developments in the asbestos litigation
area, including proposals for federal legislative compensation pro-
grams and business alternatives available to asbestos manufactur-
ers facing enormous asbestos-related liabilities.
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
A person who suffers injury from exposure to asbestos prod-
ucts may sue the manufacturer under three traditional theories of
products liability: negligence, breach of warranty, or strict liabil-
ity.23 Asbestos litigation, however, presents problems that are
unique to mass torts2' and uncommon to most products liability
causes of action.25 The plaintiff in an asbestos case, for example,
may be unable to identify the manufacturer of the products he en-
23. Although most plaintiffs seek recovery under strict liability, many jurisdictions
recognize all three theories and allow plaintiffs to sue on all three simultaneously. See
Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551 (1980).
For a discussion of these theories of products liability, see J. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY
AND THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIREMENT (1981); W. KEETON, D. OWEN, & J. MONT-
GOMERY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY (1980) [hereinafter cited
as CASES AND MATERIALS].
24. For a discussion of the problems of mass tort litigation see McGovern, Toxic Sub-
stances Litigation in the Fourth Circuit, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 247 (1982); Note, DES and a
Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Enterprise Liability; Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causa-
tion Problem, 94 HARv. L. REV. 668 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Causation Prob-
lem]; Comment, An Examination of Recurring Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 46 ALE. L.
REV. 1307 (1982).
25. Products liability law traditionally has focused on the isolated defective product,
not the problems of mass torts. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect:
From Negligen'ce [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 596
(1980); see also Comment, supra note 24, at 1310.
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countered. 6 The traditional causes of action, therefore, may not
afford a fair and adequate remedy to all parties. This part of the
Special Project discusses the three basic theories of liability and
their application to asbestos litigation.
A. The Basic Theories
1. Negligence
Although most jurisdictions have adopted strict liability in
tort for products liability cases, negligence remains an important
theory of recovery. Negligence is significant not only because some
jurisdictions have not adopted strict liability theory,27 but also be-
cause a plaintiff may choose to proceed in negligence for tactical
reasons. 28 Negligence analysis for a products liability case parallels
traditional negligence analysis:29 a manufacturer is liable if it fails
to exercise reasonable care to avoid risk of harm to others.30 Spe-
cifically, the manufacturer may be negligent by: (1) designing or
producing a product that is not reasonably safe for its foreseeable
use; (2) falling to test or inspect a product to discover its possible
defects or dangerous propensities; or (3) failing to warn or failing
to warn adequately of foreseeable dangers."1
26. See infra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
27. Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming do
not recognize strict liability in tort. 1 PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCH) § 4016 (May 1982).
28. CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 23, at 40.
29. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed. 1971). Traditionally,
courts have required plaintiffs injured by defective products to establish privity of contract
with the manufacturer to recover under a negligence theory. Id.; see Winterbottom v.
Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). Courts gradually created exceptions to
this rule to allow plaintiffs not in privity with the manufacturer to recover. The privity of
contract requirement remained until 1916, when Judge Cardozo decided the famous case of
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In McPherson the court
held that the purchaser of a product can recover in negligence without showing privity. Id.
at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053. Judge Cardozo recognized that industrial society had developed
to the extent that the manufacturer no longer dealt directly with the consumer; instead the
manufacturer delivered its product to various intermediaries in the chain of distribution. Id.
Therefore, the court imposed on manufacturers a duty of due care to produce a safe prod-
uct. See Birnbaum, supra note 25, at 593.
30. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 96.
31. Id. Evidence of a manufacturer's negligence is often difficult to obtain because the
entire manufacturing process is within his control. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 825-26 (1973). If the plaintiff cannot prove any
specific acts of negligence, he may attempt to proceed under the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur, which allows a plaintiff who suffers injury from defective products to recover by an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff must establish that the
defendant had exclusive control over the manufacture of the product causing the injury and
that the accident that produced the plaintiff's injury would not have occurred absent negli-
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Negligent failure to supply adequate warnings plays a particu-
larly important role in asbestos litigation.2 The basic premise of
this negligence theory is that manufacturers must exercise reasona-
ble care "to speak out if the product is capable of harm and does
not itself carry a message of danger."33 Moreover, courts hold man-
ufacturers to a standard of care equal to that of an expert in the
field.A Thus, a manufacturer is negligent for failing to supply ade-
quate warnings if an expert in the field exercising reasonable care
would have foreseen the dangers and supplied warnings .
5
2. Breach of Warranty
The basis for liability in warranty is the manufacturer's ex-
press or implied representations; the plaintiff may recover if the
condition of the product does not meet the consumer's reasonable
gence by the defendant. Once the plaintiff establishes these two elements, the court will
infer that the defendant was negligent. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24
Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Wade, supra, at 826.
32. See infra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
33. CASES AND MATERALS, supra note 23, at 68 (quoting Dillard & Hart, Product Lia-
bility: Directions for Use and Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145, 147 (1955)). The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts has adopted the following formulation for a negligent failure to
warn:
§ 388. Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is
subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the
consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused
by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is
supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for
the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will
realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of
the facts which make it like to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). For a well-ordered discussion of the negli-
gence analysis for failure to warn, see Hall v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours, 345 F. Supp. 353
(E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or
Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256 (1969).
34. See Laplant v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231, 240 (Mo. App.
1961). The law therefore requires a manufacturer to keep abreast of scientific knowledge
and discoveries relating to his product. Id.; see Noel, supra note 33, at 266.
35. A failure to warn is negligent only if the manufacturer could have foreseen the
potential danger. In evaluating foreseeability courts consider first, the likelihood of harm if
the manufacturer does not exercise reasonable care, and second, the manufacturer's actual
or constructive knowledge of the potential for injury. Hall v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours, 345
F. Supp. at 361; see Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 830 (1962).
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expectations that these representations create.3 6 To recover under
an express warranty theory the plaintiff must prove that the prod-
uct does not conform to the supplier's express representations, ei-
ther written or oral. Recovery under an implied warranty theory,
on the other hand, does not rest on the written or spoken words of
the seller. Rather, it rests on the implied warranty of mer-
chantability, which the Uniform Commercial Code has codified.
3 8
This implied warranty requires the manufacturer to produce goods
that are of merchantable quality and that are reasonably fit for
their intended purpose.39 To recover for breach of implied war-
ranty the plaintiff must prove that: (1) a merchant sold goods; (2)
the goods were not merchantable at the time of sale; (3) the plain-
tiff incurred injury and damages to his person or his property; (4)
the defective nature of the goods caused the injury both proxi-
mately and in fact; and (5) the seller received notice of the injury.40
Most jurisdictions no longer require privity of contract between
the plaintiff and supplier.4 1
36. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.01[1] (1982); see W. PROS-
SEa, supra note 29, § 97. Breach of warranty actions arose in response to a national move-
ment against the marketing of defective food. Advocates of this form of recovery indicated
that injured plaintiffs often had difficulty proving negligence on the part of the manufac-
turer. Therefore, courts imposed liability on the defendant even though he may have exer-
cised all possible care in the manufacture of the product. Id.
37. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 97. The express warranty theory originated in Baxter
v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), in which the court held an automo-
bile manufacturer liable for a shattered windshield. Basing liability on the manufacturer's
literature that described the windshield as "shatterproof," id. at 459, 12 P.2d at 411, the
court allowed recovery without proof of negligence, id. at 461-63, 12 P.2d at 412-13.
38. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977).
39. L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, § 16.011] (quoting Picker X-Ray Corp.
v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919, 922 (D.C. 1962)).
40. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-6, at 343-44 (1980) (citing U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977)).
41. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, § 16.03[5]. In 1960 the New Jersey
Supreme Court eliminated the privity requirement in warranty actions in the leading case of
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). The court held that the
obligation of the manufacturer is grounded in the "demands of social justice." Id. at 384,
161 A.2d at 83 (quoting Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913)). Thus,
the court determined that manufactured products carry an implied warranty of
merchantability for their intended purpose, and that warranty accompanies the product into
the hands of the consumer. 32 N.J. at 384, 161 A.2d 84. A few jurisdictions, however, con-
tinue to require privity of contract in warranty actions. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 36, § 16.03[5].
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3. Strict Liability
a. In General
Most plaintiffs in products liability actions seek recovery
under strict liability in tort 2 because strict liability eliminates the
burden of proving that the defendant acted negligently.4 s Under
the strict liability theory, "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when [it places an article] on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, [and the product] proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being."<"Therefore, a
plaintiff bringing a strict products liability cause of action must
prove that: (1) he purchased a product that the defendant pro-
duced or sold; (2) the product reached the plaintiff in substantially
the same condition that it was in when it left the defendant's con-
trol; (3) the product was defective; and (4) the defective product
injured the plaintiff.
45
Although the plaintiff in a strict products liability case must
prove all these elements, the central issue is whether the product is
defective,'4 and courts have adopted several strict products liabil-
42. Wade, supra note 31, at 825.
43. Id. at 826. In addition, the plaintiff need not establish privity of contract in a strict
liability action. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. RaV. 791, 794-800 (1966) (examining the elimination of the privity requirement in
products liability actions and the growth of strict products liability).
44. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1963). In this landmark case the California Supreme Court established strict
liability for manufacturers, independent of both negligence and warranty. This theory of
liability shifts the risk of loss caused by the possibility of a defective product from the
consumer to the manufacturer. Courts justify this risk allocation on two grounds. First, the
manufacturer is in the best position to control the risks arising from the use of his products.
Birnbaum, supra note 25, at 596. Second, the manufacturer more easily can bear the burden
of product-related injuries. Id. The manufacturer, for example, can obtain insurance and
adjust the price of his products to balance the cost of damage claims, but the consumer may
suffer irreparable financial harm if he bears the loss. Id.
45. Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13
ST. MARY'S L.J. 521, 523 (1982); see, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg., 268 N.W.2d 830
(Iowa 1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1030 (1974); Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975); see also Wade, supra note 23,
at 556-57. The courts refusing to follow this approach argue that it provides no real guid-
ance to juries in design defect or failure to warn cases. Id. at 557.
46. See Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30,
33 (1973). The focus of a strict liability action is on the condition of the product and not on
the conduct of the manufacturer. Id. The plaintiff, however, still must prove the existence of
the defect in the product. Commentators agree that a manufacturer is not an insurer of his
product. See Wade, Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Effect of Knowledge
Becoming Available Only After the Product Has Been Marketed, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rsv. _
(1983) (forthcoming); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965).
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ity tests to determine whether a product is defective.47 Most juris-
dictions have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts
formula" for determining defectiveness. 49 According to this
formula, a manufacturer is strictly liable to the ultimate user or
consumer if it "sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user."5 A manufacturer may be liable even
though it "exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product." 51 To determine whether the product is in an unrea-
sonably dangerous and defective condition, the jurisdictions fol-
lowing the Restatement (Second) of Torts formula apply a user-
oriented test and hold the manufacturer strictly liable if the prod-
uct does not meet the reasonable expectations of the user.2
Some jurisdictions have modified the basic Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts user-oriented test by redefining the concept of "un-
reasonably dangerous." 5' These courts follow a manufacturer-ori-
ented approach advocated by some commentators to determine
whether a product is unreasonably dangerous by balancing its util-
47. For a discussion of the concept of a defective product, see J. BEASLEY, supra note
23; Keeton, supra note 46; Wade, supra note 31.
48. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) the rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added).
49. Jurisdictions applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts test include: Arizona,
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Vermont. See J. BEASLEY, supra note 23, at 167-210.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
51. Id.
52. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines "unreasonably dangerous" as danger-
ous "to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteris-
tics." Id. § 402A comment i. The courts applying this test reason that strict products liabil-
ity developed out of liability for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Since
breach of warranty implies the loss of a bargain or failure to receive what is bargained for, a
consumer-oriented standard is appropriate. See Wade, supra note 23, at 555.
53. Jurisdictions applying this modified test include: Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See J.
BEASLEY, supra note 23, at 211-72.
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ity against the magnitude of danger inherent in its use. 4 These
courts maintain that since tort law is the foundation of strict prod-
ucts liability, they should determine defectiveness by asking
whether a reasonable supplier would have placed the product into
the market if it had known of the product's defective condition.55
The most important feature of this test is its imputation to the
manufacturer of knowledge 56 about the dangers of the product.57
Based on this imputed knowledge the court then determines
whether the seller was negligent to market the product in its defec-
tive condition. 8
Although the majority of jurisdictions follow either the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts approach or the imputed knowledge
approach, other jurisdictions have created different theories to
evaluate defectiveness. Some courts combine the user-oriented test
and the manufacturer-oriented test to determine if a product is de-
fective. 9 In these jurisdictions the plaintiff may prevail by showing
either that the product does not meet the reasonable expectations
of the consumer or that a reasonable supplier would not have
placed the product into the market if it had known of the prod-
uct's defective condition.6 0 Other courts have attempted to elimi-
54. See id. at 211. The jurisdictions applying this theory rely on Dean Wade's articles
including: Wade, supra note 31; and Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.
L.J. 5 (1965). Dean Wade has advocated the use of the term "unreasonably dangerous" as
the test for the manufacturer's liability because juries have difficulty understanding the
term "defective." See id. at 14-15; Wade, supra note 46, at _. For a criticism of this ap-
proach, see J. BEASLEY, supra note 23, at 77-84.
55. See Wade, supra note 23, at 556. Dean Wade has proposed the following test: "A
[product] is not duly safe if it is so likely to be harmful to persons [or property] that a
reasonably prudent manufacturer [supplier], who had actual knowledge of its harmful char-
acter would not place it on the market. It is not necessary to find that this defendant had
knowledge of the harmful character of the [product] in order to determine that it was not
duly safe." Wade, supra note 31, at 839-40.
56. See Wade, supra note 23, at 556. This imputation of "knowledge" to the defen-
dant differentiates negligence from strict liability. Id.
57. Both Deans Wade and Keeton have advocated this approach, but they have dif-
fered on the time at which knowledge of the danger is imputed to the manufacturer. Phillips
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 492 n.6, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 n.6 (1974). Dean Wade has
imputed the knowledge that existed at the time the product entered the consumer's hands.
See Wade, supra note 46. Dean Keeton, on the other hand, has imputed all the knowledge
available at the time of trial. See Keeton, supra note 46. The Keeton approach places a
much greater burden on the defendant and may result in "absolute liability."
58. Phillips Kinwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. at 492, 525 P.2d at 1036.
59. See Wade, supra note 23, at 556.
60. Id.; see, e.g., Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973).
In Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978), however, the court suggested
that a product must be defective under both tests for the plaintiff to recover. Id. at 100. The
user may consider the product to be unreasonably dangerous only because it injured him,
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nate altogether the unreasonably dangerous requirement from
strict products liability actions on the grounds that it "rings of
negligence.""1 Commentators vigorously have attacked this ap-
proach, and most courts have rejected it.62
b. Strict Liability for Failure to Warn
The defect in a product may arise in one of several stages of
the production process, including design, manufacturing, or mar-
keting and sales,"s but most reported asbestos decisions focus on
marketing defects. Marketing defects include the seller's or manu-
facturer's failure to provide adequate warnings of the risks inher-
ent in using its product and failure to provide adequate instruc-
tions for the safe and appropriate use of its product. 4 Thus, a
court may find a product defective because the manufacturer failed
to provide adequate warnings regarding the product's use.6 5
The duty to warn of a product's dangers arises when the ab-
sence or inadequacy of a warning makes the product unreasonably
dangerous. 6 This situation exists when a product is "unavoidably
unsafe" or "incapable of being made safe for [its] intended use.""
the court noted, and the manufacturer's profit motive may interfere with its objective evalu-
ation of the product's dangers. Id. Thus, the court must consider both sides and remain
cognizant both that the user is entitled to expect that the manufacturer has designed the
product to meet the demands of its proper use, and that the manufacturer is not an insurer
who must guarantee that no harm will result from using its product. Id.
61. Jurisdictions eliminating the unreasonably dangerous requirement include: Alaska,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Da-
kota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. See J. BEASLEY, supra note 23, at 101-66.
62. Wade, supra note 23, at 556.
63. Sales, supra note 45, at 523. Design defects arise in the creation of the idea for a
product and prior to the manufacturing process. Products with design defects leave the as-
sembly line exactly as the manufacturer intended. See J. BEASLEY, supra note 23, at 69.
Manufacturing defects arise during the manufacturing process from an unintended malfunc-
tion or error. Id. Marketing and sales defects arise from the manufacturer's failure to pro-
vide adequate directions or warnings regarding the use of the product. Id. at 71.
64. Sales, supra note 45, at 523-24.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 525.
67. See REsTATMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A comment k (1965). This comment
provides:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordi-
nary uses. These are especially common in the field of drugs.... Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warnings, is not defec-
tive, nor is it unreasonably dangerous .... The seller of such products ... is not to
be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely be-
cause he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
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In this case the court first must determine whether the utility of
the product outweighs the risk of harm caused by its use. If the
benefits of the product exceed the risks, then the product is not
unreasonably dangerous per se and the manufacturer may market
it if he provides adequate warnings.6
Foreseeability of harm is the primary issue in failure-to-warn
cases.70 Most jurisdictions require the manufacturer to warn of
only those dangers about which it knows or reasonably can foresee
at the time the product leaves the seller's hands.71 When evaluat-
Id.
68. Sales, supra note 45, at 540. "Asbestos-related cases provide the courts with a clas-
sic utility versus danger evaluation." Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp.
1353, 1355 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd in part, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982). Asbestos products
have great utility in society as heat resistant insulation and pipe covering. See supra note 7.
Most asbestos decisions byj~ass discussion of whether asbestos products are so danger-
ous that the manufacturers should not have placed them on the market, and they go di-
rectly to the duty to warn question. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Indeed, the balancing of risks and
utility is rarely at issue in failure to warn cases. See Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87
N.J. 229, 242-44, 432 A.2d 925, 932 (1981). The courts focus instead on the adequacy of the
manufacturer's efforts to warn users of the dangers in its products, because "regardless of
the utility and risk of a product without warnings, a warning can generally be added without
diminishing utility." Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 201 n.5, 447 A.2d
539, 545 n.5 (1982).
69. See supra note 67. Even if the court considers the product to be unavoidably un-
safe, it may be unreasonably dangerous in the absence of adequate warnings. See RESTATE-
MSENT (SEcOND) oF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). This comment provides:
Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dan-
gerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to
its use. The seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies, as for
example to eggs or strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn
against them. Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a substan-
tial number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is
not generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably not
expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he has
knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight
should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger. Likewise in
the case of poisonous drugs, or those unduly dangerous for other reasons, warning as to
use may be required.
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and
heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is
not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
Id.
70. Sales, supra note 45, at 543.
71. Id.; Hulsen, Design Liability and State of the Art: The United States and Europe
at a Cross Roads, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 450, 474 n.83 (1981); see, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975)(applying Minnesota law); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1088 (applying Texas law); Woodill v. Parke
Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980); Peterson v. B/W Controls, Inc., 50 IMl.
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ing whether the manufacturer should have foreseen a particular
danger, these courts attribute to the manufacturer the knowledge
of an expert in the field. 2 They thus impute to the manufacturer
all information about its product that was available when the
product entered the stream of commerce."3
Some courts, however, eliminate the foreseeability require-
ment and impute to the manufacturer knowledge of its product's
dangerous propensities even though the danger was scientifically
undiscoverable when it sold the product.7 4 These courts effectively
impute to the manufacturer all information about its product that
exists at the time of trial.5 "A major concern of strict liability,"
these courts reason, "is the conclusion that if a product was in fact
defective, the distributor of the product should compensate its vic-
tims for the misfortune that it inflicted on them. 7  These courts
thus would impose liability without regard to whether the manu-
facturer knew, should have known, or reasonably could have
known about the danger.
Many courts address the foreseeability issue in terms of a
"state-of-the-art" defense.78 The issue is the same in both in-
stances: whether the manufacturer can be liable even though the
dangers of its product were scientifically undiscoverable when it
App. 3d 1026, 366 N.E.2d 144 (1977); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l
Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820 (Ind. App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d
974 (1976).
72. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1089; see supra authorities
cited note 34.
73. This imputation is the only distinction between strict liability for failure to warn
and negligence. See Sales, supra note 24, at 545. Some courts and commentators have sug-
gested that the failure to warn analysis is identical under strict liability and negligence. See
J. BEASLEY, supra note 23, at 423-24; Wade, supra note 46, at _; see also Basko v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969).
74. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 385-86, 549 P.2d 1099, 1108-09
(1976); Prentice v. Acme Mach. & Supply Co., 226 Kan. 406, 601 P.2d 1093 (1979); Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm
Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or.
485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 19 Wash. App. 812, 579 P.2d 940
(1978), aff'd as modified, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979); Haugen v. Minnesota Min-
ing & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 550 P.2d 71 (1976).
75. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 239 (1978). Critics of this approach have argued that it effectively imposes absolute
liability. See Birnbaum and Wrubel, N.J. High Court Blazes New Path in Holding a Manu-
facturer Liable, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 24, col. 1; Sales, supra note 45, at 545-46; supra
notes 61-62.
76. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546.
77. See id.; Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. Rv.
398, 407-08 (1970).
78. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542.
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marketed the product. The term "defense," however, may be a
misnomer in those jurisdictions that require a manufacturer to
warn only of foreseeable dangers. The plaintiff in those jurisdic-
tions apparently must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant knew or should have known of the dangers in-
herent in the use of its product.79 Some commentators, on the
other hand, suggest that the defendant should have the burden of
proving that the dangers of his product were not foreseeable 0 Of
course jurisdictions that have eliminated the foreseeability require-
ment hold manufacturers liable regardless of whether they knew,
should have known, or reasonably could have known of a product's
dangers."1 Thus, these courts refuse to admit state-of-the-art evi-
dence at all.82
Despite these differences, courts generally require plaintiffs to
establish five basic elements to recover in strict liability for a fail-
ure to warn. First, the intended use of the product must carry an
inherent risk of harm to the consumer. Second, the manufacturer
must have actual or constructive knowledge of the risk of harm.
Third, the manufacturer must fail to warn or fail to warn ade-
quately of the product's dangers. Fourth, the lack of warning must
make the product unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. Last,
this failure to warn must proximately cause the plaintiff's
injuries. 83
B. Application of Theories of Liability to Asbestos Cases
Although asbestos plaintiffs may sue in negligence, breach of
warranty, or strict tort liability, 4 most reported asbestos decisions
79. See Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 IMI. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 104 (1980); Robb, A
Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability Cases,
77 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 12 (1982).
80. Professor Spradley has suggested that defendants should have the burden of pro-
ducing evidence showing that a danger was undetectable or unsolvable at the time of mar-
keting, but he would not make the state of the art an actual affirmative defense. Spradley,
Defensive Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 67 MINN. L. REV.
343, 348, 439 (1982). Some commentators have argued that the burden of persuasion should
be on the defendant to show that the dangers of his product were undetectable when the
manufacturer marketed the product. See Wade, supra note 46, at -
81. See Robb, supra note 79, at 13; Wade, supra note 46, at -
82. See Robb, supra note 79, at 14-16.
83. Sales, supra note 24, at 524. Both courts that require foreseeability and those that
do not require foreseeability apply these same basic elements. These courts differ only about
whether a particular manufacturer has constructive knowledge of its product's dangers.
84. Id. at 523-24. Victims of asbestos also may seek damages from asbestos manufac-
turers on the basis of fraud, although no reported decision has allowed recovery on that
ground. The elements of a cause of action for fraud are: (1) a false representation of an
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apply either negligence or strict liability. Moreover, most of these
cases focus on the asbestos manufacturer's failure to warn the con-
sumer of the dangers inherent in using asbestos products.8 5 In
most jurisdictions-those that hold manufacturers liable only for
foreseeable dangers-the failure to warn analysis is identical under
either negligence or strict liability."8 A few courts, however, re-
cently have rejected this approach and have distinguished between
negligence and strict liability in failure to warn cases.87
1. Strict Products Liability and the Foreseeability Requirement
in Asbestos Litigation
a. Asbestos Decisions Applying the Foreseeability Requirement
The leading asbestos products decision applying a failure to
warn analysis is Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.88 In Bo-
existing fact; (2) the speaker's knowledge of the statement's falsity; (3) the speaker's intent
for the plaintiff to act upon the statement; (4) the plaintiff's reliance on the statement; and
(5) damage to the plaintiff. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 105. See also Starling v. Sea-
board Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. at 192. The plaintiff does not have to establish privity
of contract to recover under fraud. Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. at
192-93. Courts have recognized, however, that fraud requires clear and convincing proof,
rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard of strict liability. See Comment,
supra note 24, at 1318-20.
An asbestos plaintiff offered this theory in Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. in
which plaintiffs alleged that manufacturers of asbestos insulation products had made false
representations about the dangers of these products. 533 F. Supp. at 192. Further, plaintiffs
claimed that the manufacturers intended to induce the workers to continue to use the prod-
ucts and that plaintiffs relied on these representations. Id. The court held that if plaintiffs
could prove that they had suffered harm and that the manufacturers had engaged in this
fraudulent conduct, they could recover. Id. Based on Starling, asbestos plaintiffs may be
able to recover under this theory if they can prove that the defendants knew of the danger
and concealed this information. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1317.
85. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
86. E.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); see J. BEASLEY,
supra note 23, at 423-24. For unavoidably unsafe products § 402A follows the negligence
concept in duty to warn cases, and, therefore, "the two theories are virtually identical." Id.
at 427.
87. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(1982); infra notes 160-78 and accompanying text.
88. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). In a strict liability
action, plaintiffs in asbestos litigation must prove the following elements:
1. Defendants manufactured, marketed, sold, distributed, or placed in the stream of
commerce products containing asbestos.
2. Products containing asbestos are unreasonably dangerous.
3. Asbestos dust is a component producing cause of mesothelioma [or asbestosis].
4. Decedent was exposed to defendant's products.
5. The exposure was sufficient to be a producing cause of mesothelioma [or
asbestosis].
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rel plaintiff,s9 an insulation installer, brought an action against
eleven manufacturers of asbestos insulation materials.90 Plaintiff
had contracted asbestosis91 and sued defendants for negligence,
gross negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability.2 Plaintiff
based the strict liability claim on the manufacturers' failure to pro-
vide adequate warnings of the foreseeable dangers associated with
the use of asbestos products.93 The jury found for plaintiff on the
negligence count,9 4 but it did not award damages because it also
found plaintiff contributorily negligent.9 5 On the strict liability
count the jury awarded damages against all defendants.9 "
Applying the standard failure to warn analysis,97 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the jury's
findings relating to strict liability. First, the court found that the
manufacturer could have foreseen that insulation workers might
suffer harm from inhaling asbestos dust.98 The court observed that
I
6. Decedent contracted mesothelioma [or asbestosis].
7. Plaintiffs suffered damages.
Flatt v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 838 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
89. Plaintiff died before trial, and his wife substituted as plaintiff. Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1086.
90. Id. Plaintiff settled with four defendants and the court instructed a verdict in
favor of the fifth because plaintiff could not prove exposure to any of that company's prod-
ucts. Id. at 1086 n.17. The remaining defendants were: Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,
Johns-Manville Products Corp., Pittsburgh Corning Corp., Phillip Carey Corp., Armstrong
Cork Corp., and Rubberoid Corp. Id. at 1086.
91. For a discussion of asbestosis and other related diseases see supra notes 9-16 and
accompanying text. Mr. Borel testified in deposition that at the end of a day dust from the
insulation materials covered his clothes and that he blew "dust out of his nostrils by the
handfuls." 493 F.2d at 1082.
92. Mr. Borel alleged that defendants: (1) failed to take reasonable precautions or to
exercise reasonable care to warn him of the danger to which he was exposed as an insulation
worker; (2) failed to warn him about proper wearing apparel and protective equipment and
appliances or method of handling the various products; (3) failed to test the asbestos prod-
ucts to determine the dangers associated with their use; and (4) failed to remove the prod-
ucts from the market once they determined that the products would cause asbestosis. 493
F.2d at 1086.
93. Id.




97. See supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text. Texas law controlled the case, and
the Texas Supreme Court had adopted the theory of strict liability in tort as expressed in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 493 F.2d at 1087.
98. Id. at 1083-86. The court emphasized that the danger must be foreseeable for the
manufacturer to be liable. The foreseeability requirement, the court stated, coincides with
the standard of due care in negligence cases, id. at 1088, except that the manufacturer is
held to possess the knowledge and skill of an expert in the field, id. at 1089. See supra notes
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several studies published in the 1930's and 1940's provided defen-
dants with sufficient information to conclude that asbestos expo-
sure could be dangerous.99 Second, the court held that once the
danger became foreseeable defendants had a duty to warn of this
danger. 100 Third, the court affirmed the jury's finding that defen-
dants failed to provide any warnings and that this failure to warn
made the product unreasonably dangerous.10 1 Last, the court up-
held the finding that the unreasonably dangerous condition of de-
fendant's product was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
10 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ap-
plied a similar analysis in Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp.103 In Karjala plaintiff, an insulation worker, had become ex-
posed to asbestos dust and had contracted asbestosis; conse-
quently, he brought an action alleging that defendant failed to
warn him of the products' dangers.10' The trial court awarded
damages to plaintiff and the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's findings on the strict liability claim."0 5 Citing Borel the
Eighth Circuit stated that an asbestos manufacturer may be sub-
ject to strict liability in tort if it fails to provide adequate warnings
regarding the use of its product.106 Applying the standard of an
expert in the field, the court determined that the manufacturer's
duty to warn users about the product's potential danger depends
on the manufacturer's knowledge, whether actual or constructive,
of the risks associated with the product's use. 07 Moreover, the
court affirmed the jury's finding that defendant should have known
of these risks.108
70-73 and accompanying text.
99. The court discussed at length the extent of defendants' knowledge of the dangers
associated with insulation products containing asbestos. Id. at 1083-86. The court concluded
that ample evidence in the record indicated recognition of the danger from inhaling asbestos
at least as early as the 1930's. Id. at 1092. See infra notes 114-59 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the research on asbestos diseases. The court also noted that none of the
defendants ever tested the product to determine its effect on industrial insulation workers.
Id.
100. The court rejected defendants' argument that the danger of inhaling asbestos was
so obvious to insulation workers that defendants had no duty to warn. Id. at 1093, 1105.
101. Id. at 1093.
102. This conclusion implies that had the manufacturers provided adequate warnings,
plaintiff would have chosen to avoid the danger. Id.
103. 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 158-59.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 159. The court noted that plaintiff was an insulation worker, not a factory
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.109 recently adopted the Bo-
rel analysis. In Moran plaintiff, an asbestos insulation installer,
brought a strict liability action against the asbestos manufac-
turer.110 The trial court applied Ohio products liability law, which
follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and held defendant
strictly liable for failing to place warnings on its insulation prod-
ucts."' The court of appeals cited Borel and noted that a duty to
warn attaches "'whenever a reasonable man would want to be in-
formed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to
it.' "112 Evaluating plaintiff's evidence that defendant should have
known of the significant health hazards to insulation installers, the
court concluded that the jury did not err in holding defendant
strictly liable for a failure to warn.'
b. Proving Foreseeability Against Asbestos Manufacturers
The evidence regarding whether asbestos manufacturers fore-
saw or reasonably should have foreseen the dangers resulting from
the use of their products is contradictory and, to an extent, incon-
clusive. The first reported cases of asbestos-related disease oc-
curred in 1906 and 1907."" These reports received little attention
worker. This distinction between insulation installers and asbestos factory workers is impor-
tant because the danger to asbestos mill workers became apparent before the danger to
insulation installers. Id. at 157-58; Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191,
197, 447 A.2d 539, 542-43 (1982). Thus, at some point the danger of asbestos to factory
workers may have been foreseeable while the danger to installers was not. Indeed, asbestos
manufacturers usually settle before trial cases brought by mill workers. Id.
Defendant in Karjala contended at trial that it could not have foreseen the dangers to
insulation installers. To support this contention, defendant introduced the Fleischer-
Drinker report and the Selikoff report. For a discussion of these reports, see infra notes 137-
43 and accompanying text. Defendant alleged that it could not have known of the hazard to
insulation workers until the publication of the second report. Karjala v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 157 (8th Cir. 1975).
109. 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982).
110. Id. at 813.
111. Id. at 813-14.
112. Id. at 814 (quoting Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1089).
113. 691 F.2d at 814-16. The court rejected defendant's argument that the Fleischer-
Drinker study, which concluded that plaintiff's occupation was not dangerous, excused de-
fendant's failure to place warnings on its insulation products. Id.
114. The first reported cases of asbestos-related disease were in textile workers. Pliny
the Younger commented as early as the first century A.D. on the sickness of slaves who
wove asbestos cloth. Mansfield, supra note 7, at 864. In 1906 Mr. M. Auribault, an inspector
for the French Department of Labor, suggested that exposure to asbestos caused the deaths
of 50 textile mill employees. This conclusion was not verified by scientific data. In 1907 Dr.
H. Montagu-Murry reported the first case of asbestosis. ASBEsTos LITIG. REP. (ANDREWs) 2,
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outside the scientific community. Although six states between 1913
and 1919 enacted workers' compensation laws that covered asbes-
tosis,115 asbestos research received little attention until 1924116
when British scientist W.E. Cooke reported the first verifiable
death caused by asbestos exposure. The Cooke report's conclusive
link between exposure to asbestos and lung disease 17 stimulated
European and American research into the relation between asbes-
tos and respiratory diseases.11 8
In 1927 the American medical community reported the first
official claims in the United States for compensation associated
with asbestos, 9 and in 1932 and 1933 American asbestos manufac-
turers settled the first lawsuits brought by asbestosis victims. 12 0 By
that time the leading producers of asbestos were aware of a poten-
tial health problem in the industry and provided funds to Dr.
Anthony J. Lanza to conduct a study.121 Dr. Roscoe Gray, surgical
director for Aetna Life Insurance Company, released further evi-
dence of the harmful nature of asbestos exposure in 1934. Dr. Gray
concluded:
9 (Feb. 7, 1979).
115. The states were Iowa (1913), Illinois (1913), Hawaii (1915), California (1917),
Wisconsin (1919), and Connecticut (1919). ASBESTOS LrrMG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9 (Feb. 7, 1979).
116. In 1917 an English researcher noted that X-ray changes similar to those caused
by pneumoconiosis in 15 individuals who had suffered exposure to asbestos. In 1918 the
United States Department of Labor reported that American and Canadian insurance com-
panies generally did not issue life insurance policies to asbestos workers because of their
increased health risks. Id. at 2, 9; see Mehaffey, supra note 2, at 343 n.3; Note, supra note 2,
at 698.
117. Cooke, Fibrosis of the Lungs Due to the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust, 2 BaT.
MED. J. 147 (1924); Cooke, Pulmonary Asbestosis, 2 BRrr. MED. J. 1024 (1927); ASBESTOS
LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3, 9 (Feb. 7, 1979). Dr. W. E. Cooke based his study on the autopsy
of a 33-year old woman who had worked for 20 years in a British asbestos factory. He found
a large amount of asbestos dust in the woman's lungs. Ironically, Mr. Henry Ward Johns,
the founder of Johns-Manville, died from "dust phthisis pneumonitis" in 1898. AsBEsTOs
LrrG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9 (Feb. 7, 1979).
118. In 1930 Drs. Merewhether and Price reported to Parliament that "the inhalation
of asbestos dust over a period of years results in the development of a serious type of
fibrosis of the lungs." The report concluded that improved ventilation and dust suppression
would guard against the ill effects of exposure. The International Labor Office in Geneva
also recognized the urgency of the problem. Mansfield, supra note 7, at 864-65; Note, supra
note 2, at 698 n.100; ASBESTOS LTG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9-38 (Feb. 7, 1979).
119. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (citing Lanza, Asbestosis, 106 J.A.M.A. 368 (1936)).
120. AsBEsTOs LrrG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3 (Feb. 7, 1979). In 1932 Raybestos-Manhattan
Co., Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., and the American Surety Co. paid $2,500 to
settle a suit initiated by Addie M. Platt. Johns-Manville Corp. paid $35,000 to settle 11
asbestosis claims the following year. Id.
121. Johns-Manville Corp. and Raybestos-Manhattan Co. originally provided funding
to Dr. Lanza in 1929. Note, supra note 2, at 698.
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Asbestos products inhaled into the lung produce an exceedingly severe and
perhaps fatal inflammation. This condition, called asbestosis, is not so impor-
tant as many other forms of mineral irritation of lung tissue, because of its
infrequency. However, it will become more prevalent as the industry
grows. . . . Since asbestosis is incurable, and usually results in total perma-
nent disability followed by death, care and caution should be used before a
claim is assumed. This is a very serious disease. . . Particles once ingested
continue their slow, insidious tissue destruction through the years, even
though exposure may long have terminated. Death usually occurs within a
year after the patient can no longer work.122
Some of the most damaging evidence against asbestos manu-
facturers are the Sumner Simpson papers, highly publicized corre-
spondence written in late 1934 and early 1935 between members of
the asbestos manufacturing community.1 23 These papers establish
that the major asbestos manufacturers either knew, should have
known, or were at least very concerned about the potential dangers
caused by exposure to their asbestos products.
In one of the first of these letters, Johns-Manville Corporation
attorney Mr. Vandiver Brown wrote to Dr. Lanza: "All we ask is
that all of the favorable aspects of the survey be included and that
none of the unfavorable be unintentionally pictured in darker
tones than the circumstances justify. I feel confident we can de-
pend on you and Dr. McConnell to give us this 'break.' ,,"2 The
results of the Lanza study showed that over half of the workers
examined had some form of lung damage, although the study re-
ported no evidence of marked disability. 25
In May 1935 Dr. K.A. Lynch published the first report linking
asbestos exposure to carcinoma of the lung. 2 ' The newly created
Asbestos Magazine sought to publish much of this damning infor-
mation about asbestos. Concerning the magazine's request for in-
formation, Mr. Brown wrote Mr. Simpson: "I quite agree with you
that our interests are best served by having asbestos receive the
minimum of publicity.1127 In 1936 Mr. Simpson responded to a
122. ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3 (Feb. 7, 1979).
123. Mr. Sumner Simpson was the president of Raybestos-Manhattan Co. from 1929
through 1948. See ASBESTOS LrrIG. REP. 3-5 (ANDREWS) (FEB. 7, 1979); id. at 529-91 (July 31,
1979).
124. Letter from Mr. Vandiver Brown to Dr. Anthony Lanza (Dec. 21, 1934), re-
printed in ASBESTOS Lrrm. REP. (ANDREWS) 538 (July 31, 1979).
125. Lanza, McConnell, & Fehnel, Effects of Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the
Lungs of Asbestos Workers, 50 Pun. HEALTH REP. 1, 7-8 (1935); Note, supra note 2, at 699;
ASBEsTos LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3 (Feb. 7, 1979).
126. Lynch & Smith, Pulmonary Asbestosis III: Carcinoma of the Lung in Asbestos-
Silicosis, AM. J. CANCER 24, 56 (1935); Mansfield, supra note 7, at 865.
127. Letter from Mr. Vandiver Brown to Mr. Sumner Simpson (Oct. 3, 1935), re-
printed in ASBESTOS LrrM. REP. (ANDREWS) 550 (July 31, 1979).
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proposed United States Public Health Service X-ray survey that
he did not want the results disclosed to "shyster lawyers and doc-
tors in the country" because of a fear of extensive litigation. 128 In
1937 ten of the nation's largest asbestos manufacturers 129 provided
financing for the Saranac Laboratory studies, conducted by Dr. Le-
roy V. Gardner; these manufacturers, however, greatly circum-
scribed the research.13 0 Although the studies continued for the
next twenty-five years, the researchers never published conclusive
results."1 Finally, in 1938 the United States Public Health Ser-
vice's Dreessen report discussed the health risks facing asbestos
textile workers.13 2 The report advocated the elimination of hazard-
ous exposure and the increased use of safety measures. 3 '
While the research of this period established that exposure to
asbestos could be dangerous, this research had limited scope.
First, most researchers believed that asbestos was harmful only if
the dust concentration was high or the exposure extended over a
long period of time. Second, few studies, except for the Lynch re-
port, recognized the carcinogenic properties of asbestos. Last, the
128. Letter from Mr. Sumner Simpson to United States Public Health Service (1936),
reprinted in ASBESTOS LIrzG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4 (Feb. 2, 1979).
129. These manufacturers were: Johns-Manville Corp., Thermoid Rubber and South-
ern Asbestos, Keasbey & Mattison (predecessor of Nicolet Industries, Inc.), Asbestos Manu-
facturing, Russell Manufacturing, Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., American Brake Block Corp.,
Gatke Corp., United Asbestos & Rubber Co. (Unarco), and United States Gypsum Co. Note,
supra note 2, at 699 n.106.
130. Mr. Brown wrote the Saranac Laboratories regarding conditions of the funding
agreement. In the letter, he stated,
It is our further understanding that the results obtained will be considered property of
those who are advancing the required funds, who will determine to what extent and in
what manner they shall be made public. In the event it is deemed desirable that the
results be made public the manuscript of your study will be submitted to us for ap-
proval prior to publication.
Letter from Mr. Vandiver Brown to Dr. Leroy U. Gardner (Nov. 20, 1936), reprinted in
ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 557-58 (July 31, 1979). Mr. Simpson reiterated this senti-
ment in a letter to Mr. Brown: "The reports may be so favorable to us that they would cause
us no trouble but they might be just the opposite which could be very embarrassing." As-
BESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4 (July 31, 1979) (quoting letter from Mr. Simpson to Mr.
Brown (1939)).
131. In fact, the early Saranac studies tended to conflict with the results of the other
research. In one early report Dr. Gardner stated that short fiber asbestos was inactive and
that asbestosis "quite definitely" does not progress after cessation of exposure. Letter from
Dr. Leroy U. Gardner to Mr. Vandiver Brown (Nov. 5, 1941), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG.
REP. (ANDREWS) 1266 (Jan. 11, 1980).
132. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1084; Dreessen, Dallavalle,
Edwards, Miller, & Sayers, A Study of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry, PuB.




researchers confined most of their work to the effects of asbestos
exposure on mine workers, milling workers, carding operators, and
textile workers; none of the studies examined insulation workers,
shipyard workers, consumers, bystanders, or persons exposed to as-
bestos in the household.""
A series of reports published in the 1940's indicated that as-
bestos was not dangerous in every work environment. In 1943 El-
liot DeForest, Secretary of the Northwest Magnesia Association,
wrote:
In our entire practice of handling asbestos in the State of Washington, and
our Association members have been in this business over 40 years, we have no
knowledge of anyone who is even acquainted with the coined word "Asbesto-
sis" much less ever having contracted the disease. . . .[T]he recorded singu-
lar case of Asbestosis as noted in the medical journals occurred in England
some forty or fifty years ago under must [sic] unsanitary and inhuman work-
ing conditions. Since this foreign disease has not come to our attention, we
feel it should be left in Europe where it belongs and not brought to our local
communities and create hysteria and fear amongst the families of our con-
tented workmen who are now enjoying good health and living to a ripe old
age, which is significant of the Pipe Coverers Union as compared with other
trades. 35
In 1944 Dr. Gardner reported the low incidence of asbestosis
among mine workers at the huge mining operation in Asbestos,
Quebec. 136 The most important-and most misleading-report of
the 1940's was the Fleischer-Drinker report, published in 1945.137
The researchers examined 1,074 insulation workers in various
Navy shipyards, and, finding only three cases of asbestosis, they
concluded that "asbestos covering of naval vessels is a relatively
safe operation."' 38 Nonetheless, in 1947 the American Conference
of Governmental Industrial Hygienists recommended limiting as-
134. Mansfield, supra note 7, at 865; Note, The Causation Problem, supra note 2, at
699; ASBEsTos LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3 (Feb. 7, 1979).
135. Letter from Mr. Elliot DeForest to Mr. John E. Morgan, supervisor of safety,
State of Washington Department of Labor and Industries (June 14, 1943), reprinted in As-
BESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 579-80 (July 31, 1979).
136. In 1944 Dr. Gardner reviewed the files of 200 to 300 workers at the Quebec mine.
He reported only two cases of asbestosis. This result was corroborated by Drs. Robert and
Vestal of the North Carolina State Industrial Commission. Letter from Dr. Leroy U. Gard-
ner to Mr. Vandiver Brown (July 15, 1944), reprinted in ASBEsTos LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS)
1322-23 (Jan. 25, 1980).
137. Fleischer, Viles, Gage, & Drinker, A Health Survey of Pipe-Covering Operations
in Constructing Naval Vessels, 28 J. INDUs. HYGIENE ToxiCOLOGY 9 (1945).
138. Id. "Significantly, ninety-five percent of those examined had worked at the trade
for less than ten years. Since asbestosis is usually not diagnosable until ten to twenty years
after initial exposure, the authors' conclusion has been criticized as misleading." Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1084. Ironically, these workers are primarily
responsible for the current asbestos litigation explosion.
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bestos exposure to five million parts per cubic foot of air."3 9
Although researchers conducted further studies throughout
the 1950's, the Fleischer-Drinker report generally was accepted un-
til the publication of the Selikoff studies in 1965. In this report Dr.
Irving J. Selikoff and the Mount Sinai School of Medicine pre-
sented conclusive evidence that exposure to asbestos insulation
was extremely hazardous to insulation workers. 140 The Selikoff re-
port notified all asbestos insulation manufacturers of the associ-
ated health hazards and "set the stage for the present asbestos re-
lated litigation nightmares."'' By 1967 asbestos manufacturers
placed warnings on virtually all asbestos products. The Conference
of Governmental Industrial Hygienists by 1968 reduced the safety
level of atmospheric concentration of asbestos dust to two million
parts per cubic foot. Legislative and judicial activity concerning as-
bestos increased. 42 Before the 1960's ended, medical researchers
revealed another startling discovery: asbestos exposure causes
mesothelioma. 4 s
Despite the ambiguity of the studies before 1965, evidence of
the dialogue within the asbestos manufacturing community dem-
onstrates that the manufacturers had some knowledge of asbestos'
139. Id. at 1084. Other reports published in the 1940's were less optimistic. Chief In-
spector of British Factories A.W. Garrett cautioned: "I would, however, emphasize that,
while asbestos dust may not have any apparent effects at first, experience shows that, par-
ticularly if the workers are exposed to dust in substantial concentrations, serious results are
apt to develop later." Letter from Mr. A.W. Garrett to Mr. Sumner Simpson (August 1945),
reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 585-86 (July 31, 1979).
Asbestos plaintiffs also have proffered evidence that Dr. Kenneth W. Smith, chief Ca-
nadian medical officer for Johns-Manville Corporation, recognized the harmful nature of
asbestos exposure by this time. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
140. Dr. Selikoff and his coauthors examined 1522 members of an insulation workers
union. The research team found evidence of asbestosis in over 50% of the workers ex-
amined. Over 90% of the workers with more than 40 years experience had abnormalities in
their lung tissue. The authors concluded that "asbestosis and its complications are signifi-
cant hazards among insulation workers." Selikoff, Churg, & Hammond, The Occurrence of
Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers in the United States, 132 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCi.
139, 152 (1965). Other reports are in agreement. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 493 F.2d at 1085 n.16; ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5-6 (Feb. 7, 1979). Studies
reveal a high incidence of asbestosis among shipboard-trade workers, pipe insulators, floor
installers, automobile repairmen, asbestos-cement manufacturers, and family members liv-
ing in the same household with an asbestos worker. Id. at 5-6; see Note, supra note 2, at
700-01.
141. Mansfield, supra note 7, at 865.
142. The federal courts reduced the government standard for permissible levels of as-
bestos dust in work areas in 1974. Note, supra note 2, at 701.
143. Mehaffey, supra note 2, at 344; see I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra, note 10; Wagner,
Sleggs, & Marchand, Diffuse Pleural Mesothelioma and Asbestos Exposure in the North
Western Cape Province, 17 BR. J. IND. MED. 260 (1960).
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dangers.14 4 Moreover, Dr. Kenneth W. Smith, the medical director
for Johns-Manville Corporation's Canadian operations from the
mid-1940's until 1951, has said that he informed certain senior vice
presidents and the corporate legal department about the dangers
of asbestos as early as the early 1950's.145 Dr. Smith advised the
company that instances of asbestos disease extended beyond its
own employees to other workers using Johns-Manville products.1"
This warning must have included the insulation trade. According
to Dr. Smith, Johns-Manville officials responded to his warnings
by saying, "'Yes, we recognize the hazard. What is it going to cost
us to do this and what are the potential hazards of assuming a
label in workman's compensation or public liability or such things
as that.' ,7 Therefore, by this time significant evidence suggests
that asbestos manufacturers actually knew or at least should have
known about the dangers of their products. Indeed, knowledge of
asbestos' dangers increased almost continuously throughout this
century, and at some point manufacturers should have begun to
warn consumers of the dangers of asbestos.
Presenting evidence of this knowledge at trial, however,
presents significant problems. A variety of evidentiary issues con-
cerning the admissibility of certain medical research reports and
various other documents have arisen. The Sumner Simpson papers
and the deposition of Johns-Manville's Dr. Smith form the focus of
this controversy. These documents establish that specific members
of the asbestos manufacturing community were aware of hazards
attending the manufacturing process as early as the 1930's and
1940's. 1
48
Asbestos defendants, therefore, have sought to preclude the
admission of these items under a variety of evidentiary theories.
Defendants typically argue that the Sumner Simpson papers are
inadmissible because: (1) they lack proper authentication; (2) the
papers are hearsay and do not fall within any exception to the
hearsay rule; (3) the papers do not constitute admissions; (4) the
144. Some juries, at any rate, have found that the manufacturers during this period
reasonably should have foreseen the dangers of asbestos even to insulation workers. See
infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
145. Transcript of deposition of Dr. Kenneth W. Smith (Jan. 13, 1976), reprinted in
ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 1031, 1047 (Oct. 26, 1979). Dr. Smith was chief medical




148. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
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documents specifically discuss the effects of asbestos exposure on
manufacturing workers and hence are irrelevant to the insulation
industry; and (5) the documents are confusing, misleading, and
prejudicial.14 9 Courts disagree on the admissibility of these docu-
ments, although the apparent trend is to admit them. °50
The Smith deposition raises other evidentiary questions.
Plaintiffs first used this deposition in Pennsylvania and Kentucky
lawsuits. 51 Attempts to admit the deposition testimony in -subse-
quent cases have not been entirely successful. Courts have admit-
ted the deposition on the basis of relevancy and reliability. 52 The
courts that have denied admissibility have cited lack of privity be-
tween the parties, dissimilarity of issues, and undue prejudice as
reasons.' 53 While the bulk of the evidentiary litigation has com-
prised issues related to these documents, new and complex
problems certainly will arise.
54
149. Brief for Defendant, Wilkerson v. Raymark Indus., Inc., No. C79-2036A (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 16, 1982). Courts have deemed the documents admissible in cases in which relevancy is
established or when an exception to the hearsay rule applies. The ancient documents excep-
tion and the business records rule have been applied successfully in a number of cases. See
infra authorities cited note 150.
150. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the admissibility of the Sumner Simp-
son letters, see Parsons v. Celotex Corp., CV 478-319 (S.D. Ga. order issued Aug. 27, 1980),
reprinted in AsBESTOs LrrM. REP. (ANDREws) 2556 (Nov. 14, 1980) (admitting the Sumner
Simpson documents). For a discussion of the admissibility of the Smith deposition, see In re
Johns-Manville/Asbestosis Cases, 93 F.R.D. 853 (1982) (following Adkins v. Combustion
Eng'g, Inc., No. 77-3032 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 5, 1981) (admitting the deposition testimony)).
Defendants in Wilkerson v. Raymark Indus., Inc., No. C79-2036A (N.D. Ga. 1982), ar-
gued that a majority of courts have refused to admit this evidence. Supplemental Brief for
Defendant at 1-3, Wilkerson v. Raymark Indus., Inc., No. C79-2036A (N.D. Ga. 1982). De-
fendant's only authority for that argument, however, was a list of unreported cases barring
the evidence. Id. These cases include McGrath v. Johns-Manville, CV 76-2417 (D.N.J. Oct.
22, 1979), and Oman v. Raybestos-Manhattan, CV 76-178 (E.D. Va. Aug., 1982).
151. Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 174-922 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1976);
DeRocco v. Forty-Eight Insulators, Inc., Nos. 7880 & 2281 (Pa. C. P. Allegheny County
1974).
152. In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142, 1146-48 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (con-
siderations in admitting the deposition include: (1) the unavailability of the deponent; (2)
whether the deposition was taken in compliance with the law; (3) the motive, opportunity,
and interest in developing the deponent's testimony; (4) the relevancy of the deposition of
testimony; and, (5) whether admission will cause prejudice or confusion).
153. Daniels v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 583 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978)
(tests for inadmissibility include: (1) same parties or parties in privity; (2) same issues or
questions in controversy; (3) prejudice of the testimony; (4) judgment and verdict in one
case would be evidence in another case; and (5) the legal existence of the first suit).
154. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 347-48 (5th Cir.
1982) (judicial notice); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1102-03 (5th
Cir. 1973) (refreshing witness memory), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); In re Related
Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1155-56 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (incriminating minutes of As-
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This history of asbestos disease research and industry corre-
spondence demonstrates with reasonable certainty that asbestos
manufacturers had sufficient knowledge of asbestos' dangers to
millworkers to create as early as 1935 a duty to warn those work-
ers. The record, however, does not establish conclusively that as-
bestos manufacturers knew or should have known that exposure to
asbestos products would be hazardous to insulation workers. The
early medical tests did not indicate that exposure to low concen-
trations of asbestos dust or exposure for short periods of time
could cause asbestosis or mesothelioma. More importantly, the
early reports did not consider the effects of asbestos exposure on
insulation workers, and the initial studies of the insulation indus-
try indicated that these workers were not in danger.155 Only in
1965, when Dr. Selikoff released his study, did the asbestos manu-
facturers have conclusive proof that insulation workers were in
danger.156
Despite the lack of specific evidence prior to 1965 describing
the dangers to insulation workers, many asbestos decisions have
held that manufacturers had a duty to warn insulation workers
long before the release of the Selikoff report.157 Noting that none
of the manufacturers had tested the product for dangers to insula-
tion workers, the Borel court concluded that defendant manufac-
turer had sufficient knowledge in the 1930's to create a duty to
warn insulation workers of the dangers of asbestos exposure. 58
Moreover, in Karjala the trial judge specifically instructed the jury
on the distinction between factory workers and insulation work-
ers, 59 and the jury found that Johns-Manville Corporation had
bestos Textile Institute meeting deemed admissible because authenticated and relevant; ju-
dicial notice); id. at 1149-50 (expert testimony); ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3562-3579
(July 10, 1981) (current efforts to depose Mr. Vandiver Brown fail); id. at 3628 (July 10,
1981) (same).
155. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 814-16 (6th Cir.
1982); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d at 158-59; Borel v. Fibreboard Pa-
per Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1092-93.
158. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1092-93. The court dis-
cussed at length the various studies of the dangers asbestos presents to man. Id. at 1083-86.
Based on this information the court of appeals determined that plaintiffs had produced
ample evidence to show that the danger of asbestos "was widely recognized at least as early
as the 1930s." Id. at 1092. The court, however, did not appear to make the important dis-
tinction between textile-mill workers and other workers who encountered the product far-
ther down the production chain.
159. Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d at 156-58. The trial judge in-
structed the jury to "consider the knowledge which Johns-Manville had relative to factory
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sufficient knowledge prior to plaintiff's exposure as an insulation
worker in 1948 to create a duty to warn him.16 0 Although these
decisions indicate that asbestos manufacturers knew of the dangers
to insulation workers, each asbestos case will turn on its own facts.
No court has held as a matter of law that all asbestos manufactur-
ers shoulHl have warned insulation workers as of a certain date. As
a result, juries probably will continue to determine the issue of
foreseeability.
2. Asbestos Decisions Eliminating the Foreseeability
Requirement
A minority of jurisdictions have rejected the Borel approach
and have held manufacturers liable even for unforeseeable dan-
gers.16' These courts contend that the concept of foreseeability has
no role in a strict liability action.162 The New Jersey Supreme
Court recently used this strict approach in Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp., 63 in which asbestos workers and survi-
vors of other workers brought suit against manufacturers and dis-
tributors of asbestos products for injuries caused by exposure to
asbestos. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants were strictly liable for
failing to warn of asbestos' dangers. Defendants asserted the state-
of-the-art defense, under which manufacturers are liable only for
injuries resulting from dangers scientifically discoverable at the
time the product entered the stream of commerce.6 The trial
court denied plaintiffs' motion to strike the state-of-the-art de-
fense and the supreme court granted leave to appeal.6 5 The court,
relying on its earlier decision in Freund v. Cellofilm Properties,
Inc., '6 rejected the state-of-the-art defense. Initially, the court
workers and whether or not this knowledge would put Johns-Manville on notice of the dan-
ger to Mr. Karjala as an installation worker." Id. at 158. Johns-Manville admitted that it
knew as early as 1942 that asbestos would cause asbestosis in factory workers. Id.
160. Mr. Karjala began working as an asbestos installer in 1948. Id. at 156.
161. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(1982); supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
162. See J. BEASLEY, supra note 23, at 423.
163. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). This case was a consolidation of six actions for
wrongful death and personal injury. Id. at 196, 447 A.2d at 542.
164. Id. at 197, 202, 447 A.2d at 542, 545; see supra notes 78-81 and accompanying
text.
165. Id. The trial court in Beshada concluded that Freund v. Cellofilm Prods., Inc., 87
N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981), merely created a rebuttable presumption that a defendant
had knowledge of the dangers of his products. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90
N.J. at 198-99, 447 A.2d at 543.
166. 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
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noted that negligence and strict liability differ in failure to warn
cases, because negligence is conduct-oriented and focuses on the
actions of the manufacturer while strict liability is product-ori-
ented and focuses on whether the product was reasonably safe for
its intended use.167 Further, the court stated that in failure to warn
cases the issue is whether the manufacturer had reduced to the
greatest extent possible the risks of using the product, not whether
the utility of the product outweighed the risks of its use." 8 Re-
jecting defendant's argument that the court should impute only
knowledge that existed at the time of manufacture or distribu-
tion,1 69 the court imputed to the manufacturer the knowledge of
the dangerous propensities of the product that was available at the
time of trial.17 0 Thus, New Jersey will impose strict liability when-
ever the product is unsafe, regardless of culpability or the state of
technology at the time of manufacture.'
7 '
Commentators have criticized the few decisions that eliminate
the foreseeability requirement in failure to warn cases.17 1 Specifi-
cally, they have argued that the Beshada decision incorrectly ap-
plied Dean Wade's analysis.77 The New Jersey Supreme Court im-
plied that Dean Wade would impute to the manufacturer all
knowledge available at the time of trial. 7 4 The Wade test for strict
liability, however, imputes to the manufacturer only that knowl-
edge of the product's dangerous condition that was available when
the product entered the stream of commerce. 17 5 Thus, applying the
Wade test, the Beshada court should have allowed defendants to
present evidence that when they sold the asbestos products, they
could not have foreseen the dangers to insulation workers. Com-
mentators also have accused courts that eliminate the foreseeabil-
ity requirement of judicially transforming "the product supplier
167. 90 N.J. at 202, 447 A.2d at 545.
168. Id. at 199-200, 447 A.2d at 544. The court noted that this imputation of knowl-
edge is a legal fiction: "It is another way of saying that for purposes of strict liability the
defendant's knowledge of the danger is irrelevant." Id. at 200 n.3, 447 A.2d at 544 n.3.
169. Id. at 203-04, 447 A.2d at 546.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 75, at 24-25; Sales, supra note 45, at 546.
173. The New Jersey Supreme Court has indicated its adoption of Dean Wade's strict
liability analysis. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. at 200, 447 A.2d at 544
(citing Wade, supra note 31, at 834-35). For a discussion of the Wade approach, see supra
notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
174. 90 N.J. at 200, 447 A.2d at 544.




into an insurer against product related accidents. ' 176 Further,
these courts impose a standard of care greater than that of an ex-
pert in the field, because the manufacturer will be liable for failing
to discover an undiscoverable danger. 177 In addition, the elimina-
tion of the foreseeability requirement may result in a disincentive
to research. If the manufacturer will be liable for all knowledge
available at the time of trial, he may avoid the discovery of prod-
uct hazards and the development of new and safer products.178 In
view of these criticisms, other jurisdictions may not follow the New
Jersey approach in failure to warn cases.
C. Summary
If a plaintiff can prove that he has an asbestos-related disease
and can identify the asbestos products he encountered, strong au-
thority supports his ability to recover. Several cases have deter-
mined that asbestos manufacturers negligently failed to warn insu-
lation workers of the dangers of asbestos. Other courts have
refused to admit evidence regarding the asbestos defendant's con-
duct and have held the defendant manufacturers strictly liable
even though they could not have foreseen the dangers of asbestos.
If the asbestos plaintiff cannot identify the manufacturer of the
products he encountered, however, his route will be much more
difficult. Therefore, to ensure recovery for an asbestos-related dis-
ease the plaintiff should be able to prove that a particular defen-
dant's products caused the plaintiff's injuries.
III. CAUSATION
Causation in fact is a principal component of the chain of cau-
sation 7 9 in products liability actions. The purposes of the causa-
176. Sales, supra note 45, at 546.
177. Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 75, at 25.
178. Id.
179. While both causation in fact and medical causation are essential links in the
chain of causation that a plaintiff must establish, they are distinguishable. In asbestos prod-
uct litigation, causation in fact concerns whether a particular product actually caused plain-
tiff's injury. Medical causation, on the other hand, concerns the effects of asbestos inhala-
tion on the human body and the medical capability of asbestos' causing a particular disease.
See Comment, supra note 24, at 1336-37 n.138. In Flatt v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 488
F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980), the court listed seven elements of the plaintiff's case in an
asbestos products action. The following four elements represented the chain of causation:
(1) Asbestos dust is a competent producing cause of the plaintiff's disease; (2) the plaintiff
was exposed to the defendant's products; (3) the exposure was sufficient to be a producing
cause of the plaintiff's disease; and (4) the plaintiff contracted the disease. Id. at 838. The
first issue represents the medical causation requirement in the plaintiff's case. The other
19831
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tion in fact requirement are to delineate the scope of potential lia-
bility for an injury 80 and to assess moral blame and responsibility
for the harm caused. 8" Traditional tort principles place the burden
of proving causation in fact on the plaintiff.8 2 Should the plaintiff
fail to meet this burden, the court will deny his recovery of dam-
ages even though he demonstrates that he was injured and that the
defendant committed a tortious act. Thus, courts have refused to
impose liability on a defendant product manufacturer when the
plaintiff could not trace his injury to the defendant's products.
183
Because of the long latency periods associated with asbestos-
induced diseases, 84 the plaintiffs in asbestos products cases often
find this burden of proving causation in fact extremely difficult to
three issues relate to causation in fact. In Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp.
1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), the court described the distinction as a matter of "can it" cause the
disease (medical causation) versus "did it" cause the plaintiff's disease (causation in fact).
Id. at 1362. Because the causation in fact issue depends on the circumstances of the case,
the parties will litigate it in each case. Medical causation, however, usually will not depend
on the circumstances of a particular injury. Thus, the plaintiff may rely on collateral estop-
pel to prove medical causation with respect to diseases such as asbestosis and mesothelioma,
for which the medical causation issue is well-established. See infra part VI. Medical experts,
however, disagree about whether asbestos inhalation causes some other diseases such as gas-
trointestinal cancer. See In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig.,
431 F. Supp. 906, 909 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977); Comment, supra note 24, at 1337 n.140. Conse-
quently, the plaintiff will find medical causation more difficult to prove in cases concerning
those diseases.
180. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 41, at 237; Fischer, Products Liability-An Analy-
sis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1629 (1981).
181. Fischer, supra note 180, at 1629-30.
182. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The requirement that
the plaintiff prove causation exists irrespective of the theory of liability on which he re-
lies-negligence, breach of warranty, or strict liability. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 103, at
671-72; see Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1344, 1351-52 (1973).
183. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (court
denied recovery to DES plaintiff who could not identify the manufacturer of the injury
causing drug); Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22, 28 (D. Minn. 1973) (plaintiff must ad-
vance evidence to establish which of two manufacturers produced defective product); Davis
v. Yearwood, 612 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tenn. App. 1980) (court denied recovery to plaintiffs
who could not identify the particular product that caused a fire in the padded cell of a jail).
For a discussion of the identification problem in asbestos litigation, see Note, supra note 2;
Comment, Texas Asbestos Claims and Market Share Liability: New Remedy for an Old
Tort, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 957 (1982).
184. Asbestos-induced diseases may manifest themselves within 10 years after expo-
sure, but the more common latency period is 25 to 30 years. The duration of latency may
vary as the result of the asbestos type, the duration and intensity of exposure, and individ-
ual body chemistries. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). For a more thorough discussion about the latency
periods of asbestos diseases, see infra notes 9-16 and accompanying text; see also Selikoff,
Hammond, & Seidman, Latency of Asbestos Disease among Insulation Workers in the
United States and Canada, ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3078 (Mar. 13, 1981).
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meet. To prove causation in fact, the plaintiff customarily must
identify both the product that injured him and that product's
manufacturer.185 This requirement, however, has many evidentiary
problems. For example, a plaintiff whose asbestos-caused disease
becomes diagnosable only after a twenty-year latency period may
not recall accurately the brands of asbestos products to which he
was exposed. 186 If the plaintiff's coworkers also cannot identify the
manufacturer of the alleged injury-causing product, the employer's
and the asbestos manufacturer's documents may enable the plain-
tiff to identify the proper defendants. 8 " During the long latency
period, however, sales receipts, records, invoices, purchase orders,
and other pertinent documents may have been discarded, lost, or
destroyed. 88 A plaintiff's exposure to several different asbestos
products may complicate further the identification of the responsi-
ble manufacturer.' 89 Proving which product and which exposure
caused the plaintiff's injury often will be virtually impossible.'90
Furthermore, plaintiffs whose diseases arise not from working di-
rectly with an asbestos product but from working or living in the
185. In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), the California Supreme Court stated that "as a gen-
eral rule, the imposition of liability depends upon a showing by the plaintiff that his...
injuries were caused by the act of the defendant. "Id. at 597, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 136.
186. See Note, supra note 2, at 681; Comment, supra note 15, at 83.
187. Henderson, Product Liability Disease Litigation: Blueprint for Occupational
Safety and Health, TRIAL, Apr. 1980, at 25, 26.
188. See Note, supra note 2, at 681.
189. A plaintiff's exposure to numerous asbestos products is not unusual because
many workers moved from jobsite to jobsite, and many employers obtained asbestos prod-
ucts from more than one manufacturer. In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material
Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906, 910 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977); Henderson, supra note 187, at
26; Note, supra note 2, at 681; Comment, supra note 8, at 83.
190. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1083. Before addressing the
issue of which exposure caused the plaintiff's injury, a court must make a more fundamen-
tal determination: did asbestos cause the plaintiff's disease? This determination comprises
both the medical causation and the causation in fact issues: (1) is asbestos a competent
producing cause of the disease suffered by the plaintiff; and (2) are any other substances
competent producing causes of the plaintiff's disease, and are they in fact the cause of the
plaintiff's injury? This issue frequently surfaces in asbestos product litigation because the
most common plaintiff's diseases-asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancer-may be
caused by exposure to substances other than asbestos. Lung cancer is a common disease
resulting from exposure to a variety of carcinogens including chromates, nickel, coke oven
emissions, cigarette smoke, uranium, arsenic, auto emissions, and other pollutants. See
Note, supra note 2, at 694 n.75. Likewise, medical research indicates that the inhalation of
numerous other types of fibrous substances may trigger mesothelioma or cause scarring of
the lung tissue identical to the symptoms of asbestosis. Id.
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vicinity of asbestos products 9' or asbestos dust will have even
greater difficulty identifying the responsible manufacturer. These
plaintiffs often must rely on others to identify the injury-causing
product and its manufacturer because they have little or no first-
hand knowledge regarding the source of the disease-causing
asbestos.
Despite these potential obstacles, some plaintiffs in asbestos
products cases can meet the burden of proving causation in fact.19
In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. 93 plaintiff carried his
burden by offering persuasive circumstantial evidence to prove his
exposure to defendants' products.194 Although many asbestos vic-
tims, through no fault of their own, cannot identify the manufac-
turer of the disease-causing product, courts that apply traditional
tort principles of causation nonetheless would deny recovery of
damages."9 5 Consequently, the plaintiffs in asbestos products cases
have asserted alternative theories of recovery that relax the plain-
tiff's burden of proving causation. These theories eliminate the
identification requirement or shift the burden of identifying the
party responsible for the injury to the defendant manufacturers.9 6
This part of the Special Project, therefore, reviews the prevalent
alternative theories of recovery in tort law: alternative liability,
concert of action, enterprise liability, and market share liability.
191. Among this class of plaintiffs are workers who worked near workers using asbes-
tos products and demolition workers who may be exposed to asbestos dust while demolish-
ing a building. See Note, supra note 2, at 681 nn.17-18. Consumers and wives of asbestos
workers also contract asbestos-induced diseases as the result of their secondary exposure to
asbestos. Id.
192. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
193. Id.
194. 493 F.2d at 1094. The Borel court resolved the problem of determining which
exposure caused the disease by upholding the jury's finding that each exposure was a cause
in fact of some injury to plaintiff. The court stated that when "tortious acts of two or more
wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible injury, . . . all of the wrongdoers will be held
jointly and severally liable for the entire damages." Id. at 1095 (quoting Landers v. East
Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 255, 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (1952)). The Borel
court noted that the Landers rule applies equally well to cases in which the tortious acts did
not occur simultaneously. 493 F.2d at 1095-96. In asbestos litigation this rule is particularly
beneficial to plaintiffs because the successive acts of two or more defendants often combine
to produce the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g., id. at 1095.
195. See supra authorities cited note 183.
196. For a discussion of these theories, see Fischer, supra note 180; LaMarca, Market
Share Liability, Industry-Wide Liability, Alternative Liability and Concert of Action:
Modern Legal Concepts Preserving Liability for Defective But Unidentifiable Products, 31




Each section describes and critiques the theory of recovery, its pol-
icy basis, and its actual and potential application to asbestos prod-
uct litigation.
A. Alternative Liability
The alternative liability theory, which the California Supreme
Court adopted in Summers v. Tice, 97 eases the plaintiff's burden
of identifying the actual wrongdoer and, thus, may permit the
plaintiff to recover damages when the traditional rules of causation
would deny recovery. In Summers two hunters, aiming at a covey
of quail, negligently fired their rifles in the direction of plaintiff.
One of the shots struck plaintiff in the eye, but because defendants
fired simultaneously, plaintiff could not identify which defendant
actually was responsible for the injury. Ordinarily, the plaintiff has
the burden of showing that one of the defendants was more likely
than not the cause of the plaintiff's injury. 98 Because Summers
concerned two defendants who independently acted negligently,
the court instead required the defendants to bear the burden of
exculpating themselves. 99
Under the theory created in Summers, a plaintiff must join as
defendants all of the actors who might have caused the harm.200
The court then will impose joint and several liability for the full
amount of the plaintiff's damages on any defendant who the plain-
tiff shows to have acted tortiously but who fails to prove that he
did not actually cause the plaintiff's harm.201 One commentator
197. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
198. RESTATEMEr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) comment a (1965).
199. 33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965)
subsequently incorporated this theory of alternative liability.
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm
has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to
which one has caused it, the burden is upon such actor to prove that he has not caused
the harm.
200. Fischer, supra note 180, at 1631 & n.50. The tortious conduct may be simple
negligence, intentional behavior, or a strict liability tort. Id. at 1631.
201. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d at 86, 199 P.2d at 4. Unlike the justification for
shifting the burden of proof of causation to defendants under the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur, see, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), superior knowledge of
or better access to information concerning the cause of the plaintiff's injury may not be a
prerequisite to invoking the alternative liability theory. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 600, 607 P.2d 924, 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 138, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980). The Sindell position, however, may contravene the requirements originally set forth
in Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d at 88, 199 P.2d at 5. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F.
Supp. 1004, 1017 (D.S.C. 1981); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) comment f
(1965) (suggesting that burden of proof may not shift under alternative liability theory un-
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has identified two principal justifications for shifting the burden of
proof and imposing liability under this theory. 0 First, because the
theory imposes liability only upon defendants proved to have acted
tortiously, the defendants are morally blameworthy and, therefore,
justifiably held liable.2 0 3 Second, courts would treat plaintiffs un-
fairly by denying an innocent plaintiff a remedy while permitting
proven wrongdoers to escape liability. 0 4 Application of the theory
is particularly appropriate when the number of defendants is
small, because the probability that any one of them caused the
harm is significant enough to assess moral blame.05
Courts have been reluctant to embrace the alternative liability
theory in industry-wide products liability litigation when a larger
number of product manufacturers may have caused the plaintiff's
injury. 0 6 In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,0 7 for example, plain-
tiffs brought a class action suit against five2 °0 of approximately two
hundred manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol (DES), a cancer-caus-
ing drug. Plaintiffs, alleging several causes of action including neg-
ligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability,20 9 sought damages
for their injuries resulting from their mothers' ingestion of DES.
210
Plaintiffs established that all defendants were equally culpable for
manufacturing the drug from the same formula, sharing test data,
and simultaneously marketing DES as a safe, effective product. 1'
The California Supreme Court, however, refused to apply the al-
ternative liability theory to hold defendants jointly and severally
liable.2 12 Distinguishing the case from Summers, the court noted
that plaintiffs failed to join all possible tortfeasors. Therefore, the
court could not be absolutely certain that plaintiffs had joined the
less the defendants are responsible for the plaintiff's inability to prove causation).
202. Fischer, supra note 180, at 1632-33.
203. Id. at 1632; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment f (1965); Sum-
mers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948).
204. Fischer, supra note 180, at 1632.
205. Id. at 1633-34; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment h (1965)
(alternative liability is useful and equitable only when the number of potential defendants is
limited and all potential defendants can be joined).
206. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
207. Id.
208. Plaintiffs originally named 11 defendant manufacturers, but the court dismissed
the claims against all but five of them. Id.
209. Id. at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
210. Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
211. Id. at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
212. Id. at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
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actual wrongdoer. 13 The Sindell court also focused on the remote-
ness of the possibility that any of the five defendants in an indus-
try of 200 manufacturers actually supplied the injury-causing
DES.21 Contrasting the situation in Summers, in which each de-
fendant had a fifty percent chance of causing the harm, the court
concluded that shifting the burden of proving causation to defen-
dants and imposing joint liability would be unfair. 15
For reasons identical to those expressed by the Sindell court,
asbestos victims probably will be unsuccessful in persuading courts
to apply the alternative liability theory in asbestos litigation. Ini-
tially, whether the plaintiff may have difficulty joining all possible
defendant manufacturers is questionable."' In addition to the ob-
vious jurisdictional problems, 17 the plaintiff may encounter the
impossible task of joining a bankrupt corporation2 18 or one that
has gone out of business. Even if the plaintiff successfully joins all
possible tortfeasors, however, two considerations still militate
against the use of the alternative liability theory in asbestos prod-
ucts litigation. First, the justification for applying the theory di-
minishes as the number of potential wrongdoers increases. 1 9 While
each defendant in Summers had a fifty percent likelihood of caus-
ing the harm, if an asbestos victim joins twenty manufacturers as
defendants, the likelihood that any given defendant actually
caused the harm may be as low as five percent.220 At some point,
the reduced likelihood that a particular defendant caused the harm
no longer will support the imputation of causal blame and liability
to all defendants. Fairness to the defendants will outweigh the im-
portance of the plaintiff's recovering damages without first identi-
fying the direct cause of his injury. Second, the Restatement (Sec-
213. Id. at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
214. Id. at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
215. Id. at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
216. More than 300 companies manufactured or marketed asbestos and asbestos-con-
taining products. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1327 n.87 (citing Hoenig, Recent Develop-
ment, N.Y.L.J., March 27, 1981, at 2, col. 4).
217. Joinder of all possible tortfeasors may destroy the diversity jurisdiction of federal
courts or may be impossible because of the personal jurisdiction requirements of state or
federal courts. Note, supra note 2, at 683-84 n.28.
218. See infra XII.
219. Note, supra note 2, at 683-84 n.28.
220. See Fischer, supra note 180, at 1633-35. The likelihood that any given defendant
actually caused the harm is inversely proportional to the number of defendants. The
probability is not precisely five percent because the plaintiff's injury in asbestos products
cases may be the result of exposure to numerous asbestos products. Thus, unlike Summers,
more than one defendant may be directly responsible for the harm.
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ond) of Torts notes that in all cases applying the theory of
alternative liability the conduct of each of the defendants created
the same risk of harm. 21 While the manufacture and distribution
of a generic drug such as DES may222 create the same risk of harm,
the manufacture of numerous asbestos products arguably does not
meet this standard. These considerations, therefore, will limit the
use of the alternative liability theory in asbestos litigation.
B. Concert of Action
Concert of action is another theory that eliminates the plain-
tiff's burden of identifying the manufacturer of the injury-causing
product. The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes the concert
of action theory as follows:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other
or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows the other's conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encourage-
ment to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to
the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.ns
A popular illustration of this theory is the illegal drag racing case
in which one of the drivers injures a bystander.224 Although only
one participant actually inflicted the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff
may sue any or all of the drivers under the concert of action the-
ory. If the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendants aided or fa-
cilitated the illegal race, 25 that their participation in the race was
tortious, and that the illegal race caused the plaintiff's injury, then
each defendant will be jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's
injury.226 Under the concert of action theory, the basis of the de-
fendant's liability is the joint activity rather than the conduct of
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment h (1965).
222. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 145. The Sindell court noted that DES is a fungible product produced by all
manufacturers according to a mutually agreed upon formula, which doctors prescribe by a
generic name. Id. at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1965).
224. See, e.g., Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968); see also W. PROSSER,
supra note 29, § 46.
225. The participants need not have an express agreement; the plaintiff must establish
only that a tacit understanding existed between the participants. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 29, § 46. The court may infer this understanding from the participants' conduct. Note,
supra note 2, at 685 & n.35.
226. See, e.g., Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968).
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any particular participant.22 Accordingly, each participant may be
liable for the plaintiff's damages. In addition, the plaintiff need not
identify the particular actor who caused the injury, and no proven
participant may escape liability by showing that his conduct was
not the actual cause of the plaintiff's harm.2
The concert of action theory appeals to plaintiffs bringing la-
tent disease products liability suits because it allows them to pro-
ceed against any one of many manufacturers. It also allows the
plaintiffs to recover from a defendant even if the defendant proves
that his product did not injure the plaintiff2 29 The courts, how-
ever, disagree about the propriety of using the theory in latent dis-
ease products liability litigation, which implicates numerous manu-
facturers. The Sindell30 court, for example, refused to apply the
concert of action theory to DES cases.23' Plaintiffs in Sindell ar-
gued that the concert of action theory was applicable because de-
fendants failed to test the product adequately, failed to warn con-
sumers of the drug's hazards, relied on other manufacturers' safety
tests, and took advantage of other manufacturers' promotional and
marketing techniques; the court, however, rejected each of these
arguments.2 2 The court held that defendants' conduct did not
constitute a common plan or tacit agreement to test inadequately
or to give insufficient warnings. Moreover, the court recognized
that sharing test results and marketing techniques was an accept-
able practice. Thus, the court suggested that concert of action re-
quires more than ordinary communication and cooperation among
the members of an industry.233 Determining that the "[a]pplication
• ..of concert of action to this situation would expand the doc-
trine far beyond its intended scope, 2 34 the court demonstrated its
227. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 72, 289 N.W. 2d 20, 25 (1979); LaMarca,
supra note 196, at 68.
228. LaMarca, supra note 196, at 67; Note, supra note 2, at 685.
229. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 24.
230. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
231. Id. at 605-06, 607 P.2d at 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
232. Id. at 604-06, 607 P.2d at 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
233. See LaMarca, supra note 196, at 66. But see Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich.
App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625,
af'd, 53 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1981).
234. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 141. The court stated that this application of the concert of action theory "would render
virtually any manufacturer liable for the defective products of an entire industry, even if it
could be demonstrated that the product which caused the injury was not made by defen-
dant." Id.; see Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1016 (D.S.C. 1981) (court also
denied recovery under concert of action theory and held that plaintiff failed to establish
even a tacit agreement among the manufacturers not to list or to warn adequately of
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concerns that the concert of action theory's distribution of losses
may be inequitable.
2 3 5
Notwithstanding the Sindell court's reservations, other courts
have allowed recovery on the concert of action theory in industry-
wide products liability cases. In Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.23 6 the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed a
DES plaintiff's award premised on a modified version of the con-
cert of action theory.287 The trial court had incorporated this "lim-
ited expansion"2 ' of the doctrine in the jury charge, which stated
that a manufacturer who "consciously paralleled" a deficient in-
dustry-wide standard could be liable under concert of action.39 In
upholding the jury instruction, the appellate division thus equated
conscious parallelism with the theory's tacit understanding re-
quirement.240 The court justified its liberalizing the agreement ele-
ment of concert of action by stating that it could not permit some
manufacturers "to escape their liability altogether by means of [a]
shroud of anonymity. 2 41 The Bichler court, however, may have re-
laxed the concert of action requirements too much. Given the po-
dangers).
235. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1324-25.
236. 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450
N.Y.S.2d 776 (1981).
237. 79 A.D.2d at 329, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632; see Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App.
59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979) (court held defendants jointly and severally liable under a concert
of action theory even though defendant proved that it did not produce the DES that
harmed plaintiff).
238. 79 A.D.2d at 329, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
239. The trial court gave the following charge to the jury.
[I]f you find that defendant and the other drug companies either consciously paralleled
each other in failing to test D.E.S. . . . as a result of some implied understanding, or
that they acted independently ... [and] that such independent actions had the effect
of substantially aiding or encouraging the failure to test by the others, then you should
find that the defendant wrongfully acted in concert with the other drug manu-
facturers....
Id. at 326, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
The court's jury charge in Bichler is perhaps even more interesting because it in-
structed the jury to find a concert of action if the independent actions of defendant aided
the failure to test by other manufacturers. Arguably, the court created a situation in which
defendant could not win: if defendant actively engaged in cooperative testing and the stan-
dards were found deficient, defendant could be found liable; if defendant merely abided by
industry standards that are found to be deficient, he could be found liable; and if the jury
were to find that by acting independently, rather than encouraging industry-wide testing,
defendant aided the failure to test by others, defendant would be found liable.
240. Id. at 326, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
241. Id. at 328-29, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed
this decision but refused to review the trial court's charge relating to concert of action be-
cause defendant did not pursue adequately that issue for appeal. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 583, 436 N.E.2d 182, 187, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 781 (1982).
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tentially burdensome liability a court may impose on one defen-
dant under concert of action, the traditional formulation of the
doctrine is fairer to the defendant because it requires the plaintiff
to prove with greater certainty that the defendant actually engaged
in a blameworthy concert of action.
Commentators who oppose the application of this theory to
market-wide products liability cases have argued that the plain-
tiff's ability to select any manufacturer as a defendant will create
pronounced inequities in the amounts that each manufacturer
must pay to the plaintiffs. Naturally, the plaintiffs will sue the
most solvent manufacturers. 42 Because the defendants cannot ex-
culpate themselves by showing that their products did not cause
the harm, 43 the wealthiest manufacturers ultimately will pay for
the injuries caused by other manufacturers' products.244 Concerns
that such inequities would arise may have played a role in Johns-
Manville Corporation's decision to file for bankruptcy, notwith-
standing its current state of solvency.245 The manufacturers' ability
to seek contribution from the other participants in the concert of
action partially may alleviate this unfairness. 48 Reimbursement is
not assured, however, and the consequent proliferation of asbestos-
related lawsuits would crowd further the dockets.
Concert of action may be particularly unsuitable to asbestos
products cases because the plaintiff will find it difficult to establish
the requisite express agreement or tacit understanding among as-
bestos products manufacturers. The Sumner Simpson papers, cor-
respondence between representatives of two manufacturers in the
1930's, contain the most damaging evidence of an agreement re-
garding the industry's knowledge of asbestos dangers.247 Although
242. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1324-25. The Bichler court stated that plaintiff
had the option of proceeding against any tortfeasor. 79 A.D.2d at 331, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
243. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1324. The Bichler court imposed joint and sev-
eral liability on defendant even though plaintiff could not establish that defendant had
caused the injury. 79 A.D.2d at 331, 456 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
244. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1324-25.
245. For a more extensive discussion of Johns-Manville Corporation's filing for bank-
ruptcy, see infra part XII.
246. See LaMarca, supra note 196, at 67. Courts have not addressed the question of
whether a defendant who proves he did not manufacture the injury-producing product must
identify its actual manufacturer, or whether he can proceed against any asbestos manufac-
turer. Id.; see Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALUF. L. REv. 413, 427-30
(1937).
247. For a discussion of the correspondence between Mr. Sumner Simpson, president
of Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., and Mr. Vandiver Brown, executive secretary of Johns-
Manville Corp., see supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
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these documents suggest that two manufacturers attempted to
suppress information about the potential hazards of asbestos, the
letters implicate no other manufacturers."" Thus, plaintiffs could
not use the letters to prove the participation of any other manufac-
turers in a concert of action. The only other evidence suggesting a
tacit agreement among asbestos product manufacturers is the
membership of some industry members in a trade association 249
and the entire industry's failure to provide adequate warnings on
asbestos products.250 While this evidence may be sufficient to
demonstrate a concert of action in courts applying the Bichler
court's modified theory, it should not result in liability in courts
applying the better-reasoned, traditional theory outlined in
Sindell.
C. Enterprise Liability
The theory of enterprise liability is similar to concert of action
because both theories relieve the plaintiff's burden of proving iden-
tification by recognizing the defendants' joint activity as the proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's injury. 51 Under both doctrines, courts
may impose joint and several liability on the participants of the
wrongful concerted conduct.252 Enterprise liability, however, per-
mits the defendants to exculpate themselves by proving that their
products were not the actual cause of the plaintiff's injury.253 Con-
248. See id.
249. Several leading asbestos manufacturers, including Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
Johns-Manville Corp., Amatex Corp., H.K. Porter, Inc., Southern Textile, and UNARCO, par-
ticipated in the Asbestos Textile Institute, a trade association. In re Related Asbestos Cases,
543 F. Supp. 1152, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1982). A leading asbestos plaintiffs' attorney has alleged
that courts may infer cooperation among asbestos manufacturers from the manufacturers'
membership in the trade association. See Note, supra note 2, at 687 n.44 (citing Motley,
The Lid Comes Off, TRIAL, Apr. 1980, at 23).
250. See Note, supra note 2, at 687.
251. In Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the
court, drawing from an 18th century concert of action case, stated that "the issue of who
'caused' the injury is distinctly secondary to the fact that the group [of defendant manufac-
turers] engaged in joint hazardous conduct." Id. at 372. Courts and commentators also refer
to this theory as "industry-wide" liability. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d
588, 607, 607 P.2d 924, 933, 164 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
252. Compare Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 608, 607 P.2d at 934, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 142 and Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968).
253. See Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. at 378-80. The concert
of action theory effectively eliminates the traditional identification requirement because the
identity of the specific manufacturer of the injury-causing product is totally inconsequential
under that theory. In enterprise liability, on the other hand, the court shifts the burden of
proof to the defendants. The validity of the identification requirement is implicit in the
theory insofar as the defendants capable of proving that they were not the cause of harm
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sequently, enterprise liability may be much less costly to defen-
dants who can show that their products did not cause a particular
plaintiff's injury.
The enterprise liability theory originated in Hall v. E. L Du-
Pont de Nemours & Co.,254 in which plaintiffs could not identify
the specific manufacturer of blasting caps that exploded and in-
jured several children. Plaintiffs thus joined all six American blast-
ing cap manufacturers and their industry trade association.255 As-
serting a right to recover under concert of action, plaintiffs could
demonstrated that industry-wide standards govern the manufac-
ture and sale of blasting caps and that defendants had delegated
some of the safety research and design matters to their trade asso-
ciation.258 The Hall court held that plaintiff must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that a named defendant manufactured
the injury-causing product.2 57 Then, if plaintiffs could demonstrate
"defendants' joint awareness of the risks at issue ' 258 and defen-
dants' "joint capacity to reduce or affect those risks," the
Hall court would hold defendants liable on enterprise liability
grounds.
259
After the plaintiff establishes that each defendant breached a
duty of care owed to the plaintiff by virtue of its membership in
the industry, the burden of causation shifts to each defendant to
prove that its product did not cause the plaintiff's harm.260 The
Hall court expressly noted, however, that the application of enter-
prise liability to an industry comprising more than five or ten
members may be "manifestly unreasonable. '261 This limitation
comports with the court's emphasis on the manufacturer's joint
control of the risk. Each firm's control over risks likely will dissi-
pate as the number of firms in an industry increases. The court's
caution against the application of enterprise liability to industries
composed of many manufacturers also may reflect the court's rec-
escape liability.
254. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). Scholarly commentary on the theory of enter-
prise liability appears more widespread than its acceptance by the courts. Fischer, supra
note 180, at 1627 n.32.
255. 345 F. Supp. at 359.
256. Id. at 371-78.
257. Id. at 379. The court emphasized that plaintiffs did not have to link each injury-
causing blasting cap to a particular defendant. Id.
258. Id. at 378.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 379. But see LaMarca, supra note 196, at 72 (defendants cannot exculpate
themselves under enterprise liability theories).
261. 345 F. Supp. at 378.
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ognition that the joinder of all defendant manufacturers becomes
more difficult as the size of the industry increases; yet unless the
plaintiff joins a very high percentage of industry members, he may
not meet the requirement that one of the named defendants actu-
ally produced the injury-causing product.262
Since the Sindell court refused to impose enterprise liability
in a DES case,263 courts for similar reasons likely will refuse to ap-
ply enterprise liability in asbestos products cases. Concern for fair-
ness to defendants led the Hall court to limit the theory's applica-
tion to industries with a small number of members. Similarly, the
existence of more than 200 DES producers influenced the Sindell
court's decision not to apply enterprise liability.264 Since at least
300 companies manufactured asbestos products during the past
fifty years,265 the potential unfairness of applying this doctrine,
whose philisophical integrity may depend upon the joinder of the
entire industry, is even greater in asbestos litigation than in the
DES litigation. Moreover, asbestos plaintiffs have not been able to
muster sufficiently convincing evidence of any industry-wide man-
ufacturing standard or delegation of risk control to a trade
association.6 6
D. Market Share Liability
A final theory under which courts may shift the burden of
proving causation to the defendant manufacturers in products lia-
262. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 608 n.24, 607 P.2d at 935 n.24,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 143 n.24. The court listed one of the elements of enterprise liability as
follows: "There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's injury was caused by a prod-
uct made by one of the defendants. For example, the joined defendants accounted for a high
percentage of such defective products on the market at the time of plaintiff's injury." Id.
(citing Note, Enterprise Liability, supra note 24, at 995).
263. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 588, 607 P.2d at 924, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 132.
264. Id. at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
265. See supra note 216.
266. A review of the leading asbestos decisions reveals no cases in which the plaintiff
has carried burden of proof on this issue. But see Motley, supra note 249, at 23. The plain-
tiff's proof requirements under enterprise liability are similar to those under the concert of
action theory. See Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. at 378. A plaintiff
may demonstrate joint control of risk in several ways. First, a plaintiff can prove the tradi-
tional concert of action by showing an express or tacit agreement by the defendant. Second,
a plaintiff can establish that the defendant consciously parallelled the behavior of other
defendants. Third, a plaintiff can show adherence to an industry-wide standard. Id. at 373-
74. The variety of asbestos products seems to refute the notion that asbestos products man-
ufacturers could have developed an industry-wide standard comparable to that in Hall.
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bility cases is market share liability.'87 The California Supreme
Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories2s 8 introduced the market
share theory of liability, which draws heavily from the alternative
liability theory of Summers v. Tice.sss Market share liability re-
quires that the plaintiff join as defendants a "substantial share"
2 70
of the manufacturers of the relevant market.2 1 The plaintiff also
must establish that: (1) the product which injured the plaintiff is
of a type manufactured by the defendants; 272 (2) the product was
defective; and (3) the defendant manufacturers knew or should
have known of the dangers associated with their products.2 7 3 The
theory then shifts the burden of proving causation to the defen-
dants. The defendants may exculpate themselves by demonstrating
that they did not produce the injury-causing product. 74 The court
will apportion liability for the plaintiff's damages among those de-
fendants who cannot exculpate themselves. In contrast to the other
theories of recovery under which the defendants are jointly and
severally liable for the entire amount of the plaintiff's damages,
market share liability attempts to assess liability in proportion to
267. See Fischer, supra note 180; Note, supra note 2; Comment, supra note 24.
268. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 588, 607 P.2d at 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 132.
269. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134; see supra notes 197-223 and
accompanying text. The court stated, "[W]e hold it to be reasonable in the present context
to measure the likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the product which allegedly
injured plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold by each of them ... bears to the
entire production of the drug sold .... " 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 145. In Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982), the
federal district court rejected the application of market share liability on the ground that
Georgia had not developed the theoretical foundation for the theory. Georgia did not recog-
nize the theory of alternative liability. Id. at 186-87.
270. The Sindell court did not set a fixed percentage of the market that plaintiffs
must join, but it rejected the suggestion that plaintiffs must join 75% to 80% of the rele-
vant market. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The percentage of the
market that a court requires the plaintiff to join may be a crucial determinant of how closely
the liability apportioned among the defendants corresponds to the probability that each
defendant actually caused the plaintiff's injury. Fischer, supra note 180, at 1639-40.
271. The Sindell court also did not provide guidelines for determining the relevant
market. Commentators have suggested that courts define the relevant market in terms of
the locality in which the plaintiff was injured, the injury-causing product, and the time at
which the plaintiff sustained the injury. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 180, at 1642-45, 1649;
Note, supra note 2, at 693-94. The court's definition of the relevant market can affect signif-
icantly a defendant's share of liability. Fischer, suprq note 180, -at 1642.
272. See Note, supra note 24, at 669. If a defendant can prove that he did not produce
DES for use during pregnancy, the court usually dismisses his case. Id. at 669 n.11. Simi-
larly, an asbestos manufacturer should be able to escape liability with proof that it never
produced the type of asbestos product to which the plaintiff was exposed.
273. See Note, supra note 2, at 690.
274. Id.
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the probability that each defendant's product was the actual cause
of the plaintiff's injury.2 75 To achieve this apportionment, courts
therefore look to each defendant manufacturer's share of the rele-
vant market.
2 71
The Sindell court offered several policy considerations to sup-
port its application of market share liability in a DES case. First, it
noted that the increased production of fungible products exacer-
bates the plaintiff's burden of proving causation. The court recog-
nized the need for a theory that would allow plaintiffs to overcome
these proof problems. Second, the Sindell court reiterated the fair-
ness policy underlying the alternative liability theory: "[A]s be-
tween an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter
should bear the cost of injury.' '1 77 Last, the court reasoned that the
manufacturers are better able to bear the cost of the injury be-
cause they can pass the costs along to consumers.278
A few courts have acknowledged the applicability of market
share liability in asbestos products cases.279 In Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp.2 0 a federal district court determined that
Texas courts had adopted the theory of market share liability. The
district judge noted that in many asbestos products cases in Texas
since Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,281 the plaintiff's
only proof of causation was his own testimony about the asbestos
products he encountered.28 2 Thus, the Texas courts effectively had
275. See Fischer, supra note 180, at 1623.
276. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 145. The court noted that each manufacturer's liability would depend on the probability
that it caused the harm to plaintiff. The court, however, failed to account for the possibility
that plaintiff would fail to join 100% of the relevant market. The dissent contended that the
defendants whom plaintiff could join should be liable for all of plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 617,
607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148. (Richardson, J., dissenting). An alternative solution
would be to hold the manufacturer liable only for a percentage of the award based on that
manufacturer's share of the entire market. This approach would limit the plaintiff's recov-
ery to a portion of the entire amount of damages awarded proportionate to the percentage
of the market that he had joined. See Note, supra note 2, at 696.
277. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 144.
278. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
279. See, e.g., Herbeck v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. SA-80-CA-520 (W.D. Tex.
order issued Feb. 23, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrM. REP. (ANDREWS) 4698 (Mar. 12,
1982); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Burke v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. C-
1-81-289 (W.D. Ohio order issued Oct. 27, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (AN-
DREWS) 4136 (Nov. 13, 1981).
280. 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
281. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
282. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. at 1358.
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shifted the burden of identifying the manufacturer from the plain-
tiff to the defendant. The district court then explained its choice of
market share liability over other burden-shifting theories by de-
claring that the imposition of joint and several liability results in
unfairness to the small producers. 8
Most courts that have considered applying market share liabil-
ity to asbestos products cases, however, have declined to follow the
Hardy position.2 8 4 Recently, in In re Related Asbestos Cases2 5 and
in Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad286 two federal district
courts criticized the theory's applicability to asbestos litigation.287
Both courts observed that asbestos products, unlike DES, are not
fungible goods, 8 8 and indeed, the different products vary in asbes-
tos content and propensity to emit harmful asbestos particles.
Therefore, because each type of product creates a unique risk of
harm,89 the likelihood that a particular manufacturer's product
caused the plaintiff's harm depends not only on the manufacturer's
share of the asbestos market but also on the relative risk of harm
created by each manufacturer's product.2 9 0 Because the Sindell
court designed market share liability for use with a generic prod-
uct, however, the theory does not account for these differences and
its application could result in an apportionment of damages that
does not correspond to fault. 1 Indeed, the Starling court ex-
pressly rejected the notion that it could adjust the Sindell theory
to represent fairly the relative harmfulness of each product.292
283. Id. at 1358-59.
284. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Mor-
ton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F. Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Prelick v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 531 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Garcia v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 81-649-
Civ-T-GC (M.D. Fla. order issued Aug. 28, 1981) (this order applied to 10 other cases),
reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrG. REP. (ANDREws) 3931 (Sept. 25, 1981); Gorniak v. Combustion
Eng'g, No. C78-465 (N.D. Ohio order issued July 6, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrIG. REP.
(ANDREWS) 4141 (Nov. 13, 1981); Aguilar v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 400769 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Sept. 8, 1981) (order without opinion).
285. 543 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
286. 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
287. See supra note 269.
288. In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. at 1158; Starling v. Seaboard Coast
Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. at 191. The Asbestos Cases noted that asbestos fibers are of several
varieties, that they differ in their capacities to cause harm, and that defendant manufactur-
ers use them in varying quantities in their products. 543 F. Supp. at 1158; see supra note 1.
289. In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. at 1158; Starling v. Seaboard Coast
Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. at 191.
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Both courts also emphasized the practical difficulties of ascer-
taining the appropriate relevant markets and apportioning liability
according to the defendants' market shares.293 The likelihood that
the plaintiffs encountered numerous asbestos products24 during
many years in several geographic regions 25 complicates the proce-
dure of defining relevant product and geographic markets. 29 6 Addi-
tionally, the market share for each manufacturer's product lines
may vary and these market shares may have fluctuated signifi-
cantly through the years.297 Thus, an accurate division along mar-
ket share lines may be impossible. 298 The Asbestos Cases and Star-
ling courts concluded that if a plaintiff can identify at least one
manufacturer whose products contributed to the plaintiff's injury,
the rationale for shifting the burden of proving causation no longer
exists. 2 9 The court in Starling expressly refuted the contention
that its position was overly burdensome to plaintiffs, and it con-
veyed its belief that the plaintiff's proof problems in asbestos liti-
gation usually are not as great as those of DES plaintiffs. The
Starling court noted that in most cases plaintiffs can present suffi-
cient circumstantial evidence that they had become exposed to the
products of a particular defendant manufacturer.300
The California Supreme Court designed market share liability
293. 543 F. Supp. at 1158; 533 F. Supp. at 191.
294. Asbestos products manufacturers have produced at least 3,000 different products.
Comment, supra note 24, at 1327 n.89.
295. The Asbestos Cases court included the many uses of asbestos products and the
diverse purchasing practices of plaintiffs' employers as considerations making the determi-
nation of relevant markets extremely complex. 543 F. Supp. at 1158.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. 543 F. Supp. at 1158; 533 F. Supp. at 191. The Starling Court also criticized the
market share liability theory's failure to discuss a defendant's liability for the contributorily
harmful effects of substances other than asbestos. Id. at 191. This deficiency, however, is not
peculiar to market share liability; it is an issue of causation that courts often face in asbes-
tos products cases irrespective of the theory asserted by the plaintiff. See supra note 190.
299. 543 F. Supp. at 1158; 533 F. Supp. at 91; see also Prelick v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
531 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (enterprise liability not applied when at least one manufac-
turer identified as causing the plaintiff's injury). Commentators have expressed concern that
market share liability creates an incentive for a plaintiff to suppress evidence when he can
prove that a specific manufacturer causes his harm but that manufacturer is insolvent. In
such a case, the plaintiff might conceal his knowledge and allow the burden to shift to the
defendants to absolve themselves. Fischer, supra note 180, at 1650.
300. 533 F. Supp. at 191. Judge Alaimo listed several types of evidence that distin-
guish asbestos cases from DES cases: (1) asbestos products are not generically marked, but
have brand names; (2) the plaintiffs encountered these products at their places of employ-
ment; and (3) the employers who purchased the products were large corporations who prob-
ably kept invoice records. Id.
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in a DES case to meet the exigencies of a unique products liability
situation.301 When courts apply it to asbestos products litigation,
they upset the balance of fairness between defendants and plain-
tiffs, which the Sindell theory arguably attained in DES litiga-
tion. 2  Because of the many different asbestos products and the
indistinct market boundaries, the theory does not achieve its ob-
jective when used in asbestos litigation; it does not apportion lia-
bility according to fault. The courts' reservations about the the-
ory's adaptability to asbestos litigation suggest that few courts will
embrace market share liability as a means of relaxing the plaintiff's
evidentiary burdens.
E. Summary
Because of the great potential for the inequitable allocation of
liability, each of the alternative theories of recovery will be difficult
to apply in asbestos disease litigation.30 3 A few courts, however,
may apply the market share theory after determining that the
plaintiff's proof problems are unfairly burdensome. In attempting
to conform the theory to the demands of asbestos litigation,
304
these courts must be mindful of the theory's deficiencies and po-
tential inequities. In particular these courts should assess carefully
the enormous procedural and practical difficulties of fairly apply-
ing the theory,30 5 and they should balance the value of using the
theory against the costs of achieving a level of "mathematical ex-
actitude"30 in apportioning liability. Also, they should remember
that courts primarily have designed market share liability, alterna-
tive liability, concert of action, and enterprise liability to alleviate
the plaintiff's problems of identifying specific defendant manufac-
turers. Therefore, courts should consider applying these theories
only after they determine that the plaintiff, through no fault of his
own, cannot produce sufficient evidence to identify a manufacturer
that caused or contributed to his injury. Otherwise, these alterna-
tive theories of recovery only will shift the potential inequities
301. See supra notes 267-78 and accompanying text.
302. But see Fischer, supra note 180, at 1651-52.
303. See supra notes 216-22, 242-50, 263-66, & 284-302 and accompanying text.
304. Some commentators have suggested that courts could adapt market share liabil-
ity to asbestos litigation by incorporating considerations representing each product's relative
propensity to cause harm into the final apportionment of liability. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 21, at 704.
305. See Fischer, supra note 180, at 1642-50.




from the plaintiffs to the manufacturers.
IV. DEFENSES
When faced with liability for injury caused by their asbestos
products, defendant manufacturers may assert a number of argu-
ments that can bar or diminish recovery by the plaintiff. These
arguments, when successful, either break plaintiff's chain of causa-
tion and render his cause of action incomplete, or preclude recov-
ery as affirmative defenses. 07 To avoid or diminish liability, asbes-
tos manufacturers also have filed cross-claims against other po-
tential defendants.30 While this method of defensive strategy is
not a defense in the traditional sense, it is, like the affirmative de-
fense or the refutation of causation, a useful means of limiting
liability.
In a broad sense, therefore, all these arguments are defenses to
liability. The availability and potential success of each defense de-
pends on the theories of liability asserted by the plaintiff, the law
of the jurisdiction, and the facts and circumstances of each case.
This part of the Special Project discusses the defensive positions
most commonly asserted in asbestos product cases. This part notes
the requirements of each defense and the strategies posited by the
asbestos defendants. It also assesses the success of the defenses
thus far and the potential usefulness of the defenses in the future.
A. State of the Art
Courts have based the so-called state-of-the-art defense on the
technical knowledge in the industry available at the time the de-
fendant manufactured the product. The primary issue in this de-
fense is whether at the time the manufacturer sold the product he
had sufficient knowledge reasonably to foresee dangers inherent in
its use.309 Some commentators analyze the state-of-the-art argu-
ment as an actual defense and place the burden on the defendant
to demonstrate that it could not have foreseen the dangers of as-
307. Typically, the manufacturers attempt to refute the plaintiff's proof of causation
or, when applicable, the element of foreseeability. By preventing the plaintiff from carrying
his burden of proving every element of his cause of action, the defendant prevails.
308. ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREws) 2500, 2523 (Oct. 24, 1980) (summarizing Stan-
dard Asbestos Mfg. & Insulating Co. v. American Tobacco Co. (cross-complaint filed Sept.
17, 1980)) (asbestos manufacturer cross-claims against the American tobacco industry for its
role in exacerbating asbestos-related lung disease); ASBESTOs LITiG. REP. (ANDREws) 5974-75
(Dec. 24, 1982) (complaint dismissed).
309. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 36:573626
ASBESTOS LITIGATION
bestos exposure given the knowledge available at the time of man-
ufacture. 10 In most jurisdictions, however, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving that the defendant knew or should have known
of the dangers inherent in its product at the time of manufacture
and that the defendant failed to remedy the defect, failed to pro-
vide sufficient testing, or failed to provide adequate warnings. 11
Finally, a few courts reject the state-of-the-art argument entirely
and hold manufacturers liable regardless of whether they could
have foreseen the dangers of their products. s 2
B. Contributory Negligence
"[C]ontributory negligence consists of the plaintiff's failure to
exercise the care of a reasonable person for his own protection."313
Both contributory negligence and comparative negligence rely on
the rationale that courts should consider the plaintiff's negligence
or unreasonable behavior in determining the defendant's liabil-
ity.3 14 Contributory negligence thus requires a balancing of the
plaintiff's conduct against the gravity of the potential harm.3 1 5 In
most jurisdictions, the defendant has the burden of pleading and
proving the plaintiff's contributory negligence. 16 A decreasing
number of jurisdictions recognize contributory negligence as a de-
fense to negligence actions that totally bars plaintiff's recovery,
even if the plaintiff's conduct is less culpable than that of the
defendant.
1 7
Courts and commentators disagree about the applicability of
310. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 63-65 & 71 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 74-77 & 161-71 and accompanying text. For a complete discus-
sion of state-of-the-art analysis, see supra notes 63-178 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of state of the art and the doctrine of collateral estoppel, see infra part VI. See
generally Sobota, Product Liability Reform Proposals: The State of the Art Defense, 43
ALB. L. REv. 941 (1979); Note, Use of "State of the Art" Evidence in Strict Liability
Claims: The New Texas Standard, 33 BAYLOR L. Rav. 165 (1981).
313. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1096 (5th Cir. 1973).
314. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, §§ 65, 67.
315. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1096; see RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 463, 466 (1964).
316. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assump-
tion of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 105 (1972); see W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 65, at 416. A
few jurisdictions have held that the plaintiff must prove as a part of his case that he was not
contributorily negligent. Id.
317. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 65, at 416. When the defendant is guilty of an
intentional tort or gross negligence, however, many courts hold that the plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence does not bar recovery. Id. at 426.
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contributory negligence principles to strict liability cases .3 1  The
philosophy underlying strict liability actions leads many courts to
question the use of this defense in strict products liability law-
suits. e19 These courts generally accept the position of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts that "[c]ontributory negligence of the
plaintiff, is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a
failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against
the possibility of its existence."320 Virtually all courts, however,
agree that
[t]he form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unrea-
sonably proceeding to encounter a known danger ... is a defense [to strict
products liability] .... If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is
aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of
the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
32 1
Thus, according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, contribu-
tory negligence is a defense to strict liability claims only if the
plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably encounters a known risk;32
the plaintiff's mere failure to exercise due care will not bar his re-
covery. 23 Although a few courts hold that ordinary contributory
negligence can bar the plaintiff's recovery in a strict products lia-
bility action, 24 most courts follow the Restatement (Second) of
Torts approach. 25
One of the most widely accepted uses of the contributory neg-
ligence defense in strict liability actions concerns a plaintiff's ab-
318. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1097; W. PROSSER, supra
note 29, § 102 at 670 ("[T]he decisions are ostensibly in a state of flat contradiction as to
whether contributory negligence is available as a defense [to strict liability claims]."); infra
authorities cited notes 319, 324.
319. See, e.g, 493 F.2d at 1108; Benson v. Beloit Corp., 443 F.2d 839, 840 (9th Cir.
1971); DeFelice v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 164, 255 A.2d 636 (Super. Ct. 1969);
Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); see generally Noel, supra
note 316, at 105-19 (discussing the courts' various rationales for not allowing contributory
negligence as a defense to strict products liability).
320. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1964).
321. Id.
322. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1097.
323. See supra authorities cited note 319.
324. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, for example, has held that "[t]he defense of
contributory negligence is available to the seller. The plaintiff has the duty to use ordinary
care to protect himself from known or readily apparent danger." Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.
2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967); see Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 266 A.2d 855
(N.H. 1970). For a discussion of these cases, see Noel, supra note 316, at 114-15.
325. Noel, supra note 316, at 118 ("When the plaintiff's contributory negligence, along
with a defect in the product, is found to be one of the proximate causes of the accident, it is
the prevailing view that the plaintiff still can recover in a strict liability case.").
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normal use or misuse of a product.3 26 Misuse encompasses use of a
product in a fashion "not reasonably foreseeable by the seller or
manufacturer. '32 7 Common forms of misuse include failure to fol-
low adequate warnings or instructions, failure to follow safety pro-
cedures, and failure to use protective equipment.32 8 Proof of this
misuse may bar a plaintiff's recovery.
29
The use of the contributory negligence defense may be partic-
ularly relevant in failure to warn cases in which the manufacturer's
warning, if adequate, renders the product nondefective and hence
makes the plaintiff responsible for his own injuries. If the plaintiff
disregards known warnings, he arguably assumes the risk inherent
in the use of the product.3 30 In asbestos litigation, however, the
defendant manufacturers rarely prevail in their assertions that the
plaintiffs were contributorily negligent for failing to follow proper
safety procedures or failing to heed warnings, because at the time
of most plaintiffs' exposure, adequate safety procedures, warnings,
and instructions were nonexistent.33 1 Thus, while the defendants
favor the contributory negligence defense because it completely
bars the plaintiff's recovery, the defense probably will not be use-
ful in strict liability asbestos litigation. The lack of warning and
safety procedures at the time of manufacture and exposure, the
limited popularity of the contributory negligence defense among
the jurisdictions, and the defense's inherently harsh effect upon
the plaintiff will limit the defense's use in asbestos litigation.
C. Comparative Negligence
A comparative negligence system attempts to divide liability
between the plaintiff and the defendant in proportion to their rela-
tive degrees of fault.3 3 2 Because comparative negligence, unlike
326. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1099. Dean Prosser
distinguished abnormal use and contributory negligence: "[A]lithough the two frequently co-
incide, one may exist without the other." W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 102, at 670.
327. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1099.
328. See Noel, supra note 316, at 100-01 (discussing cases in which the plaintiff failed
to heed warnings or follow instructions).
329. See id.; W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 102, at 668-69.
330. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1964).
331. See, e.g., Borel Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1099.
332. The comparative negligence systems used in most states may be classified as ei-
ther "pure" or "fifty percent" systems. PROSSER, WADE, & SCHWARTZ, TORTS CASES AND
MATERIALS 612 (7th ed. 1982). In a pure system, the plaintiff may recover even if his negli-
gence is greater than that of the defendant. Id. at 613 (citing UNIFORM CoPARATIvE FAULT
ACT § l(a) (1979)). In a 50% system the plaintiff may recover if his negligence is "no greater
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contributory negligence, does not totally bar recovery, defendant
asbestos manufacturers successfully have raised comparative negli-
gence as a defense in both negligence and strict liability actions.3 38
The application of comparative negligence principles to strict lia-
bility cases has created a controversy over whether, given the phil-
osophical underpinnings and policy objectives of strict liability,
33 4
courts should allow the plaintiff's culpable behavior to mitigate the
defendant's liability.33 5 Nonetheless, many jurisdictions have
stated that fundamental fairness requires this application to prod-
ucts liability lawsuits.""6
These courts typically argue that a plaintiff whose misconduct contributed to
the condition or situation which gave rise to his injury should not escape
from having his fault considered under a strict products liability theory since
a defendant seller or manufacturer is only responsible for the injury caused
by the defect in its product.
37
If a court accepts comparative negligence as a defense in a
strict liability lawsuit and the defendant is liable, then the defen-
dant has the burden of proving the existence and extent of the
plaintiff's negligence. If the defendant establishes this negligence,
the court will reduce the plaintiff's recovery in proportion to his
degree of fault.33 In traditional negligence actions, calculating the
parties' comparative fault requires examining and comparing the
conduct of both parties. Yet in a strict products liability action,
than" the negligence of the defendant or "less than" the negligence of the defendant, de-
pending on the wording of the statute or decision. PROSSER, WADE, & SCHWARTZ, supra, at
612.
333. See infra authorities cited note 336.
334. See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text.
335. Compare V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE §§ 1.1-1.7 (1974) (advocating
application of comparative negligence principles to strict products liability actions) with Le-
vine, Strict Products Liability and Comparative Negligence: The Collision of Fault and
No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337, 346-56 (1977) (arguing that the concept of comparative
fault is inconsistent with the principles of strict liability and should not be applied in strict
liability actions). For a summary of this controversy and its historical development, see Daly
v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 731-43, 575 P.2d 1162, 1165-73, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
382-90 (1978).
336. Nobriga v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 55624 (1st Cir. Hawaii order issued
May 24, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrinG. REP. (ANDREws) 5093, 5099-5101 (June 11,
1982); see Butad v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976);
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); West
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262
N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843
(1978); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Baccel-
leri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351 (1979).
337. Nobriga v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Civ. No. 55-624 (1st Cir. Hawaii order
issued May 24, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LriIO. REP. (ANDREWS) at 5099 (June 11, 1982).
338. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 2 (1979).
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the defendant's conduct is not an issue. s3 9 Thus, in products liabil-
ity litigation, "the plaintiff's fault will be considered against the
defect in the defendants' product to determine to what extent the
injury sustained by the plaintiff was caused by the defendants' de-
fective product.
' '340
Examples of comparative negligence often are identical to ex-
amples of contributory negligence and may include failure to fol-
low safety procedures, failure to use protective equipment, failure
to discover or provide against defects, and failure to use a product
in the proper manner.3 4 1 Thus, the factual considerations that limit
the utility of the contributory negligence defense in asbestos cases
also will limit the applicability of comparative negligence. 4 2 More-
over, while alleviating the harshness of contributory negligence, the
comparative negligence doctrine may exclude other potential de-




D. Effects of Plaintiff's Tobacco Smoking
Asbestos workers who smoke cigarettes greatly increase the
likelihood of their contracting lung cancer. 4 4 A spokesman for one
manufacturer has noted that "but for smoking, lung cancer would
not have been a significant health factor among people occupation-
ally exposed to asbestos. 3 4 5 Using such information, defendants
have sought to bar or to limit plaintiffs' recovery for asbestos-re-
lated diseases when the plaintiff is a cigarette smoker. Although
the tobacco defense has not completely barred recovery by plain-
tiffs, the defense often has precipitated a dramatic reduction in the
339. See supra notes 43 & 167 and accompanying text.
340. Nobriga v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Civ. No. 55-624 (1st Cir. Hawaii order
issued May 24, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) at 5100 (June 11, 1982).
The reasons for permitting a comparative negligence defense in strict liability cases are, or
may be, equally relevant to the reasons for permitting a contributory negligence defense.
For example, a seller is responsible only for injuries caused by a defect in his product. Thus,
if the warning is adequate and the product is not defective, the misuse of the product by the
plaintiff should bar or diminish recovery.
341. See supra note 328.
342. See supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
343. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975);
PROSSER, WADE, & SCHWARTZ, supra note 332, at 614, 622.
344. See supra note 190; see also Selikoff, Seidman, & Hammond, Mortality Effects of
Cigarette Smoking Amongst Amosite Asbestos Factory Workers (Mar. 17, 1980), reprinted
in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 2710-13 (Dec. 12, 1980).
345. Letter from Mr. Curtis G. Linke, senior director of corporate relations for Johns-
Manville Corporation, to Mr. Robert Lubar, managing editor of Fortune Magazine (May 2,
1979), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 491 (June 28, 1979).
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damages awarded.34 s Nonetheless, the courts that have permitted
the tobacco defense to limit recovery have not articulated any legal
rationale for reducing damages, nor have they established any spe-
cific formula for determining the amount of the reduction. Rather,
these courts, in the exercise of discretion, have based the reduced
recovery on notions of fairness and justice."4
Basing this reduction on ad hoc determinations of fairness,
however, may lead to inconsistent decisions. An alternative ap-
proach treats smoking as a widespread form of contributory negli-
gence that, when proven, serves as an affirmative defense to the
plaintiff's recovery. Although cigarette smoking certainly is a con-
tributing factor to lung disease, characterizing smoking as a form
of contributory negligence may be incorrect because smoking may
not be negligent. The tobacco defense better may be analyzed as it
relates to the causal elements of the plaintiff's case. Given that
both asbestos and tobacco smoke may cause or did cause the plain-
tiff's lung disease, the issue is the degree to which each factor is
responsible for the disease. If the court decides that both the
plaintiff's exposure to the defendant's asbestos products and the
plaintiff's cigarette smoking contributed to his disease, the court
should reduce the damages in proportion to the extent that his
smoking caused the ailment. Thus, the courts should consider the
number of years the plaintiff has smoked cigarettes; the extent, du-
ration, and intensity of the plaintiff's exposure to asbestos; the na-
346. See Martin v. Louisville Insulation & Supply Co., Claim No. 80-29600 (Ky. Work-
men's Comp. Bd. Nov. 23, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4791 (Mar.
26, 1982) (ruling that asbestos victim's disability compensation award should be cut by 50%
because he suffered from other respiratory ailments that stemmed from smoking); ASBESTOS
LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4160 (Nov. 25, 1981) (summarizing Hillen v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
C.A. No. 79-73236 (E.D. Mich. order issued Nov. 23, 1981) (jury award reduced by 90%
because plaintiff smoked two packs of nonfiltered Camel cigarettes each day for 30 years;
asbestos exposure was only six years)). Cigarette smoking also is important to the apportion-
ment of market share liability. See supra notes 267-302 and accompanying text.
Because tobacco substantially contributes to the high incidence of lung cancer among
asbestos workers, and because smoking has become so widespread, one manufacturer of as-
bestos has initiated legal proceedings against the American tobacco industry. Standard As-
bestos Mfg. & Insulating Co. v. American Tobacco Co., No. 764 046 (Cal. Super. Ct. cross-
complaint filed Sept. 17, 1980), reprinted in ASBESTOS LMrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 2382 (Sept.
26, 1980); see ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) at 2500, 2523 (Oct. 24, 1980). Although the
asbestos defendant's use of a cross-complaint was a creative effort to limit liability or to
receive indemnification, the cross-complaint against the tobacco industry recently was dis-
missed. Id. at 5974-75 (Dec. 24, 1982). Third party complaints also have been filed against
the government in Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, Massachusetts,
Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Id. at 6033.
347. See supra authorities cited note 346.
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ture and severity of the disease; the costs of requisite health care;
and the amount of the damages awarded. The balancing of these
considerations and the use of remittitur should make the courts'
treatment of the tobacco defense more consistent.
E. Assumption of the Risk
The doctrine of assumption of the risk has four basic ele-
ments: "(1) the plaintiff knows the facts constituting a dangerous
condition; (2) he knows the condition or activity to be dangerous;
(3) he appreciates the nature or extent of the danger; and (4) he
voluntarily exposes himself to the danger. ' 34 8 If these elements are
present, a court may completely deny the plaintiff's recovery.3 49 As
in the case of contributory negligence, the defendant usually has
the burden of pleading and proving each element of assumption of
the risk. 5 Unlike contributory negligence, however, assumption of
the risk is a defense to both actions in negligence and actions in
strict liability. 1
The defendants in asbestos lawsuits have not used the as-
sumption of the risk defense with great frequency despite its value
as a defense to strict liability. The average asbestos worker proba-
bly was entirely unaware of the danger to which he was exposed.
Thus, his assumption of any risk would be neither objectively un-
reasonable nor voluntary. Furthermore, even if the plaintiff knew
or should have known of the dangers to which he was exposed,
courts refuse to accept the assumption of the risk defense if the
plaintiff's only alternative to assuming the risk was to lose his job.
This economic coercion would render the plaintiff's actions invol-
untary and thus negate the assumption of the risk defense. 52 Fi-
nally, the jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negligence
principles hold that assumption of the risk is no longer an absolute
defense, but instead is a factor to be considered in the apportion-
ment of harm.3 53 Altogether, these considerations greatly diminish
the value of this defense in the context of asbestos litigation.
Nonetheless, the defense may remain a useful tool for reducing a
348. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1096. In some jurisdictions,
assumption of the risk is known as violenti non fit injuria, an ancient maxim meaning that
"no wrong is done to one who consents." Id.
349. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1964).
350. Id. § 496G.
351. Id. § 402A comment n; see supra notes 320-29 and accompanying text.
352. See, e.g., Siragusa v. Swedish Hosp., 373 P.2d 767 (Wash. 1962).
353. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41 (1975).
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defendant's liability in a few situations. 54
F. Superseding Cause
A superseding cause is some act or event that so substantially
contributed to the plaintiff's injury that it cuts off the defendant's
tort liability. 55 Regarding asbestos litigation, a superseding cause
relieves the manufacturer from liability "irrespective of whether
his antecedent negligence was or was not a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm. '35  Defendant manufacturers therefore
may argue that a superseding event, rather than a defect in the
manufacturer's product, proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries.
Defendant manufacturers may argue, for example, that the failure
of the plaintiff's employer to provide adequate protective equip-
ment, sufficient warnings, and a safe work environment constituted
a superseding cause. 57 This argument is the basis of the "sophisti-
cated user doctrine. ' 5  Asbestos manufacturers argue that the
plaintiff's employer was a sophisticated user and thus was as aware
of the dangers of asbestos as the defendant manufacturer. They
354. For a discussion of this topic, see Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on
Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 267; Greenhill, Assumption of Risk, 16 BAYLOR L.
REv. 111 (1964); KEETON, Assumption of Product Risk, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965); IKEETON, As-
sumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REv. 108 (1961); Keeton, Assumption of
Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122 (1961); Noel, supra note 316.
355. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "A superseding cause is an act
of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being
liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing
about." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1964).
356. Id. § 440 comment b. Considerations important in determining whether an inter-
vening force is a superseding cause of harm include:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that
which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event
to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the
time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation
created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of
such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's
act or to his failure to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is
wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the
intervening force in motion.
Id. § 442 (1964).
357. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
358. Id. at 1151; see Bradco Oil & Gas Co. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 532 F.2d
501 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977).
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argue that the failure of the plaintiff's employer to warn the plain-
tiff absolves the defendant manufacturer of liability.
3 5 9
The plaintiff may rebut the defendant's superseding cause ar-
gument, however, by showing that the manufacturer could have
foreseen the superseding events ° or that the ensuing harm was the
same as that risked by the manufacturer's conduct. 61 While the
foreseeability notion may not be a formidable barrier to the use of
the superseding cause defense in asbestos cases, plaintiffs may find
more troublesome the requirement that the harm caused by the
superseding event be of a different kind than that risked by the
manufacturer's conduct. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that when the plaintiff's injury is the same as that risked by the
defendant's conduct, an intervening cause relieves the defendant of
liability only if "the harm is intentionally caused by a third party
and is not within the scope of the risk created by the actor's con-
duct. 3 62 Under this provision, the courts in most asbestos cases
may diminish the defense of superseding cause because the harm
inflicted by the manufacturer's conduct and the harm caused by
the negligence of the plaintiff's employer essentially are the same:
a high incidence of asbestosis, mesothelioma, or other lung diseases
arising from workers' exposure to asbestos. Although no court in
an asbestos case similarly has analyzed the superseding cause de-
fense, this defense apparently would be appropriate only if the
plaintiff's employer intentionally failed to follow safety procedures
when these procedures would have obviated any risk in the use of
the asbestos product.3
63
A manufacturer also is not liable for "miscarriages in the com-
munication process that are not attributable to his failure to warn
or the adequacy of the warning."" This form of superseding cause
occurs when the manufacturer alerts an intermediate party of the
product's danger, or when that party independently discovers the
danger, and the intermediate party nevertheless deliberately ex-
359. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. at 1150-51.
360. Id. at 1150-51.
361. Id. at 1151.
362. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B (1964) provides:
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the risk of a particular
harm and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is brought
about through the intervention of another force does not relieve the actor of liability,
except where the harm is intentionally caused by a third person and is not within the
scope of the risk created by the actor's conduct.
363. See id.
364. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1091.
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poses others to the product without providing a warning. Ss6
The superseding cause argument may prove to be an appropri-
ate defense to asbestos negligence and strict liability. At the very
least, proper assertion of the defense should be a question for the
jury.36s The defense has had limited success in asbestos litigation,
but few courts have confronted it. The defense could become an
effective device for apportioning liability among the guilty parties
along the chain of product use. Moreover, because the defense usu-
ally involves the United States Navy as the plaintiff's employer,67
its- use could hasten governmental intervention into asbestos lit-
igation.
G. Government Contract Specifications Defense
Defendant manufacturers argue that their compliance with the
government's contract specifications absolves them of part or all
liability for injuries that their products caused to government em-
ployees. Essentially, they argue that the manufacturer cannot be
liable for injuries caused by its product because it manufactured
and supplied the product as the government specified. This de-
fense is an extension of the general rule that an employer who ex-
ercises extensive control over an independent contractor may be
responsible for the torts of the independent contractor.6 ' The con-
tract specifications argument may be a defense to both negligence
and strict liabilityS 9 and could prove especially useful to those de-
fendants who supplied asbestos to United States Navy shipyards
during the Second World War.$
70
Manufacturers successfully have asserted the government con-
tract specifications defense in contexts other than asbestos litiga-
tion. In the celebrated case of In re "Agent Orange" Product Lia-
365. Id. at 1091-92. A court also may classify cigarette smoking, product misuse, fail-
ure to follow instructions, and employee carelessness as superseding causes when a third
party or an independent force induces them. These actions are usually the result of the
plaintiff's own initiative, however, and courts treat them under the traditional labels of con-
tributory negligence, comparative negligence, or assumption of the risk. See supra notes
313-43 & 348-54 and accompanying text.
366. See, e.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. at 1150.
367. Id.
368. Order Granting Motion for Separate Trials, Tefft v. A.C. & S. Inc., Nos. C80-
924M, C81-179M, & C81-533M (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG.
REP. (ANDREws) 5606 (Sept. 24, 1982); see ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREws) at 5572 (Sept.
24, 1982).
369. ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREws) 6031 (Jan. 14, 1983) (summarizing Brown v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., No. 81-2479 (3d Cir. order issued Dec. 28, 1982)).
370. See infra text accompanying note 373.
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bility Litigation3 7 1 the court held that the manufacturers of Agent
Orange, a widely used Vietnam War-era defoliant that has
debilitating effects upon human life, may escape liability because
they manufactured the product and put it into operation pursuant
to government contract specifications.3 7 2 The court noted that "as
a matter of public policy, a manufacturer who supplies equipment
to the United States [military] in a time of war pursuant to gov-
ernment specifications may not be held liable for any inadequacy
in the plans . . . . ,"7 The court stated that the government speci-
fications defense requires the defendant to prove that: (1) he sup-
plied the injury-causing product to the government pursuant to
contract; (2) the government established specifications for the
product; (3) the product manufactured by the defendant met those
specifications in all material aspects; and (4) the government knew
as much or more than the defendant about the hazards associated
with the use of the product." 4
In jurisdictions that permit its use, courts have accepted the
government specifications argument with increasing frequency in
asbestos litigation. These courts adhere to the requirements es-
tablished in the Agent Orange litigation,3 7  and the defendants
often meet these requirements in the cases concerning the installa-
tion of asbestos insulation in Navy ships during the Second World
War.3 77 In adhering to these requirements, the courts have rejected
arguments that the defense is applicable only to suppliers of war
materials such as Agent Orange378 or that the defense is inapplica-
371. 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 794.
374. Id. at 792-96; see In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. at 1152; ASBESTOS
LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5572 (Sept. 24, 1982) (summarizing Tefft v. A.C. & S. Inc., Nos. C80-
924M, C81-179M, & C81-533M (W.D. Wash. order issued Sept. 15, 1982)).
375. Winter, Asbestos Fight-Feds, Manufacturers Gear Up, 69 A.B.A. J. 33 (1983);
Order Granting Motion for Separate Trial, Tefft v. A.C. & S., Inc. Nos. C80-924M, C81-
179M, & C81-533M (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (AN-
DREWS) 5606 (Sept. 24, 1982); ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS)at 5572 (Sept. 24, 1982) (sum-
marizing Tefft v. A.C. & S. Inc., Nos. C80-924M, C81-179M, & C81-533M (W.D. Wash. or-
der issued Sept. 15, 1982)); ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 6033 (Jan. 14, 1983); id. at 6031
(summarizing Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., No. 81-2479 (3d Cir.)(pending)); ASBESTOS
LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 2098 (July 25, 1980) (discussing Hogard v. Johns-Manville Corp., No.
137 466 (Cal. Super. Ct.)).
376. ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5572 (Sept. 24, 1982) (summarizing Tefft v. A.C.
& S. Inc., Nos. C80-924M, C81-179M, & C81-533M (W.D. Wash. order issued Sept. 15,
1982)).
377. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
378. Order Granting Motion for Separate Trial, Tefft v. A.C. & S. Inc., Nos. C80-
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ble to products not supplied exclusively to the government."7 '
Courts that have recognized the defense have used it to bar com-
pletely380 or diminish the plaintiff's recovery.,3 1
While the current trend is to allow the assertion of the govern-
ment contract specifications defense in asbestos-related lawsuits,
the use of the defense in this context often is problematic. Some
courts have held that compliance with government specifications
does not relieve the defendant manufacturer of the duty to test
and to inspect his product in a strict liability lawsuit."8 ' Other
courts have recognized the defense only in rare cases in which the
government guaranteed to indemnify the defendant or in which
the government coerced the defendant to follow the defective spec-
ifications.3 s In addition, because not all jurisdictions recognize this
defense, the problem of forum shopping may arise. The choice of
forum also may be significant in determining whether the defen-
dant may shift the burden of proof or even liability to the govern-
ment.3 84 The defense necessarily requires the filing of third party
complaints against the government, which could result in confu-
sion, complexity, inefficiency, and the possibility of separate trials
with the government and the manufacturer as litigants."8 5 Finally,
924M, C81-179M, & C81-533M (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrriG.
REP. (ANDREWS) 5606 (Sept. 24, 1982); ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) at 5572 (Sept. 24,
1982) (summarizing Tefft v. A.C. & S. Inc., Nos. C80-924M, C81-179M, & C81-533M (W.D.
Wash. order issued Sept. 15, 1982)).
379. Id. Winter, supra note 375, at 33. Chief Judge Walter McGovern, speaking for
the District Court for the Western District of Washington, ruled that asbestos defendants
may assert the government contracts defense. If every element of the defense is proven, the
defendant would be relieved of all liability. Id.
380. Id.
381. See ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 2098 (July 25, 1980) ("Commenting that the
jury verdict awarding $1.2 million to shipyard insulator Robert J. Hogard was based on
'either passion, prejudice or speculation,' Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Earl F. Riley
lowered the award this week to $250,000.. . . " partly because of Johns-Manville Corpora-
tion's conformity with Navy specifications) (quoting Hogard v. Johns-Manville Corp., No.
137 466 (Cal Super. Ct.)).
382. Nobriga v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Civ. No. 55624 (1st Cir. Hawaii order is-
sued May 24, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5093, 5097 (June 11,
1982).
383. Nobriga v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Civ. No. 55624 (1st Cir. Hawaii order is-
sued May 24, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) at 5097 & n.16; see
Rubin, The Government Contract Defense in Strict Liability Suits for Defective Design, 48
U. Cm. L. REv. 1030 (1981).
384. See, e.g., ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5572 (Sept. 24, 1982) (summarizing
Tefft v. A.C. & S. Inc., Nos. C80-924M, C81-179M, & C81-533M (W. D. Wash. order issued
Sept. 15, 1982)).
385. ASBESTOS LIwrG. RE. (ANDREWS) 6033 (Jan. 14, 1983) (Third party complaints
have been filed against the government in Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Minne-
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the government may claim immunity under the Federal Tort
Claims Act,3 6 and thereby raise the possibility that plaintiffs will
have no recovery when the defendant successfully asserts the gov-
ernment contract defense.
H. Miscellaneous Defenses
In addition to the defensive strategies already enumerated, de-
fendant manufacturers have made other arguments that have had
mixed success. Defendants repeatedly have asserted the statute of
limitations defense, for the statute of limitations is a natural
threshold requirement in every case: if the claim is time-barred,
the defendant automatically prevails. 87 Defendants have argued
that insufficient exposure should be a defense to liability.3 88 Defen-
dants also have suggested that because asbestos is a uniquely use-
ful material, its social utility always should outweigh its risks and
thus always bar recovery. Although defendants often present this
argument as a defense, it is actually a component of strict liability
analysis.38 9
L Summary
Defendant asbestos manufacturers have asserted various de-
fensive strategies in an effort to negate an asbestos victim's claim
of causation and render his cause of action incomplete, or to pre-
clude recovery by affirmative defenses. The defenses have had va-
rying degrees of success depending on the circumstances under
which the defendant asserted them. Contributory negligence, com-
parative negligence, the so-called tobacco defense, and assumption
of the risk are classifiable as affirmative defenses, which the defen-
dant must plead and prove. Of these four defenses, contributory
negligence is the least useful in asbestos litigation because of its
declining popularity with the courts, its harsh effect upon the
plaintiff, and its general inapplicability to strict liability actions.
Comparative negligence may be a more useful means of limiting
sota, Massachusetts, Texas, Virginia and Washington.).
386. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976).
387. For a complete discussion of statutes of limitations and statutes of repose in as-
bestos litigation, see infra part V.
388. See Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 840 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
389. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text. Under strict liability analysis,
courts generally assume that asbestos is a useful product and that its utility often outweighs
the risks it poses. This cost-benefit determination is made initially in deciding whether the
defendant should ever have placed the product on the market.
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the defendant's liability in asbestos litigation because a majority of
jurisdictions have accepted it as a defense and because it has a less
severe effect upon the plaintiff. The tobacco defense is analytically
similar to the other defenses that consider the conduct of the
plaintiff. The tobacco defense already has proven to be a useful
means of diminishing the defendant's liability in cases concerning
a plaintiff who smokes cigarettes. Although this defense needs an
improved definitional framework, it is an equitable device for con-
sidering the plaintiff's own contribution to his health problems. Of
the noted defenses, assumption of the risk may prove to be a most
useful tool for reducing the plaintiff's recovery because this de-
fense generally is applicable to strict liability claims such as those
advanced in the majority of asbestos lawsuits.
Although the defendant usually must raise and prove the su-
perseding cause theory, the sophisticated user doctrine, the gov-
ernment contracts specifications defense, and the state-of-the-art
argument, these defenses relate more closely to the plaintiff's chain
of causation. The state-of-the-art defense will become less promi-
nent as a "defense" in the traditional sense of the word. In most
jurisdictions the plaintiff must prove the state-of-the-art argument
as a part of his case. The superseding cause defense and the so-
phisticated user doctrine may preclude or diminish the liability of
the defendant asbestos manufacturers if an intermediate employer
fails to provide a safe work environment, adequate protective
equipment, or sufficient warnings to apprise employees of the dan-
gers related to asbestos exposure. The government contract specifi-
cations defense may prove to be the most useful defensive argu-
ment available to asbestos manufacturers.
Defendants already have used the government contract de-
fense to diminish the plaintiff's recovery in an asbestos case. The
defense is especially applicable to asbestos manufacturers who sup-
plied asbestos to navy shipyards pursuant to government contracts
during the Second World War because many current asbestos
plaintiffs were shipyard insulators during the war years. The de-
fense also necessarily includes the United States government as a
potential solution to the problems raised by asbestos litigation.
The complexities, problems, and demands posed by asbestos
litigation ensure that defendants will be innovative in modifying
traditional defenses and in creating new ones to preclude or to
limit liability. The potential changes not only may diminish or bar
recovery by the plaintiff but also may alter traditional defensive
strategies in shaping the future of tort law.
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V. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
The limitation of actions issue, one of the most heavily liti-
gated issues in asbestos products liability cases, provides a unique
forum for balancing the interests of plaintiffs and defendants.
Statutory limitations of actions fall into two categories: statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose. In a products liability context,
the cause of action accrues and, consequently, the statute of limi-
tations begins to run at the time of the plaintiff's injury. In the
latent disease context, the time of accrual can vary greatly depend-
ing on when, in the court's view, a legal injury occurred.390 A stat-
ute of repose, 9' on the other hand, begins to run independently of
any personal harm to the plaintiff-normally when the manufac-
turer sells or delivers the product.3 92 Because a court may find that
a legal injury occurred years after delivery of a product, the appli-
cable statute of repose may expire long before the applicable stat-
ute of limitations and thus bar an otherwise valid claim against the
manufacturer."'
This part of the Special Project first considers statutes of limi-
tations. It investigates the various points at which courts place the
time of accrual but primarily focuses on the prevailing standard in
asbestos cases-the discovery rule. This part then examines stat-
utes of repose as a restriction on the discovery rule and discusses
the policy rationale and constitutionality of these statutes as well
as their application to asbestos litigation.
A. Statutes of Limitations
The courts have employed three different theories in deter-
mining when an asbestos-caused injury occurred and thus have
created three possible times of accrual for a given cause of action.
390. The effects of exposure to asbestos dust may not become evident for over 25
years after initial contact. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Pauley v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 528 F.
Supp. 759 (S.D. Va. 1981). Therefore, the court must decide whether the injury occurred at
the time of exposure or at a later time related to the disease's progress. See infra part VIII.
391. Eighteen states now have products liability statutes of repose. See infra note 464.
392. Some statutes have two periods, one running from the date of delivery and an-
other beginning on the date of manufacture. The expiration of either bars the claim. See,
e.g., 7 Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.310(1) (Supp. 1979) ("five (5) years after the date of sale to the
first consumer or more than eight (8) years after the date of manufacture"); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977) ("six years after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption,
or ten years after the date of manufacture").
393. See Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products Lia-
bility Cases, 13 FORUm 279 (1977).
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These theories are: the discovery rule, the time of exposure rule,
and the medical evidence rule.
1. The Discovery Rule
The discovery rule, by far the most pervasive accrual theory in
asbestos cases, states that a "cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knows or through the exercise of due diligence should
have known of the injury. '39 ' The rule is well-established in the
latent disease context as Urie v. Thompson 95 illustrates. In Urie,
one of the earliest cases to apply the discovery rule, a fireman on
defendant's steam locomotive sued under the Federal Employees'
Liability Act396 and the Boiler Inspection Act.39 7 Plaintiff alleged
negligence in the maintenance of a sanding apparatus that created
silica dust from which plaintiff contracted silicosis3 98 Although
plaintiff had been exposed to the dust since approximately 1910,
he did not learn of his disease until 1940. He thus claimed that his
filing suit in 1941 was within the three-year statute of limita-
tions.3 99 Defendant, however, argued that plaintiff must have con-
tracted silicosis long before 1938 and that the three-year statute of
limitations therefore barred the claim. °00 The United States Su-
preme Court upheld plaintiff's position and ruled that Congress
did not intend to charge plaintiffs with knowledge of an "inher-
ently unknowable '40 1 disease and thus provide them with only a
"delusive remedy. '40 2 The Court further stated that barring the
claim was inconsistent with "the traditional purposes of statutes of
limitations, which conventionally require the assertion of claims
within a specified period of time after notice of the invasion of le-
gal rights. 4 0 3 Consequently, the Court held that a statutory injury
occurs "only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious sub-
stance manifest themselves. '01
394. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
395. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
396. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976).
397. Id. § 23.
398. 337 U.S. at 165-66.
399. Id. at 168-69.
400. Id. at 169. Alternatively, defendant asserted that each inhalation was a separate
tort and that plaintiff could recover only for injuries occurring between 1938 and 1940. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 170.
404. Id. (quoting Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 124 Cal.
App. 378, 381, 12 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1932)).
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By making the time of accrual of a cause of action dependent
upon the plaintiff's knowledge of a harmful condition, the Court in
Urie recognized the unique nature of latent disease cases and ad-
ded a notice component to the traditional rule that a cause of ac-
tion accrues at the time of injury.0 5 While this notice component
expands the traditional theory of accrual, logic dictates that a stat-
ute of limitations cannot bar a claim before the plaintiff is aware of
any harm. 06 Moreover, use of the discovery rule balances the in-
terests of the parties. On one side, the plaintiff has the opportunity
to seek a remedy but cannot sleep on his rights. On the other, the
defendant has a measure of protection against stale claims but no
more than a tortfeasor reasonably should expect.
40 7
The discovery rule is readily applicable to asbestos litigation
since both asbestosis and mesothelioma have long latency peri-
ods, 0 8 and consequently, the discovery rule is the prevailing stan-
dard in all but a few jurisdictions.40 9 Application of the rule differs
among the states using it, however, because courts disagree about
what facts constitute discovery. Accrual and discovery might coin-
cide, for example, with one or more elements: knowledge of the
injury, its cause, the identity of the defendant, and the existence of
405. Note, Statutes of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims:
An Exception or the Law?, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 501, 517 (1982). This situation is analogous
to medical malpractice cases in which the physician leaves a foreign object in the body of a
patient and the patient has no way of learning about the negligence until physical symptoms
of the mistake manifest themselves. See, e.g., Hill v. Clarke, 241 S.E.2d 572 (W. Va. 1978).
406. Dean Prosser has asserted that failure to employ some type of discovery rule
would be an "obvious and flagrant injustice." W. PROSSER, supra note 29, § 30, at 144. The
injustice becomes even clearer when one realizes that a plaintiff cannot recover damages
based on future consequences unless the consequences are "reasonably certain." Wilson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Therefore, if an asbestos
plaintiff brings within the traditional statutory period an action based on the possibility of
developing a disease in the future, he would lose because of failure to state a claim for which
relief can be granted.
407. Note, supra note 405, at 517. Another argument for applying the discovery rule in
asbestos cases is that the passage of time in these cases does not cause evidentiary problems.
When circumstances delay accrual of the cause of action, evidence often becomes either lost
or stale. In asbestos cases, however, the evidence of the disease remains in the body and
consequently "improves" over time. Id. at 514.
408. See supra note 390. Asbestosis and mesothelioma, however, are distinct afflictions
that manifest themselves at different times. Therefore, accrual of a cause of action for as-
bestosis does not compel a court to find that a claim for mesothelioma has accrued. See
Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
409. Some states that have adopted the discovery rule, however, do not apply it when
a wrongful death statute of limitations already has run. See, e.g., De Cosse v. Armstrong
Cork Co., 319 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. 1982); Anthony v. Koppers Co., 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 181
(1981). But see In re Johns-Manville Asbestos Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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a legal claim.41 0
Early asbestos cases that applied the discovery rule followed
Urie and held that the plaintiff's cause of action accrues when the
disease manifests itself to the extent that the plaintiff is or should
be aware of both the injury and the causal relationship between
the injury and exposure to asbestos. Karjala v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp.411 exemplifies this approach. Plaintiff, an asbestos
insulation installer, experienced shortness of breath and in 1959
had his chest X-rayed for tuberculosis. Although the X-ray was
negative, plaintiff soon noticed that his hospital record showed
"possible asbestosis. ' ' 412 In 1963 doctors removed a tumor from his
lung, but his difficulty in breathing continued. Finally, in 1966
plaintiff learned that he indeed had asbestosis. He filed suit in
1971. Applying Minnesota law the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury's finding that Karjala had
filed within the six-year statute of limitations; the court held that
accrual occurs "when the disease manifests itself in a way which
supplies some evidence of causal relationship to the manufactured
product. ,,413 Under Karjala, therefore, the reasonably diligent
plaintiff must be aware of both the injury and its cause for the
statute of limitations to begin to run.414
The expanding acceptance of the discovery rule in the late
1970's paralleled an expansion of the discovery rule itself. Under
this liberalized standard, not only must a reasonably diligent plain-
tiff be aware of an injury and its cause for the statute to run, but
also he must be aware of a possible legal claim. In Velasquez v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.41 5 plaintiff insulation worker
knew of his injury and its cause at a time which, if deemed the
time of accrual, would have barred the claim.41 6 The appellate
410. McGovern, supra note 24, at 255.
411. 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975).
412. Id. at 156.
413. Id. at 160-61. The court refused to examine the sufficiency of the evidence and
upheld the jury's finding in spite of the knowledge plaintiff had gained in 1959 and 1963.
414. The leading case in asbestos litigation, Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), employed a similar rule in holding that the "cause of action
does not accrue until the effects of such exposures manifest themselves." Id. at 1102 (cita-
tion omitted).
415. 97 Cal. App. 3d 881, 159 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1979).
416. Plaintiff learned in 1971 that he had "'indications of asbestosis'" based upon
"unequivocal diagnosis." Id. at 883-84, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 115. In March 1973 plaintiff had
another examination, at which time the examining physicians made "positive findings" of
asbestosis. Id., 159 Cal. Rptr. at 115. Finally, a reexamination in November 1973 revealed
further evidence of asbestosis, and the attending physician recommended that plaintiff leave
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court nevertheless reversed the trial court's grant of defendant's
motion for summary judgment and held that the cause of action
accrued when plaintiff knew or should have known "that he was
suffering from a disease that had caused or was likely to cause him
injury for which relief could be sought at law. '417 This language
and the depth of knowledge required by the court manifest a
heightened standard regarding the plaintiff's knowledge of a possi-
ble cause of action.
4 1 8
The trend toward a more liberalized discovery rule for latent
injuries in general and asbestos cases in particular reached a turn-
ing point in United States v. Kubrick.1 9 In Kubrick plaintiff was
unaware of a possible legal action until shortly before he filed his
claim.42 0 The Supreme Court, however, found that the statute of
limitations barred plaintiff's claim because the cause of action ac-
crued when plaintiff discovered the injury and its probable
cause. 421 Significantly, the Court drew a distinct line between
knowledge of the injury and its cause and knowledge of a legal
cause of action:
We are unconvinced that for statute of limitations purposes a plaintiff's igno-
rance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact of his injury or its cause
should receive identical treatment. That he has been injured in fact may be
unknown or unknowable until the injury manifests itself; and the facts about
causation may be in the control of the putative defendant, unavailable to the
plaintiff or at least very difficult to obtain. The prospect is not so bleak for a
his job. Plaintiff filed suit in October 1974. The applicable statute of limitations was one
year. Id., 159 Cal. Rptr. at 115.
417. Id. at 888, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
418. In Exnicious v. United States, 563 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1977), a medical malprac-
tice case, the court found that the cause of action does not accrue "until a claimant has had
a reasonable opportunity to discover all of the essential elements of a possible cause of
action .... "Id. at 420 (footnote omitted) (emphasis by the court). In a claim against a
drug manufacturer for a contraceptive that caused thrombophlebitis, another court distin-
guished between knowledge of a possible causal relationship and knowledge of an actionable
claim, requiring the latter as well as the former. Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d
566, 575 (3d Cir. 1976).
419. 444 U.S. 111 (1979). For a more detailed analysis of this decision, see Comment,
Federal Tort Claims Act-Lack of Reason to Know of Possible Medical Malpractice Claim
Does Not Toll Statute of Limitations-United States v. Kubrick, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV.
1428 (1980).
420. Plaintiff received treatment with an antibiotic that eventually caused hearing
loss. Upon examination in 1969, plaintiff's doctor informed him that it was "highly possible"
that the antibiotic had caused the problem. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 114.
Plaintiff then filed an administrative claim that did not toll the statute of limitations. Id. In
1971 another doctor told plaintiff that the antibiotic had injured him and that it should not
have been administered. Plaintiff brought suit in 1972. Id. at 114. The applicable statute of
limitations was two years. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976).
421. 444 U.S. at 123.
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plaintiff in possession of the critical fact that he has been hurt and who has
inflicted the injury. He is no longer at the mercy of the latter. There are
others who can tell him if he has been wronged, and he need only ask.
4 2
2
Kubrick attempted to restrict the discovery rule and require
only awareness of injury and causation to trigger the statute of
limitations. While this decision was consistent with the traditional
rule espoused in Urie v. Thompson,423 Kubrick marked an impor-
tant development favoring defendants. Since a plaintiff had little
obligation to investigate a possible invasion of his legal right under
the liberalized discovery rule employed in Velasquez,424 he theoret-
ically could keep claims alive indefinitely. According to the stricter
rule articulated in Kubrick, however, a plaintiff had an affirmative
duty to ascertain whether he suffered a legal wrong.4 25 Kubrick,
therefore, put a limit on the statutory period and offered a defen-
dant some measure of repose.
The tightening of the discovery rule carried over to asbestos
litigation as McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.426 illustrates.
In McDaniel plaintiffs, a group of Johns-Manville Corporation em-
ployees, had filed workers' compensation claims during 1975 and
1976 and alleged an occupational disease resulting from asbestos
exposure. In October 1978 they brought suit against defendant as-
bestos suppliers, and defendants moved for summary judgment.27
The district court granted the motion based on a two-step analysis.
First, the court found that the filing of the workers' compensation
claims demonstrated knowledge of both an injury and wrongful
causation.428 Second, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that by exer-
cising due diligence they could not have discovered their cause of
422. Id. at 122.
423. 337 U.S. 163 (1949); see supra notes 393-404 and accompanying text.
424. See supra notes 415-18 and accompanying text.
425. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123 n.10.
426. 542 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
427. Id. at 717-18.
428. Id. at 718. In making this finding the court used a common-sense approach. Ar-
guably, since workers' compensation claims are no-fault proceedings, the filing of a claim
need not indicate awareness of wrongful causation. The court, however, reasoned that even a
layman should realize that serious illnesses resulting from occupation related exposure im-
plied wrongful conduct. Id. This common-sense approach demonstrates that the addition of
"wrongful" to the traditional injury and causation elements makes little difference. Cf.
Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (cause of action
accrues when plaintiff discovers or should have discovered nature and cause of injury; no
mention of wrongful conduct). If an ordinary person develops asbestosis or mesothelioma as
a result of exposure to a manufacturer's products, that person should realize that the pre-
cipitating conduct was wrongful.
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action.429 Therefore, plaintiffs' knowledge of the injury and wrong-
ful causation triggered the running of the statute, and plaintiffs
bore the responsibility of discovering their legal claims.430 The
great majority of asbestos cases decided since Kubrick follow this
interpretation of the discovery rule.3 1
2. The Time of Exposure Rule
Under the time of exposure rule, the statute of limitations be-
gins to run when the plaintiff comes in contact with the harmful
material. In Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp.43 2 the New York
Court of Appeals employed the time of exposure rule to bar a
claim for asbestos-caused injuries. 3 In a memorandum opinion
the majority relied on three cases in which the.court found that a
cause of action accrued at the moment the offending substance in-
vaded the plaintiff's body.434 The court also noted that the New
York Legislature had not extended the discovery rule to this type
of injury and that the matter was more suitable for legislative than
judicial scrutiny.435 The court thus held that the three-year statute
of limitations barred plaintiffs' claims since the last employment-
related exposure to asbestos occurred four years prior to the date
429. Id. at 719.
430. Id. McDaniel also shows that the plaintiff need not be aware of the identity of
the defendant for the cognition of injury and causation to trigger the statute. Discovering
the identity of the defendant is simply another duty of the plaintiff. Id. at 718-19.
431. See, e.g., Pauley v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. W. Va. 1981);
Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981).
432. 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1981).
433. Id. New York is one of the few states that uses the time of exposure rule. Note,
supra note 405, at 505-06. Alabama still has some vestige of the rule even though that state
enacted a discovery rule for asbestos cases in 1980. See ALA. CODE § 6-2-30 (Supp. 1982). In
Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So. 2d 263 (Ala. 1981), the court decided not to
apply the new statute retroactively to revive claims barred before enactment of the new law
on May 19, 1980. Because Alabama has a one-year products liability statute of limitations,
the time of last exposure rule enunciated in Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala.
1979), should apply to any plaintiff whose last exposure was prior to May 19, 1979.
434. Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979) (radium injected for diagnostic purposes caused cancer 20 years later); Schwartz v.
Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (compound
injected into plaintiff's sinuses to make them more perceptible in X-ray examination caused
carcinoma 13 years later), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch
Transp. Corp., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936) (inhalation of dust eventually caused
pneumoconiosis).
435. Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d at 1010-11, 430 N.E.2d at 1299,
446 N.Y.S.2d at 246. The New York Legislature has made a discovery rule exception for




The dissenting opinion criticized the applicaton of the time of
exposure rule and argued that a statute of limitations should not
bar plaintiffs' recovery "before they learned or could have learned
that they had sustained the injuries of which they complain.
4 3 7
The dissent maintained that because asbestos particles have no
immediate effect at the time of exposure, no real injury occurs at
that moment. 8 Moreover, not every person exposed to asbestos
contracts a disease, and the time of development for those who
suffer the malady is unpredictable. The dissent concluded, there-
fore, that on a case-by-case basis the trier of fact and not a judge
applying an inflexible rule439 should decide when the disease comes
into existence.
3. The Medical Evidence Rule
The medical evidence rule, an alternative to the discovery
rule, makes a cause of action's accrual dependent upon the medical
evidence available in each case. Under this rule the statute begins
to run at one of two times: when the injury is diagnosable440 or
when medical evidence fixes the time of injury.4 1 Only two asbes-
tos cases have adopted the medical evidence approach,4 2 the most
recent of which is Neubauer v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.45
In Neubauer plaintiffs appealed a district court decision which
held that the three-year statute of limitations began to run at the
time of last exposure.44 The United States Court of Appeals for
436. Although it held that the statute of limitations barred the claim, the court none-
theless indicated that the statute accrues at the time of the last exposure rather than the
first. Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d at 1010, 430 N.E.2d at 1298, 446
N.Y.S.2d at 245. The exposure, therefore, is in the nature of a continuing tort.
437. Id. at 1011, 430 N.E.2d at 1299, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 246 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
This problem also can arise under the Locke interpretation of the medical evidence rule.
See infra text accompanying note 456.
438. 54 N.Y.2d at 1013, 430 N.E.2d at 1300, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 247. A medical argument,
however, does exist for the proposition that an injury occurs upon exposure. For example, a
histologist, who studies body tissues, would assert that the harm begins to occur when the
asbestos particles reach the lungs, even before impairment. See Note, supra note 405, at
516.
439. 54 N.Y.2d at 1013, 430 N.E.2d at 1300-01, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 247-48.
440. Neubauer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 686 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1982).
441. Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
442. Neubauer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 686 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1982); Locke
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
443. Neubauer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 686 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1982).
444. Neubauer v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 504 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. Wis. 1981),
modified and remanded, 686 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1982).
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the Seventh Circuit, applying Wisconsin law, first noted that a
cause of action could not accrue until plaintiff had a legally prova-
ble claim.445 The court then held that, since asbestosis and
mesothelioma are impossible to diagnose at the time of exposure,
exposure and accrual cannot be simultaneous.4" Next, the court
determined that plaintiff's knowledge of the injury and its cause
was irrelevant under Wisconsin case law and that the court would
not adopt a judge-made discovery rule.447 Finally, following medi-
cal malpractice cases448 decided prior to enactment of a special dis-
covery rule statute,4 the court held that "the limitations period
begins when the injury was diagnosable without regard for any no-
ticeable impairment to the plaintiff.' ' 45 0 The court then remanded
the case for an almost certain disposition against plaintiffs. 51
4. Analysis
Because statutes of limitations function to regulate remedies,
445. 686 F.2d at 573.
446. Id. at 574.
447. Id. at 574-75. In 1979 the Wisconsin Legislature refused to adopt a discovery rule
applicable to all personal injury claims. Id. at 575.
448. See Olson v. St. Croix Valley Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 55 Wis. 2d 628, 201 N.W.2d 63
(1972) (statute began to run when plaintiff received faulty blood transfusion since injury
was provable at that time); McCluskey v. Thranow, 31 Wis. 2d 245, 142 N.W.2d 787 (1966)
(statute began to run when doctor left hemostat in plaintiff's abdomen).
449. Wis. STAT. § 893.55 (Supp. 1982-1983).
450. 686 F.2d at 575. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reached a similar conclusion in Clutter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151 (6th
Cir. 1981) (applying Ohio law), by using a "manifestation" rule. Under this rule the statute
begins to run when the disease manifests itself, meaning that someone "could have discov-
ered the injury had one made an appropriate investigation as to the cause even though the
symptoms were not such that a reasonable person would have investigated the cause." Id. at
1154 (emphasis in original). This rule implies diagnosability although the case does not em-
phasize the medical component.
451. 686 F.2d at 577. Similarly, in Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 959,
275 S.E.2d 900, 905 (1981), the Virginia Supreme Court held that accrual occurs when the
available evidence "pinpoints the precise date of injury with a reasonable degree of medical
certainty." While Locke and Neubauer have virtually identical rationales, the two differ in
one respect: the Locke court emphasized the time at which the injury occurred while the
Neubauer court stressed diagnosability. This variation could be important to plaintiffs since
an injury almost certainly can occur before it can be diagnosed. See Note, Preserving
Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp. Date-of-the-
Injury Accrual Rule, 68 VA. L. REv. 615, 626-27 n.86 (1982). In addition, the Locke court's
emphasis on pinpointing the time at which the harm occurred rather than the time at which
the harm could have been diagnosed presents an analytical deficiency. Like the court in
Neubauer, the Locke court noted that a cause of action cannot accrue until the plaintiff has
a legally provable injury. 221 Va. at 957, 275 S.E.2d at 904. If a court were to hold that a
cause of action accrues when the medical harm occurs, however, accrual often will occur long
before the plaintiff suffers legally provable damage.
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a comparative analysis of the discovery, time of exposure, and
medical evidence rules must focus on each rule's ability to balance
the respective interests of plaintiffs and defendants. The evolution
of the discovery rule not only demonstrates the courts' attempts to
balance the respective interests of plaintiffs and defendants but
also evinces the rule's inherent capability to obtain an equilibrium.
Created to give plaintiffs an opportunity to state a claim that is
"inherently unknowable '45 2 within the ordinary statutory period,
the original rule presumed that a reasonably diligent plaintiff's
right to a remedy outweighs a defendant's interest in absolute re-
pose. Expansion of the rule, however, by tolling the statute until
the plaintiff discovers the legal cause of action, shifted the balance
heavily in favor of plaintiffs. Under this standard, the statute of
limitations would not begin to run until the injured party discovers
his legal rights.453 The Kubrick rule provides an equilibrium: the
defendant receives some measure of protection and the plaintiff
has the opportunity to bring suit provided he exercises reasonable
diligence in investigating a possible invasion of his legal rights.
The time of exposure rule provides a definitive standard to de-
termine when a statute of limitations begins to run. The arbitrari-
ness of the rule, however, outweighs this benefit, and, conse-
quently, use of the rule has evoked criticism. 54 By employing the
rule in asbestos-related latent disease cases, a court decides that
the value of repose is absolute and virtually ignores the plaintiff's
interest in recovering for wrongfully caused injuries. 5 Certainly,
the rule's unfairness to plaintiffs4 56 has provided an impetus for
the judge-made discovery rules in many states457 and should lead
452. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. at 169.
453. This discovery might not occur for years after the plaintiff had knowledge of the
injury and the cause. The argument for this approach rests on the premise that an ordinary
person, with knowledge of only injury and causation, cannot recognize the elements of a
cause of action and thus might not discover a possible invasion of his legal rights within a
reasonable time. See Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864
(1981). A similar argument is that, in technically complex cases, even the most diligent
plaintiff depends totally upon experts in investigating a possible cause of action and should
not be held responsible when he has no reason to suspect actionable conduct. See United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority in Kubrick
rejected this argument and asserted that the determination of negligence often is compli-
cated and that the plaintiff has the duty to seek appropriate advice and then to decide
whether to sue. Id. at 124.
454. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 393, at 283-84.
455. See supra notes 437-39 and accompanying text.
456. Id.
457. See, e.g., Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 IlM. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981);
Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978).
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New York to abandon the time of exposure rule.""
The medical evidence rule represents a compromise between
the discovery rule"'9 and the time of exposure rule.460 In latent dis-
ease cases medical evidence would not show harm or diagnosability
until some time after the last exposure, but it almost always would
establish accrual before the reasonably diligent plaintiff could dis-
cover the injury and wrongful causation. While this compromise
approach initially might appear the most equitable balancing of
the plaintiffs' and the defendants' interests, any theory that allows
for the determination of accrual without consideration of the
plaintiff's knowledge has an inherent flaw. A statute of limitations
should give a reasonably diligent plaintiff an opportunity to bring
an action and offer a defendant a reasonable amount of protection
against stale claims. Therefore, the medical evidence rule is defi-
cient since the statute may run before a reasonable person would
have investigated a possible cause of action. 41 In this situation, the
plaintiff has no control over his legal fate.
A second problem with the medical evidence rule is that its
major attraction is illusory. Theoretically, the rule determines ac-
crual using an objective physiological determination that sets the
point of injury "with a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
4 62
This method should produce a date of injury free of the subjective
uncertainties that exist in discovery rule cases. Scientific evidence,
however, indicates that such an accurate determination is unlikely,
since the rate of deterioration in asbestos-related diseases varies
from person to person.463 Therefore, the medical evidence rule ac-
tually provides little more certainty than does the discovery rule.
In sum, the medical evidence rule represents a compromise view
that is more equitable than traditional time of injury theories, but
its failure to consider the plaintiff's awareness of a cause of action
and its inability to pinpoint the date of injury with certainty make
it less satisfactory than the discovery rule.
458. Even if New York eventually does abandon the rule, it probably will linger in
workers' compensation laws. See, e.g., Stark v. Zimmerman, 638 P.2d 843 (Colo. Ct. App.
1981); Bunker v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 441 N.E.2d 8 (Ind. 1982); Fossum v. State Accident Ins.
Fund, 293 Or. 252, 646 P.2d 1337 (1982).
459. See supra notes 393-425 and accompanying text.
460. See supra notes 444-51 and accompanying text.
461. See Clutter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151, 1154 (6th Cir. 1981).
462. Locke v. Johns-Manville, 221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 905.
463. Note, supra note 451, at 631.
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B. Statutes of Repose
1. Definitions
Since the majority of jurisdictions apply the discovery rule, as-
bestos litigation defendants may attempt to use statutes of repose
to restrict a plaintiff's ability to preserve a cause of action.46 4 A
statute of repose functions as a "cap" on the discovery rule be-
cause it runs independently of any harm to the plaintiff and puts
an absolute limit on the period within which a plaintiff can bring
an action against a manufacturer.465 Therefore, it is practically and
conceptually distinguishable from a statute of limitations. Al-
though a statute of limitations limits a particular remedy, a statute
of repose extinquishes a claim and thus defines a substantive
right.466 Indeed, a statute of repose can bar a cause of action before
it accrues.467
2. Policy Rationale
Manufacturers have asserted governmental, legal, economic,
and societal policy arguments in favor of statutes of repose that
would relieve their liability for products they have marketed for
many years.468 From a governmental standpoint, a statute of re-
pose shifts major products liability compensation decisions from
the courts to the legislatures.46 9 Manufacturers argue that this shift
464. For a survey of the states that have enacted statutes of repose, see Stevenson,
Products Liability and the Virginia Statute of Limitations-A Call for the Legislative Res-
cue Squad, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 323, 333 (1982). See generally McGovern, The Variety,
Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 579
(1981).
465. Most statutes of repose begin to run at the time of delivery of the harmful sub-
stance and circumvent the problem of determining the time of injury. See supra notes 390-
392 and accompanying text. The ending date, or the tolling of the statute, varies from state
to state. In some states the statute stops running on the date of injury with the date of
injury determined by the discovery rule. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5805(9)
(West Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West Supp. 1982). The majority of states,
however, use the filing of the action as the terminal point. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
50(b) (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1)(1979). For further elaboration on this point,
see Martin, A Statute of Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50 FORDHAM L, REV. 745
(1982).
466. McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and Statutes of Repose in
Product Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM 416, 419 (1981).
467. Id. at 418-19.
468. This is the so-called "long-tail" problem. See Martin, supra note 465, at 746-47;
see also Green v. Volkswagen of Am. 485 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1973) (action brought concern-
ing defect in 16-year old Volkswagen van); Wittkamp v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 1075
(E.D. Mich. 1972) (action based on malfunction of 50-year old rifle).
469. McGovern, supra note 464, at 592-93.
(Vol. 36:573
ASBESTOS LITIGATION
is appropriate since the legislature has better access to the data
necessary to make policy decisions on questions of compensation.
Moreover, the courts often fail to use available social science infor-
mation when confronting policy issues.470 Therefore, manufacturers
argue that statutes of repose place the responsibility for making
these policy decisions in the more appropriate branch of govern-
ment. Similarly, defendant manufacturers contend from a legal
perspective that the long time span between manufacture and trial
causes difficulties in defending products liability suits: the admissi-
bility of certain evidence becomes questionable; the availability of
proof diminishes over time; and the determination of damages be-
comes more difficult.4 71 Furthermore, juries tend to judge older
products by current standards.
4 72
From a business point of view, a manufacturer's continuing re-
sponsibility for its products' safety coupled with the manufac-
turer's inability to avoid long-term liability or estimate its costs
has led to increased products liability insurance premiums.473 De-
fendants argue that statutes of repose lead to more reasonable in-
surance rates, especially for capital goods producers.474 Further-
more, older producers have a competitive disadvantage relative to
new producers because older producers must charge consumers
with the costs of liability for products already on the market.
475
Therefore, proponents of statutes of repose argue that a statutory
bar would help businesses compete as well as plan for the future.
In addition to the legal and business arguments, proponents of
statutes of repose assert that the statutes are beneficial to society
as a whole. They contend that the costs of trying cases based on
defective older products substantially exceed the benefits to the
plaintiffs who recover.476 If statutes of repose would eliminate
these "transaction costs," the manufacturers would pass on their
savings to society and would effect a more efficient allocation of
470. See id. at 592.
471. Id. at 589.
472. Id. Manufacturers thus may hesitate to make changes in design that would in-
crease safety, because they fear that plaintiffs would introduce the changes against them at
trial. Id.
473. Estimation of asbestos manufacturers' tort liability is impossible. Therefore, as-
bestos manufacturers face inflated insurance premiums to cover all anticipated claims. Such
increases have been common in the products liability field. See Martin, supra note 465, at
748-49.
474. Id. at 756. Capital goods producers pay the bulk of the claims for injuries caused
long after manufacture.
475. Id. at 747 (footnote omitted).
476. McGovern, supra note 464, at 593-94.
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economic resources. 7 Furthermore, by barring long-term liability,
a statute of repose encourages product safety in the short run.47 8
Plaintiffs' arguments against statutes of repose, however, also
have merit. They argue from a governmental standpoint that al-
though the legislature has greater access to information, much of
that information comes from manufacturers who have a relatively
greater influence upon legislative bodies than do consumers.41 9
Under these circumstances, a court of law probably would treat the
individual plaintiff and the corporate defendant more equally.
Therefore, although the legislature theoretically may be the best
forum, it realistically may not be the most equitable. In a legal
context, application of these statutes present litigation problems
similar to the defendants' problems, including the definition and
proof of defect.480 In addition, opponents of the statutes contend
that they do not significantly reduce insurance rates because insur-
ers set rates on a national scale and are unaffected by the passage
of nonuniform state statutes.481
Moreover, opponents assert that the statutes of repose do not
benefit society as a whole. First, a statute of repose leads to harsh
results by barring claims before the plaintiff ever had an opportu-
nity to file suit. Second, a simple and easily administered statute
would not account for the differences in the longevity of products
or the variations in short- and long-term defects. 4 2 Third, the stat-
utes inevitably contain exceptions that decrease efficiency and re-
sult in arbitrariness. 43 Last, while erasing long-term liability might
encourage short-term product safety,484 statutes of repose may re-
duce long-term safety incentives and thus abrogate a significant as-
pect of products liability law.48 5 Therefore, with arguments and
counter-arguments abounding, the policy questions surrounding
products liability statutes of repose remain hotly contested.
477. Id. at 594.
478. Id. at 599.
479. Id. at 596-97.
480. Id. at 589.
481. Id. at 595.
482. Id. An alternative is to create "useful life" provisions for individual products and
thus add flexibility. See McGovern, supra note 466, at 426. Of course, this solution would
add complexity and inefficiency, two problems that a statute of repose is intended to solve.
483. Typical exceptions would include situations in which the manufacturer has a con-
tinuing duty to correct or warn when the manufacturer fraudulently has concealed the cause
of action. For other examples, see Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products
Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REv. 663, 666-72 (1978).
484. See supra text accompanying note 478.




Because they extinguish substantive rights, statutes of repose
have provoked charges of unconstitutionality. More specifically,
plaintiffs have alleged violations of equal protection, the prohibi-
tion of special legislation, due process, or right to remedy.4 86 To
date, two state supreme courts have ruled on the constitutionality
of a products liability statute of repose, and they have reached
conflicting conclusions.
In Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp.8 7 the Indiana Supreme
Court upheld a statute that barred plaintiff's action for wrongful
death against defendant aircraft manufacturer. Rejecting plaintiff's
due process and right to remedy challenges, the court first noted
that the legislature "has the power to abrogate or modify common
law rights and remedies. '488 The court then stated that no party
has a vested right in any common-law rule and that the right to
bring a common-law action is not fundamental.48 Thus, plaintiff
had no vested right to a remedy and no right to due process pro-
tection.490 Furthermore, the court held that the Indiana Constitu-
tion does not require the legislature to offer an alternative remedy
simply because it took away a common-law right. 91 Combining
this evaluation of the affected interests with a strong presumption
of constitutionality, the court upheld the statute of repose. 92
Conversely, the Florida Supreme Court in Battilla v. Allis
Chalmers Manufacturing Co.498 held that its statute of repose un-
constitutionally violated plaintiff's "right of access" to the courts.
In a per curiam opinion the court relied on Overland Construction
Co. v. Sirmons4' 4 which held that if a statute takes away a remedy
and no alternative remedy exists, then the statute must be
"grounded both on an overpowering public necessity and an ab-
486. For a detailed discussion of the constitutionality of statutes of repose, see id. at
600-20.
487. 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981).





493. 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1981). The "right of access" to the courts protected in many
state constitutions is basically the same as the right to a remedy protected by an "open
court" provision in Indiana. See Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d at 212; McGov-
ern, supra note 464, at 615.
494. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
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sence of any less onerous alternative means . . . .,,e The chal-
lenged statute could not meet this demanding standard. Thus, the
Florida Supreme Court accepted virtually the same argument that
the Indiana Supreme Court rejected. Together, these decisions
make two points: first, the right to a remedy or access to court
challenge is the best method for attacking products liability stat-
utes of repose; and second, the court's relative deference to the leg-
islature probably will determine the outcome of any constitutional
challenge.
4. Application to Asbestos Litigation
Statutes of repose potentially may limit the discovery rule in
the context of asbestos exposure cases. Since asbestosis and
mesothelioma normally do not produce legally provable injuries
until years after exposure,49 a statute of repose could bar many of
the claims against asbestos manufacturers. To date, however, only
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois in O'Connell v. Keene Corp.497 has applied a statute of repose
to an asbestos plaintiff's cause of action.
In O'Connell plaintiff's decedent was exposed to asbestos
products between 1961 and 1969. As a result of this exposure,
plaintiff's decedent developed mesothelioma, which doctors diag-
nosed in January 1980.,"s Plaintiff filed a strict products liability
claim in December 1981. Illinois has a two-year statute of limita-
tions49 9 that begins to run when the plaintiff discovers or should
have discovered the injury, 00 and it has a ten-year statute of re-
pose that applies to any cause of action accruing on or after Janu-
495. Id. at 573.
496. See supra note 407. Existing statutes of repose are between 5 and 12 years in
length. See supra note 464.
497. No. 81 C 7306 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1982) (available Nov. 1, 1982, on LExis, Genfed
library, Dist file). Two reasons exist for the minimal use of.the statute of repose defense in
asbestos cases. First, most of the statutes are recently enacted and apply only to causes of
action accruing after their enactment. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2(g) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1982). Second, the statutes often apply only to certain causes of action. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(b)(2) (Supp. 1981) (applies only to strict liability claims); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 21.2(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (applies only to strict liability claims);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-1 (Burns Supp. 1981) (does not apply to warranty claims). De-
fendants successfully used the defense in Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, 366 So. 2d 1221
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), a drug products liability case.
498. No. 81 C 7306 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1982) (available Nov. 1, 1982, on LExis, Genfed
library, Dist file). The disease proved fatal in October 1980.
499. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
500. Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 IlM. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981).
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ary 1, 1979.501 Plaintiff contended that her claim remained actiona-
ble because she had brought suit within two years of discovery.5 02
The court, however, found that because accrual occurred after Jan-
uary 1, 1979, and because the decedent was an asbestos products
user within the meaning of the statute, the statute of repose rather
than the statute of limitations governed °.50  The court held, there-
fore, that the statute of repose extinguished all strict products lia-
bility claims on December 31, 1979, ten years after the last possible
date of exposure.04
While O'Connell illustrates the potential effect of statute of
repose on asbestos-related claims, the rationale favoring this statu-
tory bar does not necessarily extend to latent injury actions. First,
unlike most products liability claims, some of the essential evi-
dence in asbestos exposure cases does not deteriorate-it im-
proves. 5  Second, a statute of repose for asbestos manufacturers
does not stabilize insurance rates since these manufacturers virtu-
ally cannot obtain insurance. 506 Third, although holding an ordi-
nary manufacturer responsible in perpetuity for a product with a
finite useful sale life seems harsh, asbestos has no useful safe life; it
is dangerous from the beginning and remains dangerous. 07 There-
fore, no inequity results from imposing continuing responsibility.
Fourth, in the context of asbestos litigation, a statute of repose will
501. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
502. The court accepted the time of diagnosis as the time of discovery (January 1980).
No. 81 C 7306 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1982) (available Nov. 1, 1982, on Lzxis, Genfed library, Dist
file).
503. Id.
504. Id. The court offered an abbreviated constitutional analysis. First, it recognized
that a statute which extinguishes a cause of action before discovery is not necessarily uncon-
stitutional. Id. (citing Anderson v. Wagner, 79 IMI. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560 (1979) (special
limitations period for medical malpractice actions against physicians and hospitals)). Sec-
ond, the court followed Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 IM. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522
(1981), which upheld the constitutionality of the state statute of repose against a due pro-
cess challenge because the statue was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose and
because it barred the cause of action before any right vested. Id. at 725-26, 425 N.E.2d at
525. Last, the O'Connell court found that the statute operated uniformly upon all persons in
similar circumstances and thus did not violate equal protection. No. 81 C 7306 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 7, 1982) (available Nov. 1, 1982, on Lyms, Genfed library, Dist file).
505. Indeed, evidence of the plaintiff's injury may not exist at all until after the stat-
ute of repose bars the cause of action. For a discussion of the unfairness of this result, see
supra note 406.
506. See infra part VIII.
507. See supra part III. Moreover, exposure to asbestos products during their ex-
pected useful lives causes injuries that become detectable many years later. See supra part
I.
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not promote a more efficient allocation of resources.5 0 8 The trans-
action costs of trying asbestos cases in which exposure to the prod-
uct occurred long ago does not outweigh the benefits to the recov-
ering plaintiffs since the majority of asbestos plaintiffs can sue
only many years after exposure.509 Therefore, a statute of repose
tends to bar a disproportionate number of asbestos exposure
claims. Last, a statute of repose fails to balance properly the re-
spective interests of plaintiffs and defendants. Indeed, the practi-
cal effect of a statute of repose in asbestos litigation is similar to
that of the time of exposure theory for statutes of limitations. 10
The statute places inordinate value upon repose and thus deprives
a potentially large group of plaintiffs of compensation. 1'
The need for products liability statutes of repose raises strong
policy arguments on both sides. Moreover, the constitutionality of
these statutes is questionable. Even if these statutes were benefi-
cial in most instances, however, they are inappropriate in the con-
text of asbestos litigation. Therefore, the proper resolution of the
statutes of repose issue in asbestos exposure cases is to except as-
bestos-related injuries from the statutory bar and to rely on the
discovery rule to balance the interests at stake. 2 This approach
gives a state the option of employing a statute of repose and at the
same time prevents the imposition of undue harshness on asbestos
exposure plaintiffs.
C. Summary
The limitations of actions issue will continue to be one of the
most heavily litigated aspects of asbestos exposure cases as long as
the discovery rule remains prevalent. The discovery rule, unlike
some other issues in asbestos litigation, depends entirely on factual
determinations made in individual cases and thus allows courts to
make essentially ad hoc decisions. In most instances counsel's abil-
ity to prove the plaintiff's knowledge or lack of knowledge will de-
termine the outcome. Although courts may make more consistent
decisions by applying statutes of repose, the better position ex-
cepts asbestos exposure actions from this statutory bar.51 While
508. See supra notes 483-84 and accompanying text.
509. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
(over 25 years elapsed between the time of exposure and trial).
510. See supra notes 444-51 & 460-63 and accompanying text.
511. See supra text accompanying notes 459-61.
512. Tennessee has adopted this approach. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(b) (1980).
513. See supra notes 505-12 and accompanying text.
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this approach fosters case-by-case and, therefore, inconsistent
court decisions, it is the most equitable because it equalizes the
positions of plaintiffs and defendants.
VI. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Collateral estoppe1514 promotes judicial efficiency by preclud-
ing the unnecessary relitigation of issues that prior proceedings
have determined.51 5 Thus, the invocation of collateral estoppel may
alleviate the duplication of arguments and presentation of evi-
dence at trial. By accepting the validity and sufficiency of a prior
determination of an issue, collateral estoppel seeks to bring the lit-
igation of that issue to a reasonably prompt, final conclusion.516
514. Collateral estoppel, like the doctrines of merger and bar, is a type of res judicata.
"Issue preclusion" is another term for collateral estoppel; "claim preclusion" is another label
for merger and bar. F. JAMms & G. HAzARD, CIVL PROCEDURE 532 (2d ed. 1977). Claim pre-
clusion affects actions in which the claim presented was or should have been the subject of a
former action. Note, Use of Juror Depositions to Bar Callateral Estoppel: A Necessary
Safeguard or Dangerous Precedent?, 34 VmD. L. REv. 143, 144 (1981); cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 45 (1982) (the term "res judicata" referred only to claim preclu-
sion while "collateral estoppel" denoted issue preclusion). "On the other hand, when the
second case involves a different cause of action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel operates
to preclude deliberation as to any issue upon which a judge or jury actually based a finding
or verdict in the first action." Note, supra, at 144. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments
has adopted the terms "claim preclusion" and "issue preclusion." It defines issue preclusion
as follows: "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is
conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). Sections 28 and 29 discuss excep-
tions to the general rule of issue preclusion and the nonmutual use of issue preclusion. Id.
§§ 28-29. For the United States Supreme Court's formulation of the rule see Montana v.
United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1877).
515. Colateral estoppel also protects the same litigants from having to relitigate the
same issues, and it protects the public from excessive litigation. 1B J. MOORS, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTiCE 1 0.412[1], at 1809 (2d ed. 1948); Note, supra note 514, at 146 n.15; cf.,
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (offensive collateral estoppel has
"dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with
the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless
litigation").
The rule of collateral estoppel applies to issues of fact and, with some qualifications, to
issues of law also. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 627 comment c (1982); see, e.g.,
Buckeye Industries, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 587 F.2d 231, reh. denied, 591 F.2d 1343 (5th
Cir. 1979). Collateral estoppel should not prevent the relitigation of an issue of law when:
(1) it would place the party asserting collateral estoppel in a favored position in the general
administration of the law; (2) the first determination of the issue was not taken through the
appellate process; and (3) the body of law to which the issue belongs has changed signifi-
cantly since the issue's first determinations. For a more thorough discussion on this matter,
see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, at 571; 1B J. MooRs, supra, 1 0.442, at 3851.
516. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Il. Found., 402 U.S. 313
(1971), the Supreme Court noted that collateral estoppel does not serve merely to relieve
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Because of these objectives and the mechanisms designed to
achieve them, the use of collateral estoppel theoretically is a natu-
ral way to streamline the monstrous docket of asbestos product
cases encompassing numerous similar issues.517 The actual applica-
tion of collateral estoppel to these cases, however, has been diffi-
cult, and the courts have been dubious of extending it. Both doc-
trinal and practical considerations contribute to the courts'
reluctance and inability to apply ,collateral estoppel more fre-
quently in asbestos product cases. The courts' attitudes suggest
that collateral estoppel is not a timesaving panacea in mass tort
asbestos product litigation.5 18 This part of the Special Project dis-
cusses the doctrine of collateral estoppel and its varied application
in asbestos products cases.
A. Elements of Collateral Estoppel
The party seeking the benefits of collateral estoppel must
show the following: (1) the issue in contention is identical to an
issue litigated to a final judgment in a prior action;5 19 (2) a court of
competent jurisdiction actually determined the issue in the prior
crowded dockets: "The broader question is whether it is any longer tenable to afford a liti-
gant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue." Id. at
328; see generally F. JAMES.& F. HAZARD, supra note 514, at 529-32 (discussing policy con-
siderations underlying res judicata).
517. Other articles discussing the use of collateral estoppel in asbestos product litiga-
tion include: Baldwin, Asbestos Litigation and Collateral Estoppel, 17 FORUM 772 (1982);
Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 75, at 31; Mehaffy, supra note 2; Wheeler & Allee, Collat-
eral Estoppel in Products Liability Cases, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 15; Comment, supra
note 24, at 1330-41.
518. Some mass tort litigation situations are more amenable to the economizing effects
of collateral estoppel. For example, in tort actions arising from a single airplane crash the
issues raised by the many claimants often are similar because the injuries resulted from one
event, the crash. Thus, a court can establish an identity of issues and identify inconsisten-
cies in prior judgments more easily. In asbestos product litigation, however, the claimants'
injuries often are not attributable to any one event or product. Because an idbntity of issues
is more difficult to establish, considerations of fairness limit the courts' use of collateral
estoppel. See infra notes 606-16 & 656-700 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
requirement of identity of issues and considerations of fairness in collateral estoppel. In
Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1977), however, the court stated
that "[tihe doctrine of collateral estoppel should not. . .be used as a club to attain [the]
goal [of preventing repetitive litigation] but as a fine instrument that protects 'the litigant's
right to a hearing [and protects] his adversary and the courts from repetitive litigation.'"
Id. at 551 (quoting Exhibitors Post Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 421 F.2d
1313, 1316 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971)); cf. Currie, Mutuality of Col-
lateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957) (discussing
the multiple claimant anomaly created by nomnutual collateral estoppel).




action; 520 (3) the determination of that issue was necessary to the
result in the prior action;52' and (4) the target party against whom
the proponent asserts collateral estoppel was either a party or a
privy of a party that litigated the issue in the prior action.22 Al-
though some states still require mutuality between the par-
ties-both the proponent and the target party must have been par-
ties to the previous litigation of the issue 52!--most state and
federal courts permit the offensive524 and defensive5 2 5 use of collat-
eral estoppel on a case-by-case basis. 526
A target party may avoid the effects of collateral estoppel by
demonstrating that its application in a particular case would cause
an unfair result.52 7 The United States Supreme Court acknowl-
edged this "fairness" element in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation5 28 and Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore.52 9 In Blonder-Tongue the Court abolished the mutu-
ality requirement for the defensive use of collateral estoppel. as In
520. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 453 (D.D.C. 1978); infra
notes 617-48 and accompanying text.
521. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. at 453; infra notes 649-55
and accompanying text.
522. See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); infra notes 555-86 and accom-
panying text.
523. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); infra notes
535-54 and accompanying text.
524. Offensive collateral estoppel permits a plaintiff to preclude a defendant who lost
in a prior proceeding from relitigating an issue previously determined against him. Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979).
525. Defensive collateral estoppel enables a defendant to bar the plaintiff from reliti-
gating an issue determined against him in a prior action. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).,
526. F. JAmEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, at 580-82; Note, supra note 514, at 150.
For a more detailed review of the mutuality rule, see Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutuality,
Not to Praise It: An Analysis of Collateral Estoppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
31 HAMSNGs L.J. 755 (1980); Currie, supra note 518; Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doc-
trine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1 (1969); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Vari-
ables: Parties, 50 IowA L. REV. 27 (1964); Note, A Probabilistic Analysis of the Doctrine of
Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 76 MxCH. L. REv. 612 (1978); Note, Collateral Estoppel
Without Mutuality: Accepting the Bernhard Doctrine, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1423 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Collateral Estoppel Without Mutuality].
527. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979). Although the target
party has the burden of showing that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue, the court may reject this party's argument but still refuse to apply collateral es-
toppel. This scenario may occur because the court has broad discretionary power when ap-
plying collateral estoppel. See infra notes 656-700 and accompanying text.
528. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
529. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
530. Blonder-Tongue concerned a patent infringement claim. Plaintiff sought enforce-
ment of a patent that a court had declared invalid in a prior action against another party.
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Parklane the Court permitted the offensive use of collateral estop-
pel without mutuality. 31 Thus, the Court abolished the mutuality
requirement of federal common-law collateral estoppel and de-
clared that the touchstone for its use is whether the target party
had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue in the former
action. 2  In a broad sense, Parklane describes the constraints that
the Constitution and notions of fairness place on the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. Privity and the identity of issues actually and
necessarily determined are requirements designed to keep collat-
eral estoppel in compliance with the fairness guideline. In a nar-
rower sense, "full and fair opportunity to litigate" denotes a group
of elements, in addition to privity and the identity of issues, that
must exist for a court to apply collateral estoppel. This group in-
cludes consideration of whether the target party had an adequate
opportunity to call and to cross-examine witnesses in the prior ac-
tion. These considerations, like those of identity and privity, are
subsets of the standard and are necessary to sustain it.5 3s
The final component of a collateral estoppel analysis is the
likelihood that its use will economize judicial resources, or alterna-
tively, that use of the doctrine will not effect a more confusing and
cumbersome procedure. Evaluation of the appropriateness of col-
lateral estoppel requires consideration of judicial economy regard-
less of whether the parties raise the question.5 3 4 The following sec-
tions review asbestos product cases that apply or reject the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. Each section focuses on the courts'
Defendant in Blonder-Tongue argued that the prior judgment should preclude relitigation
of the issue and the Supreme Court agreed. Acknowledging the strain that such relitigation
places on judicial resources, the Court endorsed the use of nonmutual defensive collateral
estoppel when the target party had a "full and fair opportunity" to pursue his claim in the
prior action. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313
(1971).
531. In Parklane, a stockholder's derivative suit, the stockholder asserted a nonmutual
offensive use of collateral estoppel on the ground that a prior SEC suit already had resolved
the issue against the defendant corporation. The Court permitted the use of collateral estop-
pel but cautioned that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel poses problems that non-
mutual defensive collateral estoppel does not. In particular, the Court noted the problems of
encouraging a "wait and see" attitude among potential plaintiffs, inconsistent verdicts, and
the possibility of different procedural opportunities in the two actions. In granting trial
courts broad discretion to determine when to apply collateral estoppel, the Court empha-
sized the consideration of fairness to the target party. Parkland Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322 (1979).
532. Id. at 332.
533. For further discussion of this consideration, see infra notes 756-700 and accompa-
nying text.
534. See infra notes 702-03 and accompanying text.
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analyses of the particular requirements of collateral estoppel: the
identity of issues, the actual and necessary determination of the
issues, fairness, and judicial economy.
B. Identity of Parties
1. Rule of Mutuality
The rule of mutuality originally restricted the application of
collateral estoppel5 5 by requiring that "in order [for a party] to
take advantage of a judgment [he] must have been so related to
the case that he would have been bound by it if the judgment had
gone the other way. '53 6 Thus, only parties to the prior litigation or
their privies could use collateral estoppel.37 In 1942, however, the
California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank of America Na-
tional Trust and Savings Association38 stated that "[n]o satisfac-
tory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mu-
tuality. 535 The Bernhard court sustained the defensive use of
collateral estoppel by discarding the rule of mutuality.54 0 The court
replaced the rule of mutuality with a rule of privity, under which
collateral estoppel may be asserted only against "a party or [one]
in privity with a party to the prior adjudication.
5 41
A majority of state courts substituted the Bernhard rule for
their state rule of collateral estoppel.5 42 The United States Su-
preme Court effectively eliminated the mutuality requirement of
collateral estoppel with its decisions in Blonder-Tongue Laborato-
535. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
536. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 244 (2d ed. 1979).
537. Privity constitutes a relationship between two persons that justifies making a pre-
vious judgment conclusive upon one of them because the other was a party to the original
action. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, at 576. Privity connotes something more
than a similar interest in the subject matter litigated in an action. See Berch, A Proposal to
Permit Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties Seeking Affirmative Relief, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
511, 512-17. For further discussion of privity and collateral estoppel, see Note, Collateral
Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1485 (1974); infra notes 555-604 and accompany-
ing text.
538. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
539. Id. at 812, 122 P.2d at 895.
540. See supra note 525.
541. 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
542. E.g., Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution Control Bd., 78 Il1.2d 1,
398 N.E.2d 9 (1979); Pat Peruse Realty Co. v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 238 A.2d 100 (1968); Israel
v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956). For a complete list
of the states applying the Bernhard rule, see Note, Collateral Estoppel Without Mutuality,
supra note 526, at 1423-24 n.8. For discussions of the evolution of exceptions to the mutual-
ity rule, see Note, supra note 514, at 147; M. GREEN, supra note 536, at 246-53.
1983]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:573
ries, Inc. v. University of Illinois FoundationU3 and Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore.5 4 The "full and fair opportunity" language of
those cases embraces a requirement of actual identity of the par-
ties or privity comparable to that of the Bernhard rule. 5  Some
states, however, still require mutuality as an element of the rule of
collateral estoppel. 46
Because some jurisdictions require mutuality while others
have abandoned it, plaintiffs hoping to benefit from collateral es-
toppel can seek the most beneficial litigating forum. In asbestos
products cases, plaintiffs rarely meet the mutuality requirement
but often assert collateral estoppel offensively against the manu-
facturer-defendant. The plaintiff, therefore, probably will select a
forum state whose rule of collateral estoppel automatically will not
foreclose the offensive use of collateral estoppel by requiring mutu-
ality. 54 7 When an asbestos case meets federal diversity jurisdiction
requirements, a plaintiff lacking mutuality and desiring to litigate
his claim in a state requiring mutuality may attempt to circumvent
the rule by filing his claim in federal court. Electing the federal
543. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
544. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
545. See supra notes 538-41 and accompanying text; infra notes 555-603 and accom-
panying text.
546. F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, at 580. For a survey of the states that still
require mutuality as an element of collateral estoppel, see Note, Collateral Estoppel With-
out Mutuality, supra note 526, at 1424 n.9. In Recommendation of Magistrate, Van Harville
v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., Civ. Action No. 78-642-H (S.D. Ala. filed Dec. 11, 1980),
reprinted in AsBEsTos LITIG. REP. (ANDRws) 2737 (Dec. 26, 1980), an asbestos product
case, the court noted that Alabama still requires mutuality as an element of its rule of col-
lateral estoppel. The Arizona Court of Appeals in Spettigue v. Mahoney, 8 Ariz. App. 281,
445 P.2d 557 (1968), concluded that the differences between trials can detract from the
truth seeking goals of the court, and it thus required mutuality as an essential guarantor of
fairness to the parties. Id. at 288, 445 P.2d at 564.
547. Generally, as long as a court has jurisdiction its judgment will be given effect by
courts of other jurisdictions. Thus, a state court can observe the judgment of a federal court
as the basis of a collateral estoppel, and a federal court likewise can accept the judgment of
a state court. See, e.g., Vernitron Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1971). In some
instances, however, a court that does not require mutuality for the application of collateral
estoppel must determine whether it appropriately can base a nonmutual use of collateral
estoppel on a judgment of a court that recognizes the mutuality requirement in collateral
estoppel. One commentator has suggested that despite the obviously different policy con-
cerns of the court's practices, the judgment is a sufficient basis for collateral estoppel if all
other requisites are present because the target party had the opportunity to litigate the
issue. Scoles, Interstate Preclusion by Prior Litigation, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 5 (1979). A court,
in determining whether to apply collateral estoppel, at least should consider whether the
mutuality requirement in the forum of the prior proceeding affected the target party's abil-
ity to foresee the collateral estoppel effect which that judgment would receive in other fo-
rums. The foreseeability strand of the fairness test seems to require at least that inquiry.
See infra notes 670-84 and accompanying text.
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forum, however, does not guarantee the availability of the more
liberal federal rule of collateral estoppel. The federal courts disa-
gree whether they must apply the state or federal rule of collateral
estoppel to diversity cases. Federal district courts in Penn-
sylvania 54 8  and Mississippi,5 49  relying on Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,5 5 0 have ruled in asbestos products cases that because
state collateral estoppel rules requiring mutuality are substantive,
federal courts must follow state law in diversity actions. Con-
versely, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
requires the application of the federal rule of collateral estoppel,
which does not require mutuality in federal diversity cases . 5 1 Ac-
cordingly, federal district courts in Texas apply the federal rule of
collateral estoppel even though the Texas rule of collateral estop-
pel requires mutuality.5 52 Of course, for federal district courts sit-
548. Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
549. McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Miss. 1980). The
McCarty court cited Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), in which the Supreme Court
held that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), requires federal courts sitting in diver-
sity actions to apply the law of the forum state to determine the availability of defenses to
the application of collateral estoppel. 502 F. Supp. at 338. The McCarty court was uneasy
about its position on this issue and noted that even if federal law controls the application of
collateral estoppel, several other reasons made offensive collateral estoppel inappropriate in
that case. Id. at 339.
550. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
551. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982). In
Hardy the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cited its decision in Johnson
v. United States, 576 F.2d 606 (1978), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981), as authority for its
rule that in federal tort claims federal res judicata principles apply in order to preserve the
integrity of federal court judgments. The court reasoned that the same rationale also applies
to diversity cases. Accord, Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 716-17 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975); see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 (1982).
The court acknowledged that all federal circuits do not follow this rule, but added that it is
nevertheless the better reasoned position because the principle of finality demands that
"federal law determine the effects under rules of res judicata of a judgment of federal
court." 681 F.2d at 337-38 & n.2 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 com-
ment b (1982)).
552. E.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1982);
Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982); Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242
(E.D. Tex. 1980).
The Fifth Circuit and, particularly, the federal district courts in the Eastern District of
Texas have been at the center of asbestos product litigation and the use of collateral estop-
pel in asbestos cases. Federal district courts in Texas have relied on Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), as the
basis for collateral estoppel in numerous cases. Judges Fisher and Parker of the Eastern
District of Texas have been two of the more creative judges in using collateral estoppel in
asbestos litigation. See infra notes 564, 567, 580, 595, 614, & 708 and accompanying text for
discussions of the asbestos cases over which Judges Parker and Fisher have presided.
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ting in states that have abandoned the mutuality requirement the
issue is academic.
5
Forum shopping is one result of the federal courts' discrepant
practices regarding the rule of mutuality. Plaintiffs in asbestos
products cases who cannot meet the mutuality requirement will
seek the courts that are willing to apply collateral estoppel without
requiring mutuality. Paradoxically, these courts may find that al-
though they wish to conserve judicial resources, plaintiffs anxious
to benefit from collateral estoppel will crowd their dockets.'" A
uniform federal policy defining the rule of collateral estoppel as
procedural under the Erie doctrine and allowing all federal courts
to use nonmutual collateral estoppel may distribute more equita-
bly the number of asbestos products cases in the federal judicial
system.
2. Requirement of Privity Between Parties
Even in forums not requiring mutuality, courts may apply col-
lateral estoppel only against parties or privies of parties that had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims in the prior ac-
tion.55 The requirement of privity provides the rule of collateral
estoppel with an element of fairness grounded in the due process
considerations of the Constitution55 and the notion that each
party should have his day in court.55 7 For collateral estoppel pur-
poses the concept of privity denotes a relationship between a party
to a prior proceeding (the privy) and the target party in the pre-
sent proceeding. Privity expresses the idea that the relationship
between these parties is sufficiently close to justify a court's pre-
cluding the target party from relitigating an issue previously deter-
553. In Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1982), the
court commented on the appropriate rule of mutuality in a footnote to its decision. Id. at
542-43 n.3. The court concluded that the disagreement among federal courts whether to
apply the state or the federal rule of collateral estoppel was inconsequential in that case
because Minnesota's rule of collateral estoppel was identical to the federal rule.
554. Undoubtedly, the tremendous number of asbestos products cases filed in the fed-
eral courts of the Eastern District of Texas is due in part to the district's reputation for
granting plaintiffs' motions to apply collateral estoppel. By 1980 over 3000 asbestos prod-
ucts cases were on the dockets of the Eastern District of Texas. Wheeler & Allee, supra note
517, at 17.
555. See, e.g., Parkland Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Amader v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 431 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65,
265 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
556. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
557. M. GREEN, supra note 536, at 244; see, e.g., Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 32 Cal. 2d 13,
18, 193 P.2d 728, 732 (1948).
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mined against his privy. Substantial representation of the target
party's interest in the prior action is a principle determinant of
privity.
5 5 8
The similarity of many issues commonly litigated in asbestos
products cases invites attempts by plaintiffs to construct privity
relationships among defendant-manufacturers. Generally, the
courts in asbestos products cases neither have retreated from the
traditional requirements of privity nor have recognized these rela-
tionships as sufficient to find privity, notwithstanding plausible ar-
guments that the target party's interests had adequate representa-
tion in prior litigation.
The Fifth Circuit in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
55 9
labelled the district court's failure to distinguish between parties
that were and were not participants in the prior action5 60 an "in-
surmountable problem with the. . . application of collateral estop-
pel.' 61 In Hardy Judge Parker of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas issued a pretrial order giving
preclusive effect to determinations previously made in Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.562 Although most of the Hardy
defendants were not parties to Borel, Judge Parker's order es-
topped all defendants from litigating the issues of whether asbes-
tos can cause asbestosis or mesothelioma and whether asbestos
products are unreasonably dangerous. Judge Parker advanced two
bases for extending an estoppel against all defendants including
those who never had litigated the issues in question s.5 6 First, Judge
Parker reasoned that the extension was appropriate because all de-
558. The courts have failed to explain precisely the meaning of "substantial represen-
tation" of another party's interest. Certain well-recognized legal relationships, such as in-
demnitor-indemnitee, and some other contractual agreements usually evidence substantial
representation. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, at 589-95. The courts, however, may
consider less formal relationships sufficient; the focus of their determination is whether the
other party fairly has represented the interests of the nonparty to the prior litigation. Id. at
584. For a discussion of the concept of privity, see M. GREEN, supra note 536, at 241-44; F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, at 575-76; Berch, supra note 537, at 512-17.
559. 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
560. Plaintiff in Hardy sought an estoppel of several issues that he believed Borel
previously had determined. Id. at 336.
561. Id. at 338.
562. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). See supra part
II.
563. In Hardy Judge Parker entered an omnibus pretrial order based on nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel that was effectively a summary judgment for plaintiffs. The
order precluded litigation on the following issues: (1) whether asbestos causes either asbes-
tosis or mesothelioma; (2) defendants' knowledge of asbestos' harmful effects as it may re-
late to a duty to warn; and (3) the state-of-the-art defense. Id. at 336 n.1.
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fendant-manufacturers "shared an identity of interests" sufficient
to constitute privity.6 4 Second, Judge Parker relied on the doc-
trine of "virtual representation" to find privity among the
parties.
565
The Fifth Circuit rejected the "identity of interests" reasoning
because it stretched "the idea of privity beyond meaningful lim-
its. ''566 The court acknowledged the district court's creative union
of collateral estoppel and the theory of enterprise liability,56 7 which
courts have applied in mass tort litigation cases and recently in
asbestos-related litigation.5 68 In rejecting the identity of interests
rationale, the Fifth Circuit relied on its decision in Southwest Air-
lines Co. v. Texas International Airlines,5 9 in which the court
listed acceptable privies for purposes of collateral estoppel. These
included: (1) nonparty persons who succeeded to the party's inter-
est in property; (2) nonparty persons who controlled the original
suit; and (3) nonparty persons whose interests had adequate repre-
sentation in the original suit.57 ° Although the court failed to ex-
plain why the third type of privity did not pertain to the instant
case, it did explain that the court had an interest in keeping non-
party exceptions strictly confined. The Fifth Circuit stated that
privity does not exist merely because all the defendants manufac-
564. Judge Fisher, Judge Parker's colleague in the Eastern District of Texas, previ-
ously rejected this same "identity of interest" theory of privity in Mooney v. Fibreboard
Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex. 1980). Judge Fisher held that the theory would violate
the full and fair opportunity standard that governs the use of collateral estoppel. The in-
creased number of asbestos products cases in the district since Judge Fisher's decision
might have prompted Judge Parker to accept the identity of interest theory. Judge Fisher
based his identity of interest theory on the concert of action theory. Id. at 249. "The [con-
cert of action theory] relies on the fact that market entities for economic reasons often
cooperate in their exploitation of the market. Where this cooperation can be shown, the
doctrine allows the jury to regard the market entities as a single person." Concert of Action
Theory: Polluters Beware, 68 A.B.A. J. 1209, 1209 (1982) (quoting Broder, N.Y.L.J., July 9,
1982). Although Judge Parker's efforts appear to deviate dramatically from traditional no-
tions of privity in the application of collateral estoppel, the concert of action theory is
analagous to the modern tort theory of enterprise liability. See supra part III.
565. See infra note 576.
566. 681 F.2d 339 (1982); cf., Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363
(Tex. 1971) (a mere interest in the same question or in proving the same set of facts by
parties does not prove privity between those parties).
567. Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The enterprise
liability theory of collateral estoppel set forth by Parker in Hardy may appear at first glance
to be revolutionary.").
568. See Fischer, supra note 180; supra part III.
569. 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1977).
570. Id. at 95; cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 30, 31, 34, 39-41 (1982)
(describing the privity requirements of collateral estoppel).
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tured products containing asbestos.57 1 Noting that the defenses in
Borel were not linked and that some of the defendants in Hardy
were not aware of the Borel litigation when it occurred, the court
determined that privity relationships did not exist between the Bo-
ret and non-BoreI defendants in Hardy.7
Although the Fifth Circuit appeared to require that privity ex-
ist for all the issues litigated in Borel as a prerequisite for the use
of collateral estoppel, a more traditional application of the doctrine
requires that privity exist only for the particular issue being es-
topped. By following the traditional approach, the Fifth Circuit
would have determined whether the relationships among the Borel
and non-Borel defendants were sufficient to evince privity with re-
spect to the causation issue independent of the privity question on
the unreasonably dangerous issue. The Fifth Circuit's analysis ig-
nored the defendant manufacturers' shared interests in specific as-
bestos product litigation issues. For example, the issue of whether
asbestos dust is a competent producing cause of mesothelioma is
common to virtually every asbestos product case. The Fifth Cir-
cuit, using a blanket approach to privity, reversed Judge Parker's
application of collateral estoppel to this causation issue against the
non-Borel defendants because privity was absent.57 3 Had the
Hardy court addressed each issue individually, it might have found
that the Borel defendants' 574 litigation of the causation issue suffi-
ciently represented the non-Borel defendants to support a finding
571. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d at 339.
572. Id. at 339-40. The Fifth Circuit in Hardy also extended the protection of its deci-
sion to named parties in Borel who settled with plaintiff before trial. The court, however,
intimated that the rule of privity would not shield parties that settled before a known final
judgment was entered against them in a trial in which they participated, because their set-
tling suggests that they purposefully tried to avoid the use of that determination as the
basis for an estoppel in subsequent cases. Such a case would not violate due process consid-
erations of fairness because the party had its day in court.
The absence of an evidentiary hearing or a requirement that the proponent prove some
link between the Borel and the non-Borel defendants before the trial court makes its deter-
mination also troubled the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 339.
573. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d at 338-41.
574. Seven of the defendants in Hardy were parties to the Borel litigation: Pittsburgh
Corning, Armstrong Cork Co., Phillip Carey, Ruberoid Co., Johns-Manville Corp.,
Fibreboard Corp., and Combustion Engineering. Four of the Hardy defendants were named
in Borel but settled before trial: Owens-Corning Fiberglass, Standard Asbestos Mfg. & Insu-
lating, Unarco, and Eagle-Picher Industries. The other Hardy defendants-Forty-eight In-
sulations Inc., Garlock, Crown Cork & Seale Co., Moodette Corp., GREFCO Inc., Keene
Corp., Owens-Illinois, Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., Nicolet, GAF Corp., and Celotex-were
not defendants in Borel. See id. at 339 n.4.
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of privity on that issue. 575 An issue-by-issue privity analysis also
might have produced a more refined articulation of the adequate
representation test established in Southwest Airlines. The Fifth
Circuit also rejected Judge Parker's reliance on the doctrine of
"virtual representation '578 as a basis for finding privity in Hardy.
The court stated that virtual representation requires an express or
implied legal relationship of accountability between parties.
57 7
Plaintiffs in Hardy showed no such relationship among defendants
that were parties to Borel and those that were not.
The Eastern District of Texas has employed two other theo-
ries-stare decisis 57 8 and judicial notice 57 9 -to preclude defendant
manufacturers from litigating particular issues in asbestos prod-
ucts cases. The Fifth Circuit, however, rebuffed those efforts, 580
which would have sidestepped the privity requirement of collateral
estoppel and prevented defendant manufacturers from litigating
575. Even if the court had determined that privity existed in this case, the non-Borel
defendants would not have been subject to collateral estoppel for the same reasons that the
court refused to permit its use against the Borel defendants: the absence of a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issues in Borel. If the parties actually participating in Borel did
not represent themselves adequately, they could not have represented adequately the non-
Borel defendants.
576. The Fifth Circuit articulated the doctrine of virtual representation in Aerojet-
General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975): "Under the federal
law of res judicata, a person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party [to the
original litigation], if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as
to be his virtual representative." 511 F.2d at 719.
577. See Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1008-09 (5th Cir. 1978).
578. The principle of stare decisis embodies the idea that judges should follow the
decisions of their predecessors rather than make new law. Ruppin, The Legend of Stare
Decisis, 41 ALA. LAw. 601, 601-02 (1981). For a more thorough review of stare decisis, see 1B
J. MooRE, supra note 515, 0.402; Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949).
579. Judicial notice denotes the power of a judge to accept the truth of certain facts
without requiring formal proof. See, e.g., Grand Opera Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp., 235 F.2d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 1956); Geer v. Birmingham, 88 F. Supp. 189, 228 (N.D.
Iowa 1950); Thurman v. Illinois Dep't of Pub. Aid, 25 Ill. App. 3d 367, 370, 323 N.E.2d 502,
504 (1974). The objectives of -judicial notice are the prevention of incorrect determinations
of fact by the jury and the conservation of judicial resources. See Note, Judicial Notice:
Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 723, 729-30 (1976). Rule 201
of the Federal Rules of Evidence codifies the doctrine of judicial notice, which originated in
the common law. FED. R. EvID. 201. For further discussion of judicial notice, see Keeffe,
Landis, & Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REV. 664 (1958);
McNaughton, Judicial Notice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Controversy, 14
VAND. L. REv. 779 (1961); Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269 (1944); Roberts,
Judicial Notice: An Exercise in Exorcism, 19 N.Y.L.F. 745 (1974); Note, Judicial Interven-
tion in Evidence, 10 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 585, 595-606 (1979).
580. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981),
rev'd, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 493 F.Supp. 61 (E.D. Tex.
1980), rev'd, 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981).
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issues irrespective of their relation to the defendants in the previ-
ous litigation. In Migues v. Fibreboard Corp.581 Judge Parker inter-
preted the Borel decision 582 to be "precedential authority for the
proposition that all asbestos products are unreasonably dangerous
as a matter of law."58 3 Citing the principle of stare decisis as the
basis for his order, Judge Parker estopped both Borel and non-
Borel defendants from litigating that issue. The Fifth Circuit re-
jected Judge Parker's attempt to apply an estoppel based on stare
decisis, which does not require privity between parties. Stare deci-
sis584 applies only to those issues necessarily decided by the
court.5 15 Clarifying the meaning of its decision in Borel, the Fifth
Circuit stated that "[t]he only determination made by this court in
Borel was that, based on the evidence in the case, the jury's find-
ings could not be said to be incorrect as a matter of law. The jury
was entitled not compelled to find the products unreasonably
dangerous. ' '15, 6
In Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.587 Judge Parker justi-
fied his attempt to estop all parties from litigating the medical
causation issue by taking judicial notice 58 8 that asbestos is a "com-
petent producing cause of mesothelioma and asbestosis. ' '589 Again,
the Fifth Circuit overturned the district court's order, this time by
expressly rejecting the applicability of judicial notice to the causa-
tion issue.590 The court found that rule 201 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence applies only to medical facts not subject to reasonable
dispute.591 The court listed a "host of disputed issues," such as
whether "mesothelioma [can] arise without exposure to asbestos"
581. 662 F.2d 1182 (1982).
582. Judge Parker also cited Condray v. Fibreboard, No. B-76-108-CA (E.D. Tex.
1977) as the basis for precluding litigation on the unreasonably dangerous nature of some of
the defendants' asbestos products. Id. at 1185.
583. 662 F.2d at 1183 (emphasis in original).
584. See supra note 578.
585. 662 F.2d at 1187.
586. Id. at 1188 (emphasis in original); see also Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
681 F.2d 334, 345 (5th Cir. 1982) (the court quotes its Migues opinion to reiterate its read-
ing of Borel).
587. 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982). Judge
Parker issued his pretrial order in Hardy before the Fifth Circuit handed down its decision
in Migues.
588. See supra note 579.
589. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d at 347.
590. Id. at 347-48.
591. See FED. R. EvD. 201; cf. Klein v. Dep't of Registration and Educ., 412 Ill. 75,
105 N.E.2d 758 (1952) (court takes judicial notice that the eyesight of eyeglass wearers con-
tinues to change over the years and may return to normal).
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to support its decision to overrule the district court.592 The court of
appeals also found that Judge Parker's use of judicial notice did
not meet the requirement that "there [be] no evidence before the
jury in disproof' 593 of the issue because "there [was] evidence on
both sides of an issue" before the court.594
In reversing Judge Parker's judicial notice that asbestos causes
mesothelioma and asbestosis, the Fifth Circuit may have been un-
necessarily cautious. 595 Judge Parker's determination that the issue
was not subject to reasonable dispute apparently was within the
bounds of judicial discretion,9 ' given the current medical knowl-
edge about the causes of those diseases.59 7 Because Judge Parker
narrowly characterized the factual issue he judicially noticed, the
circuit court's "host of disputed issues" ' were beside the point.
Judge Parker judicially noticed only that asbestos is one known
cause of asbestosis and mesothelioma; 5 9 not that asbestos is the
592. 681 F.2d 347-38.
5937 Id. at 348 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee note (1975)). The note
acknowledges that courts and commentators disagree whether courts should admit evidence
to disprove facts of which they took judicial notice. Id.
594. 681 F.2d at 348.
595. But see Wheeler & Alee, supra note 517, at 18. In Migues Judge Parker had
heard expert witness testimony that asbestos is the only known cause of mesothelioma.
Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d at 1185.
596. Subdivision b of the advisory committee note to Rule 201(b) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence describes the use of judicial notice as a "significant vehicle for progress in the
law ... particularly in developing fields of scientific knowledge." FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory
committee note.
597. Dr. Maxey Rosenau has summarized the medical profession's position on the re-
lationship between asbestos and cancer: "Few credible doctors will dispute the causative
role of asbestos in cases of mesothelioma. Indeed, Dr. Irving J. Selikoff has characterized
mesothelioma as a 'signal tumor', that is a tumor, the existence of which almost invariably
points to prior asbestos exposure." M. ROSENAU, PuB. HEALTH AND PREVENTIVE MED. 581-82
(1980). Likewise, in Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975),
the district court's jury instructions contained the following passage: "It is admitted that
Johns-Manville knew as early as 1942 that asbestos would cause asbestosis when inhaled by
factory workers." Id. at 158. The district court in Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
529 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1982), recently applied collateral estoppel to the issue of
whether asbestos dust is a competent producing cause of mesothelioma and asbestosis. The
court said the proposition that asbestos dust is a competent producing cause of disease is
"so firmly entrenched in the medical and legal literature that it is not subject to serious
dispute." Id. at 544. The Bertrand court expressly distinguished this ruling from a finding
"that asbestos dust is the only cause of asbestosis or mesothelioma." Id. at 544-45 n.4 (em-
phasis in original).
598. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d at 347-48.
599. See J. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 764 (2d ed. 1972) ("it suffices if the principle [of
which judicial notice is taken] is accepted as a valid one in the appropriate scientific
community").
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only cause of those diseases.600 Judicial notice would not foreclose
litigation on the issues about which the Fifth Circuit voiced con-
cern-for example, "can mesothelioma arise without exposure to
asbestos."60 1 The circuit court further suggested that Judge Parker
inappropriately exercised judicial notice because its use would cre-
ate an unfair presumption that all products containing asbestos
cause cancer.10 2 Thus, the court grafted the collateral estoppel fair-
ness consideration onto the doctrine of judicial notice.603 By focus-
ing on the likely effect of judicial notice in the trial rather than on
whether the "fact" was beyond reasonable dispute, the Fifth Cir-
cuit may have only postponed the inevitable at the expense of con-
suming further judicial resources to relitigate the issue.04
C. Identity of Issues
To acquire the benefits of collateral estoppel the proponent
must demonstrate that the matter on which he seeks the estoppel
is identical605 to an issue actually litigated608 in a prior action. 07
To meet this burden the proponent may submit as evidence the
pleadings, any part of the record action, 03 or the testimony of any
observer 0 9 of the former action. If the court has any reasonable
600. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. at 1362.
601. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d at 348.
602. Id. at 347.
603. In Hardy the Fifth Circuit found that judicial notice was improper "[flor much
the same reasons" that it rejected the use of collateral estoppel. Id.
604. See Keeffe, Landis, & Shaad, supra note 579, at 670 ("It brings discredit upon
the legal profession and it makes a mockery of a court of justice to permit a jury to accept
or reject in accordance with their prejudices a fact capable of exact scientific
determination.").
605. For a discussion concerning the identity of issues requirement as it relates to the
issues of medical causation, knowledge of the product's dangerousness, and product defec-
tiveness in asbestos product litigation, see Note, supra note 24, at 1334-39.
606. Professor Vestal has criticized the "actually litigated" requirement of collateral
estoppel incorporated in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as unnecessarily restric-
tive. Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 CORNELL L.
REv. 464 (1981). This requirement prohibits courts from giving preclusive effect to certain
agreements on issues made before or during trial. Professor Vestal has argued that the ac-
tual litigation of an issue should be irrelevant to the determination of collateral estoppel as
long as the target party had the opportunity and the incentive to litigate the issue and the
issue was essential to the decision in the prior action. Id. at 470-95.
607. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, § 11.18.
608. In cases tried to the court, the judge usually issues written findings of law and
fact. These written findings often are helpful in acertaining those issues actually deter-
mined. Id..
609. The parties may submit the testimony of the judge or jurors from the prior action
to prove their assertions regarding the issues actually litigated. Id. § 11.17, at 567; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment f (1982) (discussing the use of extrinsic
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doubt whether the issues are identical or actually litigated in the
earlier proceeding, it usually will refuse to apply collateral estop-
pel.610 Rulings concerning identity of issues depend on how broadly,
or narrowly the court conceives the issues litigated in the prior and
current actions.""1 Typically, the proponent will broadly character-
ize the issue in the former action as identical to the issue in the
present litigation. Conversely, the target party will minimize the
similarities of the issues and attempt to show that the issue in the
former action was so narrow that it is inapposite to any issue in the
current action. By reviewing the prior and current proceedings the
court will determine whether the issues are identical.
A court's failure to view an issue in the context of the previous
litigation may result in an interpretation that does not comport
with the original scope of the issue. If, for example, the court
agrees with a proponent in a strict liability case that the issue of
whether all products containing asbestos are defective and unrea-
sonably dangerous was the subject of litigation and determination
in a prior action, then knowledge that the elements of proof in the
prior action also included a determination of whether the plain-
tiff's exposure to the particular product was a sufficient producing
cause of injury should limit the estoppel effect of the determina-
tion on the defectiveness issue.
The issues litigated in asbestos products cases vary with the
theories of liability pleaded by the plaintiff.6 1  Some of the issues,
such as the plaintiff's damages, usually will not be appropriate
subjects for application of collateral estoppel because each plaintiff
evidence to determine the issues actually litigated).
610. See, e.g., Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir. 1970); Mulligan v. Schlacter,
389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968); McNellis v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 364 F.2d 251, 257
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 970 (1966) ("a reasonable doubt as to what was decided in
the first action should preclude the drastic remedy of foreclosing a party from litigating an
essential issue").
611. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, § 11.17 at 564-65 n.3; Polasky, Collat-
eral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L. REv. 217, 222-224 (1954). Comment c
to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 discusses the difficulties inherent in de-
lineating the dimensions of an issue. Some of the considerations for a court in determining
whether the issues in the two proceedings are identical include:
Is there a substantial overlap between the evidence or argument to be advanced in the
second proceeding and that advanced in the first? Does the new evidence or argument
involve application of the same rule of law as that involved in the prior proceeding?
Could pre-trial preparation and discovery relating to the matter presented in the first
action reasonably be expected to have embraced the matter sought to be presented in
the second? How closely related are the claims involved in the two proceedings?
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment c (1982).
612. See supra part II.
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must prove the damages peculiar to his own case.613 The issues
most likely to be subjects of collateral estoppel are those that are
common to many cases and that concern the behavior of the defen-
dant or the properties of a product. For example, one element
plaintiffs must prove in asbestos products cases relating to the ap-
plication of collateral estoppel is that the defendant manufactured
a product containing asbestos.61
Because asbestos products litigation entails numerous vari-
ables, establishing identity of issues is a particularly difficult task
for the proponent. While the proponent may characterize a previ-
ous ruling on the issue of an asbestos product's defectiveness as a
determination that all asbestos-containing products are defective,
the target party may argue that the prior action concerned only
the defective nature of the particular product. 15 Since the asbestos
products often vary from case to case, the target party may argue
that collateral estoppel cannot apply because no identity of issues
exists. Similarly, variations in the period of exposure to the prod-
uct, the duration of the exposure, the conditions under which the
exposure occurred, the plaintiff's exposure to warnings about the
product, and the nature of the warning may defeat a proponent's
613. See Kroll, Principles of Collateral Estoppel in Products Liability, 1979 INS. L.J.
313, 319.
614. In a typical asbestos product case a plaintiff relying on a strict liability theory
will have to prove the following elements: (1) The defendants manufactured, sold, distrib-
uted, marketed, or placed in the stream of commerce products containing asbestos; (2) the
products containing asbestos are unreasonably dangerous; (3) asbestos dust is a competent
producing cause of asbestosis, mesothelioma, or whatever disease from which the plaintiff
claims to be suffering; (4) the plaintiff was exposed to the defendant's product; (5) the expo-
sure was sufficient to be a producing cause of the asbestosis, mesothelioma, or other disease
the plaintiff claims to have; (6) the plaintiff contracted asbestosis, mesothelioma, or another
disease that asbestos dust can cause; and (7) the plaintiff suffered damages. See, e.g., Ber-
trand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 540-41 (D. Minn. 1982); Flatt v.
Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 838 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Plaintiff's Motion,
Hebert v. Fibreboard Corp., Civ. No. B-77-595 (E.D. Tex. filed May 15, 1979), reprinted in
AsBzsO LITIO. REP. (ANDREWS) 364 (June 12, 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A(1) (1965). Working within this general framework, some courts have construed more
narrowly the elements of an asbestos product case. Thus, in Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp.,
485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex. 1980), the court's list of the elements of plaintiff's proof con-
cerned only asbestos insulation products rather than all asbestos-containing products. Id. at
244. This type of precise construction of the issues enables courts in subsequent actions to
discern the scope of the issues more easily, and thus fosters confidence in the application of
collateral estoppel.
615. Many defendants in asbestos products cases manufactured or distributed more
than one type of asbestos or asbestos-containing product. For an extensive list of asbestos
products used by the railroad industry, see Motley & Middleton, Asbestos Disease Among
Railroad Workers-Legacy of the Laggin' Wagon, 17 TRIAL, Dec. 1981, at 39, 41 table 1.
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claim of identity of issues."'6 Although the court may preclude the
target party-defendant from relitigating the issue of the defective-
ness of asbestos-containing products, it should permit the target
party to litigate the issue of whether the plaintiff's exposure to his
product was sufficient to cause the injury. To deny him this oppor-
tunity would enlarge unfairly the effect of the original determina-
tion beyond its intended scope.
D. Issue Actually Determined
In addition to establishing the prior litigation of the issue in
question, the proponent must show that a judge or jury actually
determined the issue in that prior action. 17 General verdicts make
application of collateral estoppel difficult because the issues actu-
ally resolved may not be easily discernible. If the jury in the prior
action did not illuminate its general verdict with specific find-
ings, 18 the proponent may submit any part of the record of the
616. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d at 343-44.
617. The rule of collateral estoppel requires a final and valid determination of the
issue on which the party bases a claim of estoppel. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 514,
§§ 11.4.-6; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment k (1982). The requisites of a
valid determination are the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter and the party
against whom the court makes the determination. Id. § 1; see also id. §§ 2-9 (discussing
adequate notice and personal jurisdiction).
The court's entry of a final judgment in an action is usually dispositive that the court
finally determined the issue. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, § 11.4, at 534. Accord-
ingly, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments states generally that "[tihe rules of res judi-
cata are applicable only when a final judgment is rendered." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982). For purposes of collateral estoppel, however, § 13 defines "final
judgment" to include "any prior adjudication of an issue. . . that is determined to be suf-
ficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect." Id. § 13 comment e. Thus, a court may
consider a prior determination of an issue final for collateral estoppel purposes if the court
believes that an appellate court would not overturn the determination or that the court in
the prior action would not revise it before a final judgment.
Because of the large number of asbestos products cases currently in court and on the
dockets, the finality requirement likely will pose some troublesome questions for the courts.
As proponents seek collateral estoppel on issues determined in recent prior actions and per-
haps some concurrent actions as well, the courts will need to weigh the value of giving con-
clusive effect to those determinations against the risks that appellate courts will reverse
those determinations. Fairness to the target party militates in favor of the trial court's wait-
ing for appellate affirmation of a judgment before relying on it to preclude litigation of
issues in a subsequent action. To minimize the unnecessary relitigation of issues, the courts
might postpone trials in which parties seek collateral estoppel until final disposition of the
appeal of the prior action. The delay would not be unfair to plaintiffs asserting collateral
estoppel arguments because they benefit from the use of collateral estoppel; but they should
not benefit at the expense of the defendant-manufacturer.
618. The availability of specific findings of fact by the jury will depend on the practice
within the relevant jurisdiction. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, § 7.15; see FED. R.
Civ. P. 49(a)-(b).
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prior action or the testimony of a qualified observer to prove sub-
mission of an issue for determination. 19 The parties, however, may
not inquire into the determination process of the prior litigation,2 0
and the court will not receive the testimony of a judge or juror
from the prior action to establish the grounds for the judgment.
62 1
Courts will resolve the question of whether a prior proceeding ac-
tually determined a specific issue only by reviewing the record of
that proceeding, the jury's answers to interrogatories (if they ex-
ist), and the verdict. Because juries determine most asbestos prod-
ucts cases, the use of special interrogatories increases the opportu-
nities for courts to apply collateral estoppel by clarifying the issues
determined in reaching the verdict.
In Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp.622 a federal district court
refused to review extrinsic information when it applied collateral
estoppel in an asbestos products case. The proponent sought col-
lateral estoppel on the issue of the defectiveness of asbestos-con-
taining products in a strict liability action. 23 The Borel decision
provided the basis for the use of an estoppel. 24 One of the defen-
dant target parties offered extrinsic evidence to show that Borel
could not be the basis for collateral estoppel in a strict liability
case because the Borel jury considered only whether the defen-
dants were negligent.6 25 The Amader court ruled that because the
target party was a defendant in Borel and because the Borel jury
found all the defendants "strictly liable," collateral estoppel was
appropriate.2 6
Issues litigated in the Borel case have served as the basis for
parties asserting collateral estoppel in several asbestos products
cases. Federal courts in the Eastern District of Texas have relied
on Borel in collaterally estopping defendant manufacturers from
rebutting the propositions that products containing asbestos were
unreasonably dangerous and that asbestos is a competent produc-
ing cause of asbestosis and mesothelioma 2 7 Other federal district
619. See supra notes 608-10 and accompanying text.
620. Note, supra note 514, at 154.
621. Id.
622. 541 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
623. Id. at 1385.
624. See supra note 562 and accompanying text.
625. 541 F. Supp. at 1386. n.1.
626. Id.
627. E.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Behr-
inger v. Standard Asbestos Mfg. & Insulating Co., No. 81-2229 (5th Cir. 1982), reprinted in
ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5275 (July 23, 1982); Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d
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courts similarly accepted Borel as a basis for collateral estoppel of
those issues.2  In Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 9 the
court interpreted the Borel decision to support estoppel on the
causation issue but not on the strict liability issue of unreasonable
dangerousness. 30 To apply collateral estoppel, these courts must
have found that the Borel jury actually determined those issues.
Some district courts, however, disagree.6 3' The magistrate presid-
ing in Van Harville v. Johns-Manville Corp., 2 for example, found
that the Borel jury did not precisely determine the issues of causa-
tion and unreasonable dangerousness of asbestos products 33 He
stated that the charge to the Borel jury was confusing and "a thin
reed upon which to construct an estoppel. '6 34 The court in Mc-
Carty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp."3 5 likewise denied plaintiff's
request for collateral estoppel concerning the defectiveness of as-
bestos products. 68 The court ruled that the issues were not clearly
identical because the case at bar was solely a strict liability case
while Borel comprised litigation on the warranty and negligence
theories of liability in addition to strict liability.63 7 Because the Bo-
rel verdict was unclear, the court could not ascertain which issues
the Borel jury actually determined in reaching its verdict, and,
therefore, the court would not apply collateral estoppel.65 8
1182 (5th Cir. 1982); Flatt v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
628. E.g., In re General Dynamics Asbestos Cases, 539 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Conn. 1982);
Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1982).
629. 529 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1982).'
630. Id. at 544-45.
631. See, e.g., Recommendation of Magistrate, Van Harville v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., Civ. Action No. 78-642-H (S.D. Ala. filed Dec. 11, 1980), reprinted in ASBESTos LITIG.
REP. (ANDREWs) 2737 (Oct. 12, 1979); Bailey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 3-80.192
(E.D. Tenn. 1980), reprinted in AsB.STOs LIG. REP. (ANDREws) 2537 (Oct. 26, 1980); Mc-
Carty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Miss. 1980).
632. Recommendation of Magistrate, Van Harville v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,
Civ. Action No. 78-642-H (S.D. Ala. filed Dec. 11, 1980), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITM. REP.
(ANDREWS) 2737 (Oct. 12, 1980).
633. Id.
634. Id. at 2738.
635. 502 F. Supp. 339 (S.D. Miss. 1980).
636. Plaintiffs relied on Borel as the basis for collateral estoppel. Id. at 338.
637. Id. at 339. Judge Nixon gave two other less persuasive reasons for denying plain-
tiff's motion for collateral estoppel in McCarty. First, he said that defendants' showing that
they had prevailed in 14 of 24 previous asbestos product cases was a legitimate basis for
denying collateral estoppel. Second, Judge Nixon ruled that application of collateral estop-
pel based on determinations made in Borel would be unfair because defendants could not
have foreseen during the Borel litigation the extent of their potential liability in asbestos
products actions. Id.; see infra notes 670-79 and accompanying text.
638. 502 F. Supp. at 339.
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The Fifth Circuit recently agreed with the Van Harville and
McCarty courts' interpretation of Borel and once again rejected
the use of collateral estoppel in an asbestos products case. In
Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. s9 the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that "the judgment in Borel cannot estop even the Borel
defendants in this case" on the issues of product defectiveness or
the adequacy of the warning. 40 The court noted that the Borel de-
cision was ambiguous on "certain key issues. 6 41 Thus, the jury's
decision about when defendants' duty to warn attached was not
clear. 64 2 Further, the jury's verdict did not clearly indicate whether
the jury accepted plaintiff's state-of-the-art defense. 43 Likewise, it
did not explain whether the jury based strict liability on the insuf-
ficiency of the warnings themselves or the failure to ensure that
the warnings reached all persons reasonably expected to come in
contact with the product.6 44 In short, the court found that neither
the verdict nor the jury instructions in Borel adequately delineated
the scope of the issues actually determined by the jury. In the
wake of Hardy, asbestos litigation plaintiffs no longer may be able
to rely on Borel as the basis for collateral estoppel.
Some plaintiffs, however, may be able to use Karjala v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp.6 45 as a predicate for collateral estoppel.
Indeed, some courts have cited Karjala along with Borel as the
basis for estopping litigation of an asbestos product's defective-
ness.6 46 Plaintiff in Karjala was an asbestos insulation installer
who contracted asbestosis. He submitted to the jury only one the-
ory of liability: defendants were strictly liable in tort for failing to
warn plaintiff that their products were unreasonably dangerous.4
The jury awarded Mr. Karjala $200,000 in damages. Because the
jury in Karjala considered only one theory of liability and based
639. 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
640. Id. at 343. The Hardy court discussed in another section of its decision the dis-
trict court's decision to estop litigation of whether asbestos is a competent producing cause
of cancer. Id. at 347-48.
641. Id. at 343. The court gave two other reasons for denying the application of collat-
eral estoppel to the issue of the product's defectiveness: (1) the existence of verdicts incon-
sistent with the Borel verdict; and (2) the Borel defendants' inability to foresee the magni-
tude of their potential liability during the Borel litigation. Id. at 346-47.
642. Id. at 344.
643. Id.
644. Id.
645. 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975).
646. E.g., In re General Dynamics Asbestos Cases, 539 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Conn. 1982);
Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1982).
647. Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d at 157 n.1.
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its decision on evidence that defendants failed to warn plaintiff of
the product's hazards, the issues actually decided are more readily
discernible than those in Borel. Thus, Karjala may provide a suffi-
cient basis for collateral estoppel if the court deems the propo-
nent's issue identical. 48
E. Issues Necessarily Determined
Finally, the proponent must show that the determination of
the issue in question was necessary to the result in the prior ac-
tion.64 9 Courts usually ascertain whether an issue was necessarily
determined by examining the pleadings, the record, the final judg-
ment, and any special jury findings of the prior action.6 5 0 Ih asbes-
tos litigation the capacity of asbestos to cause mesothelioma or as-
bestosis exemplifies an issue that is a necessary component of a
judgment for a plaintiff afflicted with those diseases. 51 Conversely,
when mesothelioma is the injury for which the plaintiff seeks dam-
ages, an explicit finding by the trier of fact that asbestos also
causes asthma is not necessary to the final judgment. The finding
regarding asthma, therefore, would not support a collateral estop-
pel of that issue in a later action. 5 2 The "necessarily determined"
648. If the proponent's contact with asbestos was reasonably foreseeable by the defen-
dant-target party and the proponent received no warning of the asbestos product's danger-
ous nature, then he may have a valid collateral estoppel claim based on Karjala. Alterna-
tively, a proponent averring that the target party's warnings were insufficient or not timely
poses an issue different from that determined in Karjala. Thus, Karjala probably would not
support an application of collateral estoppel-to this proponent's action.
649. F. JAMES &. G. HAZARD, supra note 514, at 569. This requirement makes sense
because issues actually determined but unnecessary to the result usually are not reviewable
on appeal. Also, the court and the parties probably focused their attention and efforts on
the issues necessary to the result. This element of the rule of collateral estoppel thus limits
the rule's use to cases in which the parties actually litigated the issue diligently. Id. at 570;
see, e.g., Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 165 N.E.2d 156, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959); see also
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment j (1982) (discussing the requirement
that the determination is essential to the judgment).
650. Note, supra note 514, at 155.
651. In asbestos products cases such a determination is implicit in a verdict awarding
damages, even if the issue did not appear explicitly in the pleadings, record, jury instruc-
tions, or verdict.
652. A relatively narrow finding by a jury, however, might have a broader collateral
estoppel effect by implication. If, for example, a plaintiff were to base his claim for damages
on his exposure to an asbestos product and the defendant's concomitant failure to warn him
of the products' hazardous characteristics during a specified period of time, then a court
could view a verdict for the plaintiff by implication as necessarily finding that the duty to
warn arose sometime during or before the time the defendant marketed the product that
injured the plaintiff. Thus, a plaintiff in a later case with a similar claim might be able to
rely on the former judgment for the proposition that the duty to warn existed after the
exposure period determined in the former action.
680
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element of collateral estoppel permits the court to limit the scope
of a previously decided issue by characterizing parts of the broad
finding as nonessential to the final judgment of the prior action.
A proponent in an asbestos products case also may encounter
difficulties applying collateral estoppel when the'trier of fact in the
prior case based its judgment on alternative findings. 53 In a Borel-
type case,65 4 in which the court submits more than one theory of
liability to the jury for consideration, the jury may return a verdict
for the plaintiff based on either a warranty theory of liability or, in
the alternative, a strict liability theory. Because courts cannot de-
termine whether either finding was necessary to the judgment,
later cases may use neither as a basis for collateral estoppel.
6 55
F. Considerations of Fairness
When assessing the propriety of applying collateral estoppel in
a case, courts have assigned significant value to considerations of
whether the target party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the former action. This practice comports with the Su-
preme Court's requirement in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.6 56
Courts have considered the following as considerations affecting
their determination of fairness:
5 7
(1) Whether differences exist between the procedural laws of the
original forum and the current forum;
6 58
653. For a discussion of the effect of alternative findings on the use of collateral estop-
pel, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, at 570-71. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comments h, i (1982) (discussing the effect of alternative findings and
the requirement that the determination be necessary to the judgment).
654. The trial judge in Borel instructed the jury on breach of warranty and strict lia-
bility in tort. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1090 (5th Cir. 1973).
655. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 514, at 571-72.
656. In Parklane the Court held that the offensive use of collateral estoppel does not
violate a defendant's seventh amendment right to a jury trial, but the Court cautioned that
when "the application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, the trial judge
should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322, 331 (1979). See Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1170 (5th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Parklane).
657. The burden of persuading the court that application of collateral estoppel would
be unfair is on the target party. See Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d
725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969); Kroll, supra note 613, at 315.
658. See Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata: Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine,
55 IND. L.J. 615, 625 (1979-80); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 28(3), 29(2) (1982).
Comment d to Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 lists as pertinent procedural differ-
ences "such procedures as discovery devices" and the target party's limited voice in choos-
ing the forum of the original action. See, e.g., Fink v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (whether target party selected forum of prior action is a consideration in applying
collateral estoppel).
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(2) whether a party offensively or defensively seeks to apply col-
lateral estoppel;659
(3) whether the amount of damages sought in both actions are
significantly different;660
(4) whether the target party could foresee subsequent actions and
further liability on the issue litigated in the original action;661
(5) whether the original action exhibits evidence of a compromise
verdict;
66 2
(6) whether conflicting judgments exist;63
(7) whether the target party had the opportunity to appeal find-
ings on specific issues in the original action;6"
(8) whether the use of collateral estoppel against some but not all
defendants or plaintiffs would unduly prejudice a jury against the
nonestopped parties;
65
(9) whether the estoppel of one issue might unduly prejudice the
jury's determination of any other issue.66
Litigation of most asbestos products cases occurs in federal
courts, which rely almost exclusively on federal court cases to ap-
659. The Court in Parklane registered its concern that the use of offensive collateral
estoppel might encourage potential plaintiffs to "wait and see" how other plaintiffs fared in
the litigation of an issue against a particular defendant rather than joining in the original
action. Thus, the ease with which a proponent of offensive collateral estoppel could have
joined the litigation of the issue in an earlier action is a consideration in determining if
collateral estoppel is appropriate. 439 U.S. at 331; see also Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 840 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (if the plaintiff easily could have joined in the
original action, offensive collateral estoppel will not be allowed).
660. See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
661. See, e.g., McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Miss.
1980).
662. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(5) (1982); Note, supra note 514, pas-
sim; see, e.g., Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
663. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(7) (1982); see, e.g., McCarty v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335, 338 (S.D. Miss. 1980).
664. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982); see, e.g., Amader v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The court in Amader referred to Flynn
v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 88(123) Case No. 23 CCP, (Philadelphia Sept. Term 1978), in
which the jury found that the product was not defective but nonetheless awarded damages
to plaintiff, and Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 79-3016 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 1982), in
which the jury found that the product was defective but also found in favor of defendant
because the claim was time barred. 541 F. Supp. at 1385; see also Diagiacomo v. Johns-
Manville Corp., No. 76-604 (D.N.J. May 1982) (although the court adversely determined an
issue for the target party in a prior action, that issue could not be grounds for collateral
estoppel because the target party won the judgment in the prior action and, therefore, could
not appeal the determination of that issue).
665. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(6) (1982).
666. Id.; see, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir.
1982).
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ply collateral estoppel. Since procedural laws are uniform through-
out the federal court system they rarely will frustrate the applica-
tion of collateral estoppel. Any differences, such as the permitted
scope of a target party's discovery in two federal court cases, will
be attributable primarily to judicial discretion rather than the
rules of procedure.6 7 Differing substantive laws applied by the
courts in the original and current actions may require that the
court in the current action give closer scrutiny to the identity of
issues and the fairness determination. The differences in substan-
tive law may preclude the use of collateral estoppel because of dif-
ficulties in ascertaining whether the issues are identical or whether
the issues were actually and necessarily determined in the original
action. For example, considerations of fairness may preclude the
use of collateral estoppel when the court in the original action ap-
plied an enterprise liability theory of tort668 but the current forum
refuses to accept that theory. Although the two actions may appear
to have some issues in common, the court in the current action
may refuse to apply collateral estoppel because the differences be-
tween the two theories of liability may make reliance on determi-
nations in the original action inappropriate in the current forum.6 69
Differences in the amount of damages sought in both actions
and the foreseeability of future liability arising from the issue liti-
gated in the original action are closely related considerations of
fairness, because they both concern the constitutional notion of ad-
equate notice.670 Without adequate notice the parties might not
appreciate the gravity of the issues, and, therefore, they may fail to
litigate the issues fully and vigorously. In Flatt v. Johns-Manville
Corp. 1 the District Court for the Eastern Distridt of Texas de-
clared that, at the time of the Borel litigation, the Borel defen-
dants could foresee the magnitude of the collateral estoppel effect
667. When a federal court is considering whether to apply collateral estoppel based on
an issue determined in a state court, the federal court should scrutinize the state courts'
procedural policies because the state procedural rules may differ significantly from the fed-
eral rules. See, e.g., Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1977).
668. See supra part III.
669. The court also may find that the defendant could not have foreseen that findings
made in an enterprise liability action would serve as the basis for collateral estoppel in a
court that does not recognize the enterprise liability theory. For a discussion of the foresee-
ability element of the full and fair opportunity test, see infra notes 670-84 and accompany-
ing text.
670. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 332; see Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra
note 75.
671. 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
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of the case and their potential liability in asbestos cases. 672 The
Fifth Circuit in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,6 73 however,
reversed the district court's use of collateral estoppel and stated
that it was "very doubtful that these defendants could have fore-
seen that their $[59],000 liability to plaintiff would foreshadow
multimillion dollar asbestos liability. 67 4 The court cited the Su-
preme Court's explanation in Parklane that the unforeseeability of
future lawsuits may discourage a vigorous defense675 and adopted
the rationale of McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.676 The
McCarty court voiced concerns about defendants' fifth and sev-
enth amendment protections677 and included among its reasons for
denying the estoppel motion defendants' inability to foresee the
staggering potential liability of asbestos cases. 78 Thus, the Mc-
Carty court could not apply collateral estoppel without violating
the full and fair opportunity to litigate requirement.6 7 9
The reasoning of the Hardy and McCarty courts is unpersua-
sive.6 80 The $59,000 awarded in Borel should have provided a suffi-
cient inducement for defendants to defend the suit vigorously. 81
In appealing the judgment, 82 the defendants demonstrated their
concern about losing at trial and possibly indicated their anticipa-
tion of potential future liability.6 8 3 Perhaps these courts refused to
672. Id. at 841.
673. 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
674. Id. at 346.
675. Id. at 346-47.
676. 502 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Miss. 1980).
677. Id. at 339-40.
678. Id. at 339. Judge Nixon noted in McCarty that because some of the Borel defen-
dants did not have any asbestos cases filed against them before Borel, "those defendants
could not have foreseen any future prospective liability." Id.
679. Id. ("it would. . . violate the unfairness test set forth by the Supreme Court").
680. Wheeler & Allee, supra note 517, at 18.
681. See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966). In Berner defendant was sued for $500,000, did not
appeal an adverse judgment for $35,000, and later was sued for $7 million. Id. at 539. Berner
is distinguishable from Hardy because Johns-Manville Corporation did appeal the judgment
against it in Hardy. This appeal signifies that Johns-Manville Corporation made a more
vigorous defense than defendant in Berner, cf. South Pac. Transp. Co. v. Smith Material
Corp., 616 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1980) (In applying collateral estoppel, the court observed
that the target party "engaged in a week long trial in which several hundred thousand dol-
lars were at stake; [the target party] had, therefore, every incentive to litigate [the issues] to
the fullest extent.").
682. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
683. In 1973, when Borel was decided, mass tort litigation was not a novel concept.
Given the widespread use of their asbestos products, the Borel defendants should have an-
ticipated more actions arising from asbestos-related diseases, even though they might not
have foreseen the collateral estoppel effect of adverse determinations.
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apply collateral estoppel because in 1973, the time of the Borel liti-
gation, courts had not yet developed the more liberal use of collat-
eral estoppel.6es Thus, the Borel defendants might not have liti-
gated all the issues as vigorously as they would if they had been
aware of the potential collateral estoppel effect of the determina-
tion. The proliferation of asbestos products cases and the increased
use of offensive collateral estoppel illustrate the potential losses
that an adverse determination can engender. These developments
should encourage defendant manufacturers to litigate the issues
more fully, and they ultimately will reduce the availability of the
unforeseeability defense to collateral estoppel.
Inconsistent judgments685 in prior actions is another reason
some courts have refused to apply collateral estoppel in asbestos
product litigation. 6 These courts conlude that it is unfair to the
target party for the courts arbitrarily to give preclusive effect to a
prior determination of an issue against the target party when
equally valid determinations of the issue favoring the target party
exist.187 In Hardy the Fifth Circuit partially relied on the existence
684. The Supreme Court's decision in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), was, in 1973, a relatively recent development in the law
of collateral estoppel. The Parklane fairness doctrine had not yet emerged. Cf. Holland,
supra note 658, at 625.
685. Although the courts often speak in terms of "inconsistent verdicts" or "inconsis-
tent judgments," their concern is with the consistency of prior determinations of issues em-
braced by the prior judgments. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334,
345-46 (5th Cir. 1982). For purposes of applying collateral estoppel, the focus is always on
the determination of issues.
686. E.g., McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335 (S.D. Miss. 1980);
Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Tretter v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329 (E.D. Mo. 1980). In Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp., 541 F.
Supp. 1384 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the court applied collateral estoppel on the basis of a determi-
nation made in Borel. The court stated, however, that in future cases it might have to reex-
amine that position because it might face judgments inconsistent with Borel. Id. at 1386.
687. 681 F.2d 334, 346 (5th Cir. 1982). But see Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer
Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973) (court held in patent infringement suit that inconsistent
prior determinations of the patent's validity do not bar use of collateral estoppel unless
target party did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue forming the basis
for the estoppel).
The courts' practice of not giving preclusive effect to determinations when inconsistent
judgments exist allays the concerns raised by Professor Currie's "Multiple-Claimant
Anomoly." See Currie, supra note 518, at 285. Professor Currie, using his noted train wreck
scenario, illustrated the possible unfair effects of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. In
this hypothetical the defendant railroad faces negligence actions by 50 passengers injured in
the same train wreck. After litigating and prevailing on the negligence issue in 20 cases, the
railroad loses on that issue in the twenty-first trial. If in subsequent actions against the
railroad the courts give preclusive effect to the determination made in the twenty-first ac-
tion, the remaining 29 claimants will prevail despite the railroad's victories in the first 20
cases. Id. at 285-89. The courts' practice of not allowing collateral estoppel when prior in-
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of prior inconsistent judgments to reject the district court's use of
collateral estoppel."' The court of appeals expressly disagreed
with the district court's finding that none of the prior judgments
offered by the target party contained inconsistent determinations
of the specific issues on which the court granted collateral estop-
pel.6 89 In its opinion the Fifth Circuit questioned both the ade-
quacy of the district court's information about the prior actions in
which defendant target party prevailed and the district court's
ability to discern "with certainty" the basis for the juries' verdicts
in those cases.69 0 Thus, the circuit court found that the district
court's reliance upon Borel was arbitrary and impermissible.
The Fifth Circuit's position in Hardy prompts two observa-
tions about the effect of prior inconsistent judgments on the use of
collateral estoppel. First, a court's recognition of prior inconsistent
determinations of an issue is subject to the same judicial subjectiv-
ity attending the determination of an identity of issues. 91 A court
not only must acknowledge an identity of the previously deter-
mined issues to find them inconsistent, but also must find an iden-
tity of issues between these prior inconsistent determinations and
the issue in the current litigation. Thus, a court may shade the
characterization of its findings in order to evade or adopt a recog-
nition of prior inconsistent judgments if the court is result ori-
ented. Second, a complete review of prior actions for inconsistent
determinations sometimes may be more time consuming692 than re-
trying the issue. Yet, anything less than a comprehensive review of
all prior cases may make a court's finding of no prior inconsistent
determination incorrect and unfair to the target party if the court
applies collateral estoppel. The Hardy decision exemplifies this di-
lemma in the context of asbestos litigation, for courts had decided
more than seventy similar cases before Hardy.69 The Fifth Cir-
cuit's dissatisfaction with the district court's findings regarding
prior inconsistent verdicts shows the circuit court's concern about
the potential for unfair application of collateral estoppel resulting
from inadequate review of prior actions. As long as the courts ad-
consistent determinations exist is a consideration of fairness that tempers the potential
harshness of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel identified by Professor Currie.
688. 681 F.2d 334, 345-46 (5th Cir. 1982).
689. Id. at 346.
690. Id.
691. See supra notes 606-17 and accompanying text.
692. See infra notes 701-04 and accompanying text.
693. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d at 346.
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here to the belief that choosing between prior inconsistent deter-
minations works a patent unfairness on the target party,'94 the
courts must make a comprehensive review of prior cases or permit
relitigation of the issue.
Another fairness consideration identified in Hardy is whether
estoppel of one issue may unduly prejudice the jury's determina-
tion of any other issue.6s5 Because of the potential for undue influ-
ence of the jury, the Hardy court rejected the district courts' appli-
cation of collateral estoppel to the "fact" that the generic
ingredient asbestos is a competent producing cause of asbestosis
and mesothelioma e96 Noting the varieties of defendants' asbestos-
containing products, the court found the "conclusive presumption
that asbestos in all forms causes cancer" to be an unjust burden on
defendants.6 97 The Court's decision implies that the jury probably
could not separate the distinct issues of whether an asbestos prod-
uct causes cancer and whether a specific type of asbestos product
caused plaintiff's cancer. This lack of confidence in the jury is curi-
ous since juries regularly are called upon to make and apply pre-
cisely these types of distinctions.
Some courts in asbestos cases have voiced a more defensible
concern by suggesting that jury instructions create an unfair risk of
prejudice if they require the jury to apply collateral estoppel of
certain issues to some, but not all, of the defendants.9 ' In these
cases, risk of prejudice results when the nonestopped defendants
694. The courts' confidence that a prior determination substantially is correct is a pri-
mary reason that the courts give preclusive effect to that determination in subsequent ac-
tions. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 comment f (1982). Inconsistent prior
determinations of an issue weaken this inference of substantial correctness because the in-
consistent resolutions imply a reasonable doubt about the persuasiveness of the evidence
presented in the prior action or the application of law to that evidence. Id. Thus, selecting
between inconsistent determinations to apply collateral estoppel is indeed unfair. When the
courts have determined an issue many times, however, as they have some of the common
issues in asbestos product litigation, then the tally of those determinations arguably estab-
lishes the "substantial correctness" of one of the inconsistent resolutions. If, for example, 49
juries find that a product emits asbestos dust and one jury finds that the product does not
emit asbestos dust, then the correctness-though not the validity-of the dissenting jury's
determination justifiably appears questionable. A collateral estoppel of that issue in a subse-
quent action might not be unfair to the manufacturer-target party despite the inconsistent
determinations. Thus, the existence of prior inconsistent determinations should not consti-
tute an automatic bar to collateral estoppel under all circumstances.
695. 681 F.2d at 347.
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 544-45 (D. Minn.
1982). But see Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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litigate virtually the same issues that the court has collaterally es-
topped their codefendants from litigating. 9 Because the jury
probably will have difficulty ignoring the prior determination of es-
sentially identical issues, bifurcating the trial to permit the use of
collateral estoppel without prejudicing the jury against the nones-
topped defendants often would be appropriate. Bifurcation may
not be necessary, however, when the court applies collateral estop-
pel to issues that the jury more readily can distinguish from the
issues that the nonestopped defendants must litigate. For example,
knowledge of a prior determination that a specific product of one
defendant is unreasonably dangerous might not predispose a jury
to find that another product of another defendant is also unreason-
ably dangerous, unless the two products are extremely similar in
form or function.700
G. Judicial Economy
Because collateral estoppel is a discretionary device designed
to achieve judicial economy, courts should consider whether the
use of collateral estoppel in a particular instance will result in the
desired effect.70 1 When the use of collateral estoppel confuses the
jury or compels the bifurcation of the trials, it consumes extra time
and resources or causes longer trials. In these cases the court might
well refuse to apply collateral estoppel irrespective of the merits of
the proponent's motion. In Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp.70 2 the court did not apply collateral estoppel to many of the
defendants because they lacked the requisite privity. The court
further concluded that bifurcating the trial to use collateral estop-
pel against the few defendants who were defendants in the Borel
and Karjala cases would require more time and effort than the ap-
plication of collateral estoppel would save.703 Accordingly, the
699. See, e.g., Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 323 F. Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
O'Connor v. O'Leary, 247 Cal. App. 2d 646, 56 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 comment h (1982).
700. For example, two similar products would be two brands of asbestos insulation.
See, e.g., Amader v. Johns-Manville Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The Amader
court precluded defendant Unarco from relitigating the issue of the defectiveness of a par-
ticular product, "Unibestos," which a court in a previous action had judged defective. The
court's decision not to bifurcate the trial was reasonable because the issue estopped was
specific and, therefore, less likely to prejudice the jury's determinations of the defectiveness
of the other defendant's products. Id. at 1387.
701. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D.
Minn. 1982).
702. Id.
703. Id. at 545.
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court chose not to grant the estoppel on any issues that would ne-
cessitate, for the sake of fairness, a birfurcation of the trial. 04
H. Summary
Collateral estoppel in asbestos products cases thus far has
been only mildly effective as a means of streamlining asbestos liti-
gation, and the courts have given little if any indication that collat-
eral estoppel can harness the explosive growth of asbestos product
litigation.705 Collateral estoppel effectively may prevent the reliti-
gation of a few issues common to asbestos products cases; for ex-
ample, whether asbestos is a competent producing cause of asbes-
tosis. 76 The courts, however, have acknowledged that due process
and fairness considerations limit the use of collateral estoppel and
that these considerations rightfully prevail over the desire to
achieve judicial economy. Thus, even if continued asbestos litiga-
tion enables collateral estoppel proponents to meet more fre-
quently the requirement of identity of issues,70 7 the courts proba-
bly will exercise their broad discretionary powers and rely on
sensible notions of judicial economy in a case-by-case approach to
limit the application of collateral estoppel. This practice will re-
duce the threat of collateral estoppel against defendants, and it
might lessen the defendants' incentive to settle these cases out of
court.70 8 Moreover, with the ever litigable questions of exposure
704. Id. Similarly, the court in McCarty did not apply collateral estoppel because "ju-
dicial economy [was] not saved and it [was] patently unfair to [the] defendants to apply
collateral estoppel and bifurcate the trial, thus confusing the jury." McCarty v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. at 339. The McCarty court believed that the application
of collateral estoppel against some but not all defendants would require the court to bifur-
cate the trial. Bifurcation would be necessary, the court asserted, to prevent the jury from
being confused by the need to apply different standards of proof to defendants litigating
essentially the same claims. Id. at 339.
705. Cf. Wheeler & Allee, supra note 517, at 18 (recognizing the increasing judicial
reluctance to apply collateral estoppel in products liability cases).
706. See supra notes 587-604 and accompanying text.
707. See supra notes 606-16 and accompanying text. One commentator has suggested
that because all defendants eventually will litigate the issue of primary liability, courts
someday will limit asbestos products trials to the determination of damages. Mehaffy, supra
note 2, at 347.
708. The manner in which some courts have used collateral estoppel in asbestos prod-
ucts cases has elicited criticism from attorneys. See, e.g., Mehaffy, supra note 2, at 347.
These attorneys have complained that some trial court judges are using the threat of collat-
eral estoppel against defendant-manufacturers to encourage settlement. Id. Irrespective of
the judges' motives for applying collateral estoppel, the threat of its use perhaps persuades
defendants to settle. In Migues v. Fiberboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982), 13 of 14
defendants settled with plaintiff after the trial court issued an order collaterally estopping
litigation on the issue of their products' defectiveness.
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and sufficiency of exposure to the asbestos product, even the more
liberal use of collateral estoppel will save little judicial time given
the great number of potential cases and accompanying issues. °9
Nonetheless, the courts might use collateral estoppel more effec-
tively if they were to define the issues determined in asbestos
products cases more precisely so that subsequent courts could de-
termine the identity of issues more easily, more accurately, and
more fairly. The Fifth Circuit observed that through either "com-
mon law or legislative enactment, there is an urgent need for new
approaches to the national tragedy of asbestos-related disease.
7 10
Unfortunately, collateral estoppel is at best only a minor part of
the answer to the asbestos problem.
VII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
During the last decade much attention has focused on the
availability of punitive damages 11 in mass-marketed products lia-
bility litigation.7 12 Large punitive damages awards13 raise special
709. Professor Holland has observed that "[tihe advantage which doubtless attracted
the Supreme Court to the vastly broadened type of preclusion sanctioned in Parklane was
clearly the gains in judicial economies which it would seem to promise.. . . [T]he Justices
[may have] overestimate[d] the saving it would accomplish. . . [and] underestimate[d] dif-
ficulties that might be encountered in its administration." Holland, supra note 658, at 638.
These remarks accurately describe the use of collateral estoppel in asbestos products cases,
in which the courts face difficult identity of issue and fairness questions, and applications of
collateral estoppel typically engender interlocutory appeals. Cf. Polasky, supra note 611, at
220 (one effect of collateral estoppel may be to intensify litigation even though it reduces
the number of trials).
710. Migues v. Fiberboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th Cir. 1981).
711. Courts have used the terms "punitive," "exemplary," or "vindictive" damages
and "smart-money" interchangeably. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70
HARv. L. REv., 517 (1957). In this part of the Special Project punitive damages encompasses
all these terms and refers to all damages awarded a plaintiff beyond his compensatory
damages. •
712. See Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Pre-
sent-Day Society, 49 UMKC L. REV. 1 (1980); Coccia & Morissey, Punitibe Damages in
Products Liability Cases Should Not Be Allowed, 22 TRIAL L. GUIDE 46 (1978); Igoe, Puni-
tive Damages in Products Liability Cases Should Be Allowed, 22 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 24
(1978); Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defec-
tive Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Problems in Assessing Puni-
tive Damages]; Owen, Punitive Damages In Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1257 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Punitive Damages; Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages
in Products Liability Cases, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 139 (1978); Tozer, Punitive Damages and
Products Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972); Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Dam-
ages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Overkill]; Note, Pu-
nitive Damages in Mass-Marketed Product Litigation, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 405 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Product Litigation]; Note, Punitive Damages in Products Liabil-
ity Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Products Liability
Cases].
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concerns in mass-marketed products liability litigation because
their existence exposes the manufacturer of a defective or unrea-
sonably dangerous7 14 product to almost unlimited potential liabil-
ity.715 Manville Corporation's decision to file for Chapter 11 reor-
ganization because of its huge contingent liability in asbestos
litigation 1 ' highlights the inherent danger of allowing successive
punitive damages awards in this type of litigation. This part of the
Special Project discusses the policy justifications behind punitive
damages, the elements needed to establish a case for punitive dam-
ages, and the defenses that asbestos manufacturers raise to avoid
punitive damages assessments.
A. Policy Justifications Behind Punitive Damages Awards
Punitive damages existed in some form as early as 2000 B.C.
in the Code of Hammurabi The doctrine appeared first in the
English common law around the mid-eighteenth century with the
courts first using the term "exemplary damages" in 1763.71 s Ameri-
713. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-77-61 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 7,
1978), afl'd as amended, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (judge reduces to
$3,500,000 jury's original award of $125,000,000 in punitive damages); Palmer v. A. H. Rob-
ins Co., No. C60442 (Colo. Dist. Ct. filed July 30, 1979) jury award of $6,200,000 in punitive
damages for faulty intrauterine device); see ASBESTOS Lrri. REP. (ANDREWS) 4910 (May 14,
1982) (summarizing Dorell v. Johns-Manville, C.A. 7809-88-12-18 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia
May 3, 1982) (jury award of $1,000,000 in punitive damages)).
714. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
715. For example, in June 1982 Johns-Manville Corporation estimated that more than
15,500 claimants had filed over 11,000 asbestosis suits against it, and that plaintiffs had fied
approximately 425 new suits per month during the first half of 1982. It estimated that the
number of claims eventually may reach 52,000 and result in potential liability exceeding $2
billion in compensatory damages alone. ASBESTOS LrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5397 (Aug. 27,
1982) (citing affidavit of Mr. James F. Beasley, Manville Corporation).
716. On August 26, 1982, Johns-Manville Corporation filed for Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion and cited sky-rocketing and unpredictable litigation costs as the motivating factor be-
hind its decision. In support of its claim, Johns-Manville pointed out that in 1981 and the
first half of 1982 litigation had resulted in 10 punitive damages verdicts against it at an
average of $616,000 per verdict. In re Johns-Manville Corp., No. 82 B (S.D.N.Y. petition
filed Aug. 26, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS Lrrm. REP. (ANDREWS) 5419, 5423 (Aug. 27,
1978); see infra part XII.
717. The Code of Hammurabi actually provided for the multiple recovery of compen-
satory damages, the earliest form of punitive damages. See, e.g., G. DRIVER & J. MILES, THE
BABYLONIA LAWS 500-01 (1952); A. KocOUREK & J. WIGMORE, SOURCES OF ANcIENT & P~imi-
TIVE LAW 391 (1915).
718. In Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763), a journeyman
printer sued the King's officers for assault, trespass, and false imprisonment under an illegal
warrant and recovered 300 pounds in damages even though his actual damages did not ex-
ceed 20 pounds. For a brief discussion of the case, see Coccia & Morissey, supra note 712, at
51-52.
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can courts have recognized the doctrine since the early 1780's,719
but consistently have disagreed on the purposes of punitive awards
and the situations in which they are appropriate. 72 0 Despite the
disagreement surrounding their validity, punitive damages remain
a vital part of our tort compensation system,721 and several policy
justifications support their continued existence.722
Punitive damages exist primarily to punish the defendant for
his misconduct and to deter him and others similarly situated from
similar misconduct. 12  Courts and commentators repeatedly have
criticized this rationale because they consider punishment and de-
terrence to be goals of the criminal, not the civil, law. 2 Allowing
punitive damages in mass-marketed products liability litigation
has created a new set of objections to the punishment and deter-
rence rationale.7 2 5 First, critics have stressed that the availability
of punitive damages in this type of litigation subjects a manufac-
turer to potential successive punitive damages awards.726 They
have argued that successive punitive damages awards do not serve
the deterrence rationale at all since the latter awards probably
719. The first American case to allow punitive damages was Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L.
3, (1 Bay) (1784) (plaintiff recovered punitive damages when he became ill after drinking
wine that defendant had spiked with cantharides). Today, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ne-
braska, and Washington are the only states not recognizing punitive damages. See infra
note 747.
720. Compare Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (stating in dictum that
"damages assessed depend on the circumstances, showing the degree of moral turpitude or
atrocity of the defendant's conduct, and may properly be termed exemplary or vindictive
rather than compensatory") with Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) (disallowing puni-
tive damages and denouncing them as "monstrous heresy"). For a brief synopsis of the early
development and controversy, see Belli, supra note 712, at 2-5; Punitive Damages, supra
note 712, at 1262-64.
721. In contrast, the English system now allows punitive damages in only three situa-
tions: (1) for arbitrary and outrageous abuses of government power; (2) in a limited class of
deliberate, calculated, intentional torts; and (3) in those situations expressly authorized by
statute. See Rookes v. Barnard [1964] 1 All E.R. 367.
722. See Punitive Damages, supra note 712, at 1277-99; Note, Product Litigation,
supra note 712, at 7-8.
723. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982);
Note, supra note 711, at 522.
724. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) ("What kind of a civil remedy for
the plaintiff is the punishment of the defendant? The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous her-
esy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of
law."); see also Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1176
(1931); Tozer, supra note 712, at 303; Note, Product Litigation, supra note 712, at 407.
725. See Coccia & Morissey, supra note 712, at 53-65; Tozer, supra note 712, at 301-
05.
726. See Note, Product Litigation, supra note 712, at 418.
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have no greater deterrent effect than the first award. 27 Second,
critics have argued that the officials whose conduct is the basis for
the punitive damages award are unlikely to feel the effects of the
award.7 28 Therefore, the punishment of the corporation and its
shareholders neither reaches nor deters those individuals actually
responsible for the misconduct.72 9 Last, critics have contended that
the threat of mass litigation in itself is a sufficient deterrent to
manufacturer misbehavior and that subjecting the defendant to
multiple compensatory claims when misbehavior occurs is suffi-
cient punishment for that misconduct.730 These arguments have
led some commentators to conclude that although punitive dam-
ages serve a useful function in a traditional "one on one" tort situ-
ation, their application in mass-marketed products liability litiga-
tion is improper because the primary policy justification
underlying their application is not valid in this context.7 3 1 Despite
these criticisms, most scholars have agreed that allowing punitive
damages in mass-marketed products liability litigation serves the
punishment and deterrence rationale and that the continued avail-
ability of punitive damages is necessary to ensure public control
over manufacturers' misbehavior.3
A secondary, and often unstated, purpose of punitive damages
is to compensate fully the victim for his injuries.7" Critics of puni-
tive damages have maintained that this compensation rationale de-
veloped when the scope of recoverable compensatory damges was
extremely narrow. 73 ' Considering the expanded scope of recover-
727. Id. Without the deterrence rationale the award becomes strictly punitive, and
critics have argued that punishment is not a proper function of the civil law. See supra note
724 and accompanying text.
728. See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 816-17 (1982); Punitive
Damages, supra note 712, at 1299-1304.
729. Coccia & Morissey, supra note 712, at 59.
730. See Tozer, supra note 712, at 304; Note, Product Litigation, supra note 712, at
419.
731. See, e.g., Tozer, supra note 712, at 301.
732. Belli, supra note 712, at 23; Igoe, supra note 712, at 29; Problems in Assessing
Punitive Damages, supra note 712, at 59; Punitive Damages, supra note 712, at 1371; Note,
Exemplary Damages in Products Liability Cases, 1980 DEr. C.L. REv. 647, 666-67; Note,
Overkill, supra note 712, at 1813-14; Note, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litiga-
tion: Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 33 Sw. L.J. 1117, 1127 (1979).
733. Several states have recognized expressly this function of punitive damages. See,
e.g., Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229,
190 N.W. 746 (1922); Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto Inc., 112 N.H. 71, 289 A.2d 66
(1972); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Hardy, 370 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Kesler v.
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975); Note, supra note 711, at 520-21.
734. Tozer, supra note 712, at 303-04.
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able compensatory damages, critics have argued that large punitive
awards no longer are necessary to compensate fully the victim.
7 35
Supporters of punitive damages have countered by pointing out
that a successful plaintiff must spend at least one-third of his
award on legal fees7 5 6 and that recent estimates suggest that in
"big damage cases" few victims actually recover more than twenty-
five percent of their real economic loss.737 Therefore, they have
contended, punitive damages are still necessary to compensate vic-
tims fully.
A third policy justification for punitive damages, the "law en-
forcement ' 8 or "public justice 7 39 rationale, rests on the premise
that a private citizen is more apt to act as a "private attorney gen-
eral '7 40 and bring suits when injured if he has a sufficient stake in
the outcome. Because private suits are the primary means for en-
forcing the civil law, society has a compelling need to provide in-
jured parties with adequate incentive to bring suits even when the
injuries suffered are relatively slight.741 Advocates have argued that
without punitive damages manufacturers could avoid civil liability
in many situations simply because a law suit for compensatory
damages alone would not be economically feasible for the injured
victim.7 42 Thus, punitive damages serve the dual purpose of en-
couraging injured victims to enforce the civil law and encouraging
large manufacturers to correct defective products rather than risk
marketing defective products and absorbing as a business expense
the cost of the few suits brought. 43
The last policy justification for punitive damages is revenge. 44
For obvious reasons commentators have devoted little attention to
this justification and have derogated its role in the system. Few
cases today acknowledge the revenge justification, but early cases
735. Coccia & Morissey, supra note 712, at 64.
736. Punitive Damages, supra note 712, at 1297.
737. Id. at 1298.
738. Id. at 1287.
739. Belli, supra note 712, at 5-6.
740. Id. at 6; Punitive Damages, supra note 712, at 1288.
741. Belli, supra note 712, at 6.
742. Professor Owen has discussed three situations in which, if not for punitive dam-
ages, a manufacturer might risk marketing a defective product: (1) when the resulting injury
is not easily cognizable to the plaintiff and he is unlikely to link the injury to the manufac-
turer; (2) when asserting the victim's rights is likely to be expensive and the recoverable
reward minimal; and (3) when safety measures substantially reduce profit margins. Punitive
Damages, supra note 712, at 1292-95.
743. Id. at 1287-95.
744. Belli, supra note 712, at 5; Note, supra note 711, at 521.
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often cited it as a primary reason for imposing punitive dam-
ages.7 5 While many commentators have criticized the revenge mo-
tive as archaic or barbaric, most have recognized that punitive
damages may serve the useful function of encouraging use of the
legal system and discouraging victims from taking matters into
their own hands. 46
B. Proof Required of Plaintiff Seeking Punitive Damages
1. In General
All but four states 47 allow some form of punitive damages.
The exact proof required of a plaintiff seeking punitive damages
varies among the states; the requirements of all states, however,
focus on the defendant's conduct,74 8 and most states require a
showing that the defendants acted with either gross negligence,
willfulness, or wantonness. 74 9 Although defendants often have at-
tacked these standards as unconstitutionally vague, the challenges
repeatedly have failed because courts have found that these stan-
dards provide sufficient guidance and are no more vague than
many other legal standards.7 50 As with most civil issues, the plain-
tiff seeking punitive damages bears the burden of establishing the
requisite intent by a preponderance of the evidence. 51
In most states the jury determines the amount of punitive
damages awards. 752 In setting the amount of the award the jury
usually considers the seriousness of the defendant's misconduct,
the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury, and the wealth of the de-
745. See, e.g., Grey v. Grant, 2 Wils. K.B. 252, 95 Eng. Rep. 794 (1764).
746. Belli, supra note 712, at 5.
747. Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington are the only states that do
not recognize punitive damages; in certain situations, however, even these states allow
double and treble damages. Belli, supra note 712, at 4-5.
748. McGovern, supra note 24, at 294.
749. Id. Other courts have used similar standards. See, e.g., Smith v. Chapman, 115
Ariz. 211, 564 P.2d 900 (1977) (reckless disregard); Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155
Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967) (wanton disregard); Kang v. Harrington, 59 Hawaii 652, 587
P.2d 285 (1978) (malice, oppression, or gross negligence); Butcher v. Petranek, 593 P.2d 743
(Mont. 1979) (willfulness, wantoness, malice, oppression, brutality, insult, gross negligence,
or recklessness).
750. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa.
1982) ("standard for punitive damages is no more vague than the standards for preponder-
ance of the evidence or proximate cause, or a number of court-defined standards that are
applied frequently by judges and juries in civil or criminal cases").
751. See id. at 375-76.
752. Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 712, at 9. But see CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1982) (limiting amount of punitive damages recov-
erable in a products liability action to twice that of the compensatory damages).
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fendant.5 s Most states require that the defendant be liable for at
least nominal compensatory damages for the jury to impose puni-
tive damages, 5 but the permissible amount of punitive damages,
like the state of mind requirement, varies among states."' Some
states require a reasonable relationship between the amount of
compensatory and punitive damages756 while others require no re-
lationship at all.
States also differ about the types of actions in which punitive
damages are available. For example, some states allow punitive
damages in wrongful death758 and survival statute7 5 9 cases while
others do not. A major variation among states that is particularly
important in mass-marketed products liability litigation is the
availability of punitive damages under a strict liability theory.
States allowing punitive damages in strict liability cases have
noted the ease of hearing additional evidence about the defen-
dant's state of mind at the trial. 60 States disallowing punitive
damages under a strict liability theory, on the other hand, have
753. Belli, supra note 712, at 11-13. Three states do not allow consideration of the
defendant's wealth: Alabama, Kentucky, and Texas. Note, Punitive Damages and the Ad-
missibility of Evidence of Wealth, 29 ALA. L. REV. 564, 567 (1978). Idaho and Kansas allow
the jury to consider attorney's fees and court costs. See Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702,
496 P.2d 939 (1972); Brewer v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 200 Kan. 96, 434 P.2d 828 (1967).
Although some writers have suggested that in mass-marketed products liability litigation
the jury should consider other suits pending and previous punitive awards against the de-
fendant, this consideration may bias the jury. See Note, Products Liability Cases, supra
note 712, at 920.
754. McGovern, supra note 24, at 294.
755. Compare Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278, 562 P.2d 316, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635
(1977) (reasonable relationship required between compensatory and punitive damages) with
Northern Nev. Mobile Home Brokers v. Penrod, 610 P.2d 724 (Nev. 1980) (no relationship
required between compensatory and punitive damages).
756. E.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
For a discussion of the rule requiring a rational relationship between compensatory and
punitive damages, see Comment, Punitive Damages and the Reasonable Relation Rule: A
Study in Frustration of Purpose, 9 PAc. L.J. 823 (1978).
757. E.g., Butcher v. Petranek, 593 P.2d 743, 746 (Mont. 1979).
758. Compare Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594, 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (disal-
lowing punitive damages in a wrongful death suit) with Lankford v. Mong, 283 Ala. 24, 214
So. 2d 301 (1968) (allowing punitive damages recoverable in a wrongful death suit). Under
Alabama's wrongful death statute all recoverable damages are punitive. ALA. CODE § 6-5-410
(1975).
759. Compare Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416
(1974) (punitive damages not available under survival statute) with Atlas Properties Inc. v.
Didich, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1969) (allowing recovery of punitive damages under survival
statute).
760. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 378 (E.D. Pa.
1982) ("[T]he law of strict liability does not preclude consideration of 'aggravated fault,' if
the plaintiffs can properly meet their burden . . .").
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observed that strict liability depends on the defectiveness of the
product, not the defendant's state of mind.761 A second major vari-
ation among the states that has considerable effect on mass-mar-
keted products liability litigation is the availability of insurance
coverage for punitive damages.6 2 States allowing insurance cover-
age emphasize the parties' freedom to contract, 13 while those dis-
allowing insurance coverage argue that allowing insurance to cover
punitive damages defeats the deterrrence rationale.6 4
These variations are especially important in mass-marketed
products liability litigation because plaintiffs suffering the same in-
juries, from the same product, that the same manufacturer pro-
duced and sold, may recover substantially different sums because
of differences in their states' punitive damages laws. These varia-
tions also encourage forum-shopping since most large manufactur-
ers have sufficient contacts to allow a plaintiff to sue in any
jurisdiction.
2. The Case for Punitive Damages in Asbestos Litigation
Plaintiffs have recovered punitive damages in asbestos litiga-
tion because they have shown that officers of the large asbestos
manufacturers knew twenty to thirty years before they began to
warn employees and the public that continuous exposure to asbes-
tos increases the likelihood of pulmonary disease.76 5 Relying heav-
ily on evidence available from a British study76 6 in the 1930's and
the Saranac Laboratories studies767 in the late 1930's and early
1940's, plaintiffs argue that manufacturers knew of the potential
dangers of continued exposure to asbestos fibers as early as 1940.68
761. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings, Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Civ. No.
80-2907 (D.N.J. July 16, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5673, 5684-85
(Oct. 8, 1982).
762. For a general discussion of punitive damages and insurance coverage, see Note,
Punitive Damages and Liability Insurance: Theory, Reality and Practicality, 9 CUM. L.
REV. 487 (1978).
763. See, e.g., Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d
1 (1964).
764. See, e.g., Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
765. See, e.g., ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4910-12 (May 14, 1982) (summarizing
Dorell v. Johns-Manville, C.A. 7809-88-123-18 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia May 3, 1982)). See
supra part II.
766. MEREWEATHER & PRICE, REPORT ON EFFECTS OF ASBESTOS DUST ON THE LUNGS AND
DUST SUPPRESSION IN THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY (1930).
767. See Motley, supra note 249, at 22-23, for a discussion of the history and contents
of this study.
768. See Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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In addition to showing that manufacturers had this knowledge,
plaintiffs have shown that the manufacturers' officers took affirma-
tive steps to keep this information from their employees and the
general public.7 69 The testimony of former officers of the large
manufacturers" 0 and some correspondence during the 1930's be-
tween high-ranking officials of the two largest asbestos manufac-
turers7 1 are the primary support for plaintiffs' claims of affirma-
tive concealment.
Most damaging of the former officers' testimony has been the
deposition testimony of Dr. Kenneth Smith, former chief medical
advisor of Johns-Manville Corporation. 72 Before his death, Dr.
Smith testified that the results of a series of tests he conducted
shortly after coming to Johns-Manville in the late 1940's led him
to recommend the immediate implementation of various changes
in working conditions to decrease the level of employee exposure to
asbestos dust.773 After further tests, he recommended in early 1953
that Johns-Manville place warning labels on asbestos fiber bags.
Higher-ranking Johns-Manville officials, however, declined to do so
until the mid-1960's. 774 Corroborating Dr. Smith's testimony, Mr.
Hugh Jackson, a former safety director and manager of Johns-
Manville's industrial health program, testified that he and other
Johns-Manville officials were aware of the many dangers of ex-
tended exposure to asbestos dust throughout the 1950's. 7 5 A third
Johns-Manville official, Dr. Ruff, a former plant manager on indus-
trial awareness, has testified that the company's policy was to
withhold from employees X-rays indicating that the employees
might be suffering from asbestosis.7 7 6 Plaintiffs have used this tes-
timony effectively in justifying their punitive damages claims.
769. See e.g., ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4910-12 (May 14, 1982) (summarizing
Dorell v. Johns-Manville, C.A. 7809-88-123-18 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia May 3, 1982)).
770. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 375-76; infra notes
772-76 and accompanying text.
771. This correspondence, commonly called the "Sumner Simpson letters," occurred
in the mid- and late-1930's between Mr. Sumner Simpson, president of Raybestos Manhat-
tan, Inc. and Mr. Vandiver Brown, executive secretary of Johns-Manville Corp. For a full
discussion of the letters' content, see Motley, supra note 249, at 21-23; supra part II.
772. Dr. Smith joined Canadian Johns-Manville, a division of the parent company, as
a medical officer in the early 1940's. He served as medical director of Canadian Johns.
Manville from 1947 to 1951 and as Johns-Manville's chief medical advisor from 1952 to
1966. Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 375.
773. Id. at 375-76.
774. Id.
775. Id. at 375.
776. See ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4910-12 (May 14, 1982) (summarizing Dorell
v. Johns-Manville, C.A. 7809-88-123-18 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia May 3, 1982)).
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Some plaintiffs also have succeeded in using the Sumner Simpson
letters 7" as evidence of affirmative concealment by manufacturers.
This correspondence, between the president of Raybestos-Manhat-
tan, Incorporated and the executive secretary of Johns-Manville,
indicates that in the 1930's these manufacturers knew of the po-
tential dangers inherent in extended exposure to asbestos dust and
believed that they should minimize the publicity about these dan-
gers. 8 Many courts have held that this type of evidence justifies
imposing punitive damages because it indicates that manufacturers
were aware of the dangers inherent in asbestos exposure long
before they warned their employees and the public.
779
C. Manufacturers' Defenses
Asbestos manufacturers have raised a variety of defenses in
their struggle to avoid punitive damages assessments.7 10 These de-
fenses range from simple challenges to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence 7 81 to constitutional challenges to the validity of punitive
damages7 82 and complex public policy defenses concerning the in-
dustry's survival.783 Although manufacturers have had mixed suc-




First, manufacturers argue that the evidence for the plaintiffs'
claims is insufficient to satisfy the requirements necessary to im-
pose punitive damages. 785 To refute the plaintiffs' claims, manufac-
turers assert that the evidence shows that they took the first af-
firmative steps to prevent and control asbestos exposure78 6 by
777. See ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3686 (Aug. 14, 1981) (summarizing Janssens
v. Johns-Manville Corp. (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 31, 1981)); supra part II.
778. See supra note 771.
779. See ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5054 (June 11, 1982) (summarizing Jackson
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. S 79-0211 [R] (S.D. Miss. June 3, 1982)). For further
discussion of the Sumner Simpson letters, the Smith deposition, and early studies on asbes-
tos diseases, see supra notes 114-60 and accompanying text.
780. See, e.g., Bunch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 3-81-416 (E.D. Tenn. June 16,
1982), reprinted in ASBEsTos Lrrm. REP. (ANDREWS) 5146-47 (June 25, 1982) (order granting
remittitur); Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Nos. 78-122 P & 79-1228 P (D. Me. Sept.
29, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4044, 4045-47 (Oct. 23, 1981).
781. Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 376-77.
782. Id. at 374-76.
783. Id. at 377.
784. See supra note 716.
785. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 375; see also As-
BESTOS L7ITG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3690 (Aug. 14, 1981) (summarizing Directo v. Johns-Manville
Corp. (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 1981)).
786. Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 376.
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funding independent research studies investigating the effect of as-
bestos-related work on pulmonary diseases, 87 conducting their
own in-house studies788 and disseminating knowledge through
trade associations 89 about asbestos-related diseases. Manufactur-
ers also have pointed to physical plant improvements, personal
protective gear, and generally improved working conditions as evi-
dence of their attempts to minimize the dangers of asbestos-re-
lated work as they became more keenly aware of those dangers.790
Responding to the charge that they knew of the dangers of asbes-
tos-related work many years before they began warning the public,
manufacturers have insisted that until the 1964 Selikoff study,79'
they did not realize the full potential of those dangers. Defendant
manufacturers generally have not succeeded with this defense.
Courts have held that the conclusions of the studies in the 1930's
and 1940's,7 92 combined with the former officers' testimony and
correspondence793 and the manufacturers' failure to place warning
labels on products until the mid-1960's, constitute sufficient evi-
dence to justify punitive damages awards.794
Second, asbestos manufacturers have argued that awarding
punitive damages in these cases is improper because most plaintiffs
proceed under a strict liability theory, which focuses on the defec-
tiveness of the product and ignores the defendant's state of
mind. 95 This defense also has enjoyed only limited success.96
787. Manufacturers did contribute to the Saranac Laboratory studies on asbestos in
the late 1930's and early 1940's. Motley, supra note 249, at 22-23.
788. Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 375.
789. Id.
790. Id.
791. Selikoff, Churg, & Hammond, supra note 140, at 139. The results of this study
led to the placement of warning labels on asbestos products.
792. See supra notes 766-77 and accompanying text.
793. See supra notes 771-75 and accompanying text.
794. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 374-76. But see
ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3690 (Aug. 14, 1981) (summarizing Directo v. Johns-
Manville Corp. (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 1981) (without showing of malice, claim for puni-
tive damages unsupported)); ASBESTOS Lrrio. REP. (ANDREWS) 74 (Mar. 16, 1979) (summa-
rizing Campbell v. Johns-Manville Corp. (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (evidence insufficient to support
punitive damages claim)).
795. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 378; Transcript of
Proceedings, Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 80-2907 (D.N.J. July 16, 1982), re-
printed in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5673, 5686 (Oct. 8, 1982).
796. See, e.g., ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5642 (Oct. 8, 1982) (summarizing Cook
v. Lake Asbestos, Civ. No. 18-1519 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 1982)); Transcript of Proceedings, Gold v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 80-2907 (D.N.J. July 16, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG
REP. (ANDREWS) 5673 (Oct. 8, 1982). In each case the judge refused to allow the plaintiff to
seek punitive damages under a strict liability theory, but permitted the plaintiff to continue
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Courts allowing punitive damages generally have held that dis-
pensing with the need to prove fault in establishing liability does
not preclude a showing of aggravated fault if the defendant has
acted outrageously.79 7 These courts have disregarded the concep-
tual differences between negligence and strict liability theories and
have focused instead on the outrageousness of the defendant's con-
duct and the seriousness of the plaintiff's injuries.9 8 Conversely,
courts not allowing punitive damages on strict liability claims have
pointed to the conceptual differences between negligence and strict
liability theories.7 9 9 These courts have stressed that punitive dam-
ages arise in a negligence context in which the defendant's norma-
tive behavior is the focus, while strict liability depends solely upon
the product's defectiveness.800 They fear that allowing punitive
damages in a strict liability claim will confuse the jury and under-
mine the goals of the cause of action. 10
Third, manufacturers have argued that punitive damages
awards are unconstitutional because the requirements for imposing
them are unconstitutionally vague and because allowing successive
punitive damages awards violates the fifth amendment's double
jeopardy clause.8 2 In making the unconstitutionally vague argu-
ment, manufacturers have insisted that the standards governing
the imposition of punitive damages are so amorphous that they fail
to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct. Furthermore,
manufacturers have maintained that the standards are so vague
that they fail to create legal standards on which a judge or jury
rationally can base a decision.80 3 Noting that these standards are
no less vague than other legal standards, courts have rejected this
argument and have found that the standards provide adequate no-
to pursue punitive damages under a negligence theory.
797. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 378.
798. Id.
799. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings, Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 80-




802. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 377-78. The fifth
amendment provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Defendant-Manufacturers ar-
gue that since punitive damages are quasi-criminal, fifth amendment considerations should
apply. Manufacturers in mass-marketed products litigation other than asbestosis cases also
have raised these constitutional objections. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
803. Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 377-78.
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tice to the defendant and adequate guidance to judges and ju-
ries. s°0 Defendant manufacturers also have argued that successive
punitive damages awards in products liability litigation violate the
double jeopardy clause, since they impose repeated punishment on
the defendant for essentially the same act.8 0 5 Asbestos manufactur-
ers stress that a single act-their failure to warn the public of the
dangers of asbestos-related work-is the basis for all punitive dam-
ages awards against them. Courts have rejected the double jeop-
ardy argument by finding that the failure to warn each injured in-
dividual constitutes a separate and independent act meriting
punishment." 6  To date, these constitutional defenses have
failed.
07
Fourth, asbestos manufacturers have contended that repeat-
edly punishing the same manufacturers for essentially the same act
through the imposition of punitive damages does not further the
punishment and deterrence rationale. 08 Manufacturers have in-
sisted that the deterrence rationale is invalid in asbestos litigation
because all manufacturers modified their behavior in the 1960's
when they began placing warning labels on asbestos products.809
Furthermore, manufacturers have argued that the sheer magnitude
of the litigation is sufficient punishment for their misconduct.
8 10
Although a few courts have expressed sympathy for the manufac-
turers' argument,811 no court has disallowed a punitive damages
claim because of this defense. 12 Courts addressing the argument
generally have found it without merit since most jurisdictions al-
low punitive damages not only to deter the particular defendant
from future misconduct but also to deter others from similar
misconduct.8 8
In attacking the failure of successive punitive damages awards
804. Id.; see supra note 750.
805. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 377-78. For a brief
discussion of the validity of the double jeopardy defense in mass-marketed products liability
litigation, see Note, Overkill, supra note 712, at 1805-06.
806. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 378.
807. See id. at 377-78.
808. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1982);
see supra notes 723-32 and accompanying text.
809. Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d at 816.
810. See, e.g., Bunch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 3-81-416 (E.D. Tenn. June 16,
1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5146, 5147 (June 25, 1982).
811. Id. at 5146-47.
812. Id. (judge decided to wait for directions from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit rather than rule on the punitive damages issue).
813. See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d at 816.
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to accomplish its deterrent and punishment purposes, defendant
manufacturers also have argued that punitive damages awards do
not punish or deter any presently culpable party because those re-
sponsible for the misconduct no longer work for the manufactur-
ers.8 14 Courts have rejected this defense and have emphasized that
liability depends on the agency relationship at the time of the tor-
tious misconduct, not the relationship at the time of the litiga-
tion."' They also have noted the inherent unfairness of a policy
that would allow a corporate defendant to avoid liability simply
because those responsible for the misconduct have left the
company.818
Fifth, manufacturers have maintained that allowing successive
punitive damages awards in asbestos litigation actually punishes
the innocent shareholders of these companies.817 Because succes-
sive punitive damages awards theoretically threaten financial ruin
for many of these manufacturers,8 18 defendants have asserted that
these innocent shareholders, who had no voice in the decisions
leading to the misbehavior, are the ones whom the successive puni-
tive awards affect most." 9 Courts have rejected this defense for a
variety of reasons. Because shareholders are free to invest their
money as they choose, courts usually have found them accountable
for the decisions of the corporations in which they invested.
8 20
Stressing that some degree of risk characterizes all investment,
courts have held that the risk of punitive damages against the cor-
poration is only one of the many risks that a shareholder en-
counters. 21 Thus, over time, punitive damages awards in this type
814. Id. at 816-17.
815. Id.
816. Id.
817. Id. at 817; see also ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5159 (July 9, 1982) (summa-
rizing Nobriga v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 55-624 (1st Cir. Hawaii Feb. 12, 1982)).
The "innocent shareholders" defense is a common one in mass-marketed products liability
litigation. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967). In
making this argument, defense attorneys typically attempt to create the image that the av-
erage corporate shareholder is an elderly retiree who depends on her meager dividends to
make ends meet or a blue collar worker who has put his life's savings into the stock in hopes
of building a secure future for his family.
818. See e.g., Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982) (de-
fendants claim that multiple punitive damages eventually will drive them to financial ruin).
See infra notes 825-57 and accompanying text.
819. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 817 (6th Cir. 1982).




of litigation may promote prudent investing.8 22 Perhaps the strong-
est argument against the innocent shareholder defense is that
these innocent shareholders now bearing the brunt of the punitive
damages are likely the same shareholders who profited from the
misbehavior. 8 2  Therefore, justice requires them to account for
their tainted profits.824
Last, manufacturers have argued that allowing successive pu-
nitive damages awards in asbestos litigation will result in the bank-
ruptcy or financial ruin of the industry.8 2 5 This defense, known as
the "overkill" or "annihilation" defense, has its origin in Judge
Friendly's now infamous Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.
82 6
opinion. Since its origin it has been among the most frequently
raised and discussed defenses in mass-marketed products liability
litigation. 27 In Roginsky the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit refused to allow a punitive damages award
against defendant manufacturer in a MER/29828 drug litigation
case.82 9 Judge Friendly expressed fear that allowing successive pu-
nitive damages awards would result in "overkill" since no judicial
mechanisms existed to prevent financial annihilation of a corpora-
tion for a single management sin.830 Although no other court has
ever disallowed a punitive damages award solely on the strength of
this argument, asbestos manufacturers have continued to argue
that allowance of successive punitive damages awards eventually
822. Id.
823. Punitive Damages, supra note 712, at 1304-05.
824. See id.
825. See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d at 817; Neal v. Carey Cana-
dian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 376 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 IlM.
App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982).
826. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
827. See infra notes 828-49 and accompanying text.
828. Scientists in the 1950's believed that high levels of cholesterol led to atherosclero-
sis, or hardening of the arteries. Since low cholesterol diets generally were thought ineffec-
tive, many drug companies developed drugs to reduce cholesterol levels. One such drug was
MER/29, developed by Richardson-Merrell, Incorporated. MER/29 received FDA approval
for sale in interstate commerce only by prescription and under approved labelling condi-
tions. The drug proved ineffective, however, because it caused cataracts in humans. Eventu-
ally, the FDA required its removal from the market. Plaintiffs brought over 1500 suits
against Richardson-Merrell for injuries received while using the drug. For a detailed discus-
sion, see Rheingold, The MER129 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litiga-
tion, 56 CALiF. L. REv. 116 (1968).
829. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d at 851.
830. Id. at 839 ("We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive




will bankrupt even the richest defendant. 31 If early plaintiffs were
to collect large punitive awards, defendants have argued they will
exhaust the corporations' limited funds and leave nothing for later
litigants who deserve compensatory damages.8 2 Only one trial
judge has expressed sympathy and agreement with the overkill de-
fense in asbestos litigation.83 3 Though choosing not to rule on de-
fendant's motion to strike a punitive damages award,8 4 the judge
expressed concern that successive punitive damages awards in as-
bestos litigation eventually would bankrupt the industry and leave
future plaintiffs without a remedy for their compensatory dam-
ages. 35 The overkill argument also led an Illinois appellate judge
to recommend that the Illinois Legislature reevaluate that state's
punitive damages doctrine.8 8
Notwithstanding their refusals to disallow punitive awards on
the basis of the overkill defense, most courts have recognized that
allowing successive punitive awards in mass-marketed products lia-
bility litigation creates special problems.37 Nevertheless, the
courts continue to find that the policy justifications838 for allowing
punitive damages to deserving individuals are more important
than the risk of annihilation that may threaten manufacturers.839
These courts have stressed that judicial controls are available to
ensure that the punitive awards adequately punish past miscon-
duct and deter future misconduct without inflicting an unjust re-
sult on the defendant.84 0 For example, most states that allow puni-
tive damages also allow remittitur and follow the rational relation
831. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 376.
832. See, e.g., ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4519 (Feb. 12, 1982) (discussing defen-
dants' summary judgment motion in Nobriga v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Civ. No. 55-624
(1st Cir. Hawaii filed 1978)).
833. Bunch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 3-81-416 (E.D. Tenn. June 16, 1982),
reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5146, 5146-47 (June 25, 1982).
834. Id. The trial judge preferred to wat for the Sixth Circuit's decision in Moran v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982), which was pending and would
address the same issue.
835. Bunch v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 3-81-416 (E.D. Tenn. June 16, 1982),
reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5146-47 (June 25, 1982).
836. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 IM. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982) (Sullivan, J.,
specially concurring); see infra note 857.
837. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 376-77.
838. See supra notes 723-46 and accompanying text.
839. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 376-77.
840. See, e.g., Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Civ. Nos. 78-122 P &-79-228 P (D.




rule."41 Therefore, judges can prevent annihilation of a manufac-
turer by evaluating each punitive award in light of past and proba-
ble future awards.8 42 Courts also have hesitated to permit manu-
facturers to avoid imposition of punitive awards merely because
they injured a large number of persons with the same product.
43
Such a rule not only would fail to promote responsible product
marketing, but also would encourage manufacturers to continue in-
juring large numbers with a product to avoid punitive damages.
844
To date courts have resisted modifying existing punitive dam-
ages rules to cope with the problems of successive punitive awards
in asbestos litigation.4 5 One court suggested that if asbestos manu-
facturers seriously doubt their financial ability to survive multiple
punitive damages awards, they should seek to settle all punitive
awards in a single class action .846 Recent developments, however,
suggest that this approach may not be a practicable alternative.84
At any rate, the courts believe that any change in present punitive
damages rules should come from the legislatures and seem content
to allow recovery under existing rules until those changes take
place. 48 Courts simply have refused to disallow a plaintiff punitive
damages because others have already received such awards in re-
lated litigation.849
The overkill or annihilation defense has lost impetus over the
years because punitive damages awards in mass-marketed products
liability litigation have not yet destroyed a manufacturer. Thus,
many have concluded that Judge Friendly's opinion in Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc.850 exaggerated the danger of financial dis-
aster in this type of litigation.8 51 Indeed, in the MER/29 drug liti-
gation, from which Roginsky arose, only three of 1500 cases re-
841. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 377; supra note
756.
842. See Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., Civ. Nos. 78-122 P & 79-228 P (D. Me.
Sept. 29, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREws) 4047 (Oct. 23, 1981).
843. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 I1. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982).
844. Id.
845. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d at 816-17.
846. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d at 654, 437 N.E.2d at 910.
847. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d
847, 850-54 (9th Cir. 1981) (refusing to allow class certification on the issue of punitive
damages).
848. Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d at 817.
849. Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 376-77 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
850. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); see supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
851. See, e.g., Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. at 376-77.
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sulted in punitive damages awards.8 52 Whether the asbestos
litigation will lead to the financial ruin of any of the major manu-
facturers is difficult to predict.e5  Over the last two years, however,
courts have levied large punitive damages awards against manufac-
turers on a consistent basis.854 Should this trend continue, the
threat of financial ruin could become a reality for even the largest
manufacturers.8 55 Since the courts defer to legislative action 85 leg-
islatures seriously should reevaluate the policy justifications under-
lying punitive damages and their utility in mass-marketed prod-
ucts liability litigation.
8 57
Several commentators have recommended solutions to the po-
tential overkill problem.858 First, states could adopt a uniform
standard of conduct requirement for imposing punitive damages in
products liability litigation 59 This standard would be higher than
that presently required to impose punitive damages and theoreti-
cally would reduce the number of cases in which punitive damages
awards are available.8 60 The primary weakness of this proposed so-
lution is its failure to eliminate the possibility of staggering multi-
ple punitive awards against the same manufacturer and to provide
additional judicial safeguards to prevent overkill.8 1 Second, the
legislature or the courts could impose a dollar limit on the amount
852. See Rheingold, supra note 828, at 136-37.
853. Of the 147 cases that have gone to trial, 21 have resulted in punitive damages
totalling $39,468,002. ASBEsTos LrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5663-71 (Oct. 8, 1982).
854. Id.
855. See supra note 715.
856. E.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 817 (6th Cir. 1982).
857. Justice Sullivan suggested that the Illinois Legislature consider the following fac-
tors in reevaluating its punitive damages policies:
(1) [W]hether the reason for punitive damages has ceased to exist and, if not, should
they be awarded only for extremely flagrant conduct; (2) whether recovery should be
allowed only by statute; (3) whether the amount recovered should bear some relation to
the harm involved and the compensatory damages received; (4) whether the awarding
of unlimited damages as a punishment to deter like offenses is unfair compared to the
fixed minimum and maximum criminal penalties which are also imposed as punish-
ment and deterrence; (5) whether the standard of proof should be "clear and convinc-
ing" rather than preponderance; and (6) whether payment of such awards should be
made other than to the already fully compensated plaintiffs, such as to a public fund.
Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, -, 437 N.E.2d 910, 915-16 (1982) (Sullivan, J.,
concurring).
858. See Punitive Damages, supra note 712, at 1325-71; Tozer, supra note 712, at 303-
04; Note, Overkill, supra note 712, at 1800-01.
859. Punitive Damages, supra note 712, at 1325-71.
860. The imposed standard would allow punitive damages only when the manufac-
turer knowingly misleads the public concerning the product's safety. Id. at 1361.
861. Since all who met the standard could recover punitive damages not subject to
judicial limitations, the possibility of overkill still would exist.
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of punitive damages available in particular types of mass-marketed
products liability litigation.6 2 This solution, however, fails to allow
for individual consideration of a particular plaintiff's injuries and
needs.""3 It also requires the body setting the dollar limitation to
estimate the number of cases that eventually will allow the imposi-
tion of punitive damages. 64 One writer has recommended a solu-
tion that would reduce significantly the possibility of overkill by
limiting the total amount of punitive damages recoverable in a par-
ticular suit to that portion of the award exceeding the highest pu-
nitive award in previous litigation of the same kind of suits.6 5 This
type of limitation, however, would create races to judgment and
increase the danger of forum shopping.8 "6 A third possible solution
is the total abolition of punitive damages. 67 Most scholars have
criticized this proposal because they believe that some form of pu-
nitive damages is necessary to ensure. that the judicial branch
maintains some control over manufacturers.868 Last, the courts
could consolidate all punitive damages claims against a manufac-
turer into a single action through the use of the class action.8 69
While some believe this solution is judicially feasible, 70 to date it
has not been successful in any mass-marketed products liability
862. Note, Overkill, supra note 712, at 1804-05.
863. Estimation would be necessary to ensure that the amount of punitive damages
eventually awarded would be high enough to punish and deter but low enough to prevent
financial ruin.
864. Note, Overkill, supra note 712, at 1804-05.
865. Id. at 1800-01. The judge in the first case coming to trial would give the usual
instructions concerning punitive damages. If the jury were to award punitive damages, the
plaintiff would receive the entire award. In subsequent cases judges would continue to in-
struct the juries on puntive damages; however, a subsequent plaintiff would receive punitive
damages only if the award in his case exceeded the awards in previous cases. Each time a
plaintiff's award exceeded the previous high award he would receive the difference between
his award and the previous award. Thus, the manufacturer ultimately would pay only as
much as the highest single award.
866. Since the first plaintiff is the only one assured of any punitive award, the likeli-
hood of races to judgment would increase. Also, since subsequent plaintiffs' only hope of
punitive damages is an award higher than all previous awards, the various states' punitive
damages laws would become more significant and plaintiffs would shop for the most liberal
forums.
867. Coccia & Morrissey, supra note 712, at 46.
868. See supra note 732 and accompanying text.
869. See, e.g., Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 I1. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982); In
re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 914-15
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (allowing class certification on issue of punitive damages), rev'd, 693 F.2d
847 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Note, Overkill, supra note 712, at 1803.
870. See, e.g., Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910; In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal.
1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
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litigation. 17 ' The chief criticisms of the consolidation solution are
that it fails to treat plaintiffs individually and that it ignores the
differences among state laws concerning punitive damages.
172
D. Summary
The debate over the validity and utility of punitive damages
continues. The special problems they present in mass-marketed
products liability litigation suggest the need for special rules to
govern their availability in this type of litigation. Some changes
must take place to prevent asbestos manufacturers and other man-
ufacturers from becoming overkill victims. In searching for a prac-
ticable solution, courts and legislatures should not constrain them-
selves to traditional punitive damages principles. Society and the
system of compensation have changed considerably since most of
these principles developed, and a complete reevaluation is there-
fore appropriate. Whatever solution courts and legislatures ulti-
mately adopt, its central characteristic must be fair-
ness873-manufacturers must receive protection from overkill, and
consumers must receive adequate protection from malicious injury.
VIII. INSURANCE ISSUES IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION
The expansive asbestos litigation and corresponding liability
of asbestos manufacturers pose grave problems for the insurance
industry. Insurance companies have divided both on the issue of
an insurer's obligation to asbestos claimants and manufacturers
and on definitions of insurance policy terms. Ascertaining which, if
any, insurance company has incurred the duty to defend and in-
demnify an asbestos manufacturer is difficult because many differ-
ent insurers may have insured a manufacturer during the progress
of a claimant's asbestos-related disease. Insurance companies and
manufacturers increasingly are asking the courts to decide which
insurer must bear liability. Insurers whom the courts find to be "on
the risk" 74 face thousands of claims.8 7 5 Three elements complicate
871. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982).
872. Reply Brief for Oregon Appellants at 2-5, In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon
Shield" Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982).
873. See Tozer, supra note 712, at 303-04.
874. The term "on the risk" describes the basic premise of insurance: the insured ex-
changes the risk of an unknown loss-liability-for a known loss-the premium payment.
The insurer agrees to assume the risk of liability in exchange for a fixed sum. See Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1041.
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the question of insurer liability: (1) the language of the insurance
policies and the inappropriateness of that language to asbestos-re-
lated disease; (2) the lack of medical evidence about this disease;
and (3) the public policy of maximizing coverage when the applica-
tion of the insurance policy is uncertain. When the insurance in-
dustry drafted and negotiated language in the insurance policies,
8 7
the concept of latent diseases was virtually unknown. 77 Also, at
the time the policies were drafted, liability operated differently.
8 7 8
Hence, policy language that requires a single injury is inappropri-
ate for latent diseases such as asbestos-related illnesses. In addi-
tion, the available medical data cannot explain the exact causes or
etiologies of the asbestos-related diseases.879 The lack of medical
information concerning these diseases makes it difficult for courts
to interpret the insurance clauses and delineate liability clearly.
Nevertheless, courts must assign liability. Not surprisingly, public
policy guidelines for insurance contract interpretation play a major
role in courts' eventual assignment of liability and largely explain
the varied results.880
Two main theories have developed to determine when the in-
surer's responsibility to provide insurance coverage for asbestos in-
juries arises: the "exposure" and the "manifestation" theories.
875. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir.) (6000
suits), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 164 (1981); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insula-
tions, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (2000 suits), clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F.
Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1981) (5000 suits), aff'd as modified, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
876. The language of an insurance policy determines the extent of the insurer's duty
to defend or indemnify. See infra notes 896-908 and accompanying text.
877. See Comment, Insurer Liability in the Asbestos Disease Context-Application of
the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 27 S.D.L. REv. 239, 242-43 (1982). But see American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Agricola Furnace Co., 236 Ala. 535, 183 So. 677 (1938) (silicosis case
concerning 10-year exposure period).
878. See infra text accompanying notes 896-935. During its development, tort law has
shifted liability from the injured party to the manufacturer based on the theory that indus-
try more easily can spread the risk among members of society through insurance and in-
creased production costs. Strict liability for manufacturers, as courts have interpreted it, has
changed tort law considerably. Today, unlike the period in which asbestos manufacturers
and insurers entered into insurance contracts, manufacturers are better prepared for the
consequences of a litigious public and an accommodating common law. In the past, compa-
nies took precautions that were wholly inadequate for the modern context in which claim-
ants are testing them. See W. PROSSER, supra note 29, §§ 96-104.
879. Although the medical community became aware of asbestosis in the early 1900's,
recognition of the general danger of latent diseases associated with asbestos did not occur
until the late 1960's or early 1970's. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d
1034 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 164 (1981); infra text accompanying notes 936-56.
880. See generally AC&S, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 544 F. Supp. 128, 129
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (discussing various theories of interpretation applicable to the policies).
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Under the exposure theory, the claimant's exposure to asbestos
triggers policy coverage. Hence, all insurers on the risk88 1 are liable
during the years of the claimant's exposure.882 The manifestation
theory states that the insurer is not liable until the diagnosis of the
disease or the manifestation of physical symptoms.8 8s Both theo-
ries are imperfect, and numerous versions of each exist.884 This
part of the Special Project examines the three elements that courts
use to determine the imposition of insurer liability: the language of
the Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policy, medical evi-
dence, and public policy guidelines for interpreting insurance poli-
cies. This part then analyzes these elements in terms of the theo-
ries on which courts have relied to determine insurance coverage
for asbestos-related "injury."
A. The Asbestos Litigation Problem
Claimants who have suffered injury from asbestos products
have filed a virtual avalanche of lawsuits against asbestos manufac-
turers. Present estimates of the number of cases range as high as
35,000,885 and manufacturers have spent millions of dollars in the
defense and resolution of these claims.8 8 As manufacturers' costs
have mounted, manufacturers have put increasing pressure on in-
surance companies to indemnify them. 1 7 The insurance compa-
nies, of course, are reluctant to accept liability for claims whose
average cost to resolve or defend is $170,000. ss' If, as former Secre-
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph Califano has esti-
881. See supra note 874.
882. See infra text accompanying notes 977-85.
883. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1216
n.8.
884. See infra text accompanying notes 1001-19.
885. See Mansfield, supra note 7, at 865-67; see also Porter v. American Optical Corp.,
641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.) (liability imposed on manufacturer of respirator and filter appara-
tus), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
886. See Comment, supra note 877, at 240.
887. See Mansfield, supra note 7, at 877.
888. See COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE COMPANIES ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES TASK
FORCE, ASBESTOS... A SOCIAL PROBLEM 34 (May 12, 1981) (citing Insurance Services Office,
1977 Survey of Product Liability Closed Claims in the United States 38) [hereinafter cited
as ASBESTOS ... A SOCIAL PROBLEM]. Johns-Manville Corporation estimates its cost per
lawsuit at $18,690. Affadavit of John F. Beasley, In re Johns-Manville Corp., No. 82 B
(S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 26, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LIG. REP. (ANDREws) 5419, 5423
(Aug. 27, 1982). One commentator has estimated the average settlement per worker to be
$175,000. Winter, Defendant Asbestos Firms Form an Alliance, 68 A.B.A. J., 137, 137
(1982). Projection of the disposition costs for future cases raises these figures to $40,600.
Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 53.
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mated, the future death toll from asbestos exposure is 5.6 million
people,889 the ultimate cost of asbestos litigation will be monumen-
tal. Manville Corporation's filing for reorganization under the pro-
tection of the bankruptcy laws is evidence of this great economic
pressure on the asbestos industry.89 0
The controversy between manufacturers and insurers and
among the insurers arises out of the language of the insurance poli-
cies and the latent nature of asbestos-related diseases.9 Typically,
claimants name numerous manufacturers as defendants in lawsuits
brought for disabilities that resulted from exposure to asbestos
over a number of years. Because asbestos-related diseases occur af-
ter long periods of exposure to the mineral's fibers, no discrete
time of "injury" is identifiable.9 2 Additionally, a manufacturer's
insurance companies change over time. With the enormous sums of
money at issue, parties have asked courts to interpret insurance
policies, and if necessary, to determine and apportion liability.
B. The Policy Language
The terms of the insurance contract determine insurer liability
for indemnification and for costs of defense. In asbestos cases the
insurance contract is a CGL policy, which the company issues each
year to the insured.898 Because the pertinent language is the same
in policies of different insurers, examination of language changes
over time is more instructive than a comparison of the terms that
various firms use." Typically, insurer liability questions focus on
the interpretation of the CGL policies that were in force during the
three stages of the development of asbestos-related disabilities: ex-
889. ASBESTOS... A SOCAL PROBLEM, supra note 888, at 13.
890. For a detailed discussion of Chapter 11 reorganization filings by Manville Corpo-
ration, UNARCO, and Amatex Corporation, see infra part XI.
891. The insurance policy provides for coverage at the time of the "injury." Latent
diseases, however, cause injuries over a period of time and hence do not permit identifica-
tion of a discrete temporal period for imposition of insurer liability. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 896-905.
892. See Keene Corp v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1042-47 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 164 (1981).
893. Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) policies utilize the same terms to facili-
tate easy comparison of coverage by customers. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 339-40.
894. For a summary of language changes over time, see Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1227-28 (6th Cir. 1980) (table showing variance
in language from 1955-1976), clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686
(1981); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1053-57 (table showing variance
in language from 1961-1980).
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posure, exposure in residence, and manifestation." 5
1. The Duty to Indemnify
Most CGL insurance contracts contain the language of the
forms drafted by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters
and the Mutual Insurance Ratings Bureau." e A typical indemnity
clause provides:
The [insurer] will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury
... to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the com-
pany shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured
seeking damages on account of such bodily injury ... even if any of the
allegations of the suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent .... 897
In most insurance policies the existence of a "bodily injury"
triggers the duty to indemnify. 9 8 The policies generally define
"bodily injury" as "bodily injury, sickness or disease." ' Upon a
showing of bodily injury, any liability of the insured becomes that
of the insurer. A few insurance contracts, however, stipulate that
the trigger of coverage is the "occurrence." s00 Prior to 1966 policies
used the term "accident," but the growing awareness of progressive
and cumulative diseases has prompted a shift in language.90 1
895. These periods represent the stages of asbestos-related disease development. The
"exposure" period i§ the time during which the claimant inhales asbestos fibers. The period
during which each fiber affects the body is the latency or "exposure in residence" period.
The final stage is the "manifestation" of the disease in a clinically diagnosable form. See
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1042-44.
896. Ingram, supra note 10, at 339-40.
897. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1039; see supra cases cited
note 894.
898. E.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir.
1982); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1042; Porter v. American Optical
Corp., 641 F.2d at 1145; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
at 1216.
899. See supra cases cited note 898.
900. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., No. 81-2129
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1981) (available April 1, 1983, on LExIs, Genfed library, Dist file).
901. Commentators differ on the meaning of and the reasons for this shift. See In-
gram, supra note 10, at 340 n.126:
The definition [of occurrence] embraces an injurious exposure to conditions which re-
sult in injury. Thus, it is no longer necessary that the event causing the injury will be
simultaneous with the exposure. However, in some other cases, injuries will take place
over a long period of time before they become manifest. The slow ingestion of foreign
matters and inhalation of noxious fumes are examples of injuries of this kind. The
definition serves to identify the time of loss for application of coverage to these cases,
viz., the injury must take place during the policy period. This means that in exposure-
type cases, cases involving cumulative injuries, more than one policy contract may
come into play in determining coverage. Apparently, the phrase "including injurious
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Courts have interpreted "occurrence" to mean an accident, includ-
ing continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, that unexpect-
edly results in bodily injury or property damage during the policy
period.0 2 The terms "bodily injury" and "occurrence" are inappro-
priate for asbestos-related injury claims since the language fails to
describe diseases that are progressive and cumulative. Rather, the
terms are more suitable for typical industrial mishaps that take
place over short periods of time. The symptoms necessary to char-
acterize asbestosis, mesothelioma, and other asbestos-related con-
ditions take many years to develop fully. Hence, the courts fre-
quently must determine the meaning of policy language that fails
to describe accurately events that the contracting parties did not
foresee.9 03
2. The Duty to Defend
The CGL policy also standardized the policy language gov-
erning the duty to defend. Because the language is fairly broad,
however, ascertaining which insurer must defend is not as difficult
as determining which company has the duty to indemnify. For the
defendant manufacturer the question is still important, because for
every dollar the company spends in settlement or satisfaction of a
judgment, it must pay another dollar to defend the claims.904 The
broad policy language requires the insurer to defend any case
against the insured concerning alleged injury even if the allegations
of the suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent.905 The question that
arises is not whether the insurer has a duty to defend at all but
whether the insurer's duty has terminated. The court in Commer-
cial Union Insurance Co. v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.906 outlined
exposure to conditions which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury" was
intended to make coverage depend on whether bodily injury results during the policy
period, with the consequence that, if this intent is enforceable in the courts, an insurer
might escape liability by cancelling or declining to renew coverage before bodily injury
resulted.
Id. (citing Nachman The New Policy Provisions for General Liability Insurance, in 18 THE
ANNALS 197 (1965)); see 2 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABmrry INSURANCE, §§ 11.05-.05A (1981).
902. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1228.
903. Once the court determines the meaning of the policy language, it then must de-
termine the scope and extent of the policy's coverage. For a discussion of insurance coverage
theories in asbestos litigation, see infra notes 971-1019 and accompanying text.
904. See ASBESTOS.. .A SOCIAL PROBLEm, supra note 888, at 36.
905. E.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1039; Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., No. 81-2129 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1981) (available
Apr. 1, 1983, on LExis, Genfed library, Dist file).
906. No. 81-2129 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1981) (available Apr. 1, 1983, on LExis, Genfed
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the two divergent views on this issue. One approach indicates that
the insurer must defend even if it no longer has a duty to indem-
nify the insured. 7 The opposing view relates the extent of the
duty to defend to the limits on the indemnification coverage.908
a. Continuing Duty to Defend
Most courts that have interpreted duty to defend clauses have
found, absent specific language to the contrary, that the duty to
defend continues despite fulfillment of the duty to indemnify.90
These courts have perceived the duty to indemnify and the duty to
defend as two independent obligations under the insurance
contract. 10
Anchor Casualty Co. v. McCaleb91 illustrates this approach.
McCaleb concerned an oil well explosion that caused property
damage and resulted in four claims that exceeded the insured's
policy limits.912 Insurer wanted to pay the amount of the policy
limit for indemnity into the court and thus shift the duty to de-
fend to the insured. 93 The court refused to allow insurer to avoid
its obligation on the ground that the policy language clearly distin-
guished between the duties to defend and indemnify."14 In view of
McCaleb, its progeny,91 5 and strong policy considerations that op-
erate to protect the insured, the insurer may not abandon its duty
to defend upon fulfillment of its duty to indemnify.1
library, Dist file).
907. See, e.g., American Casualty Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951); Anchor
Casualty Co. v. McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1949); Simmons v. Jeffords, 260 F. Supp.
641 (E.D. Pa. 1966); National Casualty Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 230 F. Supp. 617
(N.D. Ohio 1964); Travelers Indem. Co. v. East, 240 So. 2d 277 (Miss. 1970); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, 433 P.2d 795 (1967); Kocse v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 159 N.J. Super. 340, 387 A.2d 1259 (1978); American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble
Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 1954), appeal with-
drawn, 1 A.D.2d 1008, 154 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1956).
908. See, e.g., General Casualty Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1964); Denham
v. LaSalle-Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Montgomery Trucking Co., 328 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. Ga. 1971); National
Union Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 301 A.2d 222 (D.C. 1973); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Mead Corp., 219 Ga. 6, 131 S.E.2d 534 (1963); Oda v. Highway Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 235,
194 N.E.2d 489 (1963).
909. See supra cases cited note 907.
910. Id.
911. 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1949).
912. Id. at 324.
913. Id. at 325.
914. Id.
915. See supra cases cited note 907.
916. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., No. 81-2129 (E.D.
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The court in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North
America,917 which concerned policy coverage of liability for asbes-
tos-related diseases, adopted the McCaleb view.1 8 In reaching its
decision that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to in-
demnify," 9 the court emphasized its desire to increase efficiency
and to minimize confusion in the already complex tort litigation.92 0
Hence, the court held that the insurance company selected by the
manufacturer must defend defendant's claim.921 The Keene court
chose this approach to avoid resolving insurance contract disputes
and the victim's tort claims in the same lawsuit.922 If a court were
to insist upon resolving the tort and contract issues together, all
defendants would have to join other asbestos manufacturers and
their insurers in each tort suit. 23 Each suit would become an "un-
wieldly spectacle," with inconvenience and high litigation costs to
the victim, whose action for damages would be the scene of dis-
putes among the defendants. 24
b. Limited Duty to Defend
Some courts have found that an insurer's duty to defend ter-
minates upon its exhaustion of policy limits by payment of judg-
ment or settlement.92 5 These courts interpret the duties as coex-
tensive-upon performance of the obligation of payment by the
insurer its duty to defend ceases. 28 In Lumberman's Mutual Cas-
ualty Co. v. McCarthy927 two lawsuits arose out of an automobile
accident.9 28 Insurer defended the insured in both suits. After the
court had reached a verdict on one suit 29 and insurer had paid the
policy limit in satisfaction of the judgment, insurer refused to con-
tinue defending the insured in the subsequent suit.930 Finding that
the duty to indemnify represented the extent of insurer's obliga-
Pa. Dec. 4, 1981) (available April 1, 1983, on LExis, Genfed library, Dist file).
917. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1644 (1982).
918. 667 F.2d at 1038.
919. Id. at 1050.
920. Id. at 1050-51.
921. Id. at 1051.
922. Id.
923. Id. at 1051 n.38.
924. Id.
925. See supra cases cited note 908.
926. Id.
927. 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939).
928. Id. at 320-21, 8 A.2d at 751.
929. Id., 8 A.2d at 751.
930. Id., 8 A.2d at 751.
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tion to the insured, the McCarthy court ruled that insurer was free
to withdraw from further defense of the insured.9 1
No courts have applied McCarthy to policy coverage in asbes-
tos litigation. In Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Pittsburgh
Corning Corp.932 Commercial Union argued that since the insur-
ance contract was between businesses and parties that were of rela-
tively equal bargaining power, the ordinary tenets of contract law
should apply to the policy. Therefore, insurer asserted, strict con-
struction of the contract and adoption of the public policy ration-
ale that supports resolving ambiguities in favor of the insured in-
appropriate." The Pittsburgh Corning court, however, looked
beyond the economic parity of the individual parties to the insur-
ance contract itself and focused on the parties' relative sophistica-
tion regarding the contract. The court strictly -construed the con-
tract language that required insurer to "defend any suit" to mean
that "insurer must continue to defend the insured after exhaustion
of policy limits. 9 34 Commercial Union asserted that the terms of
the contract were not ambiguous and did not require strict con-
struction in favor of the insured. The court, however, pointed to a
subsequent redrafting of the policy language that specifically lim-
ited the duty to defend as indicative of ambiguity in the policy.
The Pittsburgh Corning court rejected the McCarthy view and
concluded that the contract required Commercial Union to con-
tinue to defend Pittsburgh Corning Corporation.
93 5
C. Medical Evidence
The lack of medical information about asbestos-related dis-
eases has contributed to the difficulty in assigning liability among
insurers. Medical experts have identified asbestos as a causative
agent in three diseases: asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung can-
cer.' 36 Asbestosis, the most common asbestos-related disease, re-
sults from the inhalation of asbestos fibers. 7 The mining, process-
ing, or use of asbestos on construction sites releases asbestos fibers
931. Id. at 323, 8 A.2d at 752.





936. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 320-25; Mansfield, supra note 7, at 861-64.
937. See generally I. SELIKOFF & D. LE, supra note 10; Selikoff, Bader, Churg, &
Hammond, Asbestosis and Neoplasia, 42 AM. J. MED. 487 (1967); Selikoff, Churg, & Ham-
mond, supra note 10.
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into the air and workers in the area inhale the fibers into their
lungs. The fibrous lung tissue encapsulates the particles and traps
them in one area of the lung. As the amount of asbestos fibers in
the lung increases, the area of healthy lung tissue decreases, which
in turn impairs the pulmonary function. After years of exposure to
asbestos a victim's lung becomes covered with scar tissue. The lung
volume decreases, the efficiency of oxygen transfer diminishes and
disability results. Asbestosis is a progressive disease-the more
fibers that a worker inhales the greater the chance that he will con-
tract the disease. The precise amount of inhaled asbestos fibers
that causes the disease varies among individuals. "
Mesothelioma, another asbestos-related disability, is a cancer
of the cells that surround the organs in the chest cavity and line
the chest wall.939 Unlike asbestosis, mesothelioma is not "dose-re-
sponsive."9' 40 Generally, mesothelioma manifests itself approxi-
mately twenty years or more after an excessive inhalation of asbes-
tos.941 The disease is invariably fatal within several years of its
development. 42 Lung cancer follows a similar pattern of develop-
ment.9 43 Although medical research has not established a correla-
tion between inhalation of asbestos and the development of the
cancer,94 4 asbestos inhalation apparently accelerates the develop-
ment of lung cancer among workers who smoke.94 5 Doctors also
have linked inhalation of asbestos to heart disease.9 46 The encapsu-
lation of fibers and destruction of lung tissues that occur during
the development of asbestosis increases the resistance of the blood
flow through the pulmonary capillary bed. This condition, known
as coT pulmonale, strains the heart, which enlarges to accommo-
date the strain and eventually collapses.
94
938. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 320-21.
939. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 n.3 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 104 (1981); Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,
1083 (5th Cir. 1973).
940. Dose-responsive refers to a disease that develops in direct relation to the external
stimulus. The development of mesothelioma does not bear this linear relation to the dosages
of asbestos that a claimant receives. See Selikoff, Bader, Churg, & Hammond, supra note
937, Selikoff, Churg, & Hammond, supra note 140.
941. See Note, supra note 2, at 242 n.24. But see Ingram, supra note 10, at 321-22
(disease can manifest itself anywhere between 31/2 and 77 years after inhalation).
942. I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 10, at 303.
943. Id. at 26-28.
944. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1214 n.1
(6th Cir. 1980), clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
945. L SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 10, at 185.




The latent nature of asbestos-related diseases in general, and
asbestosis in particular, frustrates the resolution of legal issues in
the insurance area. Because the available medical data cannot
pinpoint accurately the moment that an asbestos-related disability
occurs, courts cannot ascertain precisely when a victim's "bodily
injury" existed.9 4 8 Judge Merritt, in his dissent in Insurance Co. of
North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,94 9 advocated di-
viding the progression of asbestosis into three stages: exposure, dis-
coverability, and manifestation.950 According to this scheme, the
disease begins upon an individual's exposure to asbestos fibers; the
disease becomes discoverable at some point through the use of X-
rays or biopsy procedures; and later, the disease becomes
diagnosable because it manifests itself through physical symp-
toms.9 51 Judge Merritt advocated assigning "bodily injury" to the
discovery date-a date set ten years after'the initial inhalation of
asbestos fibers.9 52 Alternatively, some courts have assigned the
point of injury to the exposure date when the fiber strikes the lung
tissue and initiates the body's defense mechanism.953 Other courts
have found the moment of injury to coincide with the manifesta-
tion of the disease.9 5' Finally, the court in Keene Corp. v. Insur-
ance Co. of North America955 ruled that bodily injury was a pro-
cess that endured from initial exposure through manifestation of
the disease.9 6
D. Policies Governing Insurance Policy Interpretation
Contract law dictates that the terms which appear in the con-
tract must govern because these terms indicate the intent of the
signers. 57 Hence, courts construe the words or phrases in their
plain and ordinary meaning;95 1 they construe ambiguous language,
948. See supra text accompanying notes 896-903.
949. 633 F.2d at 1229.
950. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 1001-11.
951. 633 F.2d at 1229.
952. Id. at 1230-31.
953. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 657 F.2d at
816; infra notes 973-87 and accompanying text.
954. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 19 (1st
Cir. 1982); infra notes 980-1000 and accompanying text.
955. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007; see infra notes 1012-
19 and accompanying text.
956. 667 F.2d at 1045-46.
957. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRA CTS § 113 (1974).
958. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at
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however, against the drafter of the contract. 59 In insurance law, in
which contracts of adhesion are prevalent,960 this policy is even
stronger. Courts construe ambiguous language against the drafter-
insurer to secure the reasonable expectations of the parties.96
Because the ambiguous terms "injury" and "occurrence" do
not define a discrete temporal period as the time of injury for as-
bestos-related diseases, 6 2 courts must use policy guidelines and ju-
dicial draftsmanship to interpret the terms of the CGL policies. To
pursue a policy goal of maximizing coverage to the insured, courts
frequently apply different theories of policy coverage to the same
terms in different insurance contracts. For example, in Insurance
Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.968 the court
faced two possible constructions of the insurance contract-one
that would provide coverage to Forty-Eight Insulations and one
that would leave the company uninsured. 64 The court construed
the language of the policy to fit the exposure theory of liability
because that interpretation permitted recovery.96 5 Conversely, in
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.9"6
the court applied the manifestation theory to virtually identical
terms to permit maximum insurance coverage to the insured.
67
Both courts gave great deference to the expectations of the in-
sured,6 " and the court in Eagle-Picher stated:
When purchasing liability insurance, a company in the shoes of Eagle-
Picher would have the following expectations. It would reasonably expect
that it could buy insurance and that the insurance would provide coverage for
lawsuits alleging damage occurring during the term of insurance resulting
from products sold in the past .... [I]t would expect that it was covered for all
future liability, except for specific injuries of which it could have been aware
959. J. MURRAY, supra note 957, § 119.
960. See Comment, supra note 877, at 253.
961. Id. at 254.
962. See supra text accompanying notes 896-903.
963. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cirt. denied, 102
S. Ct. 686 (1981).
964. 633 F.2d at 1222.
965. Id.
966. 523 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1981), afl'd as modified, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
967. 523 F. Supp. at 118.
968. In Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the
dominant purpose of the court was to secure indemnity for the insured. Id. at 1041; see
supra note 874. The court analyzed the "reasonable expectations" of the parties. See gener-
ally Comment, supra note 2, at 252-59 (discussing "reasonable expectation" doctrine, its
scope in insurance contracts, and its application in asbestos cases). The court also found
that whether or not manufacturers expected coverage for latent injuries, they clearly be-
lieved that they had purchased certainty up to the amounts of the policy limits. 667 F.2d at
1044-45.
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prior to its purchase of insurance, and that its security would not be under-
mined by the existence of prior periods in which it was uninsured
It would reasonably expect that the theories of liability under which it
was found liable would dictate the extent of its insurance coverage. '
Although each court chose a different theory of insurance coverage,
both sought to apply common, popular, and ordinary meaning to
the policy language to reflect accurately existing medical knowl-
edge about asbestos-related diseases.
9 70
E. Theories of Coverage
Courts have advanced two theories of insurer liability for
claims against insured manufacturers and distributors of asbestos:
the "exposure" theory and the "manifestation" theory. Each court
that has considered the asbestos insurance coverage question has
adopted some variation of one of these theories.9 7' Advocates of
both theories have agreed that the existence of "bodily injury"
triggers coverage under the CGL policies. 72 The theories diverge
on the question of when the injury occurred in asbestos-related
diseases.
1. The Exposure Theory
Under the exposure theory "bodily injury" occurs upon a
claimant's first exposure to asbestos fibers.9 7 3 The theory requires
that an insurer who entered into an insurance contract with a man-
ufacturer during the time of a claimant's exposure defend and
idemnify the manufacturer against the claim . 74 Exposure theorists
consider the deposit of an asbestos fiber on a lung to constitute an
injury. Available medical data supports this position because as-
bestos-related diseases are cumulative; hence some injury occurs
with each deposit of fiber.97 5 Proponents of the exposure theory
969. Brief for Appellant at 27, Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682
F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOs LriG. REP. (ANDREws) 4474 (Jan. 22, 1982).
970. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 115-16.
971. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
972. See id. at 24; Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1042 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 164 (1981); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., 633 F.2d at 1218. But see Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., No.
81-2129 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1981) (available Apr. 1, 1983, on LsxS, Genfed library, Dist file)
(court "unsure whether 'injury' or 'occurrence' must occur during the policy period").
973. Brief for Appellant at 27, Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.. Co., 682
F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), reprinted in ASBEsTos LrrIG. REP. (ANDREws) 4474 (Jan. 22, 1982).
974. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1224-25.
975. Id. at 1219.
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maintain that damage occurs continually throughout the term of
exposure, before the manifestation of any disease.7
Critics of the exposure theory have alleged that the approach
elevates the microscopic "insults" to lung tissue caused by the in-
halation of asbestos fibers to the status of a compensable "bodily
injury. '9 77 The exposure theory creates a fictional injury to assign
liability. Indeed, some medical evidence does exist to suggest that
inhalation of some quantity of asbestos will not cause identifiable
harm.
Application of the exposure theory by the courts has varied.
The district court in Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc.,978 which was the first court that considered
this insurance coverage question in the asbestos context,979
adopted the exposure theory.9 80 The court referred to exposure as
the period of inhalation of asbestos fibers.981 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision and
adopted the district court's interpretation of exposure.98 2 The cir-
cuit court, however, failed to clarify whether exposure included
only the period of inhalation of asbestos fibers or whether it also
included the latency period during which the disease was progress-
ing.983 In Porter v. American Optical Corp.9 84 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did nothing to clarify the
definition of exposure and chose instead to refer to the Forty-
Eight Insulations case as dispositive on all points.985
A conservative interpretation of exposure, which limits the ex-
posure period to the time of actual inhalation of asbestos fibers,
makes it more difficult for manufacturers to establish that they
had insurance. Most defendant-manufacturers have available evi-
dence of insurance coverage from about 1960 on,9 6 and some com-
976. See id. at 1217.
977. See id. at 1218-23.
978. 451 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), clari-
flied, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
979. See Comment, supra note 877, at 246.
980. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 451 F. Supp. at 1238.
1240.
981. Id.; see Oshinsky, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance: Trigger and
Scope of Coverage in Long-Term Exposure Cases, 17 FORUM 1035, 1042-43 (1982).
982. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980), clarified, 657 F.2d 12 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
983. 633 F.2d at 1222-23.
984. 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
985. 641 F.2d at 1145.
986. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1038 (D.C. Cir.),
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panies face great losses due to their inability to prove their insur-
ance prior to that date.
9 87
2. The Manifestation Theory
The manifestation theory imposes liability solely upon the in-
surer on the risk from the time that a claimant's injury manifests
itself through either physical symptoms or medical diagnosis.9s
Proponents of the manifestation theory argue that the exposure
theory is inappropriate because claimants are not filing suit for in-
dividual deposits of asbestos fibers on their lungs. Rather, claim-
ants sue because they have contracted an asbestos-related disabil-
ity. The necessary "bodily injury," therefore, occurs when the
disease manifests itself in physical symptoms and is provable.989
Insurance companies, which support the manifestation theory, are
its greatest beneficiaries because they have the opportunity to ad-
just the contracts and premiums of asbestos manufacturers accord-
ing to expected costs. 90 The problems of apportioning liability
among insurers under the exposure theory991 do not arise under the
manifestation theory because only one insurer will have to defend
and indemnify the claimant." 2 A flaw in the theory, however, is
the arbitrariness of the result. Injuries in latent diseases do not
occur upon diagnosis but at a point in time between exposure and
diagnosis."8 Additionally, since insurance companies have ceased
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 164 (1981); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d at 1142;
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1215; Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 117 (D. Mass. 1981), aff'd as modi-
fied, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982). Few companies keep records more than 15 or 20 years.
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1225 n.27.
987. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1225
n.27.
988. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 16; Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1045; Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641
F.2d at 1144; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1220;
AC&S, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 544 F. Supp. 128, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., No. 81-2129 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 1981) (available
Apr. 1, 1983, Lpms, Genfed library, Dist file).
989. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. at 116.
990. See Mansfield, supra note 7, at 876.
991. Some courts that apply the exposure theory assess joint and several liability for
indemnity. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1047. Other courts use
a pro rate exposure theory and apportion liability among the insurers on the risk during the
period of exposure. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at
1225; infra text accompanying notes 1020-27.
992. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 336.
993. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230.
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issuing policies to manufacturers that adequately protect them
from liability for asbestos-related disability, the manifestation the-
ory will result in a lack of insurance coverage for manufacturers.
The court in Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co.9 95 adopted the manifestation theory996 on the
ground that the policy language required that the disease or in-
jury, not the exposure, take place "during the policy period.
9 7
The court rejected as "fiction" the argument of exposure theory
proponents that each inhalation of asbestos fibers is an injury.99 8
The case represents an anamoly, however, because the manufac-
turer-insured propounded the manifestation theory to maximize its
coverage. 9 The court concluded that "[c]overage based on mani-
festation was certainly more desirable than coverage based on ex-
posure, given that Eagle-Picher was uninsured during the longest
period of exposure and that the number of claims was accelerating
during the period of coverage."'1000
3. The Discoverability/Arbitrary Date Theory
Judge Merritt in his dissent in Insurance Co. of North
America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. outlined a compromise
alternative to the exposure and manifestation theories.1001 Judge
Merritt's "discoverability" theory reflects the view that
"[a]sbestosis is a discoverable disease long before it reaches the ad-
vanced stage of manifestation.'10 0 2 The judge selected an arbitrary
point in time between exposure and manifestation as the date of
the disease's discoverability. 00 3 After analyzing the existing theo-
ries of coverage and medical data, Judge Merritt determined that
asbestosis "occurs" ten years after the first exposure. 004 He recog-
nized that because a typical claimant brings suit after the disease
has manifested itself, retrospective determinations of discoverabil-
994. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d at 23; see Keene Corp.
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1045.
995. 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982).
996. Id. at 16.
997. Id. at 19.
998. Id. at 19 n.3.
999. Id. at 16.
1000. Id. at 23.
1001. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230-32
(Merritt, J., dissenting).
1002. Id. at 1230.




ity are impractical, if not impossible. 1005 Although the theoretical
time frame concededly is arbitrary,1008 it does reflect a statistical
estimate of when diseases such as asbestosis are likely to de-
velop. 10 0 7 Courts that apply the discoverability theory would pro-
rate liability among insurers who were on the risk ten years after
the date of a victim's initial exposure.1008 Insurance companies cov-
ering manufacturers for periods during which the disease was in its
latent stage would not be liable to the insured.1009
Critics of the discoverability theory argue that, like the mani-
festation theory, it fails to recognize the medical evidence indicat-
ing that injury occurs with exposure.1010 Critics also assert that the
basis for Judge Merritt's rule is the state of the art for medical
diagnosis, not known medical data.1011
4. The Keene Approach
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America 01 3
adopted both the exposure and manifestation theories of insurance
coverage. Speaking for the court, Judge Bazelon, after reviewing
the available medical data and policy language, discussed the three
stages of asbestos-related disease: exposure, subsequent develop-
ment of the disease (exposure in residence), and manifestation. 101 3
He found that selection of either the exposure or manifestation
theories as the sole trigger of coverage would undermine the rights
and obligations that the insurance policy established. 101 4 In addi-
tion, the court ruled that exposure, exposure in residence, and
1005. Id. at 1230.
1006. Id. Judge Merritt pointed out that arbitrariness in the selection of a date is not
unusual in the field of law. The common law often has drawn arbitrary lines, such as the 21-
year adverse possession limitation. Id. at 1231 n.1.
1007. Id. at 1231.
1008. Id.
1009. Id.
1010. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., No. 81-2129 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 4, 1981) (available Apr. 1, 1983, on Laxus, Genfed library, Dist file).
1011. Judge Merritt based his choice of an arbitrary date on the most commonly avail-
able diagnostic device, an X-ray machine, which has inherent limitations. See Insurance Co.
of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1230 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
1012. 667 F.2d 1034, 1045 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 164 (1981).
1013. 667 F.2d at 1042.
1014. Id. at 1046. The court noted that neither the manifestation theory nor the expo-
sure theory provided Keene Corporation with the protection that it purchased by carrying
insurance. A manufacturer's insurance, according to the court, should cover the entire inju-
rious process. Id.
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manifestation all trigger coverage pursuant to the policies. °15 Ex-
posure to asbestos, the court stated, causes an immediate and dis-
crete injury that is part of the "injurious process" of asbestos-re-
lated diseases. 10 1 6 "Bodily injury" means "any part of the single
injurious process that asbestos-related diseases entail.' 0 17 The
court, therefore, concluded that both the exposure and manifesta-
tion theories were consistent with the language of the policies and
the expectations of the insured.
In the context of asbestos-related disease, the Keene court's
expansive interpretation of "bodily injury" is the most realistic
view that courts have espoused to date. Neither the proponents of
the exposure theory nor the advocates of the manifestation theory
can prove that the opposing viewpoint is incorrect. Each theorist
can state only that his method more appropriately effectuates the
"reasonable expectations" of the parties. Judge Bazelon, on the
other hand, accepts both theories as correct and at the same time
recognizes that asbestos-related diseases entail an "injurious pro-
cess."1018 The court's conclusion is consistent with insurance law,
which requires coverage of losses that have their genesis during a
period of coverage and continue after a policy's expiration. 01 9
Although the exposure theory properly reflects the medical ev-
idence that some "bodily injury" occurs with each inhalation of as-
bestos fibers, the theory does not take account of the injury that
occurs after the initial exposure and that develops over time. The
theory is also insufficient because it does not correspond with the
basis of the claimant's actionable injury-the manifestation of the
disease. The manifestation theory suffers from similar deficiencies.
The bodily injury caused by the inhalation of asbestos clearly oc-
curs at some point in time before the physical symptoms appear.
The Keene approach, therefore, provides the most rational cover-
age theory. By treating the disease as an injurious process, the the-
ory follows the real progress of the injury to assign liability appro-
priately. Furthermore, the theory serves the established public
policy of maximization of coverage.
1015. Id. at 1047.
1016. Id. at 1046.
1017. Id. at 1047.
1018. Id. at 1046-47.
1019. Id. at 1046.
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F. Additional Insurance Issues
1. Apportioning Liability
Courts that adopt the exposure theory0 20 but refuse to apply
joint and several liability021 must allocate liability among the dif-
ferent insurers on the risk. Most courts use a simple proportion of
the number of years during which an insurer was on the risk to the
total years of a victim's exposure.102 2 For example, if an insurer
were on the risk for two years and a claimant's exposure totaled
ten years, then that insurer is responsible for twenty percent of the
judgment against its insured.
102 3
Opponents of this pro rata exposure liability method argue
that the seemingly equitable arrangement fails to provide adequate
coverage for manufacturers that did not carry insurance or that
cannot provide records of insurance for the early years of a claim-
ant's exposure.1024 The Keene court indicated that none of the in-
surance policies provided for reductions in insurer liability for in-
juries occurring only partially within the policy period.10 25 The
Keene court also found that manufacturers expected their policies
to provide for full indemnification. The court concluded that each
insurer on the risk should be jointly and severally liable-limited,
of course, by the policy limits. °10 2 6 Proponents of apportioning lia-
bility have argued that an alternative approach is to assume that a
manufacturer was its own insurer during the years for which it
cannot prove coverage. The court in Forty-Eight Insulations
adopted this approach and required the manufacturer to assume
its share of the costs of defense and indemnity for any judgment or
settlement.
1 0 27
Courts that adopt the exposure theory or the Keene rationale
1020. E.g., Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981); In-
surance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1225.
1021. Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d at 1145; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1225.
1022. E.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1225.
1023. See id. at 1226.
1024. See supra text accompanying notes 986-87.
1025. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d at 1048.
1026. Id. at 1048-49. This holding rests upon the Keene court's belief that the domi-
nant purpose of a CGL is indemnity. Pursuant to this belief, the resulting theory of liability
for the insurer must guarantee the insured relief from all risk of liability. See id.
1027. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d at 1225.
The insured must bear the burden of proving that it carried insurance, and any pro rata
formula must consider all the years of exposure. Hence, courts often require the manufac-
turer to contribute its fair share for those years in which it either decided not to carry
insurance or cannot prove that it carried insurance.
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but reject pro rata liability could approach the overlapping cover-
age issue through a third variant. In automobile liability cases, in
which overlapping insurance coverage occurs frequently, insurers
argue about which one among them should shoulder the burden of
primary responsibility.'0 2 8 After primary liability is assigned, the
other insurers pay only for losses that exceed the policy limits of
the primary insurer. In the asbestos context the underlying theo-
ries of liability may make this approach difficult to apply. Under
the exposure theory courts cannot assess primary liability because
they deem each exposure equally causative of the asbestos-related
disease. The Keene approach likewise does not offer an opportu-
nity for insurers to shift the blame among themselves because the
court assigns liability based on the concept of the disease as a con-
tinual process. 102 9 This rationale does not permit insurers to argue
over which link in the process should be primarily liable. Given the
millions of dollars at stake in asbestos litigation,030 however, insur-
ers should begin to examine legitimate means of delaying the im-
position of liability so that they can maximize the time that they
might use their funds for investment. As asbestos litigation and
the search for solvent defendants continue to increase, insurers
must begin to shift the liability among themselves, not to avoid
fault, but to gain use of their money for valuable time.'
0 3
2. Stacking of Policy Limits
Courts that apply the exposure theory of coverage face a
troublesome problem concerning the stacking of policy liability
limits. Following the exposure theory to its logical conclusion, each
exposure to asbestos fibers by a claimant is a separate, distinct in-
jury. In Forty-Eight Insulations twelve insurance policies were in
issue with limits ranging from $300,000 to $1,000,000.103' 2 The com-
bined total limit was $5.6 million. If each inhalation or exposure
were to constitute a separate injury, however, the resulting cover-
age would far exceed $5.6 million. 033 The Forty-Eight Insulations
1028. See, e.g., Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d
958 (9th Cir. 1952); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Home Indem. Ins. Co., 23 Ohio St. 2d
45, 261 N.E.2d 128 (1970); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Or. 110, 346
P.2d 643 (1959).
1029. See supra text accompanying notes 1012-17.
1030. See supra notes 886-87 and accompanying text.
1031. See generally 3 R. LONG, supra note 901, §§ 22.01-.11 (1981).




court noted the policy language, which stated that "for the purpose
of determining the limit of the company's liability, all bodily injury
and property damage arising out of continuous or repeated expo-
sure to substantially the same general conditions shall be consid-
ered as arising out of one occurrence."1034 The court concluded that
the limit of any insurer's liability for the year of exposure was the
policy limit, and the court placed the limit on insurer liability at
the policy limit "per occurrence.'
'0 3 5
G. Summary
Manufacturers and insurers are only beginning to feel the
enormous economic impact of asbestos litigation.103 6 As claimants
continue to seek remedies from manufacturers-either informally
or in judicial proceedings-manufacturers must turn to their insur-
ers. Courts have interpreted policies issued in the 1950's to ensure
relief today.10 37 Following a policy of maximizing coverage, courts
have awarded judgments against insurers as sources for claimants'
relief. Insurers fear for their own continued existence because of
enormous potential liability from asbestos-related claims. Com-
plaining of their characterization as "deep pockets,"10 38 insurers
have emphasized that their ability to function depends on the ac-
curacy with which they are able to balance earnings from premi-
ums with actuarily calculated loss estimates.103 9 Gross shifts in the
manner of imposing liability destroy this balance.10 40 Furthermore,
insurance companies have asserted that when calculating premi-
ums in the 1950's they could not have foreseen the large jury
awards of the 1980's.
In their efforts to avoid future asbestos litigation, insurance
companies have made it difficult, if not impossible, for manufac-
turers to obtain insurance covering asbestos-related losses.
104'
1034. See Ingram, supra note 10, at 354 n.187 (citing Brief for Appellant at 56, Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980)).
1035. Id.
1036. See ASBESTOS . . .A SOCIAL PROBLEM, supra note 888.
1037. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982);
Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
104 (1981); Porter v. American Optical Co., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981); Insurance Co. of
N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), clarified, 657 F.2d
814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
1038. See ASBESTOS... A SocIAL PROBLEM, supra note 888, at 34-39.
1039. See id. at 37-39.
1040. See id.
1041. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212
(6th Cir. 1980), clarified, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 686 (1981).
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Johns-Manville Corporation recently filed suit against its insurers
to require them to pay the claims that the insurers already
owed.10 42 Court decisions that artificially maximize coverage force
the insurance industry to redistribute assets that the companies
maintained for other purposes.10 43 The real costs will be borne by
the general public in the form of increased overall premium rates
and decreased insurance industry investment.10 44 The side effect of
the forceful public policy concerns in asbestos litigation is inconsis-
tent court determinations. The courts themselves freely admit that
no one theory of liability suits the realities of asbestos-related dis-
ease better than another. Indeed, courts assign liability according
to which theory provides greater insurance coverage to the manu-
facturer. This ad hoc determination can only lead insurers to pre-
dict that if insurer liability can be found, then it will. As a result,
premiums will rise, and investment will decrease, and insurance
companies will continue to be reluctant or unwilling to insure man-
ufacturers that engage in asbestos-related activities.
IX. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Because most asbestos-related disease cases have arisen from
occupational exposures,10 45 workers' compensation is a significant
available remedy. Injured asbestos employees may use workers'
compensation as one-half of a two-part plan to recover damages:
the employee may institute a products liability tort action against
the manufacturer and supplier of the asbestos product and also
may seek a smaller but more dependable award from his employer
through workers' compensation.1 0 46 Recognizing the delays inher-
ent in the workers' compensation process and the inadequacy of
the proffered award, °1 0 4 most claimants choose the tort remedy.
104 8
1042. E.g., Memorandum submitted by Johns-Manville parties, In re Asbestos Ins.
Coverage Cases, No. 753885 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 13, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrIo.
REP. (ANDREWS) 5453 (Aug. 27, 1982) (suit by Johns-Manville Corporation against Travel-
lers Indemnity Company for indemnification).
1043. See ASBESTOS... A SOCIAL PROBLEM, supra note 888, at 34-39.
1044. Id.
1045. ASBESTOS ... A SOCIAL PROBLEM, supra note 888, at 18.
1046. H.R. 5735 Hearings, supra note 13, at 508 (statement of Daniel W. Vennoy of
the National Association of Manufacturers).
1047. See infra text accompanying notes 1082-1152.
1048. H.R. 5735 Hearings, supra note 13, at 508. Some claimants pursue both a tort
remedy and workers' compensation relief. Id. If both actions succeed, courts generally re-
duce the amount of tort damages by the amount of the workers' compensation award. Some
courts, however, have forced the manufacturer to bear the entire cost of the liability, includ-
ing the workers' compensation award. Id. at 512; see infra notes 1167-91 and accompanying
[Vol. 36:573
ASBESTOS LITIGATION
The thousands of employees of asbestos products manufacturers,
however, cannot profit from this two-part remedy because every
workers' compensation program incorporates the exclusive remedy
doctrine, which limits an employee's recovery to workers' compen-
sation by estopping the employee from suing the employer in
tort.10 49 Workers' compensation awards, although minimal, often
provide the asbestos employee's only means of recovery.
This part of the Special Project examines the exclusive rem-
edy doctrine and the options available to an employee when exclu-
sive remedy precludes tort relief. Discussion of the background of
workers' compensation, the exclusive remedy doctrine, and the
present deficiencies in workers' compensation precedes an exami-
nation of the erosion of employer's exclusive remedy and the suc-
cess of employees in suing their employers concerning asbestos-
realted diseases. This part concludes with suggested alternatives
available to workers' compensation claimants.
A. History of Workers' Compensation
The workers' compensation concept did not exist before late
nineteenth century industrialization.1050 The few injured employees
who sought relief05 1 relied upon the sympathy of the employer or
a suit at common law. The industrial revolution rendered this
method of compensation inadequate because mechanization enor-
mously increased on-the-job injuries.10 52 Employers also became
more adept at defending actions by using three defenses to avoid
liability:1053 contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and per-
haps most importantly, the "fellow servant rule. 1054 Further, em-
ployees had difficulty obtaining testimony because most fellow em-
text.
1049. See infra text accompanying notes 1073-81.
1050. S. HoRoviTz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 2
(1944).
1051. Id.
1052. See id. at 6.
1053. Id. at 2.
1054. The fellow servant rule
precluded a servant's recovery from his employer for any injury in the course of em-
ployment when such injury was caused solely by the negligence of another servant of
the employer engaged in the same general business and not by any lack of due care on
the part of the employer himself.
M. Lowe, Erosion of the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine: The Continuing Assault 1 (Feb. 4-6,
1981) (report presented to the California Self-Insurers Association). This defense particu-
larly was harmful to employee suits. See S. HOROVWTZ, supra note 1050, at 3.
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ployees were reluctant to testify against their employers.1055 In
short, the common law could not provide effective relief-em-
ployee actions overwhelmingly failed'0 56 and the time and expense
of litigation diminished the awards of the few that succeeded.0 5
Responding to this injustice, courts'0 58 urged legislators to devise a
new form of relief for injured employees. Consequently, between
1910 and 1920 many legislatures enacted workers' compensation
statutes,'0 59  "imperfect but humane efforts to bring timely
financial assistance to those who suffer industrial casualties."'1060
Workers' compensation statutes typically afford recovery to
employees for accidental injuries incurred in the course of employ-
ment. 10 ' The acts assure injured employees of dependable, albeit
limited, recovery' 2 because employers are liable regardless of
fault. e0 63 To recover from the employer, the employee must prove
1055. Comment, Intentional Employer Torts and Workers' Compensation: A Legal
Morass, 11 PAC. L.J. 187, 189 (1979); see 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION § 4.30 (1976).
1056. Between 70 and 94% of employee suits resulted in no recovery. E. BLAIR, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW 1-1 (1968); see also S. HOROVITZ, supra note 1050, at 2-3 (80% of
the cases went uncompensated).
1057. E. BLAIR, supra note 1056, at 1-1.
1058. See, e.g., Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911). Attacking the
injustice, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
Legislate as we may ... for safety ... devices the army of the injured will still in-
crease, the price of our manufacturing greatness will still have to be paid in human
blood and tears. To speak of the common-law personal injury action as a remedy for
this problem is to jest with serious subjects, to give a stone to one who asks for bread.
Id. at 348, 133 N.W. at 215.
1059. See E. BLAIR, supra note 1056, at 1-1; S. HOROVITZ, supra note 1050, at 6-7.
Switzerland enacted the first workers' compensation law in 1877; Germany (1883) and Eng-
land (1897) had enacted statutes before New York in 1910 passed the first statute in the
United States. See E. BLAIR, supra note 1056, at 1-1. Every state now has a workers' com-
pensation statute. See id.
1060. Id. Humanitarianism was not the only impetus for the enactment of workers'
compensation statutes, for legislatures also desired to systematize the payment of awards to
injured employees. In Union Iron Works v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 190 Cal. 33, 210 P.
410 (1922), the California Supreme Court noted that the
economic thought that personal injury losses incident to an industry [should be] a part
of the costs of production to be borne, just as the depreciation and replacement of a
machine is borne, by the industry itself, which compensation will be included in the
cost of the product of the industry.
Id. at 39, 210 P. 413.
1061. The statutes of 39 states specify that coverage is only for employees injured "by
accident." Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARv. L. REV. 916, 921
(1980). For a discussion of the unfortunate effect these "by accident" clauses have upon
occupational disease claimants, see infra notes 1097-1101 and accompanying text.
1062. Vieweg, Erosion of the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine: Actions Against the Em-
ployer, 17 FORUM 422, 422 (1981).
1063. See, e.g., id.
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he suffered a compensable injury and must establish a causal rela-
tionship between the employment and the injury.11 64 Because the
imposition of no-fault liability greatly increases the number of
awards that the employer must pay, the statutes protect the em-
ployers' financial position by limiting the amount of each
award.
1 06 5
Workers' compensation programs initially omitted occupa-
tional disease victims from coverage. 0 66 Legislators, ignorant of the
link between certain diseases and exposure to various workplace
substances, included only industrial accidents within the cover-
age. 1 067 Consequently, suits at common law remained the only rem-
edy for employees with occupational diseases.
068
Omission of occupational diseases from coverage was a major
oversight. As many as 100,000 deaths per year in the United States
result from occupational diseases, and an estimated 390,000 new
cases of occupational disease occur each year.169 A significant por-
tion of these deaths are asbestos-related.
10 70
Workers' compensation coverage, however, no longer omits oc-
1064. Comment, Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease, 43 MONT. L.
REV. 75, 76 (1982).
1065. See Vieweg, supra note 1062, at 422. The awards generally include payments for
lost income-usually between 50 and 66% of the employee's preaccident wage-and medical
benefits. See Page, The Exclusivity of the Workmen's Compensation Remedy: The Em-
ployee's Right to Sue His Employer in Tort, 4 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 555, 556 (1963);
Note, supra note 1061, at 919. Most statutes also provide a ceiling on the total amount of
cash benefits. See Page, supra, at 556; Note, supra note 1061, at 919.
1066. The first two workers' compensation statutes, enacted by Switzerland and Ger-
many, see supra note 1059, did include occupational diseases in their coverage. E. BLAIR,
supra note 1056, at 1-1.
1067. E. BLAIR, supra note 1056, at 1-1; see Kutchins, The Most Exclusive Remedy Is
No Remedy at All: Workers' Compensation Coverage for Occupational Disease, 32 LAB.
L.J. 212, 212 (1981).
1068. These employees faced formidable obstacles in their suits. In addition to forcing
employees to overcome employers' established defenses, see supra text accompanying notes
1053-54, courts required plaintiffs seeking recovery for occupational diseases to prove a
causal connection between the disease and the employment. See Note, Workmen's Compen-
sation: Occupational Carcinogenesis and Statutes of Limitation, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 712, 712-
13 (1979).
1069. THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 111 (1972); see
Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 217; Note, supra note 1061, at 916.
1070. Although 20 to 25% of asbestos workers die from lung cancer, the disease kills
only 4 to 5% of the general population. Note, supra note 1068, at 712 n.2. Asbestos workers
also suffer from a high incidence of mesothelioma, a rather uncommon form of cancer. See
id. Of course, asbestos workers contract asbestosis, "a condition resulting only from the in-
halation of asbestos fibers and characterized by chemical changes in the lungs which result
in decreased lung capacity and increased susceptibility to lung infection. . . " Yates v.
United States Rubber Co., 100 Ga. App. 583, 585, 112 S.E.2d 182, 185 (1959); see supra note
10 and accompanying text.
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cupational diseases. 10 71 As legislatures became aware of the in-
creasing incidence of occupationally related diseases and the causal
connection between exposure and disease, they broadened workers'
compensation statutes to provide benefits for the victims.
1072
B. The Exclusive Remedy Doctrine and Its Ramifications
1. Definition and Rationale
The exclusive remedy doctrine bars an employee 10 73 from
bringing a common-law'0 74 or statutory'0 75 suit for compensation
against his employer 0 76 for an employment injury.0 77 Exclusivity
is an integral part of every workers' compensation program.0 78 The
exclusive remedy doctrine theoretically balances the interests of
both employees and employers-each party sacrifices and gains in
the balancing. 1079 Workers' compensation affords the employee a
statutory right to recovery, but the exclusive remedy provision pre-
vents the employee from recovering damages greater than the stat-
utory maximum. 0 80 Exclusive remedy provisions shield the em-
ployer from large verdicts, but he must assume liability without
fault. 08' Most importantly, both parties benefit from a prompt res-
1071. "As of 1978, every state had statutory provisions making occupational diseases
generally compensable under workers' compensation." Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 212-13.
The inclusion of occupational diseases in workers' compensation coverage arguably is not
beneficial to stricken employees. See id.
1072. Id.; see Note, supra note 1068, at 713.
1073. In all but three states, the exclusive remedy doctrine bars not only employees
but also their dependents and relatives from filing suit against the employers. See infra
notes 1154-57 and accompanying text.
1074. In N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), the Supreme Court endorsed
the abrogation of the common-law right to damages as a reasonable and constitutional exer-
cise of the police power of the state.
1075. California, for example, provides that compensation benefits are "in lieu of any
other liability whatsoever" and that the right to compensation benefits is "the exclusive
remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer." CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3600-
3601 (West 1971).
1076. The doctrine similarly may bar suits against the employer's insurer. For an anal-
ysis of the availability of common-law actions against third parties such as insurers, see 2A
A. LARSON, supra note 1055, §§ 71-77; Smith & Ramos, Exclusive Remedy Under Workers'
Compensation Laws, 25 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 383, 384-90 (1975).
1077. The injury must arise out of and must be in the scope of employment. Vieweg,
supra note 1062, at 423; see 2A A. LAR SON, supra note 1055, § 65.00.
1078. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 65.11.
1079. Id.
1080. Id.
1081. Id. Workers' compensation is a significant departure from accepted common-law
principles of recovery in tort. S. HOROVITZ, supra note 1050, at 8.
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olution of the matter at a minimum cost.108 2
2. Deficiencies in the Workers' Compensation System
Although a system such as workers' compensation conceivably
could be the solution to problems of recovering for workplace inju-
ries, the system has many flaws. Notwithstanding the efforts of ad-
ministrators who generally construe the statutes in favor of com-
pensability, recovery rarely is adequate. Benefits paid by
workers' compensation include out-of-pocket medical expenses and
a percentage of lost wages,1084 but the system will not provide pay-
ments for pain and suffering, loss of consortium, and other injuries
that do not directly affect earning capacity.108 5 Furthermore, low
ceilings usually govern lost income benefits, 08 6 and because these
ceilings do not adequately reflect inflation,'08 7 most workers never
will receive benefits that approach the statutory maximum per-
centage of their preaccident wages.'088 Consequently, the awards
rarely compensate workers sufficiently.0 8 "
Ironically, the great changes in tort law during the seventy
years since the passage of the first workers' compensation law0 90
have demonstrated the inadequacy of the remedy offered by work-
ers' compensation. The employee now has a high probability of re-
covering at law,' 091 and while workers' compensation judgments
have a predetermined limit, juries and courts award tort damages
as justice requires in certain circumstances. As a result, the parties
have reversed their original positions-employees whom legisla-
tures intended to help frequently seek to maximize recovery by cir-
1082. See E. BLAIR, supra note 1056, at 1-1. But see infra notes 1144-50 and accompa-
nying text.
1083. See M. Lowe, supra note 1054, at 6-7; Comment, Johns-Manville Products Corp.
v. Superior Court: The Not-So-Exclusive Remedy Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 263, 266-70
(1981). The California statute, for example, provides that workers' compensation provisions
"be liberally construed with the purpose of extending their benefit for the protection of
persons injured. . . ." CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West 1971).
1084. See supra note 1065 and accompanying text.
1085. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 65.50.
1086. Note, supra note 1061, at 919.
1087. See Comment, supra note 1083, at 267-70.
1088. Page, supra note 1065, at 556.
1089. "[No] equitable correlation [exists] between what the worker has lost and what
he receives under workmen's compensation." Id.
1090. See supra note 1059.
1091. Page, supra note 1065, at 557. Both settlements and jury verdicts have multi-
plied. Settlements reduce court costs for both parties, but they usually result in reduced




cumventing the exclusive remedy doctrine, while employers en-
courage workers' compensation as a moneysaving alternative to a
tort action and rely on the exclusive remedy to minimize employee
recovery.
1 0 92
3. Deficiencies in the Treatment of Occupational Disease
Application of the exclusive remedy doctrine renders workers'
compensation a particularly deficient remedy for occupational dis-
ease victims.109 3 Relatively few victims file state workers' compen-
sation claims and of the claims filed, few succeed.10 94 Although
approximately 30,000 disease claimants receive workers' com-
pensation each year, more than three times this number die every
year from industrial diseases, and more than thirteen times this
number of claimants contract disabling occupational illnesses each
year. 0 9 5 Accident-oriented compensation systems cannot "deal
with the special medical and legal problems of work-related dis-
eases." 1098 As a result, workers' compensation, designed to provide
dependable, prompt and adequate recovery for stricken employees,
has failed disease victims in all three respects: recovery is uncer-
tain, seldom adequate, and often delayed.
a. Difficulty of Recovery
(1) Restrictive Language and Interpretation
The accident-oriented language of most statutes immediately
prejudices disease victims seeking compensation. Thirty-nine
states include "by accident" clauses in their statutes, 097 and while
the terms "occupational disease" and "accident" are not necessa-
rily mutually exclusive, 10 98 they are "conceptually antithetical.' ' 0 99
1092. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 65.10.
1093. Stating that an exclusive remedy under workers' compensation effectively is no
remedy at all, Professor Kutchins has criticized occupational disease treatment in workers'
compensation programs as "a 'bad deal' for workers and for society as a whole." Kutchins,
supra note 1067, at 213; see Comment, supra note 1064, at 91.
1094. Note, supra note 1061, at 925.
1095. Id. For the derivation of these proportions, see supra note 1069 and accompany-
ing text (discussing estimates for fatalities per year and illnesses per year). In 1978 awards
for occupational disease claimants comprised only two percent of the total benefits paid.
Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 221.
1096. Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 213.
1097. See supra note 1061. But see, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971) (no refer-
ence to an "accident").
1098. E. BLAIR, supra note 1056, at 8-2.
1099. Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 218-19.
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An accident implies an event fixed in time and space; a disease,
however, usually is a slow and gradual process. 1100 This wording in
effect limits the number of disease cases admitted into the work-
ers' compensation system.1101
Restrictive definitions of compensable disease also inhibit con-
ferral of workers' compensation benefits. To ensure a nexus be-
tween the work and the disease, workers' compensation programs
in twenty-two states' 1°2 require that the disease "be reasonably pe-
culiar to the worker's occupation," 0 3 and exclude the "ordinary
diseases of life" from coverage.1 0 4 These provisions can be disas-
trous to the stricken employee. Manifestations of asbestosis, such
as emphysema, bronchitis, pulmonary artery disease, and primary
lung cancer, are widespread among the general population and
therefore are not directly attributable to any particular employ-
ment.1105 Thus, these twenty-two states likely would allow asbestos
workers compensation only for mesothelioma, a uniquely asbestos-
related cancer." 0 6
The occupational disease victim also must meet the disability
requirement in all workers' compensation programs."0 7 The disa-
bility must be identifiable and distinct from any separate chronic
medical condition, and the disability must affect the claimant's
earning capacity." 0 8 The worker who constantly is out of breath,
1100. See E. BLAIR, supra note 1056, at 8-2.
1101. "[The] 'real objective [of workers' compensation programs] is to deliberately
limit the number of cases, especially of the chronic, long-term ... variety, which are admit-
ted to the system.' Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 219.
1102. The 22 states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West
Virginia. Note, supra note 1061, at 921-22 & n.47.
1103. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-110(1) (1975); CONN. STAT. ANN. 31-275 (1958 &
Supp. 1982); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.401(c) (Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-34-1(c)
(1968).
1104. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1314(5) (1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-803 (1973);
IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-10(a) (Burns 1974); OR. REv. STAT. § 656.802(a) (1977); VA. CODE §
65.1-46 (1973).
1105. Kutchins, supra note 1067 at 219.
1106. See supra part I.
1107. See Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 220.
1108. Some states disallow recovery if the injured employee can earn any wages at all.
See, e.g., Yates v. United States Rubber Co., 100 Ga. App. 583, 112 S.E.2d 182 (1959) (suc-
cessful asbestosis claim). In Oklahoma "disability" means an incapacity to perform work or
to earn wages in an occupation for which the disabled party is trained or physically suited.
Note, supra note 23, at 714. On the other hand, some states require only a reduction in
earning capacity. See, e.g., Ryden v. Johns-Manville Prods., 518 F. Supp. 311, 323 (W.D. Pa.
1981) ("to constitute a disability under the act and the basis for compensation, it [the dis-
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coughing, and in misery clearly may not receive relief under work-
ers' compensation. Only the disability, not the disease, is com-
pensable.110 9
(2) Time Limitations
Workers' compensation statutes of limitation1 10 often begin to
run without regard to the long latency periods11  of many diseases
and thus cut off many meritorious claims.111 2 When the statutory
time period for seeking workers' compensation has expired, a po-
tential claimant nonetheless may not begin an action at common
law.1111 Consequently, an unreasonable statute effectively can bar
recovery for many employees.
Workers' compensation statutes of limitation begin to run at
one of four times:11 1 4 the last exposure,111 5 the manifestation of the
disease,1 6 the time that the victim becomes or reasonably should
become aware of the disease,1117 or the occurrence of compensable
disability.1118 States that choose the time of last exposure effec-
ease] must impair the claimant's earning capacity").
1109. E. BLAIR, supra note 1056, at 8-1.
1110. Notice requirements usually accompany statutes of limitation in workers' com-
pensation systems and mandate that the employee give notice to his employer of the acci-
dental injury or disease within a certain period of time. E. BLAIR, supra note 1056, at 18-1.
Thus, unreasonable notice requirements may be as dangerous to the sufferer of a latent
disease as are unreasonable time periods for statutes of limitation.
1111. Asbestos-related cancer, for example, may not appear for 4 to 50 years after first
exposure. Note, supra note 1068, at 714 n.17.
1112. Statutes of limitation issues within the workers' compensation context duplicate,
for the most part, general statutes of limitations issues. See supra part V.
1113. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 65.20.
1114. For an analysis of the various alternative statutes of limitation used in workers'
compensation systems, see Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 277, 297-311 (1950).
1115. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 189 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §
617.440(I)(a) (1979).
1116. This test for "manifestation" is an objective test. For example, Oklahoma law
provides that
with respect to disease or disability caused by disease. . . the right to claim compensa-
tion . . . shall be forever barred unless a claim is filed within eighteen (18) months
after the last hazardous exposure or within eighteen (18) months after the disease first
becomes manifest by a symptom or condition from which one learned in medicine
could with reasonable accuracy diagnose this specific disease whichever last occurs.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 43 (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
1117. See, e.g., Mead v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 1 Ariz. App. 72, 399 P.2d
694 (1965); Davidson v. Bermo Inc., 272 Minn. 97, 137 N.W.2d 567 (1965); Montell v. Orn-
dorff, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680 (1960); Pittman v. City Stores, Inc., 204 Tenn. 650, 325
S.W.2d 249 (1959) (statute begins to run when the injury becomes manifest, or when claim-
ant in the exercise of reasonable diligence should know that his injury is compensable).
1118. In Ryden v. Johns-Manville Prods., 518 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Pa. 1981), the court
concluded that "when the cumulative impact of the inhalation of asbestos debilitates a
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tively bar workers' compensation coverage to employees who suffer
from diseases with long latency periods.111 9 The time of manifesta-
tion and the time of subjective awareness of the disease are inap-
propriate starting points, because the disease may manifest itself
long before it disables the victim or affects his earning capacity. 12 0
Only the time of disability statutes fulfill disease victims' needs.
Legislatures intended workers' compensation statutes of limitation
to protect employers from unnecessarily delayed liability, but they
surely did not intend to prevent claimants afflicted with latent dis-
eases from receiving appropriate compensation. If employees must
wait years for their diseases to develop, employers also should wait
to confront their liability.
1 1 21
(3) The Burden of Proving Causation
The universal requirement that the worker establish a causal
relationship between his disability and his employment 122 emerges
from the "arising out of employment" language in most workers'
compensation programs."1 23 The proof of causation forms another
obstacle that renders the supposedly dependable recovery quite
uncertain. The causal element, of course, is divorced from the con-
cept of fault-the claimant simply must show a connection be-
tween his work and his disease.12 4 While this is an easy task in
claimant to the extent that he can no longer continue at his former job, the injury and cause
of action for a workmen's compensation claim arises." Id. at 323; accord Yates v. United
States Rubber Co., 100 Ga. App. 583, 587, 112 S.E.2d 182, 186 (1959) (Disability occurs at
"the earliest time the disease can be identified when the employee actually becomes physi-
cally unable to work.").
1119. Professor Larson has noted the "senseless and inexcusable cruelty of dating the
limitations period from a point in time, such as time of accident or termination of employ-
ment, earlier than the moment when the claimant knew or should have known the nature of
her condition and its connection with the employment." 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, §
65.20.
1120. Of course, the disease victim must lose his earning capacity before he may re-
ceive compensation. See supra text accompanying notes 1107-09.
1121. Comment, supra note 1064, at 106. The criticism of unreasonable statutes of
limitations has culminated in "[t]he inclination. . .[of courts] to hold that the time does
not commence to run prior to occurrence of an actual disability which is traceable to the
disease and the employment." Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 277, 298 (1950); see E. BLAIR, supra note
1056, at 18-3.
1122. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 8.33; Kutchins, supra note 22, at 220. In
some jurisdictions the claimant must establish causation by clear and convincing evidence.
Kutchins, supra note 22, at 220. For a discussion of the employee's burden to prove causa-
tion in common-law suits, see supra part III.
1123. See supra text accompanying notes 1061-64.
1124. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 1064, at 80.
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accident cases, 1125 the burden of proving work-relatedness in dis-
ease cases often requires more accuracy than medical science can
supply. 1 2 '6 Studies showing a high incidence of the suffered disease
in the industry help, but they do not establish causation for an
individual claim." 2 7 Further, a number of factors unrelated to the
workplace can hinder attempts to link a job and an illness."2 For
instance, is the cancer of the claimant who has smoked tobacco for
years truly attributable to the workplace?"12  Asbestos workers
may enjoy a slight advantage in their endeavors to prove work-re-
latedness since they usually carry medically discoverable traces of
asbestos in their bodies;" °0 yet they still face quite a formidable
task.
Many legislatures have sought to guarantee work-relatedness
through recent and minimum"3s exposure requirements, which se-
verely restrict a disease victim's opportunity to recover."'32 The re-
cent exposure requirements, which require that the disease mani-
fest itself within a certain period after the last exposure,11 " have
the same reprehensible effect as statutes of limitation that run
from the time of last exposure. Minimum exposure rules condition
a diseased worker's recovery on his contact with the cause of illness
for a minimum period of time, often five or ten years."' 4 Although
1125. Proof that the resulting injury arose out of employment should be easy in acci-
dent cases because the effect follows so clearly and immediately from the cause. Note, supra
note 1061, at 922.
1126. Comment, supra note 1064, at 100. For a general discussion of the claimant's
causation obstacle, see Levine, Legal Questions Regarding the Causation of Occupational
Disease, 26 LAB. L.J. 88 (1975).
1127. Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 220.
1128. Note, supra note 1061, at 922.
1129. In Olson v. Federal Am. Partners, 567 P.2d 710 (Wyo. 1977), a uranium worker
who had smoked for 22 years received no recovery, despite doctors' testimony that his lung
cancer "most probably" resulted from occupational exposure to radiation. See id. at 719
(Rose, J., dissenting). Claimant failed to establish work-relatedness with the requisite "med-
ical certainty." See id. at 713. In Martin v. Louisville Insulation & Supply Co., No. 80-29600
(Ky. Workmen's Comp. Bd. Nov. 23, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS)
4791 (March 26, 1982), the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Board halved the benefits
awarded to an asbestos worker who could not trace various ailments solely to asbestos
exposure.
1130. For example, in Moore's Case, 289 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. 1972), a former asbestos
worker successfully met the work-relatedness burden.
1131. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-5a10 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(d)
(Purdon Supp. 1982).
1132. See Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 220.
1133. Id.
1134. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1981) (exposure to asbestos dust for "continu-
ous period of not less than two years during the ten years immediately preceding the date of
his last exposure. . . or for any five of the fifteen years immediately preceding the date of
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the rules attempt to assure the nexus between the disease and the
workplace, workers may contract many diseases, including asbesto-
sis, from one day of exposure.1 5 Consequently, these statutes may
block meritorious claims.
b. Inadequacy of Recovery
Even when a disease victim's claim is successful, compensation
is often inadequate. Workers' compensation pays an average of
$23,400 to a worker totally disabled for life in an industrial acci-
dent, but the average payment decreases to $9700 for disability
from industrial disease.13s  Furthermore, the surviving family of
the accident victim receives an average of $57,500, yet survivors of
disease victims receive an average of $3500."17 While several fac-
tors contribute to this disparity, 38 the disparity chiefly arises
from the calculation of the employee's wage-earning capacity. Ben-
efits generally consist of medical expenses and a percentage of
wages earned at the time of injury.113 9 In accident cases, the unfor-
tunate consequences are immediate and these wages afford a true
estimate of loss. In disease cases, however, the administrative
board often determines that the time of last exposure is the time
of injury." 40 Because of the long latency periods of asbestos-re-
lated diseases, the wages earned at the time of last exposure, unad-
justed for inflation, can be an unrealistically small amount.""
such last exposure. . . ."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-8-14 (1978) (exposure two years
in state for silicosis); NEv. REV. STAT. § 617.460 (1981) (exposure for 10 years immediately
preceding disablement or death and for three years in state); TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306
§ 26 (Vernon 1967) (repealed 1971) (exposure for not less than five years of 10 years imme-
diately preceding incapacity and at least two years exposure in state); Note, supra note
1065, at 923.
1135. Note, supra note 1061, at 923.
1136. Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 221.
1137. Id.
1138. These factors include the prejudice created through accident-oriented statutes,
see supra text accompanying notes 1097-1101, and the option of compensation boards to
reduce the award when industrial exposure is not the sole cause of the illness, see, e.g.,
Martin v. Louisville Insulation & Supply Co., No. 80-29600 (Ky. Workmen's Comp. Bd.
Nov. 23, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. RaP. (ANDREWS) 4791 (March 26, 1982).
1139. See supra note 1065.
1140. See, e.g., Dunn v. Todd Shipyards Corp., No. 78-510 (U.S. Labor Dep't Work-
men's Comp. Div. June 12, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LiTiG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3596 (July
10, 1981).
1141. Id. (dissenting opinion), reprinted in ASBEsTos LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 3596,
3617-22 (July 10, 1981). The dissent doubted that the board should limit benefits "by wages
earned many years prior to the actual date of disability." See id. (dissenting opinion), re-
printed in ASBEsTos LrrIG. RaP. (ANDREWS) 3622 (July 10, 1981). The dissent claimed that
choosing the time of last exposure as the point from which to calculate benefits "distorts the
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Even when the board decides the time of disability marks the in-
jury, 142 the disease's slow progress may so debilitate the worker
that by the time compensable disability results, his actual loss of
earning capacity is minimal.1
4
c. Delay of Recovery
Although legislatures designed workers' compensation pro-
grams to be a simple, efficient alternative to the courts by provid-
ing prompt relief, the systems in operation are inefficient and fail
to award claims promptly. Workers' compensation programs are
costly to employers 14 and employees" 45 because employers in-
creasingly choose to contest workers' compensation claims." 4 This
growing litigiousness causes longer delays in the conferral of bene-
fits,'"47 especially in disease cases. Although employers challenge
only 9.8% of accident claims, they challenge 62.7% of all occupa-
tional disease claims and almost 90% of dust disease claims." 48
Consequently, only an average of forty-three days elapses from
filing time to first payment in an accident claim, but successful dis-
ease claimants must wait 390 days for their first payment.1 49 Since
relatively few can wait so long and none can be certain of recovery,
most dust disease claimants settle with employers for very small
amounts before the official award."
150
C. Erosion of the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine
Because stricken employees do not recover adequate benefits,
very intent of the [compensation] act, which is to replace the actual loss of wage-earning
capacity suffered by employees as the result of work-related injuries or occupational dis-
eases." Id. (dissenting opinion), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITMG. REP. (ANDREws) 3622 (July 10,
1981).
1142. See, e.g., Ryden v. Johns-Manville Prods., 518 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Pa. 1981)
(asbestosis claim).
1143. This problem is especially acute in jurisdictions that recognize only a total in-
ability to perform work for wages as a compensable disability. See supra text accompanying
notes 1107-09. By the time the worker qualifies as disabled, he earns very little.
1144. Of employers' payments to workers' compensation insurers, "40 cents out of
every premium dollar pays for something other than current benefits, e.g., insurance com-
pany reserves, dividends, litigation expenses, insurance company overhead, etc." Kutchins,
supra note 1067, at 221-22 (citation omitted).
1145. The claimant must pay legal fees out of his benefits. Id. at 222.
1146. See id.
1147. See id. at 222-23; Note, supra note 1061, at 923.
1148. Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 222.
1149. Note, supra note 1061, at 923.
1150. An estimated 82% of dust disease claims are settled prior to an official ruling.
Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 223.
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workers' compensation increases the public assistance burden 1151
and fails to deter employers from maintaining unsafe work envi-
ronments.11 52 As the programs continue to prove inadequate and
inefficient, employees suffering from asbestos-related diseases have
attempted to circumvent the system by seeking a common-law
remedy. This section examines ways of circumventing the exclusive
remedy doctrine and the likelihood that an asbestos-related dis-
ease victim will succeed.
1. Statutory Erosion of the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine
a. Actions by Employees' Relatives
The exclusive remedy doctrine, as codified in most jurisdic-
tions,1 153 bars common-law suits by employees and those persons
related to employees.11 54 Some provide that the employer's liability
is "exclusive," ' 1155 or that the employer has no "other liability
whatsoever."1156 Others bar the employee and anyone else entitled
to recovery from bringing suit.1157 Three states mandate that the
exclusiveness of the recovery applies only to the injured em-
ployee. 1158 However the statute is worded, in forty-seven states the
1151. Of those workers severely disabled from occupational disease, 53% receive social
security and 16% receive welfare; this government compensation costs $2.2 billion a year.
Id. at 225.
1152. See id. at 224-25.
1153. One commentator has classified exclusive remedy provisions into three catego-
ries: the "California and Michigan type," the "New York type," and the "Massachusetts
type." See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 66.10.
1154. See id. § 66.00. Depending on the statute, "those associated with employees"
may or may not refer to dependents, relatives, or other personal representatives of the
employee.
1155. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 12
(West 1951).
1156. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODa § 3600 (West 1971); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 411.4
(1967); W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 (1981).
1157. The New York statute, for example, proscribes actions by the "employee, his
personal representatives, husband, parents, dependents or next of kin, or anyone otherwise
entitled to recover damages . . . on account of such injury or death . " N.Y. WORK.
Coup. LAWS § 11 (McKinney 1968).
1158. These three jurisdictions statutorily have narrowed the exclusive remedy doc-
trine. In Massachusetts and New Jersey exclusive remedy provisions stipulate only that the
waiver applies to the employee's rights, which implies that others may bring a suit at com-
mon law. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 152, § 24 (West 1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34.15-8
(West Supp. 1982-1983). Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc. (Mass. Sup. Ct. Sept. 9,
1980), reprinted in ASBEsTos LITIG. Rap. (ANDREws) 2459 (Oct. 10, 1980), indicates that
these statutes currently allow representatives of deceased employees to bring a common-law
action. See infra notes 1203-05 and accompanying text. Texas allows survivors' suits for any
"willful act or omission or gross negligence resulting in death." TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
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employer has an effective statutory shield against suits by employ-
ees' relatives.1159
b. Common-Law Suits for Employer Misconduct
Because the limited liability of workers' compensation protects
an employer who injures his employee willfully or through gross
misconduct, ten states1 60 have enacted statutes allowing employee
suits for certain types of employer misconduct. 116 ' Courts, however,
have limited common-law actions by requiring the employee to
prove an actual or specific intent to injure the employee, regardless
of whether the statute allows actions for the employer's willful
misconduct,"le  deliberate intent"63 or intentional wrong."6 " The
Supreme Court of West Virginia alone applies a less rigorous in-
art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967). This prerequisite of employer misconduct tempers the features
of the Massachusetts and New Jersey statutes.
1159. But see Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.) (wife of deceased em-
ployee may sue employer for loss of consortium), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), over-
ruled, Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
1160. Maryland, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and Kentucky permit employee
suits when the employee's injuries result from the "deliberate intention" of the employer.
See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.610(4) (Bobbs-Merrill 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 44
(1957); OR. REv. STAT. § 656.156(2) (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (1962 &
Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1981). Louisiana, New Jersey, and South Dakota simi-
larly exempt "intentional" wrongs. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West Supp. 1982);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1982); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978). Ari-
zona provides that the exclusive remedy doctrine applies "except where the injury is caused
by the employer's... willful misconduct... ." Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022(A) (1971 &
Supp. 1982). Idaho authorizes employee suits if the injury results from the employer's "wil-
ful or unprovoked physical aggression." IDAHO CODE § 72-209(3) (1973).
1161. Some of these statutes are cumulative and thus allow workers to apply for work-
ers' compensation benefits without relinquishing their right to sue at common law, or vice-
versa. See, e.g., WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (1962 & Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE § 23-
4-2 (1981). A greater number, however, require the employee to elect either to seek compen-
sation or to file a suit for damages. See, e.g., ARIZ. RE V. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022(A) (1971 &
Supp. 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 44 (1957); Comment, Intentional Employer Torts: A
Matter for the California Legislature, 15 U.S.F.L. REv. 651, 676-78 (1981). For a discussion
of the merits of suits against employers who have rejected compensation coverage, in the
five states that allow this rejection, or against the few employers who have not obtained
adequate insurance and do not qualify as self-insurers, see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, §
67.00.
1162. See, e.g., Lowery v. Universal Match Corp., 6 Ariz. App. 98, 430 P.2d 444 (1967);
Serna v. Statewide Contractors, Inc., 6 Ariz. App. 12, 429 P.2d 504 (1967).
1163. See, e.g., Foster v. Alsop Automatic, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 579, 547 P.2d 856 (1976);
Winterroth v. Meats, Inc., 10 Wash, App. 7, 516 P.2d 522 (1973).
1164. See, e.g., Keating v. Shell Chem. Co., 610 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1980) (interpreting
Louisiana law); Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J. Super. 522, 248 A.2d 129 (1968). But see Baley v.
Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981) (employer desired to cause the physical results or be-
lieved such results substantially were certain to follow).
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tent standard by allowing actions for intentional torts or for will-
ful, wanton, and reckless misconduct. " 5 These stringent intent
standards present more obstacles for potential litigants. Moreover,
proof of concealment of workplace hazards is not prima facie evi-
dence that an employer actually intended to injure the
employee.1166
2. Court Decisions
a. Dual Capacity Doctrine
An employer normally protected from tort liability by the ex-
clusive remedy doctrine can be liable in tort to his employee under
the dual capacity doctrine if he assumes obligations independent of
those imposed on him as employer. 11 7 In the landmark case Du-
prey v. Shane," "' the California Supreme Court ruled that a chiro-
practor who attempted to treat his injured employee on the job
had assumed responsibilities outside of an employer's duties and
therefore had forfeited tort immunity.11"6 9
Most courts have yet to recognize the innovative dual capacity
concept.11 70 Further, even in those jurisdictions that do recognize
it, the courts strictly construe the dual capacity doctrine against
the employee alleging the employer's second capacity. 1171 Recent
California decisions indicate that plaintiffs nevertheless still can
1165. See Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
1166. Whatever the intent requirement, the Idaho statute that allows employee suits if
the employer's "willful misconduct" caused the injury probably would not apply. See, e.g.,
Provo v. Bunker Hill Co., 393 F. Supp. 778 (D. Idaho 1975) (concealment of hazardous
working conditions does not constitute willful or unprovoked physical aggression).
1167. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 72.81; See M. Lowe, supra note 1054, at 16.
1168. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
1169. Id. at 791, 249 P.2d at 14.
1170. See, e.g., Strickland v. Textron, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 326 (D.S.C. 1977); Provo v.
Bunker Hill Co., 393 F. Supp. 778 (D. Idaho 1975); Mapson v. Montgomery White Trucks,
Inc., 357 So. 2d 971 (Ala. 1978); State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979); Vaughn v.
Jernigan, 144 Ga. App. 745, 242 S.E.2d 482 (1978); Needham v. Fred's Frozen Foods, Inc.,
171 Ind. App. 671, 359 N.E.2d 544 (1977); Jansen v. Harmon, 164 N.W.2d 323 (Iowa 1969);
Atchison v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 360 So. 2d 599 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Longever v.
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 857 (Mass. 1980); Frith v. Herrah South Shore
Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 552 P.2d 337 (1976); Billy v. Consol. Mach. Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152,
412 N.E.2d 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1980); Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, 268 N.W.2d 466
(N.D. 1978); McAlister v. Methodist Hosp., 550 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1977). But see Reed v.
Steamship Yaka, 373 U.S. 410 (1963) (maritime law); State v. Luckie, 145 So. 2d 239 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 77 IlM. 2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524
(1979); Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1976).
1171. Even the Duprey court noted that "the law is opposed to the creation of a dual
personality, where to do so is unrealistic and purely legalistic." Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d
at 793, 249 P.2d at 15.
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use the doctrine creatively and effectively. 1172 In Douglas v. E. & J.
Gallo Winery 7 3 and Moreno v. Leslie's Pool Mart'14 California
courts of appeal ruled that employees may sue their employers for
injuries occurring at the workplace from products manufactured by
the employer for general sale to the public. The courts reasoned
that the employer assumed the separate obligation of providing a
safe product for the public.1 75 Employees of asbestos products
manufacturers undoubtedly have noted the Gallo and Moreno de-
cisions and may attempt to apply the dual capacity doctrine in
suits against their employers.
b. Nonphysical Injury Torts
Courts" 6 have allowed nonphysical injury tort actions"7 7 by
employees because emotional or mental trauma stemming from the
workplace usually does not lead to medical expenses or loss of
earning capacity and therefore does not merit recovery under
workers' compensation. Public policy dictates that injuries like
emotional distress should be compensable even though the injury
is not physical."7 8 Because physical injury always accompanies as-
1172. See, e.g., Bell v. Industrial Vengas, Inc., 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 30 (1981); D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 3d 661, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 177 (1980); Moreno v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 110 Cal. App. 3d 179, 167 Cal. Rptr..747
(1980); Dorado v. Knudsen Corp., 103 Cal. App. 3d, 605, 163 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980); Douglas
v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 60 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
1173. 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
1174. 110 Cal. App. 3d 179, 167 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1980).
1175. Some commentators have criticized Gallo Winery and Moreno because the dual
capacity doctrine "should apply logically only when the status of employment is totally
coincidental, i.e., under only those circumstances where both the employer and employee
have assumed non-employment relationships." See M. Lowe, supra note 1054, at 21 (em-
phasis added). In Gallo Winery and Moreno employers acted as both manufacturers and
sellers to the general public, but employees did not act as public consumers.
1176. E.g., Cohen v. Lion Products Co., 177 F. Supp. 486 (D. Mass. 1959) (intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp., 173 Cal. App. 2d 386,
343 P.2d 787 (1959) (fraud injury destroying a valuable right of action against the third
party).
1177. Nonphysical injury torts include false imprisonment, invasion of the right of pri-
vacy, alienation of affections, fraud, deceit, malicious misrepresentation, and the intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 2A A. LARsON, supra note 1055, § 68.30.
1178. As Professor Larson has commented, "If the essence of the tort, in law, [is] non-
physical and if the injuries are of the usual non-physical sort, with physical injury being at
most added to the list of injuries as a makeweight, the suit should not be barred." Id. §
68.34(a). Compare Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447
(1978) (nonphysical injuries-recovery in suit allowed) with Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93
Cal. App. 3d 196, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1979) and Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,
88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 151 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979) (latter two suits disallowed when physical
injury accompanied emotional distress).
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bestos-related diseases, no injured asbestos worker has brought an
action for his concomitant nonphysical injuries. Nonphysical injury
actions, however, may prove a practicable alternative for asbestos-
workers and their families.
c. Intentional Torts
In the states that have not enacted statutes authorizing em-
ployee suits against the employer for intentional employer miscon-
duct,1179 courts" s0 generally have excepted the employer's inten-
tional torts from the workers' compensation coverage and its
exclusive remedy rule.1181 These courts have advanced various the-
ories in support of an intentional tort exception.1 1 2 In state pro-
grams that incorporate "by accident" clauses, s1 3 the nonaccidental
nature of the employee's injury from the intentional tort has pro-
vided a persuasive argument.118 4 Other courts have posited differ-
ent theories: the employer severs the employment relationship by
his act of violence;118 5 the tort is not incident to the employ-
ment;11' 6 and the simple theory that the court perverts the purpose
of the act '1117 by allowing the exclusive remedy provision to protect
the tortfeasor-employer.
" 8'
Potential litigants at common law must meet the same rigor-
1179. See supra notes 1160-61 and accompanying text.
1180. See, e.g., Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621
(1975); Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930); Le Pochat v. Pendleton,
187 Misc. 296, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 271 A.D. 964, 68 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1947).
1181. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 68; Page, supra note 1065, at 560-61;
Vieweg, supra note 1062, at 424-25.
1182. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 68.11.
1183. See supra note 1061.
1184. See, e.g., Le Pochat v. Pendleton, 187 Misc. 296, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct.
1946), afl'd, 271 A.D. 964, 68 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1947). The nonaccidental nature of the injury
may be the best justification for the exception of intentional torts from workers' compensa-
tion coverage. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 68.11.
1185. Professor Larson has described this theory as a "fictitious argument." See 2A A.
LARSON, supra note 1055, § 68.11.
1186. See, e.g., Conway v. Globin, 105 Cal. App. 2d 495, 233 P.2d 612 (1951), over-
ruled, Azevedo v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 52 Cal. Rptr. 283
(1966).
1187. See Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 471, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930). One
commentator has called this theory "unabashedly moralistic." See Page, supra note 1065, at
560.
1188. In Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg. Material Corp., 274 A.D. 690, 87 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1949),
the court concluded that "[i]t would be abhorent to our sense of justice to hold that an
employer may assault his employee and then compel the injured workman to accept the
meagre allowance provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law." Id. at 693-94, 87
N.Y.S.2d at 93.
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ous intent requirements facing potential litigants in the jurisdic-
tions that statutorily authorize the actions.11 1 Courts require a
showing of an employer's intent to injure.1 90 This burden of proof
is difficult for a stricken asbestos worker to meet, because the
courts regard most employer conduct as within the purview of em-
ployers' responsibilities. 1 91
3. Penalty Provisions Within Workers' Compensation Systems
Ten states"192 have added penalty provisions to their workers'
compensation systems in an effort adequately to compensate in-
jured employees and to deter employer misconduct. The legisla-
tures may have intended these provisions to be less burdensome
alternatives to common-law suits for intentional torts. 193 These
penalty provisions, however, generally supplement rather than sup-
plant the common-law remedy for employees injured through in-
tentional employer misconduct.1 9 Eight of the ten states supple-
ment the compensation award only if the employer has failed to
comply with safety statutes or orders. 1195 California's penalty pro-
1189. See supra notes 1162-64 and accompanying text.
1190. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 68.13. At common law, courts generally do not
impose liability on the employer for injuries caused by conduct that is not genuinely inten-
tional. See, e.g., Hagger v. Wortz Biscuit Co., 210 Ark. 318, 196 S.W.2d 1 (1946) (no liability
for "willful and reckless" conduct); Southern Wire & Iron Inc. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, 124
S.E.2d 738 (1962) (no liability for willful failure to provide safe workplace); Duncan v. Perry
Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946) (no liability for "wanton" conduct); Kenner v.
Hanreco, 161 So. 2d 142 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (no liability for ordering an employee to per-
form a dangerous job); Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J. Super. 522, 248 A.2d 129 (no liability for
"gross negligence").
1191. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 68.13.
1192. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1971 & Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.165
(1983); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 152, § 28 (West 1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(4)
(Vernon 1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-110 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1979); OHIO
CONST. art. II, § 35; S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-
12 (1953); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.57 (West 1973 & Supp. 1982).
1193. Professor Larson has reached such a preliminary conclusion:
When a penalty has been built into the compensation act for any kind of employer
conduct, the boundaries of the general exclusiveness principle are expanded to take in
that conduct. The effect may thus be to bar common-law suits for a wider range of
intentional, willful, or aggravated injuries by the employer.
2A A. LARSON, supra note 1055, § 69.30, at 13-130.
1194. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.165 (1983) (15% increase in the amount of the award);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(4) (Vernon 1965) (15% increase); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-110(B)
(1978) (10% increase); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1979) (10% increase); OHIO CONST. art. II, §
35 (15 to 50% increase at the Board's discretion); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-70 (Law. Co-op.
1976) (10% increase); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-12 (1953) (15% increase); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
102.57 (West 1973 & Supp. 1982) (15% increase up to a $10,000 ceiling).
1195. In addition to its penalty provision for failure to comply with safety regulations,
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vides a fifty percent increase in the compensation for "serious and
willful misconduct."' 196 Although a California court originally con-
strued this provision to preclude common-law actions, 1" 97 a subse-
quent decision has held that while ordinary negligence merits the
standard workers' compensation remedy, intentional misconduct
provides access to common-law tort recovery.1198 As a result, only
the Massachusetts statute, which provides for a doubling of the
award for serious and willful misconduct,1 99 precludes the com-
mon-law remedy.
2 00
D. Prospective Workers' Compensation Treatment of Asbestos-
Related Disease
Until recently almost no asbestos workers' suits have con-
cerned issues of workers' compensation, exclusivity, and the ero-
sion of the exclusive remedy doctrine. As more asbestos victims at-
tempt to circumvent the exclusive remedy doctrine, courts must
face these difficult issues and try to arrive at an equitable solution.
1. Representative Actions
Because Massachusetts and New Jersey expressly preclude
only employees themselves from bringing common-law actions and
Texas allows survivors' suits for willful acts or omissions and gross
Kentucky also has a statute authorizing suits against an employer's intentional infliction of
injury.
1196. CAL. LAD. CODE § 4553 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982) (subject to $10,000 ceiling).
1197. See, e.g., Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968). The
Azevedo court stated,
Neither moral aversion to the employer's act nor the shiny prospect of a large damage
verdict justifies interference with what is essentially a policy choice of the legislature.
The policy choice is to provide employees economic insurance against disability in ex-
change for the speculative possibility of general damages; to offer the augmented award
[which the penalty provides] for serious and willful misconduct in trade for the rela-
tively rare award of punitive damage.
Id. at 459-60, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
1198. See Magliulo v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 778-79, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621,
635 (1975). But see infra notes 1244-51 and accompanying text.
1199. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 152, § 28 (West 1958).
1200. The 100% increase, unencumbered by any ceiling on the penalty, is by far the
largest among penalty statutes. The size of the penalty suggests that the legislature may
have intended for the statute and not common law to be the employee's ultimate remedy.
Accordingly, courts have applied workers' compensation and its supplemental penalty to
cases that otherwise might have warranted common-law suits in most jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Scaia's Case, 320 Mass. 432, 69 N.E.2d 567 (1946) ("serious and willful misconduct" includes
intentional wrongs and is much more than mere negligence over even gross or culpable
negligence).
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negligence, 1201 relatives, dependents, or representatives of stricken
asbestos workers in these three states need not circumvent the ex-
clusive remedy doctrine by using the dual capacity of the employer
or the intentional nature of the injury arguments to maintain an
action. 20 2 The recent decision of the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc. 20 3 demonstrates
that at least the Massachusetts statute frees relatives to file
suit. 204 In Ferriter a disabled asbestos worker's spouse and chil-
dren instituted an action even though the worker was still alive
and receiving workers' compensation payments. The court allowed
the action and noticed that the language of the Massachusetts
statute unambiguously limits the scope of the employee's waiver of
the common-law action. 20 5 While compensation laws limiting the
exclusivity doctrine to the employee and the Ferriter interpreta-
tion of these laws commendably allow more common-law suits, the
continued unavailability of the tort remedy to the employee him-
self dulls the laws' impact.
2. Dual Capacity Doctrine
Courts consistently have rejected dual capacity of asbestos
manufacturers as grounds for a common-law suit. 208 Very few ju-
risdictions recognize the doctrine,1207 and courts further have re-
fused to acknowledge the alleged second capacities of the
1201. See supra note 1158 and accompanying text.
1202. See supra notes 1167-75 and accompanying text.
1203. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., (Mass. Sup. Ct. Sept. 9, 1980), re-
printed in ASBESTOS LiG. REP. (ANDREws) 2459 (Oct. 10, 1980).
1204. Despite the narrow exclusive remedy provision in New Jersey, a New Jersey
court barred a husband's action for loss of consortium since plaintiff's decedent was an em-
ployee in Danek v. Hommer, 14 N.J. Super. 607, 82 A.2d 659 (1951), aft'd, 9 N.J. 56, 87 A.2d
5 (1952). The lack of supporting New Jersey case authority prompted the Danek court's
action. See 14 N.J. Super. at 612-14, 82 A.2d at 661-62. Perhaps the Ferriter decision inter-
preting the similar Massachusetts statute will persuade the New Jersey courts to reverse
this position.
1205. Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc. (Mass. Sup. Ct. Sept. 9, 1980), re-
printed in ASBESTOs Lrrxo. REP. (ANDREws) 2459, 2471 (Oct. 10, 1980).
1206. For a discussion of the dual capacity doctrine, see supra notes 155-62 and ac-
companying text.
1207. See supra note 1170 and accompanying text. A lack of authority endorsing the
doctrine defeated plaintiff's claim in Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1070
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania law governing). The lack of authority similarly affected the
outcome in Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 508 F. Supp. 313 (D. Me. 1981) (interpret-
ing the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act). See also ASBES-
TOs LM. REP. (ANDREwS) 4805 (Apr. 9, 1982) (summarizing Anastasi v. Pacor Indus. (Pa.




In Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.1209 and In re Johns-
Manville/Asbestosis Cases1210 the plaintiffs contended that by re-
taining medical personnel to examine, diagnose, and treat employ-
ees for on-the-job injuries, the employer assumed the role of physi-
cian, including the duty to inform the patient of his health
problems.1 21 1 Both courts denied this alleged second capacity.
1 212
The Austin court observed that statutory programs frequently
mandate that the employer provide such medical offerings; the ob-
ligations, then, remain the employer's as employer, not as
physician. 21 3
Courts also have been reluctant to allow plaintiffs to regard
the asbestos manufacturer as the manufacturer of a product for
public use with the obligation to provide a safe product.1 21 4 In
Anastasi v. Pacor Industries1 21 5 the court inexplicably insisted
that the employer's manufactured products were not for general
public use and rejected the claim.121 6 The court in In re Johns-
Manville/Asbestosis Cases12117 found that a "miner-supplier" had
only the duty to maintain a safe workplace, a duty no different
than that of any employer.1 18 Only the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kohr v. Raybes-
tos-Manhatten, Inc.1 219 has recognized the inequity of allowing an
employee with asbestos-related injuries to recover beyond workers'
compensation simply because his employer was not an asbestos
1208. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville/Asbestos Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Ill.
1981); Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 508 F. Supp. 313 (D. Me. 1981); AsBESTOS Li-
TIG. REP. (ANDREws) 4805 (Apr. 9, 1982) (summarizing Anastasi v. Pacor Indus. (Pa. C.P.
Philadelphia Apr. 2, 1982)).
1209. 508 F. Supp. 313 (D. Me. 1981).
1210. 511 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Il. 1981) (Ilinois law governing).
1211. 511 F. Supp. at 1232; 508 F. Supp. at 317.
1212. 511 F. Supp. at 1233; 508 F. Supp. at 318. The court in Johns-Manville/Asbes-
tos Cases allowed the claim because plaintiff alleged an intentional tort. See 511 F. Supp. at
1234; supra text accompanying notes 1236-39.
1213. 508 F. Supp. at 318.
1214. The obligation carries the threat of products liability actions. Douglas v. E. & J.
Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977), and its progeny, see supra
notes 1173-75 and accompanying text, have encouraged plaintiffs to sue the employer as
manufacturer.
1215. ASBESTOS LMG. REP. (ANDREws) 4805 (Apr. 9, 1982) (summarizing Anastasi v.
Pacor Indus. (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia Apr. 2, 1982)).
1216. Id.
1217. 511 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
1218. Id. at 1233.
1219. 522 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (applying Pennsylvania law).
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manufacturer, while refusing to allow recovery beyond workers'
compensation for an identical employee of an asbestos manufac-
turer. 1220 Because Pennsylvania does not recognize the dual capac-
ity doctrine, however, the district court reluctantly found for de-
fendants. 122 1 Until more courts exhibit receptiveness to the notion
of dual capacity, asbestos workers suing employers for their failure,
as manufacturers, to provide the public with a safe product will
enjoy infrequent success at best. Most courts today either have not
recognized the dual capacity doctrine or blindly have denied its
applicability.
3. Common-Law Actions for Intentional Torts
The most prominent exception to workers' compensation cov-
erage and its exclusive remedy doctrine is the common-law remedy
for intentionally injured employees. 2 The success of asbestos
workers in maintaining these suits depends on the individual
state's willingness to ease stringent specific intent requirements.
1 223
a. Specific Intent
The decisions of several federal courts that interpreted work-
ers' compensation systems of various states demonstrate the diffi-
culty that specific intent presents. In Petruska v. Johns-
ManvilleL224 plaintiff on behalf of her deceased husband alleged
that defendants intentionally, willfully, and recklessly allowed the
decedent to be exposed to asbestos without a warning of the re-
lated health hazard.1225 Applying New Jersey law, the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania concluded that plaintiff had not proved de-
fendants' intention to injure as required by the New Jersey
statute1226 for exception from workers' compensation coverage.
227
Another federal court interpreting New Jersey law in Copeland v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp.122 8 faced virtually the same allega-
tions as in Petruska and similarly barred the claim for lack of ac-
1220. Id. at 1076.
1221. See id.
1222. See supra notes 1161-66 & 1179-91 and accompanying text.
1223. See supra notes 1162-66 & 1189-91 and accompanying text.
1224. 83 F.R.D. 39 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
1225. Id. at 39-40.
1226. See supra notes 1160-64 and accompanying text.
1227. 83 F.R.D. at 40.
1228. 492 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.J. 1980).
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tual intent.12 9 Finally, in Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.12 30
the United States District Court for the District of Maine rejected
a suit against an employer and stated that "[n]othing short of a
specific intent to injure the employee falls outside the scope of the
Act.""1 1
The Delaware Supreme Court in Kofron v. Amoco Chemicals
Co.12 3 demonstrated the rigors of the specific intent requirement
by barring an employee's suit despite allegations of willful and de-
liberate deceit concerning the hazards of employment, because
"[ilt was not contended . . . that [defendant] created or main-
tained the condition for the purpose of causing injury to its em-
ployees."' 233 Kofron and the previous cases illustrate the theory
that neither the gravity of the harm nor the depravity of the em-
ployer's conduct determines intent;'2 ,4 instead, the simple issue is
whether the employer's conduct "was deliberate infliction of harm
comparable to an intentional left jab to the chin.' 2 3 5 This stan-
dard presents problems for asbestosis-afflicted plaintiffs.
b. Lesser Intent Requirements
Recognizing the difficulties facing the plaintiffs, some states
have applied a more lenient intent standard.123 6 Two Illinois deci-
sions, McDaniel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 2 3 7 and In re
Johns-Manville/Asbestosis Cases, 238  held that the plaintiff
"should have an opportunity to prove . . . allegations"'123 9 very
1229. See id. at 501.
1230. 508 F. Supp. 313 (D. Me. 1981). Although Austin concerned a manufacturer's
attempt to receive indemnification from the employer, the principles are the same.
1231. Id. at 316.
1232. 441 A.2d 226 (Del. 1982).
1233. Id. at 229. While the court ultimately maintained that intentional acts of any
kind were not exempt from coverage, see id. at 231, it implied that it might have reached a
different outcome if employer specifically had intended to injure employee.
1234. See 2A A. LARsoN, supra note 1055, § 68.13.
1235. Id. Plaintiff in Kofron unsuccessfully argued that courts should incorporate the
gravity of the harm and depravity of the employer's conduct into the analysis:
The lung scarred because of one or more knife wounds is no more injured than the lung
scarred by hundreds of knife-like particles introduced into a worker's lungs by an em-
ployer with the knowledge that harm would occur, an act no less heinous than that of
the knife-wielders.
Synopsis of Plaintiff's Argument, ASBESTOS LMG. REP. (ANDREws) 2428 (Oct. 10, 1980).
1236. West Virginia previously adopted a less rigorous standard for employees in
Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
1237. 487 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (applying Illinois law).
1238. 511 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. IM. 1978).
1239. 487 F. Supp. at 716; see 511 F. Supp. at 1234.
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much like the allegations rejected in Petruska and Copeland.
c. California's Middle Ground
With the innovative and controversial decision of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra
Costa Superior Court,1240 California became another state that has
supplemented its specific intent requirement to afford the em-
ployee a greater opportunity to obtain relief at common law. Con-
tra Costa is the first comprehensive decision by a state's supreme
court 12 4 1 to deal specifically with the common-law remedies of as-
bestos-afflicted workers against their employers. The opinion also
illustrates the interaction of workers' compensation penalty provi-
sions and the common-law remedy for employer misconduct and
provides an inroad into a discussion of an alternative remedy for
the asbestos-related disease victim.
Contra Costa held that "while the workers' compensation law
bars the employee's action at law for his initial injury, a cause of
action may exist for aggravation of the disease because of the em-
ployer's fraudulent concealment of the condition and its cause.
'124 2
A California court of appeal in Magliulo v. Superior Court12 43 in-
terpreted the statute's "serious and willful misconduct" stan-
dard 1 2 4 as between ordinary negligence and intentional tort,
1 245
but the supreme court in Contra Costa decided that the statute
should penalize intentional behavior. 1 24  The court feared that a
broader standard would encourage employees alleging intentional
torts to flood the courts and thus undermine the entire workers'
compensation system.1 24 7 Therefore, for the plaintiff to bring a
1240. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 612 P.2d 948 (1980).
1241. The Delaware Supreme Court lessened the impact of Kofron by attributing its
decision to a refusal to exempt from coverage intentional torts of any kind. See supra notes
1233-35.
1242. 27 Cal. 3d at 469, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860, 612 P.2d at 950.
1243. 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
1244. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982); see supra note 1196 and ac-
companying text.
1245. See supra notes 1197-98 and accompanying text.
1246. "In sum, the provisions of section 4553 were designed to penalize intentional
misconduct of an employer, and the injuries which result from such acts are compensable
under that section." Johns-Manville v. Contra Costa Superior Ct., 27 Cal. 3d at 473, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 863, 612 P.2d at 953.
1247. The court found that allowing the common-law remedy for all intentional
misconduct
would undermine the underlying premise upon which the workers' compensation sys-
tem is based. That system balances the advantage to the employer of immunity from
liability at law against the detriment of relatively swift and certain compensation pay-
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lawsuit rather than a workers' compensation claim, the plaintiff
must do more than allege only that he
contracted the disease because defendant knew and concealed from him that
his health was endangered by asbestos in the work environment, failed to
supply adequate protective devices to avoid disease, and violated governmen-
tal regulations relating to dust levels at the plant .... 1249
The court asserted, however, that the penalty provision does
not exclude all intentional acts from the court system. 124 9 Instead,
the court's "perceived trend" in state law led it to exclude two sit-
uations in which plaintiff still may obtain a remedy at common
law:125 0 (1) if the employer has specific intent-he "acts deliber-
ately for the purpose of injuring the employee"; or (2) if "the harm
resulting from the intentional misconduct consists of aggravation
of an initial work-related injury. 12' 5 1 The latter situation is the
foundation for the second prong of the remedy:
[where] a plaintiff alleges that defendant fraudulently concealed from him,
and from doctors retained to treat him .... that he was suffering from a
disease caused by the ingestion of asbestos, thereby preventing him from re-
ceiving treatment for the disease and inducing him to work under hazardous
conditions... [t]hese allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for
aggravation of the disease. ... 1252
Numerous critics have attacked several features of the Contra
Costa rule. 253 Criticism has focused on the artificial distinction be-
tween causation and aggravation of the disease. Certain diseases
such as mesothelioma are irreversible once contracted, 1 2 " and ag-
gravation and contraction, even if distinguishable, usually stem
from the same intentional concealment or fraudulent misrepresen-
ments. Conversely, while the employee receives expeditious compensation, he surren-
ders his right to a potentially larger recovery in a common law action .... This bal-
ance would be significantly disturbed if it were to hold... that any misconduct of an
employer which may be characterized as intentional warrants an action at law for
damages.
Id. at 474, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863, 612 P.2d at 953-54.
1248. Id. at 474-75, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864, 612 P.2d at 954.
1249. Id. at 473, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863, 612 P.2d at 953.
1250. California thus has adopted the cumulative, rather than alternative ap-
proach-the victim may pursue and receive both tort damages and compensation benefits
concurrently. See supra note 1161.
1251. Johns-Manville v. Contra Costa Superior Ct., 27 Cal. 3d at 476, 165 Cal. Rptr. at
865, 612 P.2d at 955.
1252. Id.
1253. See Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 213-15; Comment, supra note 1083; Com-
ment, supra note 1161, at 667-73.
1254. As one commentator has noted, "It is not clear what the court meant by 'aggra-
vation' of [plaintiff's] mesothelioma; the disease is fatal, and generally it is considered irre-
versible when contracted." Kutchins, supra note 1067, at 214.
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tation by the employer. 1 5 5 Similarly, the plaintiff faces an almost
impossible task of apportioning his damages between causation to
claim the former through workers' compensation and the latter
through the courts. Perhaps more importantly, the dissent empha-
sized that the holding deters employers from furnishing medical
programs for employees-an employer who remains ignorant of his
employees' medical status cannot be liable for aggravation result-
ing from intentional concealment. 12 56
Despite these conceptual difficulties, California's response to
the problem of ascertaining the proper remedy for employees vic-
timized by asbestos-related disease is surprisingly effective: the
Contra Costa rule manages to allay fears about the impending de-
mise of workers' compensation while actually affording the disease
victims a greater chance of recovery. The Contra Costa court has
enhanced the possibilities of lawsuits as remedies by endorsing the
suit for aggravation without requiring specific intent. The over-
whelming majority of courts have limited the intentional torts for
which the common-law remedy exists to those of specific intent.
Further, since the court gives the defendant the difficult burden of
differentiating damages arising out of the contraction of the dis-
ease from those stemming from the aggravation,12 57 awards will
tend to be large.
The rule developed in Contra Costa provides a comfortable
middle ground between strict jurisdictions that require specific in-
tent and more lenient states that allow unlimited suits and thereby
threaten workers' compensation systems. A system that exempts
torts of specific intention and the intentional concealment of occu-
pational disease hazards without distinguishing between the insti-
gation or aggravation of the disease would avoid the conceptual
difficulties of the California system while still providing the victim
of asbestos-related disease with much-needed common-law relief.
E. Summary
Despite the worthy intentions behind both the enactment of
workers' compensation laws and the incorporation of occupational
disease cases into their coverage, workers' compensation programs
cannot provide victims of asbestos-related disease adequate relief.
1255. See Comment, supra note 1161, at 670.
1256. See Johns-Manville v. Contra Costa Superior Ct., 27 Cal. 3d at 479, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 866, 612 P.2d at 957 (Clark, J., dissenting).
1257. See id. at 477 n.11, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865 n.11, 612 P.2d at 956 n.11.
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Workers' compensation, which seeks to provide dependable,
prompt, and sufficient recovery for striken employees, has failed
disease victims in all respects. Legislators may rectify the problem
of insufficient awards by removing outdated ceilings and tying the
awards to a price index that reflects inflation. The delay and un-
certainty of recovery for the disease victim, however, are irremedi-
able problems. Programs attempt to assure dependable and
prompt recovery by imposing no-fault liability on the employer;
the employee need only prove a causal link between his employ-
ment and his injury. Proof of work-relatedness, however, is an
enormous hurdle for disease victims. Knowing this, employers will
continue to contest the claims of disease victims and make recov-
ery even more uncertain and more delayed. in sum, occupational
disease victims, including stricken asbestos workers, forego the
award of tort damages but do not get dependable and prompt re-
lief in return. When an employer's intentional concealment of dis-
ease hazards has precipitated the employee's condition, the
worker's plight simply is unconscionable.
A well-established exception to the exclusive remedy doctrine
of workers' compensation allows employees to sue their employers
in tort if injury has occurred through the employer's intentional
misconduct. To prevent the undermining of workers' compensa-
tion, courts in most instances should continue to harness this ex-
ception by requiring specific intent on the part of the employer.
The particular inadequacy that inevitably characterizes compensa-
tion programs' treatment of disease victims, however, mandates
that an employee whose disease stems from intentional misconduct
receive a tort remedy. Thus, the intentional employer misconduct
exception to the exclusivity doctrine should comprise both torts of
specific intent and the intentional concealment of occupational dis-
ease hazards. The legal system then could accommodate the needs
of stricken asbestos workers.
X. MANUFACTURERS' CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY CLAIMS
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Faced with billions of dollars in asbestos-related injury
claims, 12 58 the manufacturers of asbestos products have sought to
alleviate their burden by shifting all or part of their liability to the
United States Government, one of the largest commercial users of
1258. Employers and their insurers will pay between $38.2 billion and $90 billion in
asbestos claims over the next 35 years. See Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1982, at 46, col. 1.
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asbestos products. To seek contribution1 25 9 or indemnity1260 from
the government, a manufacturer must find a jurisdictional basis for
its cause of action under a statute that specifically waives the gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity1261 with respect to the substance of
the manufacturer's claim. Furthermore, the manufacturer must
comply strictly with all procedural requirements established by
that statute. Thus, selection of the proper statutory jurisdictional
basis and fulfillment of procedural prerequisites are critical to the
ultimate success of the action, not only because they affect the
availability and utility of the substantive theory underpinning the
manufacturer's claim, but also because they may determine
whether a court ever will hear the cause on the merits. 262 Notwith-
1259. Contribution is an equitable doctrine that allows one who has discharged a com-
mon tort liability to recover from all joint tortfeasors in proportion to their culpability in
the tortious act. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 886A & comments (1977). The doctrine
is applicable when two or more persons are liable to a third person for the same harm on
any basis of tort liability. Id. If the third person in fact is not liable to the injured person, he
cannot be liable for contribution. The tortfeasor seeking contribution may not receive pay-
ment in an amount greater than his equitable share of liability, and no court may require a
tortfeasor to contribute beyond his own share of the liability. The doctrine of contribution
attempts to equalize the burden for an indivisible harm and is available under statute or
judicial decision in a majority of states. Id.
1260. Indemnity, which every jurisdiction recognizes, prevents unjust enrichment by
providing restitution to a tortfeasor who has discharged the liability of another tortfeasor
who should have been responsible to pay for the harm. Id. § 886B & comments. While
contribution shifts a proportionate share of the liability from one tortfeasor to another, in-
demnity shifts all liability to the other tortfeasor. The right to indemnity supersedes a right
to contribution; therefore, indemnity is not available to joint tortfeasors if they owe the
same duty to the injured person because courts grant indemnity only when "it is just and
fair that the indemnitor should bear the total responsibility... ." Id. § 886B comment c.
Judicial formulations of unjust enrichment methodology for indemnity actions typically in-
clude: (1) one of the tortfeasors is primarily liable for the tort while the others have only
secondary responsibility; (2) one tortfeasor owes a greater duty than the others owe to the
injured person or one tortfeasor owes a higher standard of care than the others; and, (3) one
tortfeasor's fault is active and the others' fault is merely passive. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts rejects knee-jerk application of these inflexible formulations in favor of a compre-
hensive unjust enrichment analysis. Id. The right to indemnity often arises from express or
implied contractual provisions, which may shift liability between the parties according to
their agreement.
1261. The doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes a plaintiff from bringing suit
against a sovereign unless that sovereign consents to the suit. Traditionally, courts have
recognized the immunity of federal and state governments from suits concerning acts com-
mitted in their governmental capacities. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586
(1941).
1262. For example, in Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 80 Civ. 401 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrriG. REP. (ANDREws) 4191 (Nov. 25, 1981), plaintiff
sought contribution and indemnity from the United States for 6000 asbestos claims filed
against the company. Plaintiff asserted seven different jurisdictional bases and alleged 23
separate causes of action. Because plaintiff failed to match each substantive claim with the
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standing the plaintiff's proper procedural conduct, the United
States has retained full immunity from third party liability arising
from certain important classes of claims. This part of the Special
Project examines the jurisdictional bases and procedural require-
ments for a manufacturer's contribution and indemnity action
against the United States and the government's immunity from
third party liability for injuries covered by federal workers' com-
pensation plans1265 and injuries incident to military service.
A. Federal Tort Claims Act
1. Contribution and Indemnity
Prior to the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act1264
(FTCA) in 1946, redress for injury caused by the negligent conduct
of a government employee was available only by specific congres-
sional appropriation.1265 The enactment of private relief bills1 266
was a clumsy, time-consuming process that threatened to over-
whelm the congressional calendar.1 26 7 Through the FTCA the
United States waived much of its sovereign immunity and con-
sented to liability for the "negligent or wrongful act[s] or omis-
appropriate jurisdictional basis and failed to meet the procedural requirements of those ju-
risdictional bases, the court dismissed all claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See
infra text accompanying note 1278. Specifically, plaintiff based jurisdiction for many of its
claims upon the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976). Many of
these claims, however, did not meet the admiralty tort jurisdiction situs requirement, and,
therefore, the court could not take cognizance of the claims for lack of subject matter juris-
diction. See infra notes 1358-70 and accompanying text.
1263. For a detailed discussion of workers' compensation provisions, see supra part
IX.
1264. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b)-(c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b),
2412(c), & 2671-2680 (1976) (originally enacted as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842).
1265. The plaintiff may pursue the negligent employee separately in a civil action. The
employee's financial status or insurance coverage may make this election attractive. 1 L.
JAYSON, PERSONAL INJURY: HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 178.03 (1982). In addition,
under the FTCA a plaintiff may sue the negligent employee and the United States as code-
fendants, but no action against the employee is available when the suit proceeds to judg-
ment against the United States. Id. § 178.02; see 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (1976).
1266. For a detailed discussion of congressional treatment of tort claims, see Note,
Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARv. L. R-v. 1684 (1966).
1267. In Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), the Supreme Court stated that
Congress enacted the FTCA because "[t]he volume of these private bills, the inadequacy of
congressional machinery for determination of facts, the importunities to which claimants
subjected members of Congress, and the capricious results, led to a strong demand that
claims for tort wrongs be submitted to adjudication." Id. at 140. The 76th, 77th, and 78th
Congresses considered approximately 5473 private bills and approved 1457 of these for a
total appropriated sum of $3,182,020.42. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1946).
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sion[s]" of its employees "acting within the scope of [their] office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant 128 according to lex
loci delicti.2 e
In United States v. Yellow Cab Co.12 70 the Supreme Court
held that a joint tortfeasor may sue the United States for contribu-
tion under the FTCA. In Yellow Cab the Court determined that
because Congress had waived the government's immunity in broad
terms and had excepted only particular classes of claims from its
waiver, 1  courts would not construe the FTCA to include contri-
bution claims among its explicit exceptions.12 72 Moreover, the
Court rejected fine distinctions between the different types of
claims since the FTCA did not subject the government to a previ-
ously disallowed class of obligations, but merely substituted the
district courts for Congress as the forum for the settlement of
claims. 12
71
Following Yellow Cab courts have held that claimants also
1268. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). Although under the FTCA the government should be
liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual similarly situated,
the FTCA does not authorize relief other than damages. See id. The FTCA also does not
permit awards of prejudgement interest or punitive damages. Id. § 2674.
1269. Claimants probably cannot seek contribution or indemnity from the United
States for a judgment based upon strict products liability. See Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1954) (The "negligent or wrongful act or omission" language of the FTCA, 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976), absolutely precludes any action based on a theory of strict liabil-
ity.); see also Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (reaffirming Dalehite and holding that
Congress did not waive sovereign immunity for strict liability causes of action). But cf. In re
Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 703 (D. Utah 1982) (no FTCA
strict liability, but vaccination program statute deemed to constitute waiver of sovereign
immunity sufficient to impose strict liability upon the United States). See generally Jacoby,
Absolute Liability Under the FTCA, 24 FED. B.J. 139 (1964); Peck, Absolute Liability
Under the FTCA, 9 STAN. L. REv. 433 (1957).
1270. 340 U.S. 543 (1951). The Court in Yellow Cab attempted to reconcile two con-
flicting cases: Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 340 U.S. 543
(1951), and Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 183 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340
U.S. 543 (1951). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Howey had
denied the government's motion to dismiss, which asserted that the FTCA did not authorize
the taxicab company to bring a derivative indemnity suit against the United States for inju-
ries sustained by a passenger in a collision with a postal truck. The District of Columbia
Circuit in Capital Transit granted the government's motion to dismiss a third party claim
that sought indemnity for damages recovered by a streetcar passenger injured in a collision
with an Army jeep.
1271. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) (specific exceptions to the coverage of the FTCA);
infra notes 1345-57 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the "discretionary function"
exception contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976), see Gardner, The Federal Tort Claims
Act, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 509, 515-18 (1982).
1272. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1951).
1273. Id. at 549.
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may seek indemnity from the United States under the FTCA.
1274
Under the FTCA joint tortfeasors not only may seek contribution
and" indemnity from the government in separate proceedings, but
also, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,1275 they may im-
plead the government as a third party defendant.1276 Regardless of
whether the claim is for contribution or indemnity or whether the
proceeding is direct or by impleader, the FTCA limits the forum to
the federal district courts1 277 and imposes upon the claimant exact-
ing requirements to establish proper jurisdiction. Since these re-
quirements are jurisdictional, courts strictly construe them and do
not permit waiver. 1 27  Therefore, these procedural requirements




Before a claimant can bring an action against the United
States under the FTCA, he must satisfy the administrative filing
requirement by presenting his claim to the appropriate federal
1274. See, e.g., United States Lines, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.
1972); United States v. State of Washington, 351 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1965); Hankinson v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 280 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1960); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. United States, 220
F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 171 F.2d 377 (10th Cir.
1949). But see National Indem. Co. v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D. Cal. 1977),
aff'd sub nom. Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979).
1275. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 553-57 (1951). FED. R. Civ. P.
14(a) provides in part:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-party
plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party
to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him.
1276. 1 L. JAYSON, supra note 1265, § 164; see, e.g., United States Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 470 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. State of Washington, 351 F.2d 913
(9th Cir. 1965); Hankinson v. Pennsylvania R.R., 280 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1960); Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry. v. United States, 220 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry., 171 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1949).
1277. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
1278. See, e.g., West v. United States, 592 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1979); House v. Mine
Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d 609 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978); Three-M
Entrs. v. United States, 548 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1977); Rosario v. American Export-Isbrandt-
sen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); Brown v. General
Servs. Admin., 507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd, 425 U.S. 820 (1976); Bernard v. United
States Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); Goulding v. United States, 488 F. Supp.
755 (D. Ariz. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Poindexter v. United States, 647 F.2d
34 (9th Cir. 1981).
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agency.1279 The FTCA vested in the head of each federal agency
the authority to "consider, ascertain, adjust, determine, compro-
mise, and settle any claim for money damages" falling within the
scope of the Act.12s0 Until the agency has made its final determina-
tion on the claim presented, and the claimant has exhausted his
agency remedy, the district courts do not have jurisdiction to en-
tertain the suit.12 ' 1 The only express exception to this requirement
allows dispensation of the administrative claim when it can be as-
serted against the government by third party complaint, cross-
claim, or counterclaim under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.1 28 2 This third party exception is consistent with the purpose
of the administrative filing requirement:12 83 both promote judicial
economy by facilitating the settlement of meritorious claims and
avoiding unnecessary litigation.128 4 In Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.
v. United States1 8 5 the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Connecticut took a unique step to expand the third party
exception beyond the strict statutory language when technical ad-
herence would have hindered the effort toward judicial economy.
In Raybestos approximately 100 employees of a defense contractor
sued Raybestos, a manufacturer of asbestos products, for damages
allegedly resulting from exposure to asbestos fibers. Because a
number of plaintiffs lacked diversity of citizenship218 with Raybes-
tos, these plaintiffs filed suit in state court. Raybestos impleaded
the United States for indemnity and contribution in all cases
against the company pending in federal court and, because it could
not implead the United States in the state court, commenced a
separate action in federal court for any liability resulting from the
state court suits. Raybestos failed to file an administrative claim
before instituting the direct action against the United States, and
the government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-
diction. The district court denied the motion and held that in the
1279. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976).
1280. Id. § 2672. "Provided, That any award, compromise, or settlement in excess of
$25,000 shall be effected only with the prior written approval of the Attorney General
." Id.
1281. Id. § 2675(a).
1282. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13, 14, & 18-20.
1283. See Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1980).
1284. See Jacoby, The 89th Congress and Government Litigation, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
1212, 1219 (1967).
1285. No. H-78-416 (D. Conn. Feb. 15, 1979) (unpublished).
1286. Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction in cases not concerning a federal
question only if complete diversity exists between all plaintiffs and all defendants. Straw-
bridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
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interest of judicial economy it would consider the complaint within
the third party exception.
12 87
The administrative filing requirement has undergone addi-
tional development since the enactment of the FTCA. United
States Department of Justice regulations include requirements
that the claim presented be in sum certain " 8 and that it provide
sufficiently specific information to allow the government to investi-
gate and settle the claim.12" 9 Because" these regulations derive from
the FTCA's authorization of federal agencies to settle claims,29
the circuit courts129' disagree whether these regulations solely af-
fect settlement procedures or whether they also apply to provisions
governing presentation of the claim. 129 2 The majority chooses the
latter alternative and thereby furthers judicial economy by guaran-
teeing to the government from the outset information essential not
only to the terms of the settlement but also to the decision
whether to settle at all. The claimant must provide this informa-
tion before a court will deem the administrative remedy exhausted.
The administrative filing requirement and pursuant regula-
tions present a formidable barrier to the great number of claims
for contribution or indemnity typically brought by an asbestos
product manufacturer against the United States. In Keene Corp. v.
United States,12 9 3 for example, claimant sought contribution and
indemnity from the United States for any liability resulting from
approximately six thousand suits filed in twenty-eight federal dis-
trict courts by government project workers allegedly injured by ex-
posure to the company's asbestos products. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, however,
dismissed the complaint based upon claimant's failure to satisfy
FTCA filing requirements. Relying on Raybestos, 29" claimant ini-
tially argued that its complaint was exempt from filing require-
1287. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. United States, No. H-78-416, slip op. at 13.
1288. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1982).
1289. Id. § 14.4.
1290. See 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1976); supra note 1280 and accompanying text.
1291. Compare Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 288-93 (5th Cir. 1980) (28
C.F.R. § 14 bears solely on procedures for the settlement of claims) with House v. Mine
Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d 609, 615-16 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978) and
Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 225 (8th Cir. 1977) and Pennsylvania v. National
Assoc. of Flood Insurers, 520 F.2d 11, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3509
(1982) (28 C.F.R. § 14 applies also to 28 U.S.C. § 2675).
1292. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976).
1293. No. 80 Civ. 401 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1981), reprinted in ASBEsTos LITIG.
REP. (ANDREWs) 4191 (Nov. 25, 1981).
1294. See supra notes 1285-86 and accompanying text.
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ments under the FTCA's exception for third party actions. 129 5 The
court ruled, however, that treating claimant's action under the ex-
ception would not promote the judicial economy concerns of Ray-
bestos because claimant had not attempted to implead the govern-
ment in any of the six thousand suits. 29 ' Moreover, claimant had
settled or otherwise terminated many of the suits-obviously,
claimant could not implead the United States in actions no longer
pending and would have had to bring separate indemnity actions.
Consequently, the court refused to exempt Keene from the ad-
ministrative filing requirement.2 1 97 Alternatively, claimant argued
that it had met all filing requirements under the FTCA. 29 8 The
court rejected this argument and dismissed the complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint was not suffi-
ciently specific under the FTCA and because claimant had not ex-
hausted its administrative remedy. 299
1295. See supra text accompanying notes 1275-78. Claimant argued that Raybestos-
Manhattan, Inc. v. United States, No. H-78-416, (D. Conn. Feb. 15, 1979), required the
court to treat the complaint as "in the nature of a third-party action" and thus within the
third party exception to the administrative filing requirement. Id. slip op. at 4.
1296. Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 80 Civ. 401 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1981),
reprinted in ASBESTOs LTMG. REP. (ANDREWs) 4191, 4194-95 (Nov. 25, 1981).
1297. Id.
1298. Id., reprinted in ASBEsTos LITIG. REP. (ANDREWs) 4195 (Nov. 25, 1981).
1299. Id. The court found that in an amended notice of claim the corporation merely
listed the docket number of approximately 1000 pending suits. After filing this amended
notice and before oral argument, claimant incurred 5000 additional lawsuits, which it then
attempted to include in its single action against the United States. The corporation, how-
ever, made no effort to bring these additional claims to the attention of any federal agency.
Thus, the court concluded that claimant had not exhausted its potential administrative
remedy and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 5000 additional claims
under the FTCA. Id.
The government asserted that the amended notice for the initial 1000 claims was defec-
tive because it did not state a sum certain for each claim and failed to provide sufficient
information for investigation and settlement. The court did not address the applicability of
the settlement procedure regulations to the presentation of the claim; but relied instead
upon analogous common-law principles to hold that a claim for indeterminate damages does
not provide the certainty required by the FTCA. Id., reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP.
(ANDREws) 4195-96 (Nov. 25, 1981). The court likened the claim to a class action because it
aggregated 1000 separate suits. Therefore, as required for class actions, the complaint must
give notice of the specific dollar amount of relief for each asbestos suit. The court added
that, regulations notwithstanding, the government at least deserves information sufficient
"to enable it to evaluate the claim and choose between settlement and litigation." Id., re-
printed in ASBESTOs LITIG. REP. (ANDREws) 4197 (Nov. 25, 1981). Claimant did not respond
to a United States Department of Justice request for details of damages sought and of in-
surance payments recovered in each suit. Because of this failure to respond, the court held
that the corporation had not exhausted its administrative remedy and, therefore, could not
present its claims before a federal district court. Hence, the complaint was not cognizable
under the FTCA. Id.
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In summary, impleader is the best procedure for a manufac-
turer who seeks contribution or indemnity from the government
for liability for personal injuries resulting from the use of asbestos
in government projects. If impleader is unfeasible or impracticable,
Raybestos and Keene clearly demand that, barring extraordinary
circumstances, the manufacturer scrupulously must fulfill the ad-
ministrative filing requirement. The manufacturer carefully must
draft the administrative claim and include: (1) any information
bearing upon the responsibility or liability of the United States for
the injury or damages claimed; (2) the basis of the manufacturer's
liability to the original claimant; (3) the dollar amount of indem-
nity or contribution sought, including an accounting of the items
composing the total damages; and, (4) the dollar amount of any
insurance or other benefits recovered by the manufacturer on the
original liabilities. The manufacturer should provide this informa-
tion for any liability for which it seeks indemnity or contribution,
regardless of whether it subsequently may aggregate the claims.300
b. Statutes of Limitations""01
The FTCA statute of limitations bars tort claims against the
United States if the claimants do not present them to the appro-
priate federal agency for administrative remedy within two years
after the claims accrue and if the claimants do not file suit within
six months of final denial by the agency.1302 If the claimant proper-
ly files the claim within the two-year period, the claimant still has
six months after the agency denies the claim to bring suit. Con-
versely, if the agency denies the claim earlier than six months
before the end of the two-year period, the claimant has only six
months within which to sue, even though the overall elapsed time
is less than two years.1303 At his option, the claimant may consider
the claim denied if the agency fails to make a final disposition of
the claim within six months of filing.1304 Under the FTCA a claim
for contribution or indemnity accrues when the claimant's liability
1300. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.2, 14.4 (1982); 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 1265, § 323.01.
1301. For a discussion of the effect of state statutes of limitation on asbestos-related
actions, see supra part V.
1302. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976). The elapsed time between accrual of the claim and
the bringing of suit may exceed two years when the agency does not act on the claim until
after the two-year period.
1303. Claremont Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1970); Childers
v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
1304. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976).
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to the injured person becomes fixed.1"0 5
3. Claims Barred by Sovereign Immunity
a. Exclusive Liability Provisions of Federal Workers'
Compensation Plans
Although under the FTCA the government has granted its
consent to be sued for contribution and indemnity, the existence of
a cause of action generally depends upon local law.1306 Problems
arise when local law provides no remedy for a claimant seeking tort
contribution or indemnity against a party whom the injured person
could not himself have sued. This problem becomes more complex
when elements of federal law, or interpretations of federal statutes,
are necessary to the resolution of a claim. The exclusive liability
provisions of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act
(FECA)130 7 and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act0 8° can preserve the government's sovereign immu-
nity and insulate it from liability entirely.
In Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States,30 9  a
landmark case interpreting these exclusive liability provisions, the
1305. United States Lines, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir. 1972); see
Keleket X-Ray Corp. v. United States, 275 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.
v. United States, 220 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1955); 2 L. JAYSON, supra note 1265, § 277.05; Got-
tlieb, The Tort Claims Act Revisited, 49 GEo. L.J. 539, 549-53 (1961). If all the events that
fix liability of the defendant have not occurred, the district courts are without jurisdiction to
hear an independent suit for contribution or indemnity because no case or controversy ex-
ists. See Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 385
(N.D. Ill. 1979).
1306. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976). For a discussion of state laws and decisions per-
mitting contribution and indemnity, see Gottlieb, Some Aspects of Contribution and In-
demnity in Tort Actions Against the United States, 9 FED. B.J. 391 (1948); Gottlieb, supra
note 1305, at 547-49.
1307. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976) provides in part:
[Tihe liability of the United States or an instrumentality thereof [under the Compen-
sation Act] with respect to the injury or death of an employee is exclusive and instead
of all other liability of the United States or the instrumentality to the employee, his
legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and any other person otherwise
entitled to recover damages from the United States or the instrumentality ....
1308. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976). The exclusive liability provision of the Longshoremen
and Harborworkers' Compensation Act is nearly identical to that of FECA and courts have
construed it similarly. See, e.g., Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1978);
White v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 512 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nom. Bettis Corp. v. Charles Wheatley Co., 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); In re General Dynamics
Asbestos Cases, 539 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Conn. 1982); Austin v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
508 F. Supp. 313 (D. Me. 1981); Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 482 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Va.
1980), aff'd sub nom. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1981).
1309. 372 U.S. 597 (1963).
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owner of a ship damaged in a "mutual fault"'' 1 0 collision with a
government dredge sued the United States under the Public Ves-
sels Act 3 " to recover damages. A government employee was in-
jured in the collision while aboard the dredge and received com-
pensation for these injuries under the FECA. He later sued
Weyerhaeuser for damages, obtained a settlement, and returned to
the government the FECA benefits he had received. Because the
exclusive liability provision of the FECA protects the United
States from tort liability to its employees, the provision forestalls
any award of contribution and indemnity." 2 Nevertheless, Weyer-
haeuser in effect sought contribution by including the amount of
the settlement in computing its recovery from the government.
The government asserted that the exclusive liability provision pre-
cludes government liability for Weyerhaeuser's payment of the em-
ployee's injury claim. Rejecting this argument, the Court con-
cluded that the purpose of the provision "was to establish that, as
between the government on the one hand and its employees and
their representatives or dependents on the other, the statutory
remedy was to be exclusive.' 1 13" The Supreme Court held that the
FECA provision does not limit the scope of the divided damages
rule in mutual-fault maritime collisions, and the Court permitted
Weyerhaeuser to include the settlement costs in its damages
computation.
1 31 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
lied extensively upon Weyerhaeuser in Wallenius Bremen
G.m.b.H. v. United States31 5 to hold that the FECA exclusive lia-
bility provision is not a bar to an indemnity claim against the gov-
ernment brought by an unrelated third party. 316 Plaintiff brought
an indemnity action under the FTCA and the Suits in Admiralty
Act l s' 7 to recover the amount it had paid in settlement to a United
States Department of Agriculture inspector injured on plaintiff's
1310. Id. at 598. The Court held that the collision occurred through the mutual fault
of both vessels; therefore, under the traditional admiralty rules, each party could recover
from the other one half of its provable damages.
1311. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1976); see infra notes 1345-57 and accompanying text.
1312. See supra notes 1307-08.
1313. Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. at 601.
1314. Id. at 603-04. The Supreme Court determined that, in enacting the exclusive
liability provision of the FECA, Congress did not intend to affect the rights of third parties
unrelated to the employment relationship or to disturb settled doctrines of admiralty law
that fix the rights and liabilities of private shipowners in collision cases. Id. at 601.
1315. 409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
1316. 409 F.2d at 995, 998.
1317. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1976); see infra notes 1345-48 and accompanying text.
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ship. The company alleged that the government knew that the in-
spector could not safely perform his duties because of his physical
infirmities. The district court granted the government's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that the FECA exclusive liabil-
ity provision barred the indemnity claim.3 18 Reversing the order of
summary judgement, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the exclu-
sion applies only to those persons whose claims derive from a close
personal relationship to the injured government employee because
the FECA explicitly includes these persons in its compensation
scheme. 131 9 The court concluded that since the provision did not
exclude liability to an unrelated third party and since indemnity
arises from a violation of a duty to the injured person, the govern-
ment must indemnify a secondary tortfeasor when the govern-
ment's breach of duty is more egregious than the indemnitee's. 13 20
In Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp.1321 plaintiff, a civilian em-
ployee of a government-owned shipyard, contracted asbestosis al-
legedly through job-related exposure to asbestos-based materials
produced by defendant manufacturers. After receiving FECA ben-
efits, plaintiff sued the manufacturers but settled before the trial
ended. Prior to settlement the manufacturers filed a third party
noncontractual indemnity claim 22 against the United States
under the FTCA s23 for any liability that they might incur from
the suit. As in Wallenius Bremen, the government defended on the
ground that payment of FECA benefits satisfied its liability for in-
jury to its employees and that the exclusive liability provision pre-
1318. 409 F.2d at 995.
1319. The FECA expressly excludes from other remedies "the employee, his legal rep-
resentative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and any other person otherwise entitled to
recover damages from the United States. . . on account of such injury or death." 5 U.S.C. §
8116(c) (1976). The court stated that the "catch-all category," "any person otherwise enti-
tled to recover damages," merely relates back to the enumerated beneficiaries. 409 F.2d at
995. These parties are precluded from suing the government under FECA because they
more easily can recover under the appropriate statutes. Exclusion of these beneficiaries pro-
motes judicial efficiency in the federal courts. Id.
1320. Wallenius Bremen G.m.b.H. v. United States, 409 F.2d at 998.
1321. 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981).
1322. Id. at 227-28. The manufacturers based their claim upon other theories includ-
ing breach of implied warranty sounding in contract and breach of the government's em-
ployment contract with plaintiff, to which the manufacturers claimed to be third party ben-
eficiaries. Id. at 228; see infra notes 1371-88 and accompanying text. The district court,
however, dismissed these contractual issues for lack of jurisdiction. 662 F.2d at 228.
1323. 662 F.2d at 227. The manufacturers also premised jurisdiction upon the Suits in
Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1976), the Public Vessels Act, id. §§ 781-790, and the
general admiralty and maritime law of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1333. See infra notes
1345-57 and accompanying text.
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cluded further recovery by the manufacturers. The manufacturers
asserted that under Wallenius Bremen the exclusive liability pro-
vision does not bar claims of third party tortfeasors unrelated to
the injured government employee.
Distinguishing Wallenius Bremen, the district court concluded
that the Fourth Circuit must have decided the case under the Suits
in Admiralty Act alone and thus the case does not control FTCA
actions such as the defendant manufacturers' indemnity claim.
3 24
Applying Virginia law under the FTCA,132 5 the district court com-
pared the situation of the government to that of private employers
in Virginia who are not liable for indemnity claims arising from
torts to employees covered by the state's workers' compensation
scheme. Therefore, the district court rejected manufacturers' in-
demnity claims because the right to noncontractual indemnity
vests only when the proposed indemnitor may be liable in tort to
the original plaintiff.
13 26
On appeal the Fourth Circuit assumed that the FECA exclu-
sivity provision did not bar manufacturers' indemnity claims,32
but nevertheless the court ruled that the claim failed on its merits
because the district court's uncontested finding of fact that manu-
facturers actively had breached their duty to defendant"21 pre-
cluded assertion of primary fault against the government and
therefore barred recovery.132 9 In deciding whether federal workers'
compensation exclusive liability provisions bar noncontractual con-
1324. See Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 525 F. Supp. 894, 898-99 (E.D. Va. 1979),
aff'd, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981). The FTCA and the Suits in Admiralty Act were the
bases of jurisdiction in Wallenius Bremen. See Wallenius Bremen G.m.b.H. v. United
States, 409 F.2d 994, 995 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970). The Suits in
Admiralty Act, unlike the FTCA, does not rely upon local law to fix the rights and liabilities
of litigants. See infra notes 1345-57 and accompanying text. Compare 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752
(1976) (Suits in Admiralty Act) with 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) (FTCA). Because the result
in Wallenius Bremen was clearly contrary to Virginia law, which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would have had to apply under the FTCA, the district court
concluded that the Fourth Circuit must have decided Wallenius Bremen under the Suits of
Admiralty Act. See Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 525 F. Supp. at 898-99.
1325. See supra note 1264 and accompanying text.
1326. 525 F. Supp. at 899.
1327. Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1981).
1328. Id. at 229-30. Manufacturers based their claim for indemnity upon the district
court's finding that manufacturers were potentially liable to plalntiff for breach of their
duty to warn him of the inherent dangers of their products. Id. at 230. The Fourth Circuit
ruled as a matter of law that this active fault suffices to defeat a claim for noncontractual
indemnity. Id.
1329. To gain noncontractual indemnity, the indemnitee must be liable for no more
than passive or secondary fault. The indemnitor, in this case the government, must be at
primary fault. Id. at 229-30.
1983l
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tribution and indemnity suits against the government, other courts
of appeal13 0 have rejected the Wallenius Bremen rationale and
have limited Weyerhaeuser to its facts.'133  For example, in New-
port Air Park, Inc. v. United States3 32 the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit denied a noncontractual indemnity
claim against the government for recovery of FECA benefits, that
the injured employee had repaid after obtaining damages from
claimant. Holding that the FECA exclusive liability provision
shields the government from tort liability, the court determined
that the government cannot be liable for contribution or indemnity
"[e]ven when the person obliged to pay was only secondarily liable,
and hence entitled to full indemnity, [because] no right arises
against the primary actor if, as the employer, he was statutorily
immune from tort liability."'33 3
Even though the FTCA incorporates local law, courts gener-
ally agree that whether the FECA exclusive liability provision has
modified the FTCA is a question of federal law, separate from and
preceding the question of contribution and indemnity remedies
against employers under local law. 334 Most courts also agree that
while the FECA and similar compensation acts bar noncontractual
contribution and indemnity because they eliminate the govern-
ment's tort liability, these compensation acts do not preclude an
action for express or implied contractual indemnity.3 s"
1330. See id. at 233 n.1 (Hall, Circuit Judge, concurring). For other cases considering
this issue, see Kudelka v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 541 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1976); Ad-
ams v. General Dynamics Corp., 535 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 905
(1977); Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1975); Travelers Ins. Co. v. United States,
493 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1974); Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir.
1969); Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968). For cases construing the
Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Act, see Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714 (2d
Cir. 1978); White v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 512 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom. Bettis Corp. v. Charles Wheatley Co., 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); In re General
Dynamics Asbestos Cases, 539 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Conn. 1982); Austin v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 508 F. Supp. 313 (D. Me. 1981); Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 482 F. Supp.
1060 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff'd sub nom. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 243 (4th Cir.
1981).
1331. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. United States, 493 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1974).
1332. 419 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1975).
1333. Id. at 347 (citations omitted).
1334. See, e.g., Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1975).
1335. See, e.g., Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 722 (2d Cir. 1978); Santis-
teven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1974); Travelers Ins. Co. v. United
States, 493 F.2d 881, 886 (3d Cir. 1974); Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. v. Berry Bros.
Oilfield Serv., Inc., 377 F.2d 511, 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967); In re
General Dynamics Asbestos Cases, 539 F. Supp. 1106, 1109-10 (D. Conn. 1982).
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b. Injuries Incident to Military Service
Although United States armed forces personnel while on ac-
tive duty have contracted a major portion of asbestos-related disa-
bilities, 38 6 manufacturers generally cannot obtain contribution or
indemnity from the government for damages awarded to persons
injured during military service. The Supreme Court held in Feres
v. United States-37 that "the government is not liable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the inju-
ries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service.'
1 338
Several courts and commentators have questioned the contin-
ued validity of the Feres rationale,133 9 but the Supreme Court re-
lied upon it in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United
States"'40 and held that the United States is not liable for contri-
bution or indemnity to third parties for damages resulting from
claims by persons injured in the course of military service. 1 41 In
1336. See infra part IX.
1337. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Feres concerned a claim against the United States by the
executrix of the estate of a solider burned to death while asleep in his barracks. Plaintiffs
alleged that the government negligently maintained the barracks heating system. Id. at 137.
1338. Id. at 146. The rationale underlying Feres should apply regardless of the juris-
dictional basis used to seek tort-based relief. See Note, Recovery for Servicemembers Ex-
posed to Hazardous Substances, 31 Am. U.L. REV. 1095, 1112-18 (1982). The Court cited
several bases for its holding. See 340 U.S. at 141-44. First, because the relationship between
the government and the members of the armed forces is federal in character, courts would
destabilize this relationship by allowing local law to fix the mutual rights and liabilities of
the parties. Id. at 143-44 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-06
(1947)). Second, no analogous liability exists for a private individual by which courts may
test allowable claims against the government. Id. at 141 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976)).
Third, tort claims would disrupt severely the unique relationship between the serviceman
and his superiors, particularly in the maintenance of discipline. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977); United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112
(1954). Last, the Veterans' Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 321-342 (1976), provides a uniform
and comprehensive "no fault" compensation scheme as a substitute for tort liability. 340
U.S. at 144. See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977); United
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954); 1 L.
JAYSON, supra note 1265, § 155.05; Note, supra note 1338, at 1101-02.
1339. See, e.g., Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980); Thomason v.
Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1072; Peluso v. United States,
474 F.2d 605 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973); Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355
(6th Cir. 1969); Lee v. United States, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053
(1969); Buckingham v. United States, 394 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1968); Jacoby, The Feres Doc-
trine, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1281 (1973); Note, supra note 1338, at 1102-21; Note, The Federal
Tort Claims Act: A Cause of Action for Servicemen, 14 VA.. U.L. REv. 527, 549-53 (1980).
1340. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
1341. Id. at 673-74.
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Stencel claimant, a government ordnance supplier, sought noncon-
tractual indemnity under the FTCA for damages paid to a Na-
tional Guard pilot injured by the malfunctioning ejection system of
his aircraft. Claimant alleged that any malfunction in the system
was due to faulty government specifications and components.
The court disallowed contribution and indemnity claims
against the United States for service-related injuries, because
courts should not predicate government liability on "the fortuity of
where the soldier happened to be stationed" and thus destabilize
the distinctly federal relationship between the government, mem-
bers of its armed forces, and defense contractors.134 2 These claims
would circumvent the upper limit Congress placed on government
liability in the Veterans' Benefits Act.11 43 In addition, the Court
reasoned that when the case concerns liability for an injury sus-
tained in connection with military service, the disruptive effect of
the action upon military discipline will be the same whether the
injured person or a third party brings the suit.1 3"4 The Court thus
bars third party indemnity actions under the Feres rule. Because
this bar is absolute, manufacturers seeking contribution or indem-
nity from the United States for liability to persons injured in the
course of military service somehow must remove themselves from
the Feres-Stencel doctrine. Possible methods for accomplishing
this removal include an attack upon one or more of the Feres fac-
tors and a demonstration that the plaintiff sustained the injuries
outside the course of military service.
1342. Id. at 672. Determining that the relationship of the government to its contrac-
tors is no less federal in character than the relationship of the government to its soldiers,
the Court ruled that permitting the situs of the negligence to affect government liability to
its contractors for a service-related injury would be just as destabilizing to the military as
permitting this situs to affect the liability of the government to a serviceman for the identi-
cal injury. Id.; cf. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143-44 (1950) (applying local law
would destabilize the relationship between the government and servicemen).
1343. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. at 673.
1344. Id. The court concluded that
the third-party indemnity action in this case is unavailable for essentially the same
reasons that the direct action by (the injured serviceman) is barred by Feres. ...
[T]he right of a third party to recover in an indemnity action against the United States
recognized in Yellow Cab, must be held limited by the rationale of Feres where the
injured party is a serviceman.




B. Alternative Jurisdictional Bases
1. Admiralty
The FTCA expressly excludes 13' 5 suits against the United
States for which the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA) 1346 or the Public
Vessels Act (PVA)1347 provide a remedy. The SAA authorizes in
personam actions against the government on admiralty principles
in any instance in which suit could be brought "if a private person
or property were involved.' 3 4 The PVA authorizes suit against
the government for "damages caused by a public vessel of the
United States' 3 49  and provides that the SAA governs these
suits.3 5 0 Under the SAA and PVA the federal district courts have
exclusive admiralty jurisdiction over all maritime tort claims
against the United States, and they uniformly subject the United




A tort is maritime and thus within the admiralty jurisdiction
of the federal courts if the situs of the injury is a maritime local-
ity,135 2 and the alleged wrong bears a significant nexus to tradi-
tional maritime activity. 35 3 The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdic-
1345. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (1976); Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1976);
Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. United States, 247 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1957). The SAA and
the PVA provide the exclusive waiver of sovereign immunity for suits against the United
States in admiralty. See Johnson v. Fleet Corp. 280 U.S. 320, 325 (1930); Helfrich, Suits
Against the United States Pursuant to the SIAA, PVA, EAA, FTCA, and FECA, 26 TRIAL
LAW GUIDE 121, 126-27 (1982). Therefore, the SAA or the PVA, not the FICA, control all
maritime tort suits. See Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1070 (1974); De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.
1971); T.J. Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 838 (C.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 508
F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975). Similarly, the SAA or the PVA,
rather than the Tucker Act, controls contract disputes that constitute causes of action in
admiralty. 46 U.S.C. §§ 742, 782 (1976); infra notes 1371-88 and accompanying text.
1346. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1976).
1347. Id. §§ 781-790.
1348. Id. § 742; see Ramsey & Monachino, Admiralty Claims Against the United
States, 5 MAR. LAW 31, 34 (1980).
1349. 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1976).
1350. Id. § 782.
1351. The United States also enjoys "the benefits of all exemptions and of all limita-
tions of liability accorded by law to the owners, charterers, operators, or agents of vessels."
Id. § 746.
1352. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253 (1972).
1353. Id. at 268. For a discussion of the nexus requirement, see Note, Admiralty Ju-
risdiction: Executive Jet in Historical Perspective, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 355 (1973); Note, The
Other Half of Executive Jet: The New Rationality in Admiralty Jurisdiction, 57 TEx. L.
REV. 977 (1979); Recent Development, Admiralty Tort Jurisdiction-Tort Claims Not
Within Admiralty Jurisdiction Unless Requisite Maritime Nexus Exists, 27 VAND. L. REV.
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tion Act (EAJA)1351 4 encompasses injuries or damages that occur or
are consummated on land, provided that a vessel or its appurte-
nances on navigable waters cause the injuries or damages.1355 Once
the EAJA establishes jurisdiction, the SAA and PVA determine
the rights and liabilities of the parties. 35 6 The EAJA does not af-
fect the nexus requirement-the claimant must satisfy both the si-
tus and nexus requirements to invoke the admiralty tort jurisdic-
tion of the district courts. A noncontractual contribution or
indemnity claim arising from a maritime tort claim is similarly a
maritime claim properly cognizable under the SAA and PVA.
1357
Courts inconsistently have applied these admiralty jurisdiction
criteria. 3 58 In White v. Johns-Manville Corp. s'5 9 and a companion
case' 36 0 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
readily found admiralty tort jurisdiction over both the claims of
shoreside workers allegedly injured by exposure to asbestos against
the asbestos manufacturers, and the noncontractual indemnity
claims of the manufacturers against the United States. The court
concluded that the alleged injuries met the situs requirement be-
cause the employees had encountered asbestos insulation materials
while aboard vessels located on navigable waters and while working
in other shipyard and dry dock areas. 13 61 The court found that it
need only examine the functions of the injured employees to deter-
mine the fulfillment of the maritime nexus requirement. 62 The
court concluded that the direct impact of the injured employees'
343 (1974).
1354. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976).
1355. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 209-12 (1971); Gutierrez v. Wa-
terman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1963); 1 M. NORMS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PER-
SONAL INJURIES § 114 (3d ed. 1975).
1356. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976).
1357. See Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178,
186 (5th Cir. 1969).
1358. See Note, Admiralty-In Search of a New Test for Admiralty Tort Jurisdic-
tion: the Aftermath of Executive Jet, 7 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 459 (1974); Comment, Admiralty
Tort Jurisdiction: Floundering on the Sea of Inconsistency, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 805 (1975);
infra text accompanying note 1366. Compare White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234
(4th Cir. 1981) (need only consider situs and function of injured party), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982) with Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 698 F.2d 967 (9th Cir.
1983) (must consider situs as well as multi-factor analysis).
1359. 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
1360. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982).
1361. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234, 239 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
1362. 662 F.2d at 239.
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activities on maritime commerce met the nexus requirement-the
vessels upon which the injured employees worked could not per-
form their maritime function without the fabrication and replace-
ment of the asbestos insulation that is an essential appurtenance
of the ships.""68
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United States District Court364
rejected the cursory analysis of White36 5 and relied instead upon
the following factors to determine the lack of a sufficient maritime
nexus: (1) the traditional role of admiralty law; (2) the function
and role of the parties; (3) the types of vehicles and instrumentali-
ties engaged; and, (4) the causation and nature of the injury suf-
fered.3 6 The court then determined that plaintiff's job of install-
ing asbestos was not a distinctly maritime role, particularly when
contrasted to the navigational function of a ship's crew. 13 67 Finally,
1363. Id.
1364. 698 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1983).
1365. See id. at 971. The Owens-Illinois court suggested, however, that White might
be distinguishable because it concerned the repair of vessels in commerce as well as those in
construction while Owens-Illinois concerned only the construction of new vessels. Id. The
court stated that, this distinction notwithstanding, the Fourth Circuit's analysis was not
sufficiently consistent with the situs and nexus jurisdictional test. Id.
1366. Id. at 970 (citing T.J. Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States, 508 F.2d 855, 857
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975)); accord Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping Inc.,
562 F.2d 215, 220-21 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 416 U.S. 1034 (1978); Kelly v. Smith, 485
F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974); Keene Corp. v. United
States, No. 80 Civ. 401 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1981), reprinted in ASBEsTos LMG. REP.
(ANDnPws) 4191, 4199-200 (Nov. 25, 1981); Otto v. Alper, 489 F. Supp. 953, 955 (D. Del.
1980); Montgomery v. Harrold, 473 F. Supp. 61, 64 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Kayfetz v. Walker,
404 F. Supp. 75, 76-77 (D. Conn. 1975).
In examining the role of admiralty law, the court followed cases analyzing whether a
particular contract dispute is in admiralty, because admiralty jurisdiction in contract cases
requires an assessment of the maritime nature of the contract at issue. Owens-Illinois, Inc.
v. United States Dist. Ct., 698 F.2d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing North Pac. S.S. Co. v.
Hall Bros., 249 U.S. 119, 125 (1919)). Because admiralty jurisdiction traditionally extends
only to matters relating to navigation and shipping and does not include contracts regarding
the construction of a new vessel, the court concluded that torts arising from the construc-
tion of new vessels lack the "maritime flavor" necessary to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.
698 F.2d at 970 (citing Hollister v. Luke Constr. Co., 517 F.2d 920, 921 (5th Cir. 1975)). But
cf. North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros., 249 U.S. 119, 128 (1919) (contract relating to the repair
or navigation of a vessel lies within admiralty jurisdiction). The court distinguished repair of
old ships from construction of new ships because repair is "directly and immediately con-
nected with navigation or commerce by water," while construction is not. 698 F.2d at 970
(quoting Thames Co. v. The "Francis McDonald," 254 U.S. 242, 244 (1920)). The Fourth
Circuit in White also reached this conclusion, which the Ninth Circuit acknowledged as a
possible distinction in reconciling the contrary holdings of White and Owens-Illinois. See
698 F.2d at 971.
1367. 698 F.2d at 970-71. The court further noted that unlike the navigational aids or
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the court determined that the unprotected inhalation of asbestos
fibers and the resultant disease are both "far more closely affiliated
with the clearly land-based negligence arising in the construction
industry generally than with negligence taking place in commerce
and navigation on the navigable waters. '" 68 Because of these cir-
cumstances, the court concluded that the hazards of asbestos do
not bear a sufficient nexus to traditional maritime activity to in-
voke the court's admiralty jurisdiction.13 69 Under this land-based
negligence standard, courts generally should find that elements as-
sociated with maritime activity more likely include the repair of a
vessel temporarily out of service than the construction of a new
vessel. This standard, however, emphasizes judicial economy rather
than reality. Inconsistencies inherent in the Ninth Circuit's four
factor analysis appear when courts distinguish vessels "in service"
from those "not yet in service." For example, a worker injured by
exposure to the asbestos insulation he installs while the ship is at
sea is clearly "in" maritime commerce, but the asbestos installa-
tion, the instrumentalities employed, and the resulting diseases do
not have a sufficient nexus to maritime activity to invoke admi-
ralty jurisdiction. Thus, this analysis excludes from admiralty ju-
risdiction such shipboard activities as boiler operation and mainte-
nance, carpentry, and engine repair, because these activities are
not "distinctively maritime." The majority of cases do not support
this result.
187 0
safety devices of a vessel, the tools and safety equipment necessary to asbestos installation
possess no maritime characteristics. Even though Owens-Illinois concerned ships, the court
concluded that the instrumentalities related to the injuries did not have a distinctive con-
nection to traditional maritime activity. Id. at 971; see Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 80
Civ. 401 (GLG) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LING. REP. (ANDREWS
4191, 4199 (Nov. 25, 1981); cf. Montgomery v. Harrold, 473 F. Supp. 61, 64 (E.D. Mich.
1979) (exposure to asbestos on ships rather than in refineries or power plants a mere fortu-
ity, particularly because the ships never left the docks until work completed); Bailey v.
Johns-Manville Corp., No. 77-1 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 1978) (nothing indigenous to maritime
law in roles of parties or nature of hazards), reprinted in ASBESTOS Lrrw. REP. (ANDREWS)
629 (Aug. 10, 1979).
1368. 698 F.2d at 971; see Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 80 Civ. 401 (GLG)
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4200 (Nov. 25,
1981); see also In re ASbestos & Asbestos Insulation Material Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.
Supp. 906, 909 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977) (exposure to asbestos is a widespread problem not unique
to maritime activity).
1369. 698 F.2d at 971; see Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 80 Civ. 401 (GLG)
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1981), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4200 (Nov. 25,
1981).
1370. See, e.g., North Pac. S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros., 249 U.S. 119 (1919) (carpentry and
metalwork within admiralty jurisdiction whether vessel afloat, in drydock, or hauled up on
land); White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981) (installation of asbestos
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A suit in admiralty is not the best alternative to obtain federal
court jurisdiction. The SAA and PVA restrictions are complicated
and cumbersome, and courts are inconsistent in their interpreta-
tion of the statutory requirements. Plaintiffs obtain no timing ad-
vantage by electing admiralty jurisdiction since the two-year claim
limitation period is the same under the SAA, PVA, or FTCA. Be-
cause direct actions against the government in admiralty have no
administrative filing requirement when the plaintiff does not pre-
mise jurisdiction on the EAJA, the savings of filing time and ex-
pense may outweigh the disadvantages of suing in admiralty if the
claimant seeks contribution and indemnity for a large number of
claims. Asbestos-related diseases, however, have long latency peri-
ods and workers generally outfit ships with asbestos at shoreside.
Thus, plaintiffs will have great difficulty in demonstrating that the
injury was not consummated or caused upon land and that the
EAJA is inapplicable.
2. United States Claims Court
Contribution and indemnity actions founded upon an express
or implied contract with the government""7 1 are adjudicable exclu-
sively in the United States Claims Court1V 7 2 if the amount in con-
troversy exceeds $10,000.1'7' The Claims Court has jurisdiction
products in shipyards within admiralty jurisdiction), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982);
Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 618 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1980) (products liability
claims based upon defective instrument components within admiralty jurisdiction notwith-
standing that components generally used in nonmarine instruments); Jones v. Bender Weld-
ing & Mach. Works, 581 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1978) (products liability claim based upon
defective engine repair within admiralty jurisdiction); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine
Constr. Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1977) (by implication) (same); JIG The Third Corp. v.
Puritan Mar. Ins. Corp., 519 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1975) (faulty metalwork during ship con-
struction causing injury while vessel at sea within admiralty jurisdiction), cert. denied sub
nom. Atlantic Mar., Inc. v. JIG The Third Corp., 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
1371. The Claims Court can hear only suits against the United States. Hopkins v.
United States, 513 F.2d 1360 (Ct. Cl. 1975), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other
grounds, 427 U.S. 123 (1976). In addition, the contract must be of the type that can be
satisfied out of appropriated public funds. L'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc. v. United States,
668 F.2d 1211 (Ct. Cl. 1982); McCloskey & Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 374 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
1372. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1491(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982). The United States Claims
Court (formerly the Court of Claims) is a court of national jurisdiction. It sits, in effect, in
the state where the cause of action arose or where the claim accrued. Great Am. Ins. Co. v.
United States, 397 F.2d 289 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
1373. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Brown, 600 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1979); South Windsor Con-
valescent Home, Inc. v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1976); International Eng'g Co. v.
Richardson, 512 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1976); Ove Gustav-
sson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960);
United States v. Tacoma Oriental S.S. Co., 86 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1936).
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concurrent with the federal district courts for contractual claims of
lesser amounts.17 4 Jurisdiction of the Claims Court based upon
implied contract'37 5 with the United States extends only to con-
tracts implied in fact37" and does not include contracts implied in
law. 1377 The court lacks jurisdiction to hear any tort claim against
the United States, 3 78 but plaintiffs may maintain an action that
arises primarily from breach of a contractually created duty, even
though the damages may have resulted from government
negligence.
3 7 9
The Claims Court also lacks jurisdiction over any claim pend-
ing in another federal court'33 0 if the suit in the other federal
court: (1) is against the United States or its agency; 3 8 ' (2) concerns
the same claimant,38s and the same cause of action; 38 3 and, (3)
began before the claimant filed suit in the Claims Court. 3 84 Con-
1374. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2); see Glover v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 225, 230-33
(4th Cir. 1981).
1375. Implied contract claims raised by manufacturers in contribution and indemnity
actions typically include: (1) the asbestos products purchaser impliedly warranted to use the
goods only in ways that would not subject the manufacturer to liability; and (2) asbestos-
related products injured the employees because the employer breached the employment
contract to which the manufacturer claims to be a third party beneficiary. These arguments
consistently fail. See, e.g., Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1978); Dulin v.
Circle F. Indus., Inc., 558 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1977); Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d
1216 (9th Cir. 1974); In re General Dynamics Asbestos Cases, 539 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Conn.
1982).
1376. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460 (1980). To find a contract
implied in fact, a court must establish the parties' tacit understanding by inferring a meet-
ing of the minds from the conduct of the parties. Somali Dev. Bank v. United States, 508
F.2d 817 (Ct. Cl. 1974); See REsTATEzmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 comment a (1981).
1377. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 287 (1928);
Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338 (1925); Cleveland Chair Co. v. United States, 557
F.2d 244 (Ct. Cl. 1977); United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 536 F.2d 921 (Ct. Cl.
1976); Cities Service Gas Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 448 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Porter v. United
States, 496 F.2d 583 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1974).
1378. See Harley v. United States, 198 U.S. 229 (1905); Somali Dev. Bank v. United
States, 508 F.2d 817 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Clark v. United States, 461 F.2d 781 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972); Marcee v. United States, 455 F.2d 525 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
1379. See Fountain v. United States, 427 F.2d 759 (Ct. Cl. 1970), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 839 (1971); Bird & Sons v. United States, 420 F.2d 1051 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Burtt v. United
States, 176 Ct. Cl. 310 (1966).
1380. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (1976).
1381. See Oakland Truck Sales, Inc. v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 902 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
1382. See Universal Fiberglass Corp. v. United States, 537 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1976),
later proceeding, 214 Ct. Cl. 840 (1977).
1383. See Sanborn v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Cal. 1977); Meyer v.
United States, 150 F. Supp. 314 (Ct. CL 1957); Pacific Mills v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 541
(Ct. Cl. 1933).
1384. See, e.g., Tecon Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 976 (1966).
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gress has barred all claims over which the Claims Court has juris-
diction unless the claimant files the petition within six years after
the claim first accrued. 138 5 A contribution or indemnity claim ac-
crues when all events that fix liability of the United States to the
claimant have occurred. 13 86 If the claimant pursues an administra-
tive remedy,188 7 the Claims Court loses jurisdiction six years after
the agency issues a final denial of relief.13 s This six-year limitation
period gives manufacturers increased flexibility in timing the com-
mencement of their actions and allows them to assert a contract-
based cause of action in a claims court proceeding if a tort-based
action fails in the district court.
C. Summary
Asbestos products manufacturers may never be able to use ju-
dicial means to shift some of the tremendous financial burden of
impending tort claims to the federal government. The availability
of relief to these manufacturers through contribution and indem-
nity actions against the United States is largely illusory. No manu-
facturer yet has succeeded in obtaining tort-based contribution or
indemnity from the government, and absent an express contractual
provision securing a right to contribution or indemnity, manufac-
turers probably will not obtain any relief from the government. To
defeat claims asserted against it, the United States may use a for-
midable array of devices; among the most effective is sovereign im-
munity. In addition, judicial application of the doctrines of contri-
bution and indemnity often denies relief to asbestos product
manufacturers.
These barriers are not merely artifices to defeat unmeritorious
claims, for they also have important social policy implications
when injured persons cannot collect from manufacturers with de-
pleted assets or insurance coverage. No court has indicated that its
ruling would differ if manufacturers could show that the injured
claimants would not receive compensation without government
1385. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1976); see Japan War Notes Claimants Ass'n of Phillipines,
Inc. v. United States, 373 F.2d 356 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 971 (1967).
1386. Reliance Motors, Inc. v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 228 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
1387. The provisions of the Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321-322 (1976), the Contract
Disputes Act, id. §§ 601-613 (Supp. V 1981), or other dispute-settlement statutes or agree-
ments may require the claimant to submit his claim to a stipulated agency for relief prior to
instituting suit. See generally Anthony & White, Contract Suit Practice and Procedure in
the United States Court of Claims, 49 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 276 (1973).
1388. See Johnson v. United States, 527 F.2d 1209 (Ct. CL. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 889 (1976).
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contribution or indemnity. These result-oriented considerations in
awarding contribution and indemnity effectively would enlist man-
ufacturers as conduits for the orderly distribution of federal relief.
Yet, realizing their proper constitutional role, courts understanda-
bly are loathe to "legislate" in this area. Short of discarding a sig-
nificant portion of American jurisprudence, however, only Congress
can effect a practicable solution.
XI. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Because of rising asbestos litigation costs and the recent bank-
ruptcy filings of several asbestos products manufacturers, 1 8 9 asbes-
tos companies and other interested parties have pressured Con-
gress to enact legislation to address compensation for asbestos-
related disease claimants.13 10 Legislators in the Ninety-seventh
Congress proposed three bills that created plans for resolving as-
bestos injury claims."3 9 The three measures differed on which par-
ties would participate in the compensation scheme'3 92 and how the
legislative scheme would administer the compensation payments.
Although the Ninety-seventh Congress failed to enact any of these
bills, lawmakers likely will introduce substantially similar legisla-
1389. Estimates of potential asbestos litigation costs have led Manville Corporation,
UNR Industries, subsidiaries of Manville and UNR, and Amatex Corporation to seek bank-
ruptey protection. See, e.g., Paying Asbestos Damages: Government's Liability Questioned,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1982, at L35, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Paying Asbestos Damages];
Manville's Costs, supra note 22, at 4, col. 2. As of January 27, 1983, Manville Corporation
was drafting a reorganization plan that would limit the number and size of compensation
claims against the company. Manville Plans to Seek Strict Limit on its Liability for Asbes-
tos Claims, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1983, at 31, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Manville Plans].
Under this proposal, Manville, its insurance carriers, and the federal government would con-
tribute toward payment of successful claims. Id. at col. 6. For an in-depth discussion of this
reorganization plan, see infra part XII.
1390. The Asbestos Compensation Coalition (ACC), an organization consisting of as-
bestos company representatives, has supported and lobbied extensively for asbestos legisla-
tion, particularly Senator Hart's Bill, S. 1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 10,034-
38 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981). See ASBESTOs LrNG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4616, 4617 (Feb. 26,
1982). The Asbestos Information Association (AIA), which includes manufacturers, miners,
and millers of asbestos, also lobbies actively on Capitol Hill. See Congress Ready to Ex-
amine Asbestos Compensation Issue, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 204, 205 (1982).
1391. See H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 1643, supra note 1390; H.R. 5224,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
1392. Parties who are responsible for compensation under the asbestos bills include
asbestos importers and distributors, see infra notes 1504-05, 1513-21, & 1577-86, companies
that produce asbestos and asbestos products, companies that import, sell, manufacture, or
distribute any product that contains cigarettes or cigarette tobacco, see infra notes 1469-509
(discussing H.R. 5224, supra note 1391), and the federal government, see infra 1510-48 (dis-
cussing S. 1643, supra note 1390).
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tion in the Ninety-eighth Congress.1393 Additionally, asbestos com-
panies probably will lobby Congress to adopt an alternative com-
pensation proposal that industry representatives have drafted.1394
Experts predict that members of the new Congress will focus more
attention on asbestos compensation bills than lawmakers have in
the past.13 95 Legislative evaluation of future asbestos compensation
bills will entail critical examination of both enacted latent and oc-
cupational disease compensation legislation, such as the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Black Lung Act)1398 and
the Veterans' Health Care, Training, and Small Business Loan Act
of 1981,1397 and the latent and occupational disease compensation
bills that the Ninety-seventh Congress failed to enact, including
the Environmental Poisoning Compensation Act 1398 and the Radia-
1393. An aide to Representative George Miller said that Representative Miller plans
to reintroduce in the 98th Congress a "refined" version of H.R. 5735. Telephone interview
with legislative assistant to Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Educ.
and Labor (Jan. 6, 1983). A spokesperson for Senator Gary Hart stated that Senator Hart
plans to reintroduce legislation identical to or similar to S. 1643 in the 98th Congress. Tele-
phone interview with press assistant to Senator Gary Hart (Jan. 7, 1983).
1394. See Asnzsos LMG. REP. (ANDREws) 5122 (June 25, 1982). The ACC has drafted
an Occupational Disease Compensation Improvement Act with an accompanying Imple-
menting Resolution for Asbestos Related Diseases. Id. This proposed Act provides for pay-
ment of "enhanced" compensation to victims of asbestos-related disease and their survivors.
Id. at 5141. The Act also establishes an exclusive remedy that supplements present pay-
ments which state and federal compensation programs make. Id. To provide these "en-
hanced" payments, the Act establishes a trust fund, which receives financing from the fed-
eral government, insurance companies, and businesses that use or produce asbestos. Id. at
5142; see id. at 5123 (the federal government would pay for 50% of the trust fund under the
Act).
1395. See Action Expected Next Year on System for Compensating Victims of Asbes-
tos Disease, 40 CONG. Q. WnKLY REP. 2729 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Action Expected
Next Year]. Representative Miller attempted in 1981 and 1982 to establish a system for
compensating persons occupationally exposed to asbestos, but Congress showed no interest.
Because of Manville Corporation's bankruptcy filing, however, Congress is now under more
pressure to act. Id. at 2729. "The bankruptcy actions [of Manville Corporation] have raised
the profile of the asbestos problem." ASBzsTos LrMG. RE. (ANDREws) 5970 (Dec. 24, 1982)
(statement of Mr. John Lawrence, administrative assistant to Representative Miller).
1396. 30 U.S.C. §§ 900-936 (Supp. I 1977), amended by Black Lung Benefits Reform
Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (Supp. U 1978). Congress reformed the system for financ-
ing the program in the Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227, 92
Stat. 11 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C. and 30 U.S.C.). "Black Lung Act" hereinaf-
ter refers to the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (FCMHSA) and any
subsequent legislation that amended the FCMHSA.
1397. Pub. L. No. 97-72, 95 Stat. 1047 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38
U.S.C.).
1398. The bill was a proposed amendment to scattered sections of H.R. 5203, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Amendment No. 3629). H.R. 5203 proposed amendments to the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-36 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
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tion Exposure Compensation Act of 1981.1399
This section of the Special Project discusses recent develop-
ments in federal legislation designed to compensate victims of oc-
cupational and latent diseases. It examines present remedies for
people who suffer injury from exposure to asbestos and difficulties
that accompany those remedies. The section then evaluates three
asbestos compensation bills that members of the Ninety-seventh
Congress introduced in an attempt to minimize those problems.
The section concludes that the Ninety-eighth Congress likely will
act to eliminate future occupation-related asbestos litigation by en-
acting legislation similar to the bill introduced by Representative
George Miller, which relies on existing federal agencies to adminis-
ter benefits and places the burden of compensating asbestos-ex-
posed victims solely on manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos
products.
A. Recent Legislative Developments in Occupational and
Latent Disease Compensation
Members of Congress at times have introduced compensation
legislation as litigation resulting from latent and occupational inju-
ries has inundated the courts and threatened the financial stability
of industries and insurance companies.1400 Title IV of the Black
Lung Act 1401 represents an unprecedented congressional effort to
provide an exclusive compensation system for victims of occupa-
tional latent diseases. 140 2 The Black Lung Act currently provides
aid in the form of monthly benefits to coal mine workers and their
survivors if occupational pneumoconiosis, commonly known as
"black lung disease," kills or disables the worker. 1403 To receive
1399. S. 1483, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 7630-31 (daily ed. July 15, 1981).
1400. Podgers, supra note 18, at 139.
1401. See supra note 1396.
1402. Congress intended the Black Lung Act to provide compensation to recipients
because of "the failure of the States to assume compensation responsibilities" for the miners
to whom the Act applied. H.R. RP. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 576, reprinted in 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2503, 2516. Legislators viewed this occupational disease com-
pensation program as "well-nigh unique in the annals of our National Government." Id. at
626, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2566 (minority views of Representa-
tives Ashbrooke, Scherle, Collins, and Landgrebe). Some legislators criticized the Act be-
cause it "represents a foot in the door, a possible first step toward the ultimate federaliza-
tion of the entire system of workmen's compensation." Id. at 627, reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2567 (Minority views of Representatives Ashbrooke, Scherle,
Collins, and Landgrebe).
1403. See 30 U.S.C. § 922 (Supp. V 1981) (payment of benefits). Black lung disease is
a chronic respiratory ailment that results from inhalation of dust particles over a long pe-
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compensation, claimants must file for benefits,1404 and examiners
must determine the validity of each claim under prescribed medi-
cal standards. 140 5 Once an examiner affirmatively determines the
validity of a worker's claim, the coal mine operator who most re-
cently employed the claimant-the last responsible opera-
tor-must provide the compensation payments owed under the
Act.140 6 Claimants must offset these payments by any benefits that
they receive under state occupational disease and workers' com-
pensation laws.40 Additionally, the Black Lung Act creates a coal
industry-funded 140 8 Black Lung Disability Trust Fund to handle
claims when the last responsible operator no longer exists or fails
or refuses to make the compensation payments that the Act re-
quires. 409 The Black Lung Act remains controversial despite fre-
quent amendments. The program has exceeded estimated costs
4 10
and has caused administrative problems.'4  One observer has com-
riod of time. The black lung program costs approximately $1 billion each year. Kilcullen,
Compensation Benefits for Coal Miners Under the Federal Black Lung Program, reprinted
in NEw YORK PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL REGULATIONS OF MINE SAFETY, HEALTH
AND RECLAMATION 261, 264 (1978).
1404. 30 U.S.C. § 923 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1405. Id. § 922. The Act uses medical procedures originally established under § 423 of
the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1976).
1406. 30 U.S.C. §§ 931-936 (1976 & Supp. H 1978).
1407. Id. § 922(b) (Supp. H 1978); see infra note 1412.
1408. The trust fund receives money from industry by imposing an excise tax on each
ton of mined and sold coal. Id.; see I.R.C. § 4121 (1978) (establishing the National Disability
Trust, which collects money for the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund). The trust fund also
receives all fines and penalties paid by operators who fail to comply with the Black Lung
Act. 30 U.S.C. § 934a(b)(5) (Supp. II 1978).
1409. See Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 934-935a (Supp. II
1978) (establishing trust fund).
1410. "Proponents of [black lung] legislation in 1979 estimated that the total cost of
the program would be between $40 [million] and $385 million from beginning to end." Black
Lung Benefits and Revenue Amendments of 1981, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981) (open-
ing statement of Senator Nickels) [hereinafter cited as Black Lung Hearing]. Congress in-
tended the Act to terminate eventually, but it gradually became a permanent program. Id.
In 1981 the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund owed "more than $1.5 billion... to the U.S.
Treasury." Id. at 1. Senator Nickels predicts that this figure gradually will escalate to $9
billion by 1995. Id.
1411. Action Expected Next Year, supra note 1395, at 2729. According to one critic,
the Black Lung Act anticipates an unrealistic result. See id. at 2730 (statement of Represen-
tative John N. Erlenborn). Representative Erlenborn has blamed the current "less than
comprehensive protection of coal miners," Kelly, Black Lung Benefit Trusts as a Federal
Self-Insurance Alternative, 82 W. VA. L. Rxv. 847, 860 (1980), on a Congress warped by
"the emotion associated with [environmental] diseases . . ." Action Expected Next Year,
supra note 1395, at 2730. According to Representative Erlenborn, the Black Lung Act will
not achieve its desired goals because Congress incorporated into the Act a "political" rather
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plained that "coal companies have escaped most of their assigned
costs by lobbying subsequent amendments through Congress. 14 12
As a result, critics view the bill as a congressional experiment that
failed.
14 13
Congress recently has considered other occupational and la-
tent disease legislation, including Representative Robert Stafford's
Environmental Poisoning Compensation Act (Toxic Pollution
Act)14 14 and Senator Orrin G. Hatch's Radiation Exposure Com-
pensation Act of 1981 (Radiation Act).141 5 The Stafford bill pro-
vided industry-funded compensation to persons, such as Love Ca-
nal residents, 416 who had suffered injury from toxic pollution.
Senator Hatch's Radiation Act provided compensation for persons
harmed by radiation exposure as a result of employment in ura-
nium mines and atomic bomb testing in Nevada during the 1950's.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources approved
the Radiation Act on April 20, 1982. Many legislators, however,
criticized the bill for its controversial damage clauses,4 7 which im-
than a realistic definition of black lung disease, and "the political implications of what
[Congress does] . . . bear much more weight than reality." Id.
The United States Department of the Treasury's delayed issuance of the required
guidelines for implementation of the compensation program, the unexpectedly high number
of claims, and other circumstances have caused a judicial backlog of cases. See S. REP. No.
743, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3; The Black Lung Benefits Reform and Revenue Acts of 1977, 80
W. VA. L. REv. 539, 542 (1978).
One legislator has asserted that the Black Lung Act has caused "administrative night-
mares." See Black Lung Hearing, supra note 1410, at 2 (opening statement of Senator
Nickels). Senator Nickels complained that many people with bogus claims receive benefits
under the Act because of the inadequacy of the Act's standards for evaluating the validity of
claims. Id.
1412. See Reutter, Workmen's Compensation Doesn't Work or Compensate, 35 Bus.
& Soc'Y REv. 39, 44 (1980), reprinted in Occupational Disease Compensation and Social
Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Edu-
cation and Labor, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. 46, 51 (1981). Social security programs, the Veterans
Administration, and public welfare now contribute to the black lung disease compensation
program. Id.
1413. See, e.g., Fitzhugh, Disheartening Prospects: The Stress of Occupational Dis-
ease Cases on the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 22 S. TEx. L.J.
471, 486 (1982); ASBESTOs LMG. RaP. (ANDPaws) 4864 (April 23, 1982) (statement of spokes-
person for the National Association of Manufacturers); see generally Smith & Channon,
The Rising Storm, 17 FORUM 139 (1982).
1414. See supra note 1398 and accompanying text.
1415. See supra note 1399.
1416. From 1930 to 1953 Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corporation dumped 352 mil-
lion pounds of chemical wastes in an area near Niagara Falls, N.Y. These wastes caused
latent injuries such as cancer and birth defects to Love Canal residents. Victim Compensa-
tion Legislation Proposed, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RaP. 2732 (1982).
1417. Id. The bill requires public disclosure by the tobacco industry of the pesticides
and chemicals in cigarettes, expands industry liability for toxic injury to persons and prop-
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posed liability for radiation injuries on the federal government and
private industry.1 4 1 8 Although Congress failed to enact either piece
of legislation, these bills represent increased legislative concern for
occupational and latent disease compensation."1
Despite recent criticism of the Black Lung Act and apparent
congressional reluctance to enact legislation granting monetary
benefits to victims of occupational and latent diseases,142 0 experts
predict changes in this attitude.421 Lawyers and insurance compa-
nies have asserted that if asbestos and other latent disease litiga-
tion continues its present course, it will "shake the foundations of
U.S. tort laws.' 42 2 A senior vice president of an insurance com-
pany 42s has stated that because of the overwhelming number of
claims, "[t]he (tort) system could well grind to a halt by 1984; we
had better start thinking about alternatives.' ' 424 Current bank-
ruptcy filings by asbestos companies will contribute greatly to the
backlog in the courts, and lobbying organizations will continue
pressuring Congress to act. 425 Congress likely will enact occupa-
tional asbestos disease legislation if it finds that current remedies
erty, and requires payment of registration fees by pesticide manufacturers. For a discussion
of the Bill, see Conflicts Threaten Passage of Pesticide Bill, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2695
(1982).
1418. Id.
1419. The 97th Congress did pass the Veterans' Health Care, Training and Small Bus-
iness Loan Act of 1981 (Veterans Health Act), see supra note 1397, which aids a limited
number of radiation victims. The Act extends Veterans Administration medical benefits to
servicemen who suffered injury by radiation exposure from nuclear weapons testing or post-
World War H occupation of Japan and by exposure to Agent Orange and other defoliants
and herbicides. The military used Agent Orange, or dioxin, as an experimental defoliant
during the Vietnam War. Podgers, supra note 18, at 139. This herbicide allegedly causes
cancer. Id.
1420. "The history of the Federal black lung law has raised strong reservations about
whether, if ever, the Federal Government should interfere with State Workers' Compensa-
tion Programs." Black Lung Hearing, supra note 1410, at 2 (opening statement of Senator
Nickels). Of the Toxic Pollution Act, the Radiation Act, and the Veterans' Health Act, the
97th Congress enacted only the latter. Although the Veterans' Health Act imposed liability
upon the federal government, the Act compensated only veterans and provided only medi-
cal, not employment compensation.
1421. See supra note 1395 and accompanying text. The Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report and an administrative assistant to Representative Miller have stated that
asbestos compensation bills currently receive more attention from Congress than they have
in the past. ASBEsTos Lrrm. REP. (ANDREws) 5970 (Dec. 24, 1982).
1422. Podgers, supra note 18, at 139.
1423. Mr. William Bailey is senior vice president of Commercial Union Assurance
Companies in Boston and chairman of the Task Force on Cumulative Trauma and Latent
Injury. Id. at 139.
1424. Id.
1425. See supra note 1395.
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for asbestos compensation claimants are inadequate.
B. Existing Statutory Remedies for Occupational Asbestos-
Related Disease Claimants
Many workers who are disabled by asbestos exposure cur-
rently receive payments through state occupational disability and
disease laws such as worker's compensation.1 426 In addition, some
disabled employees receive benefits from public welfare, 421 Medi-
care and Medicaid, 428 private disability and health insurance, 429
and Social Security.1430 Many workers with occupational asbestos-
related diseases receive monies through federal compensation pro-
grams1 4 31 such as the Veterans' Benefit Act,143 2 the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (Longshoremen's
Act), 4' s  and the Federal Employees' Compensation Act
(FECA). 4 84 Present compensation programs, however, fail to pro-
vide for all employees who suffer occupational injuries from expo-
sure to asbestos. Thus, many dissatisfied recipients of these com-
pensation programs currently bring suits in tort against
manufacturers of asbestos and asbestos products.
The Veterans's Benefit Act awards conditional gratuities to
veterans injured in the course of military service and some victims
of asbestos-related disease receive benefits under it. Because the
1426. ASBESTOS... A SOCIAL PROBLEM, supra note 888, at 19.
1427. Id. Paying Asbestos Damages, supra note 1389, at col. 2; see Reutter, supra
note 1412 (occupational disease victims receive welfare).
1428. ASBESTOS . .. A SOCIAL PROBLEM, supra note 888, at 19; Paying Asbestos Dam-
ages, supra note 1389, at col. 2; see Note, supra note 1061, at 928 (occupational disease
victims receive benefits under Medicare).
1429. ASBESTOS... A SOCIAL PROBLEM, supra note 888, at 19.
1430. Id.; Paying Asbestos Damages, supra note 1389, at col. 2; see Note, supra note
1061, at 928 (occupational disease victims receive benefits under Social Security). See infra
note 1465.
1431. One study has revealed that the federal government exposed approximately
55,000 government workers who worked in naval and private shipyards during the Second
World War to asbestos. Manville's Costs, supra note 22, at col. 3; see Paying Asbestos Dam-
ages, supra note 1389, at col. 2. The federal government also exposed servicemen who lived
on these ships to damaged and friable asbestos. Shipyard workers whom the federal govern-
ment allegedly exposed to asbestos during the Second World War have filed one-half of the
compensation claims pending against asbestos companies. Action Expected Next Year,
supra note 1395, at 2731. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has reported
that asbestos exposure occurred to 4.5 million shipyard workers during World War II. NA-
TIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE ESTIMATES, supra note 13, at 1-2. For a discussion of governmental
liability, see supra part X.
1432. 38 U.S.C. §§ 321-362 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1433. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1434. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8150 (1976).
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United States Supreme Court has held that servicemen have no
cause of action against the government under the Federal Torts
Claims Act,"14 5 servicemen must file under the Veterans' Benefit
Act to receive compensation. Congress intended the Veterans' Ben-
efit Act to enable "a grateful Government to supplement the earn-
ing capacity of the veteran in civilian life proportionate to the de-
gree of his disability which has greatly diminished that
capacity. ' 1436 Injured parties forfeit this compensation for reasons
that include dishonorable discharge 43 7 and conviction for sabotage
or treason.4 S The government also limits the value of. awarded
compensation to a specific amount that depends upon the class in
which the government places the injured party.14 9 The Act thus
provides uncertain, limited compensation to injured veterans. 440
The Longshoremen's Act1 44' provides workers' compensation
benefits to employees 442 whom private employers hire to engage in
maritime work, such as loading and unloading vessels, in United
States navigable waters. The federal government currently com-
pensates some victims of asbestos-related diseases under the Long-
shoremen's Act' 44 3 even if the victim's work only slightly aggra-
vated any asbestos injuries or indirectly affected the employee's
asbestos exposure.1 444 The Benefits Review Board"445 reviews ad-
ministrative decisions and compensation orders regarding compen-
sation claims filed under the Longshoremen's Act.1446 The Act,
1435. E.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); see supra part X.
1436. H.R. RP. No. 2301, 79th Cong., 2d Seas. 4, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1461, 1464.
1437. 38 U.S.C. §§ 310, 331 (1976).
1438. Id. § 3504(a).
1439. Congress intended the Veterans' Benefit Act to place a ceiling on compensation.
Stencel Aero Eng'g Co. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
1440. For a further discussion of the Act's contingencies, see Note, From Feres to
Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REv.
1099, 1107 (1979).
1441. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1442. The term "employees" does not include seamen, who receive compensation for
occupational injuries under the Jones Act. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976); see supra part X.
1443. See, e.g., McCabe v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 602 F.2d 59 (3d Cir.
1979); see also Fitzhugh, supra note 1413, at 474; ASBEsTos LrrMG. REP. (ANDREWS) 511 (July
31, 1979). The Veterans' Benefit Act compensates persons who suffer exposure to asbestos in
federal shipyards, and the Longshoremen's Act compensates those persons exposed in pri-
vate shipyards.
1444. Amos v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 13 BEN. Rav. BD. SRv. (MB) 1004, 1006 (1981);
Fitzhugh, supra note 1413, at 474.
1445. The Benefits Review Board, a panel within the Department of Labor, consists of
three administrative appeals judges. Fitzhugh, supra note 1430, at 475 n.28.
1446. The Benefits Review Board also reviews decisions and orders authorized by the
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however, like other workers' compensation laws, limits benefits.
Civilian federal employees with occupational disabilities cur-
rently file claims for benefits under the FECA,1447 which contains
an exclusive liability provision 1448 limiting the total benefits that
the government awards an employee who has an occupational dis-
ease and has filed for compensation. The benefits may not exceed
the benefit ceiling accorded that employee under the FECA.1449
Thus, like other typical federal workers' compensations, the FECA
offers only limited compensation.
The benefits available to injured employees under state work-
ers' compensation laws differ from state to state.1 450 These laws
currently provide both medical and monetary compensation to in-
dividuals with occupational asbestos-related diseases.1 451 Not all
victims of occupational asbestos-related diseases, however, qualify
for these benefits. Statutory restrictions and rigid proof-of-causa-
tion requirements often bar claimants from receiving compensa-
tion.1452 Asbestos workers' family members who contract asbestos-
related diseases fail to qualify for these benefits.1 453 Moreover, the
average worker disabled by asbestos must wait one year from the
time of his disability before receiving the first compensation pay-
ment.1454 Among the critics of the state programs is Representative
Millicent Fenwick, who attacked the programs when she intro-
duced the Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act 455 in the
House of Representatives. 1456 She criticized the inadequacies,
457
Black Lung Act. See supra notes 1401-13 and accompanying text.
1447. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8151 (1976); see Paying Asbestos Damages, supra note 1389, at
col. 2. Government employees had filed 6000 asbestos compensation claims under FECA by
December 1981. Id.
1448. 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (1976).
1449. Id. §§ 8105-8107.
1450. See supra part IX.
1451. ASBESTOS LrrG. REP. (ANDREws) 4865 (Apr. 23, 1982) (statement of Mr. Robin
Obetz, chairman of U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Council on Workers' Compensation).
1452. See infra note 1459.
1453. ASBESTOS ... A SociA PROBLEM, supra note 888, at 19.
1454. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AN INTERM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OC-
CUPATIONAL DISEASEs 75 (1980) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM REPORT].
1455. H.R. 5224, supra note 1391; see infra notes 1469-1508 and accompanying text.
1456. 127 CONG. Rac. E5860 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1981).
1457. One observer has estimated that "over two-thirds of state workers' compensa-
tion systems replace less than forty percent of earnings lost due to permanent workplace
injuries." Note, supra note 1061, at 925. A Department of Labor report estimates that the
average workers' compensation benefit for a worker totally disabled by a job-related disease
equals only one-eighth of that worker's lost income. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1454, at 74.
The report also states that an occupational disease victim's survivors collectively may re-
ceive only $3,500 in cash benefits. Id.
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inconsistencies, and burdensomeness of the remedies afforded
under state laws, and asserted that the laws "fail[ed] to promote a
comprehensive, unified approach to the payment of disability ben-
efit. ' ' 1458 She added that the programs "often fail to provide cover-
age for the unusually long potency [sic] period of asbestos
disease.,
1459
Many proponents of asbestos compensation legislation have
complained that all workers' compensation programs place a "great
strain on the judicial system 1 460 by encouraging occupational dis-
ease victims who are discontented with these programs to flood the
courts with time-consuming and expensive litigation.1 461 Workers'
compensation programs, they have argued, drain public medical
and welfare systems1 4 2 and fail to provide "prompt, adequate, and
equitable compensation."' ' 14  Dissatisfied claimants who turn to
nonadversarial public medical and welfare systems find that these
programs, much like workers' compensation programs, often pro-
vide inadequate benefits.146 4 Some claimants fail to qualify for ben-
1458. 127 CONG. Rzc., supra note 1456, at E5860. Each state workers' compensation
law has different procedural requirements and offers different benefits. See supra part IX.
1459. 127 CONG. REc., supra note 1456, at E5861. Representative Fenwick has indi-
cated the need for greater compensation for the worker and his family an adjustment of
benefits when the disease becomes less or more severe, and uniform, comprehensive cover-
age under federal law to assure future payment of benefits to victims. Id. The long latency
period of asbestos-related disease causes other problems under present workers' compensa-
tion programs. For example, a worker often cannot prove that his job causally relates to his
disease. ASBESTOS... A Social Problem, supra note 888, at 18. Furthermore, statutes of
limitation often bar workers' claims. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1454, at 69; supra
part IX. One critic has stated that because of the barriers to state workers' compensation
programs only one-thirteenth of the persons who suffer from disabling occupational diseases
receives benefits under those systems. See Note, supra note 1061, at 925.
1460. H.R. 5735, supra note 1391, § 1(b)(9).
1461. ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREws) 4861 (Apr. 23, 1982) (manufacturers and ACC
members testified in hearings concerning asbestos litigation expenses); see supra note 1394
and accompanying text (estimates of the cost of asbestos litigation). Injured parties receive
only one-tenth of the asbestos industry's costs for asbestos injury litigation. AsssTos LrrG.
REP. (ANDREws) 4861 (Apr. 23, 1982) (statement of Mr. Glenn W. Bailey, chairman of Keene
Corporation).
1462. H.R. 5735, supra note 1391, § 1(b)(7).
1463. Id. § 1(b)(6).
1464. "If an occupational disease case is not compensated by workers' compensation,
the person can usually obtain benefits elsewhere, although at considerably lower levels than
in workers' compensation." Conley & Halpern, Programs to Protect Workers with Occupa-
tional Diseases, reprinted in SuBcoMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COM. ON LABOR AND Pun-
LIC WELFARE & HousE EDUC. AND LABOR COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROCEEDNGS OF THE
INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION TASK FORCE CONFERENCE ON OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASES AND WORKER'S COMPENSATION, 1976, at 808 (Jt. Comm. Print 1976). One report
indicates that "the benefits that these programs currently provide are woefully incapable of
offsetting the physical, economic and emotional losses sustained." ASBESTOS ... A SOCIAL
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efits under these programs. 614 5 Claimants who are discontended
with the various compensation programs, therefore, have filed
thousands of products liability claims.. 46 This litigation has forced
Congress to consider appropriate alternative compensation
systems.
C. Asbestos Compensation Bills Proposed in the Ninety-
seventh Congress
Legislators in the Ninety-seventh Congress introduced three
bills that provided compensation systems for individuals who died
or suffered disability from occupational exposure to asbestos.
1467
By introducing these bills, legislators attempted to solve the inade-
quacies of the current compensation programs that have caused
dissatisfied claimants to flood the courts with expensive litiga-
tion.1 468 The bills afforded exclusive and arguably equitable com-
pensation to asbestos litigation claimants.
1. Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act'
469
Representative Fenwick introduced the Asbestos Health
Hazards Compensation Act (H.R. 5224) in the House of Represent-
atives on December 15, 1981.1470 She had introduced similar legis-
lation in 1977147 ' and 1979,1472 but neither these earlier bills nor
the 1981 bill received much legislative support."73 The Asbestos
Health Hazards Compensation Act differed from its predecessors
PROBLEM, supra note 888, at 19-20, 188-89. For example, in 1978 claimants received average
benefits from Social Security Disability Insurance of $3900 per year. INTERIM REPORT, supra
note 1454, at 82.
1465. "Though the Social Security Disability Insurance Program has come to be the
most frequently utilized income maintenance program for the long-term totally disabled, as
many as 80% of those who are severely disabled from an occupational disease fail to meet
basic eligibility requirements." ASBESTOS. . . A SOCIAL PROBLEM, supra note 888, at 20 n.27
(citing INTERIM REPORT, supra note 1454, at 80-81).
1466. See supra part I. Many claimants, however, do not receive adequate or consis-
tent payments through litigation. Manville Plans, supra note 1389, at col. 5.
1467. For general background of the bills, see supra notes 1390 & 1393-95 and accom-
panying text.
1468. See supra notes 1426-66.
1469. H.R. 5224, supra note 1391.
1470. 127 CONG. REc., supra note 1456, at H9670.
1471. H.R. 8689, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
1472. H.R. 27, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
1473. ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 4617 (Feb. 26, 1982). The 97th Congress did
not hold hearings on H.R. 5224, and on December 15, 1981, Congress referred the bill to the
House Committee on Education and Labor. The Committee referred the bill to the Subcom-
mittee on Labor Standards on January 29, 1982.
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in several ways. In her introduction of H.R. 5224, Representative
Fenwick stated that her new bill scrutinized compensation claims
to prevent potential fraud and abuse. Further, it eliminated the
federal government as a responsible party147 4 and gave plaintiffs
who filed lawsuits prior to the bill's enactment the option of either
continuing their suits or filing under the Act for benefits.
14 75
The 1981 Fenwick bill required responsible parties to pay ben-
efits either directly to claimants eligible for compensation under
the bill147 68 or to a trust fund from which a board of directors would
channel benefits to eligible claimants. 477 The Fenwick bill pro-
vided exclusive benefits "to affected persons147 8 who become dis-
abled as a result of an asbestos-related disease ' 147 9 and "to the de-
pendents14 8 0 of affected persons who die from any such disease.
'1 48 '
For compensation claims that accrued or arose before January 1,
1983, the bill required responsible parties to pay benefits directly
to affected persons and their dependents.1 482 To receive compensa-
tion from responsible parties eligible claimants would file for bene-
fits "within three years after an initial medical determination of
total disability or death due to asbestos-related disease, or within
three years after the date of the enactment of this Act, whichever
occurs later.
1 483
For claims arising after January 1, 1983, the bill required that
responsible parties pay all valid claims through the Asbestos
Health Hazards Compensation Fund. 1 48 A board of directors di-
rected the Fund1 48 5 and determined the validity of claims. 48M The
1474. The term "responsible parties" refers to those parties who, pursuant to each bill,
fund the compensation program. H.R. 5224, supra note 1391, § 102(10); see infra notes
1504-05 and accompanying text.
1475. 127 CONG. REc., supra note 1456, at E5861.
1476. H.R. 5224, supra note 1391, § 202(a)(1).
1477. Id. § 203(a).
1478. The term "affected person" under H.R. 5224 refers to a worker whose occupa-
tion has exposed him or any member of his household to asbestos. Id. § 102(2).
1479. H.R. 5224, supra note 1391, § 101(b).
1480. The term "dependent" under H.R. 5224 includes a wife, widow, child, sister,
brother, or parent of the affected person. Id. § 102(4).
1481. Id. § 101(b).
1482. Id. § 202(a)(1).
1483. Id. § 202(b).
1484. H.R. 5224 establishes the Asbestos Hazards Compensation Fund within the De-
partment of Labor to satisfy all valid claims. Id. § 203(a). The bill provided that responsible
parties would sustain the Fund with contributions. Id. § 204(a).
1485. Id. § 203(b)(1).
1486. Id. § 203(e). Regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor governed the
operation of the board of directors. Id.
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United States Secretary of Labor collected contributions from each
responsible party-member of each class.14 87 Responsible parties
contributed, based on their classifications, to the Fund different
percentages of their net domestic sales of asbestos, cigarette to-
bacco, and cigarettes.14 88 If a responsible party did not contribute
the payment that the bill required, the Secretary of Labor could
assess a civil penalty 4 8 9 or bring a civil action14 90 against the party.
If a responsible party were no longer in its previous form or iden-
tity, its successor assumed its H.R. 5224 liability.14 91 The status of
the affected person1 92 and the status and number of his depen-
dents149 3 determined the amount of benefits that qualified claim-
ants could receive under the bill. Totally disabled claimants
14 94
and widows of some claimants149 5 received benefits identical to
those that the FECA offers.14 98 A partially disabled claimant re-
ceived less compensation, at a rate determined by the Secretary of
Labor, than a person totally disabled by exposure to asbestos. 4 97 A
widow or disabled claimant with dependents generally received a
percentage increase in benefits according the to the number of the
claimant's dependents. 4 98 Disabled persons not eligible for pay-
ments for medical care under state workers' compensation laws re-
ceived these additional monies under the bill. 4 99 H.R. 5224 bene-
1487. Id. § 204(a)(2). For discussion of responsible party classifications, see infra note
1504.
1488. H.R. 5224, supra note 1391, § 204(b).
1489. Id. § 204(f)(2). Responsible parties paid into the Fund a percentage, differing by
class, of net domestic sales of asbestos-containing products or cigarettes and cigarette to-
bacco for the quarter fifteen years preceding the year in which payment was made. Id. §
204(b) (emphasis added).
1490. Id. § 204(f)(1).
1491. Id. § 204(g)-(h).
1492. Different benefits are available in the event of the death, total disability, or par-
tial disability. Id. § 206(b). See id. § 102(6)-(9) for definitions of various classes of disability.
1493. See supra note 1480 (status of dependents).
1494. H.R. 5224, supra note 1391, § 206(b)(3).
1495. Id. § 206(b)(1)-(2). But see id. § 206(b)(2) (if affected person had received bene-
fits prior to death, the widow received that amount).
1496. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8151 (1976). For a discussion of the FECA, see supra notes
1447-49 and accompanying text. H.R. 5224 benefits equaled "the minimum monthly pay-
ment to which a Federal employee in grade GS-5 of the General Schedule who is totally
disabled is entitled ... under [the FECA]." H.R. 5224, supra note 1391, § 206(b)(3).
1497. See H.R. 5224, supra note 1391, § 206(b)(4). The amount of compensation for
partial disability, however, could not exceed the amount awarded for total disability. Id.
1498. Id. §§ 206(b)(5)-(6). For other situations in which a dependent's benefits in-
creased, see id. § 206(b)(7) (benefits for siblings and parents of deceased affected person).
1499. Id. § 206(b)(8). Persons receiving state workers' compensation for medical care
would have continued to receive those benefits after enactment of H.R. 5224. The Act also
allowed the Secretary of Labor to establish in needed locations clinical facilities for asbes-
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fits were "exclusive of and in addition to all benefits under [Social
Security]. '"15 0 The bill, however, reduced H.R. 5224 compensation
by the amount of benefits that the claimant received under state
disability insurance laws, state or federal workers' compensation,
or unemployment compensation. 150 1 Moreover, the Fenwick bill did
not allow claimants eligible for H.R. 5224 compensation to recover
damages from responsible parties, the federal government, or labor
organizations. 150 2 Benefits that a claimant received under the Fen-
wick bill were not taxable income.
1 503
Responsible parties under H.R. 5224 included business entities
that import, sell, manufacture, or distribute any product or sub-
stance that contains asbestos, cigarettes, or cigarette tobacco.
1 504
The Fenwick bill classified the tobacco industry as a responsible
party because an employee who both works with asbestos and
smokes cigarettes has an increased risk of contracting an asbestos-
related disease.
1 50 5
The Fenwick bill thus compensated eligible claimants by re-
quiring the asbestos and tobacco industries to contribute either di-
rectly to claimants or to a trust fund that would distribute benefits
to claimants. Claimants complained that H.R. 5224 awarded inade-
quate compensation. 506 Since the proposed Act awarded benefits
identical to the payments offered under the FECA to totally dis-
abled claimants, critics of the FECA benefits likewise were critical
of H.R. 5224.1507 The bill also exposed the tobacco industry to
tos-related disease treatment and care. See id. § 306.
1500. Id. § 206(c).
1501. Id. § 206(d).
1502. Id. § 301.
1503. Id. § 206(e).
1504. Id. § 102(10). H.R. 5224 separated responsible parties-whether corporations,
partnerships, individuals, joint enterprises, or other entities-into three classifications. Class
I encompassed those parties whose handling, use, or application of asbestos likely produces
asbestos dust. Class II included those parties whose handling of the mineral creates little
likelihood of exposure. Class III consisted of the cigarette manufacturers. Id. § 102(11)(A).
1505. 127 CONG. REC., supra note 1456, at E5861. "[T]he combined risk for dying of
lung cancer of an asbestos worker who smokes is 92 times that of an individual who neither
smokes nor works with asbestos." Nicholson, Case Study 1: Asbestos-The TLV Approach,
271 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci., 152, 164 (1976).
1506. See, e.g., Hazards of Asbestos Exposure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1982) (statement of Mr. Kowalski, employee of Johns-Manville
Corporation for 19 years) [hereinafter cited as Hazards]. Mr. Kowalski complained that "a
person has to be 100-percent disabled with three other dependents to receive $10,000 a
year." Id. at 61. This type of legislation, Mr. Kowalski asserted, "will not do the job or will
not suit the evils caused by industry." Id.
1507. See supra notes 1447-49 & 1460-63 and accompanying text.
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enormous potential liability for asbestos disease and possibly al-
lowed other cancer victims to receive compensation from the to-
bacco industry. The bill, therefore, could harm the financial status
of this currently sound American industry. The Fenwick bill also
failed to provide for governmental liability, even though the fed-
eral government exposed many military and civilian workers to as-
bestos during World War II.150 This omission, however, probably
aided rather than hindered support for the the bill.
1 50 9
2. Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 19811610
The Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1981 (S.
1643) submitted by Senator Gary Hart contained provisions simi-
lar to Representative Fenwick's legislation but created more con-
troversy.1511 The proposed Hart bill established minimum stan-
dards for state and federal workers' compensation asbestos-related
death or disability benefits.1 12 The bill required "responsible par-
ties" to provide claimants with supplemental payments when the
claimants' awarded benefits fell below these minimum stan-
dards. 513 The supplemental payments increased a claimant's total
award to the level of compensation that the bill dictated.1 514 Re-
sponsible parties"" under S. 1643 included: (1) employers who ex-
pose their workers to asbestos,1518 (2) miners, manufacturers, sell-
ers, and importers of asbestos, 517 and (3) any entity that a
worker's compensation agency1 518 designates as a responsible
party.1 5119 Additionally, responsible parties could include, among
1508. See supra note 1431.
1509. See infra notes 1597-99 and accompanying text.
1510. S. 1643, supra note 1390.
1511. Senator Hart introduced S. 1643 on September 18, 1981. See 127 CONG. Rac.
S10033 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981) (statement of Senator Hart). He previously sponsored a
similar bill in the 96th Congress. See S. 2847, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S7295-99
(daily ed. June 18, 1980). The Senate referred S. 1643 to the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources on September 18, 1981. Ten days later the Committee referred the
bill to its Subcommittee on Labor.
1512. S. 1643, supra note 1390, § 4(a).
1513. Id. § 5(b).
1514. Id. The other asbestos-related bills established a trust fund rather than provid-
ing for supplemental payments. See supra notes 1484-88 and accompanying text (discussion
of H.R. 5224); infra notes 1583-86 and accompanying text (discussion of H.R. 5735).
1515. For a general definition of a responsible party, see supra note 1474.
1516. S. 1643, supra note 1390, § 2(10)(A)(i).
1517. Id. § 2(10)(A)(ii).
1518. A workers' compensation agency administers and enforces workers' compensa-
tion law. Id. §§ 2(12)-(13).
1519. Id. § 2(10)(B).
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other entities, 152 0 "the Federal Government, any State, or any pub-
lic agency or a political subdivision of such Federal or State gov-
ernment."1521 By imposing federal liability, S. 1643 drastically dif-
fered from the two other asbestos compensation bills introduced in
the Ninety-seventh Congress.1 522 The Hart bill imposed a three-
year statute of limitations on benefit filings by claimants. 52 Like
the Fenwick legislation,15 24 S. 1643 allowed a party who filed suit
prior to Congress' enactment of the bill either to continue his suit
or to file for S. 1643 compensation.1 52 5 If settlement or resolution
of a claim occurred prior to the bill's enactment, the claimant
would receive his S. 1643 benefits less the award he received in the
finalized lawsuit.
1526
The "minimum standards for State and Federal workers' com-
pensation" that the bill established 527 provided an exclusive rem-
edy 528 for affected persons,1529 their survivors, and dependents.53 0
The benefits for partially or totally disabled persons and the sur-
viving spouses of affected persons would not be "less than [two-
thirds] of the average gross weekly wage of the affected person for
the highest three of the five years immediately preceding. . . disa-
1520. Id. § 2(10). The bill required every possible responsible party to acquire insur-
ance. Id. § 11(b). The bill thereby characterized insurance companies as responsible for pro-
viding S. 1643 benefits. Id. § 11(c).
1521. Id. § 2(10)(B).
1522. For background regarding the government's role in asbestos exposure, see supra
note 1431. The Government Contractors' Product Liability Act of 1981 also would have
established governmental liability. See H.R. 1504, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REG.
H275 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1981). This proposed Act permitted indemnification of the govern-
ment by parties who had supplied asbestos or asbestos products to the government for any
liability resulting from the use of the contracted-for products. See id.
1523. S. 1643, supra note 1390, § 4(15). The bill required claimants to file for benefits
"within three years after death or an initial medical determination of total disability due to
the asbestos-related disease, whichever occurs first: Provided, however, That every claimant
shall have three years after the date of enactment of this Act, within which to file a claim
for benefits hereunder." Id.
1524. See supra notes 1470-1509 and accompanying text.
1525. S. 1643, supra note 1390, § 16(b).
1526. Id. § 16(c).
1527. Id. § 4(a).
1528. Id. § 10(a). A person entitled to file for S. 1643 compensation could not subse-
quently file suit against a responsible party. Id. § 10(b).
1529. S. 1643 defined the term "affected person" as any person killed or disabled as a
result of exposure to asbestos who either suffered asbestos exposure as a result of his em-
ployment or lived as a member of an asbestos-exposed worker's household. S. 1643, supra
note 1390, § 2(4). The bill required the Secretary of Labor to prescribe a uniform standard
for determination of casusation and degree of disability. Id. § 4(17).
1530. The term "dependent" under S. 1643 referred to the wife or child of the affected
person. Id. § 2(7).
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bility [or death]."15 " The Hart bill resembled the Fenwick bill 53 2
in that each claimant with dependents received a certain percent-
age increase in benefits depending upon the number of the claim-
ant's dependents. 153 In addition, affected persons received reason-
able and necessary compensation for medical and rehabilitation
expenses. 153 4 A person who was eligible to file S. 1643 compensa-
tion could not recover damages from a responsible party. 53 Addi-
tionally, benefits that S. 1643 provided did not constitute taxable
income, 536 and other benefits that claimants received did not re-
duce S. 1643 benefits.
53 7
The bill provided that the Secretary of Labor would determine
whether each state and federal workers' compensation law met the
bill's minimum standards for benefit programs. 5 33 If the Secretary
found that a workers' compensation law offered compensation
lower than the bill's minimum benefit standards, the Secretary
"certif[ied] the law only to the extent that it [met] such standards
.... ,,IL53 Individual parties who claimed that a specific order or
award of compensation from a workers' compensation agency'" 0
had fallen below the Act's minimum standards could "file a
[timely] petition for review of the. . . order or award ... with the
Benefits Review Board.' 54 If the Board decided that the claim-
ant's benefits were deficient, the Board then would order the re-
sponsible party to pay directly to the claimant the supplemental
payments necessary to reach the minimum level of compensation
dictated by the bill plus all reasonable costs of the litigation.
154 2
The bill also provided that any responsible party paying S. 1643
1531. Id. §§ 4(a)(3)-(4). A claimant received benefits until either he died or the disa-
bility ended, whichever occurred first. Id. § 4(a)(8). A surviving spouse received benefits
until he died or remarried, whichever occurred first; dependents, however, collected benefits
after these events occurred. Id. § 4(a)(11).
1532. See supra note 1498 and accompanying text.
1533. S. 1643, supra note 1390, § 4(a)(5).
1534. Id. § 4(a)(9). The bill expressly did not place a limitation on the amount or
duration of these benefits. Id.
1535. Id. § 10(b).
1536. Id. § 4(a)(19).
1537. Id. But see supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (different rules apply
when claimant files or finalizes his lawsuit prior to the enactment of the bill).
1538. For a discussion of the minimum benefits standards of S. 1643, see supra notes
1518-39 and accompanying text.
1539. S. 1643, supra note 1390, § 5(b).
1540. See supra note 1518 and accompanying text.
1541. S. 1643, supra note 1390, § 6(a). For more information on the Benefits Review
Board, see supra notes 1445-46 and accompanying text.
1542. S. 1643, supra note 1390, § 6(c)(3).
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compensation could petition to divide the cost between that party
and other responsible parties.
154
-
The Hart bill, therefore, compensated asbestos victims and
their dependents by establishing minimum compensation stan-
dards and requiring responsible parties to supplement substandard
workers' compensation awards of claimants. Unlike the Miller and
Fenwick bills, S. 1643 would force the federal government to pro-
vide some of this supplemental compensation. One observer de-
scribed the controversial Hart bill as "[t]he most talked-about as-
bestos bill now before the Congress"1 4 and as the "bill that the
[asbestos industry] is pushing hard on Capitol Hill. 1545 Another
observer, doubtful that the Hart bill would pass, stated that many
members of Congress perceived the bill as "too much of an effort
to bail out Johns-Manville."1 s5 " Aides to Hart stated that the Sen-
ator viewed his bill merely as a "starting point" for securing a com-
pensation system rather than as a strict, unyielding proposal.5 47 At
least one Washington official, however, believed that Congress
never seriously would view an asbestos compensation bill imposing
federal liability as a viable "starting point" for compensating as-
bestos-disease claimants.
1 5 48
3. Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1982159
The Occupational Health Hazards Compensation Act of 1982
(H.R. 5735), unlike the Fenwick and Hart bills, focused on occupa-
tional exposure to both uranium ore and asbestos. 5 0 Representa-
1543. Id. § 7(1); see id. § 7(2)(a) (specific rules pertaining to apportionment). The
proposed Act established an Apportionment Criteria Commission to develop standards for
determining apportionment proceedings. Id. §§ 8(a)-(b). For further information regarding
the Commission and its criteria, see id. §§ 8(c)-(e).
1544. ASBESTOS LrrG. REP. (ANDREws) 4617 (Feb. 26, 1982).
1545. Id.
1546. Podgers, supra note 18, at 142 (statement of Mr. William Bailey, chairman of
the Task Force on Cumulative Trauma and Latent Injury, a New York City division of the
American Insurance Association). Manville Corporation, successor to Johns-Manville Corpo-
ration, maintains its headquarters in Colorado. Senator Hart represents Colorado as its sen-
ior senator.
1547. ASBESTOS LrriG. REP. (ANDREws) 4617 (Feb. 26, 1982).
1548. Id. at 5970 (Dec. 24, 1982) (Mr. John Lawrence, administrative assistant to Rep-
resentative Miller, has asserted Congress will not enact asbestos bill that concerns federal
contributions to asbestos fund).
1549. H.R. 5735, supra note 1391.
1550. This part of the Special Project discusses only the asbestos provisions of H.R.




tive Miller introduced the bill on March 4, 1982.1551 Unlike the
Hart and Fenwick proposals, the bill received considerable legisla-
tive action during the Ninety-seventh Congress and during 1982
acquired twenty-eight cosponsors. 1552 Observers predicted that al-
though H.R. 5735 resembled the Fenwick bill, Congress would
devote more attention to the asbestos compensation scheme that
Representative Miller introduced.1553 The Miller proposal con-
tained provisions that directed employers to pay benefits directly
to eligible employees 5 4 and, alternatively, provided persuasive in-
centives for employers to contribute to a trust fund from which a
federal Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) di-
rected benefits to eligible claimants.
1555
To qualify for H.R. 5735 compensation, an employee or survi-
vor would have to file a claim 55" for death or disability compensa-
tion with the district OWCP within two years after the occurrence
of the death or disability or within two years after the bill's enact-
ment, whichever was later.1557 After an investigation, the OWCP
would decide whether the employee was eligible for benefits under
the proposed Act and whether a last responsible employer ex-
isted. 558 The OWCP would direct the last responsible employer to
provide benefits to the claimant if the OWCP affirmatively deter-
mined eligibility. 559 If the OWCP concluded that no last responsi-
ble employer existed, the OWCP would assign responsibility for
the employee's compensation payments to the state Asbestos Com-
pensation Excess Liability Fund, which the bill also established.
560
The Miller bill provided exclusive benefits to employees per-
manently diabled 56' as the result of job-related exposure to asbes-
tos 56 2 and to surviving spouses and children of employees who
1551. See 128 CONG. REc. E772 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1982) (statement of Representative
Miller). On the same day Congress referred the bill to the House Committee on Education
and Labor, which referred it to the Subcommittee on Labor Standards.
1552. The Subcommittee on Labor Standards held hearings regarding H.R. 5735 on
March 4, April 21, and April 22, of 1982. As of January 7, 1983, Congress had not printed or
indexed these hearings. One cosponsor was Representative Fenwick.
1553. See, e.g., ASBEsTos LrrMG. REP. (ANDREws) 4617 (Feb. 26, 1982).
1554. H.R. 5735, supra note 1391, § 11(b).
1555. Id. §§ 12-13.
1556. The bill also encourages, but does not require, claimants to file a claim notice.
Id. § 6(a).
1557. Id. § 6(b).
1558. Id. § 7.
1559. Id. § 11(b).
1560. Id.
1561. Permanent disability can be total or partial. Id. § 4(a).
1562. Id. § 5(a). The bill presumed that an asbestos worker's asbestos-related disease
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died from exposure to asbestos. 5 s3 The bill did not provide com-
pensation for any asbestos employee's family member whom an as-
bestos-related disease had disabled or killed.15 4 Claimants could
receive both monetary and medical benefits under the Act. 55 The
bill provided compensation for all necessary and reasonable medi-
cal expenses and for treatment of an eligible employee's asbestos-
related disease. 56  Benefits for a partially disabled worker equalled
two-thirds of his lost weekly earnings. 56 7 A totally disabled
worker, 5 68 an employee's surviving spouse, 158 9 and-if no spouse
survived the employee' 57°-surviving children received a monetary
benefit that was "[two-thirds] of the employee's average weekly
wage for the highest three of the five years immediately preceding
the death or the onset of the disability.' 57 If a spouse survived,
surviving children would share benefits equal to fifty percent of the
H.R. 5735 benefits that the surviving spouse received.
57 2
If prior to the bill's enactment a claimant received compensa-
tion for an asbestos-related disability under either a state workers'
compensation law or the Longshoremen's Act, the claimant did not
qualify for H.R. 5735 benefits. 157 3 If a claimant had filed a compen-
satory lawsuit pror to the bill's enactment, any compensation that
the he received under the bill reduced the amount of his post-en-
actment judicial recovery. 57" After enactment, the bill provided an
exclusive remedy and barred victims eligible for H.R. 5735 com-
pensation from seeking damages against their employers or against
certain asbestos importers and manufacturers. 57 5 Under H.R. 5735
monetary benefits awarded to persons who also received compensa-
directly resulted from occupational exposure. Id. § 5(b)(2).
1563. Id. § 4(c).
1564. Id. § 5(a).
1565. Id. §§ 4(a), 2(3)(A)-(B).
1566. Id. § 4(e). The bill also established a program for further research and surveil-
lance of asbestos and other occupational diseases. Id. § 16.
1567. Id. § 4(d)(1).
1568. Id. § 4(b).
1569. Id. § 4(c).
1570. Id. § 4(c)(4).
1571. Id. § 4(b). The benefits that the claimant received during the first four years
nevertheless could exceed 200% of the average salary in the United States, id. § 4(b)(1), or
fall below 50% of the average national wage or the claimant's actual wage, id. § 4(b)(2).
1572. Id. § 4(c)(1); see supra note 1570 and accompanying text.
1573. H.R. 5735, supra note 1391, § 5(a)(3).
1574. Id. § 9(b)(3).
1575. See id. § 9(c). But see id. § 12(b)(6) (only importers and manufacturers who




tion from Social Security constituted income. 157 6
Prior to sponsoring H.R. 5735, Representative Miller stated
that he refused to protect asbestos corporations15"7 and did not
want taxpayers to "bail out" the asbestos industry.1 57 8 Representa-
tive Miller alleged that members of major asbestos corporations
knew over fifty years ago that exposure to asbestos caused lung
disease 1579 and, nonetheless, engaged in a massive cover-up of the
ill effects of asbestos exposure. He concluded, therefore, that as-
bestos manufacturers, not the federal government, should be re-
sponsible for compensation of asbestos victims. 580 Predictably,
H.R. 5735 created no liability for federal or state government.158'
Under the bill the worker's last employer was "responsible" for
compensation only if for a minimum of two years the employee
had worked for the last employer and the last employer had ex-
posed that worker to asbestos. 582 If a court could not find the last
employer "responsible" for compensation the proposed Act as-
signed liability for the payments to the Asbestos Compensation
Excess Liability Fund. 58 3 Annual contributions from manufactur-
ers and importers of asbestos and asbestos products 5"4 and from
employers who exposed their workers to asbestos fibers' 55 sus-
tained the Fund.
1586
1576. H.R. 5735 supra note 1391, § 4(g)(1).
1577. ASBEsTos LMG. REP. (ANDREWs) 282 (May 15, 1979).
1578. Id.
1579. Id. See Hazards, supra note 1506, at 6; I. SELIKOFF & D. LEE, supra note 10, 20,
21 n.16.
1580. ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREws) 278-81 (May 15, 1979). Representative Miller
stated that the corporations recklessly and unnecessarily exposed their workers to asbestos
when "the hazards were well known to industry." Id. at 282. "[T]he state of medical...
and industry knowledge. . . of the hazards of asbestos fibers may be contended to be suffi-
cient to impute a 'duty tc warn' and a 'duty to test' to the manufacturers of asbestos prod-
ucts ... " ATroRNEY GENERAL'S REPoRT, supra note 31, at 46. Even in the 1970's industry
took "relatively few precautions" to prevent asbestos exposure. Hazards, supra note 1506, at
6.
1581. See H.R. 5735, supra note 1391, §§ 11(b) & 2(5).
1582. Id. § 11(b).
1583. Id. For specific provisions regarding the Fund, see id. § 12.
1584. H.R. 5735, supra note 1391, § 12(b)(2)(A)(i). The amount of contributions from
each manufacturer or importer depended on its overall market share of asbestos and asbes-
tos product sales during the previous 15 years. Id. § 12(3)(A).
1585. Id. § 12(b)(2)(A)(ii). The state insurance commissioner determined the appro-
priate amount for each employer to contribute, based on size, type, and other characteristics
of the employer's enterprise. Id. § 12(b)(4).
1586. If the manufacturer, importer--or its successor-refused to contribute, the Sec-
retary of Labor could bring a civil action or assess a civil penalty against that party. H.R.
5735, supra note 1391, § 12(b)(3)(C). Refusal to contribute also might subject that party to
third party liability. See supra note 1575 and accompanying text.
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The bill required all responsible employers to maintain suffi-
cient insurance to secure any H.R. 5735 compensation pay-
ments.""8 7 If an employer failed to compensate a successful claim-
ant, the OWCP would order the employer to resume paying the
compensation and to pay, subject to a twenty percent rate of inter-
est, all benefits that the employer previously had withheld from
that claimant.1 5 8 8 In addition, a court could levy civil penalties
against an employer.1 9 If an employer or a manufacturer or im-
porter of asbestos or asbestos products were to refuse to contribute
to the H.R. 5735 trust fund, that party did not receive H.R. 5735
immunity from third party liability.6 90
The Miller bill, therefore, compensated asbestos-disease vic-
tims by requiring that last responsible employers compensate vic-
tims and that employers and the asbestos industry contribute to a
trust fund created to disburse payments to successful claimants.
The asbestos industry, insurance companies, and others have criti-
cized the Miller bill for containing inaccurate medical presump-
tions and for placing a heavy monetary burden on the asbestos in-
dustry.1" 9' Nevertheless, the Ninety-seventh Congress showed more
1587. See H.R. 5735, supra note 1391, § 10(a)(1)
1588. Id. § 13(c)(1).
1589. Id. § 12(b)(3)(C)(ii).
1590. Id. § 12(b)(6).
1591. Mr. G. Earle Parker, senior vice president of Manville Corporation and a
respresentative of the Asbestos Compensation Coalition, criticized the presumption of the
drafters of H.R. 5735 that asbestos exposure causes all lung cancer of claimants. Mr. Parker
stated, "It seems unfair to place total responsibility on asbestos, when other causes may be
equally or even more responsible." ASBESTOS Lrrm. REP. (ANDREws) 4862 (Apr. 23, 1982).
Mr. Glenn W. Bailey, chairman of Keene Corporation, had other objections to the bill. He
said that contrary to provisions in H.R. 5735, his corporation wanted (1) contributions to a
compensation fund by the federal government and the tobacco industry; (2) firm and de-
tailed medical standards and guidelines to establish compensation eligibility of claimants;
and (3) no uranium ore coverage. Id. at 4863.
Mr. J. Howard Bunn, Jr., vice president of the National Association of Independent
Insurers, criticized the Miller bill on the ground that its enactment would result in "federal
usurpation of the existing state compensation systems for occupational diseases." Id. at
4864. Mr. Bunn also asserted that the bill "would interfere with the state regulation of
insurance," and emphasized that the bill would be expensive. Id.
The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the United States Chamber of
Commerce also opposed Representative Miller's bill. NAM spokesmen stated that an asbes-
tos-producing corporation could not possibly give warning to every actual asbestos user.
They stated that H.R. 5735 presumed false facts and relied on outdated medical and scien-
tific knowledge. Id. Mr. Robin Obetz, chairman of the Chamber of Commerce's Council on
Worker's Compensation, criticized the bill as unnecessary because the state workers' com-
pensation system "already provides cash benefits and medical assistance to individuals with
job-related disabilities." Id. at 4865. Mr. Obetz added that "[t]he provision for an exclusive
remedy against product manufacturers raises constitutional questions, as does the provision
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interest in this bill than in the proposals that Representative Fen-
wick and Senator Hart sponsored.
D. Analysis
Previous legislation regarding occupational and latent disease
compensation will serve as a model for future asbestos-related
measures. Although Congress has not enacted most of the legisla-
tion that likely will resemble the asbestos-related bills,1592 it did
develop a black lung disease compensation program for coal min-
ers. Legislators have used this measure in drafting asbestos disease
compensation bills. The controversial aspects of the Black Lung
Act, including high costs for both industry and the federal govern-
ment, unrealistic legislative goals, inadequate benefits to miners,
administrative problems, and a backlog of claims,1593 however,
could deter Congress from passing any similar legislation.
1 594
The three asbestos compensation bills that Representative
Fenwick, Senator Hart, and Representative Miller proposed in the
Ninety-seventh Congress likely also will serve as models for any
future legislative solutions. Two major differences existed among
these bills: which parties would make payments based on their lia-
bility for asbestos disease compensation and how the legislative
scheme would administer the compensation payments. Parties lia-
ble for compensation under the Fenwick bill included businesses
that import, sell, manufacture, or distribute products which con-
tain asbestos, cigarette tobacco, or cigarettes. The bill required
these business entities to contribute either directly to claimants or
to a trust fund that a broad of directors and the Secretary of Labor
then would use to compensate victims. Congressmen may oppose
the Fenwick bill because it gave claimants awards that were identi-
cal to the payments which the government provides under federal
workers' compensation and, thus, did not solve the problem of in-
adequate federal workers' compensation. The Fenwick bill also re-
quired controversial payments from the tobacco and cigarette in-
dustries. The controversy centers around arguments that smoking
merely increases the chances of contracting an asbestos-related
requiring officials in state governments to set up and operate excess liability funds." Id.; see
H.R. 5735, supra note 1391, §§ 9(a) (exclusivity provision), 12 (excess liability fund section).
1592. Congress did pass the Veterans' Health Act. See supra note 1397 and accompa-
nying text.
1593. See supra notes 1411-13 and accompanying text (criticism of Black Lung Act).




disease and that claimants, therefore, could not meet proof-of-cau-
sation requirements in cases against members of the tobacco and
cigarette industries. These industries argue that asbestos exposure
alone can cause the disease, whereas use of tobacco products alone
cannot. The Fenwick bill, however, presumed that if an employer
exposes a smoking worker to asbestos, both asbestos and tobacco
caused the disease. Injured victims of asbestos disease typically
have sought recovery only against the asbestos industry, not
against the tobacco and cigarette industries. If legislation deems
the tobacco and cigarette industries liable, some critics would at-
tack the proposed Act for partially bailing out the asbestos indus-
try. Others argue that if the tobacco industry is liable, the bill also
should have rendered liable other entities that have contributed to
the development of asbestos-related diseases, including employers
who exposed their employees to asbestos but who are not liable
under the bill and the federal government. The bill's trust fund
also could cause problems: creating the board of directors to direct
the fund would be expensive; the Secretary of Labor probably
would lack the necessary expertise to process asbestos claims; and
the administrative problems inherent in the Black Lung Act's trust
fund likewise could plague the asbestos trust fund. Consequently,
Congress likely will refuse to pass future legislation modeled after
the Fenwick bill. Indeed, because Representative Fenwick no
longer serves as a member of the House of Representatives, she
will not have the opportunity to introduce a similar bill in the
Ninety-eighth Congress.
The Hart bill compensated asbestos victims and their depen-
dents by establishing minimum compensation standards and re-
quiring employers, the asbestos industry, the federal government,
and other parties which workers' compensation agencies designate
to supplement claimants' workers' compensation awards that fall
below those standards. The Secretary of Labor would determine
whether each workers' compensation law met the bill's minimum
benefit level, would certify the laws only to that extent, and would
demand that responsible parties supplement the workers' compen-
sation of individual claimants. Although the bill did not create any
new agencies, critics may observe that the Secretary of Labor prob-
ably lacks the expertise to administer asbestos claims. The bill's
imposition of federal liability, however, promised to be its most
controversial aspect. The government exposed thousands of work-
ers to asbestos during the Second World War. Currently, the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity shields the government from liability.
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The Hart bill forced taxpayers to assume part of the financial bur-
den borne, until now, by the asbestos industry. Critics argue that
liability should rest solely on the asbestos industry, which knew for
over fifty years about the ill effects of asbestos exposure but con-
tinued to manufacture and market asbestos without publicly re-
leasing the information. In view of these considerations, a budget-
minded Ninety-eighth Congress likely will not pass legislation that
provides for governmental liability.
1595
Representative Miller's Occupatonal Health Hazards Compen-
sation Act of 1982, although not as popular with the asbestos in-
dustry as the Hart bill, received more legislative action and co-
sponsor support in the Ninety-seventh Congress than did the Hart
and Fenwick bills. The Miller bill compensated asbestos victims
and their survivors 159 6 by requiring that victims' last responsible
employers pay benefits, and that other employers and the asbestos
industry contribute to a trust fund designed to disburse compensa-
tion to victims. The bill avoided the problems of the Black Lung
Act's trust fund by mandating that the OWCP direct the fund and
channel payments to claimants. The Act thus created no new fed-
eral agencies.
The Miller bill, however, placed a heavy burden on the asbes-
tos industry because it did not impose liability on the federal gov-
ernment or on the cigarette and tobacco industries. Placing the en-
tire burden on the asbestos industry may be inappropriate. Of the
thirteen million workers exposed to asbestos since the 1940's, over
one-third worked in government-owned or -controlled ship-
yards.'S59 A compensation program must include federal govern-
ment contribution if it is to reflect the government's substantial
role in the asbestos problem. Federal government contribution
should be limited, however, to those situations in which the gov-
ernment is directly responsible for the disability. For example, gov-
1595. Congress similarly would oppose the Asbestos Compensation Coalition's pro-
posed Occupational Disease Compensation Act, see supra note 1394 and accompanying text,
because the proposed Act required the federal government to finance 50% of the Act's trust
fund, see id.
1596. Some legislators have criticized the Miller proposal for failing to provide com-
pensation for workers' family members who contract the disease themselves. Arguably, how-
ever, the family members would not be suffering from an "occupational" disease within the
meaning of the statute.
1597. H.R. 5735 Hearings, supra note 13, at 132 (statement of Mr. Harry Martens,
executive vice president, Commercial Union Insurance Companies, Inc.). Keene Corporation
estimates that employees of the United States government shipyards account for 40% of the




ernment liability would be appropriate when the government pro-
cured the asbestos products or services, the asbestos industry
manufactured the products pursuant to government contract speci-
fications, the government resold stockpiled asbestos or asbestos-
containing products, or the government controlled or supervised
the workplace. 1598 Although Congress must be careful to avoid the
pitfalls of legislation like the Black Lung Act, a failure to include
government contribution in a compensation program arguably
would be an abdication of responsibility for the government's part
in the asbestos problem. The tobacco industry also should contrib-
ute to a legislative compensation program. Studies reveal that an
asbestos worker who smokes is fifty-three times more likely to con-
tract lung cancer than a nonsmoking worker. 599 Although identify-
ing the proper extent of cigarette manufacturer participation in a
compensation plan will be difficult, failure to include the tobacco
industry would disregard its share of responsibility for asbestos-
related illness. Even though the asbestos industry must contribute
the largest portion to any compensation program to shoulder its
proper share of the burden, Congress should consider enacting an
asbestos compensation program that requires contribution of the
federal government, the insurance industry, and the tobacco
industry.
Representative Miller plans to continue campaigning for his
proposal. Of the three asbestos bills that legislators introduced in
the Ninety-seventh Congress, Representative Miller's legislation
has the greatest chance for success. Since the bill's compensation
program creates no new federal agencies, it would be inexpensive
and create few administrative problems. The bill imposed liability
on the same parties that the courts usually find liable for asbestos-
disease compensation-members of the asbestos industry. Con-
gress is not likely to pass legislation that forces taxpayers to com-
pensate victims of asbestos exposure. Unless members of the
Ninety-eighth Congress propose alternative legislation that is more
favorable to claimants, the federal government, and industry, or
the courts establish a universal remedy,6 °0 Representative Miller's
asbestos bill probably will control future asbestos-related disease
1598. See id. at 274 (letter from Mr. William C. McLaughlin, president, Asbestos
Compensation Coalition).
1599. Id. at 133 (statement of Mr. Harry Martens, executive vice president, Commer-
cial Union Insurance Companies, Inc.). For an analysis of the relationship among smoking,
asbestos, and lung cancer, see I. SLIKOFF & D. Lmn, supra note 10, at 324-29.





Justice Frankfurter stated over thirty years ago that
"[l]egislation is needed which will effectively meet the social obli-
gations which underlie the incidence of occupational disease.
'" 16 01
Sponsors of the asbestos compensation bills in the Ninety-seventh
Congress attempted to fulfill this need by pioneering legislative so-
lutions to the current judicial nightmare of occupational and latent
disease lawsuits. Despite current congressional reluctance to pro-
vide legislative assistance to victims of occupational and latent dis-
eases and strong criticism of the Black Lung Act, the Ninety-
eighth Congress may well enact asbestos compensation legislation
similar to Representative Miller's Occupational Health Hazards
Compensation Act of 1982.
XII. BUSINESS ALTERNATIVES
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.160 2 has
had an extraordinary effect on asbestos-related litigation. In Borel
the Fifth Circuit ruled that courts may hold manufacturers of as-
bestos products jointly and severally liable for failure to provide
warnings regarding the dangers of asbestos use and exposure.6 0 3
The numerous sufferers of asbestos-related health problems enthu-
siastically have embraced this expanded liability1604-thousands
have already filed suit against manufacturers of asbestos prod-
ucts, 160 5 and because of the latent nature of asbestos-related dis-
1601. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 197 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part).
1602. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); see supra part
II.
1603. Lanzone, Asbestos Litigation: Common Sense or Common Disaster, 54 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 24 (1982).
1604. Professors Selikoff and Hammond have linked ingested asbestos fibers to nu-
merous asbestos-related diseases, including mesothelioma, asbestosis, and cancer of the
lung, esophagus, colon, rectum, larynx, kidney and stomach. I. SELIKOFF & E. HAMMOND,
supra note 10, at 114.
1605. The major corporations engaged in the asbestos industry are the defendants in
thousands of asbestos-related health lawsuits: Manville Corporation, as of August 1982, ap-
proximately 16,500 suits, Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 19, 20 (statement of Mr. G.
Earle Parker, senior vice president, Manville Corporation); UNR Industries, as of April
1982, approximately 12,000 suits, ASBESTOS LrrM. REP. (ANDREWS) 5261 (JULY 23, 1982);
Amatex Corporation, as of November 1982, approximately 10,000 suits, id. at 5765 (Nov. 12,
1982); Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., approximately 13,000 suits, Sorenson, A Small Firm's
Answer to Suits Over Asbestos, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1982, at 23, col. 3. Smaller companies
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eases, 160 the number of future lawsuits likely will soar. 160 7 Regard-
less of the exact number, however, the suits have resulted in a
substantial investment of time and money by injured workers,
manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products, insurance
companies, and the court system in an array of counter-claims,
cross-claims, and third party claims.
The immense cost of litigation and the spectre of the effect on
the financial statements from actual and contingent judgments for
the plaintiffs have led the asbestos industry to seek business alter-
natives to improve its financial situation. The common goal of the
manufacturers and distributors of asbestos and related products is
to emerge from the legal and moral controversies surrounding the
asbestos litigation as viable, profit-producing entities. This part of
the Special Project presents and analyzes the mechanisms and
strategies used by these companies in their struggle to overcome
the mounting costs and burdens of asbestos litigation. Section A
discusses Chapter 11 reorganization'608 and analyzes particular
problems that arise when asbestos companies file under Chapter
11. Section B considers the relationship of the successor liability
doctrine to other creative corporate reorganizations and analyzes
the doctrine's possible application to asbestos cases.16 9 Finally,
section C examines and analyzes various defensive strategies im-
plemented by asbestos manufacturers.6 10
A. Chapter 11 Reorganization
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978111 (Bankruptcy Code)
provides two options to debtors who cannot meet their obligations:
such as Pacor, Inc. estimate total pending or settled lawsuts at 2500. The Tennessean, Nov.
29, 1982, at 5, col. 6.
1606. See supra part VIII.
1607. The study upon which Manville Corporation based its bankruptcy filing indi-
cates that future asbestos-related lawsuits will number approximately 45,000; the corpora-
tion estimates at least 30,000 suits and at most 120,000 suits. A. M. WALKER, PROJECrIONS
OF ASBEMos-RELATED DISEASE, 1980-2009 (Epidemiology Resources, Inc. 1982), reprinted in
Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 50. Another source estimates the number of new asbes-
tos-disease victims at 8000-10,000 per year for the rest of the century. See Editorial, The
Asbestos Mess, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 1982, at A18, col. 1. The Asbestos Committee, ap-
pointed on October 8, 1982, pursuant to order of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York, sharply disagrees with Manville's numbers because Manville has
based its projections on possibilities under certain unguaranteed circumstances. ASBESTOS
LIG. REP. (ANDREws) 5786 (Nov. 12, 1982).
1608. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1609. See infra notes 1778-1834 and accompanying text.
1610. See infra notes 1835-53 and accompanying text.
1611. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
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Chapter 71612 liquidation proceedings or Chapter 111613 reorganiza-
tion proceedings. Chapter 7 liquidation generally requires that a
debtor relinquish all his assets to his creditors in exchange for a
discharge of his debts; as a result, the debtor's business ceases. Al-
ternatively, Chapter 11 reorganization allows a debtor to discharge
his debts based on a plan of reorganization in which creditors, ei-
ther by consent or through the operation of protective provi-
sions,161' accept less than the full amount of their debts. In reor-
ganization, the debtor's business continues in a modified form, and
the creditors receive payments from the future earnings of the re-
organized business.161
Currently, three asbestos manufacturers-Unarco, Manville
Corporation, and Amatex Corporation-have filed for Chapter 11
reorganization."'s The following analysis of Chapter 11 proce-
dures 61" 7 presents a synopsis of the statutory provisions, discusses
the reasoning behind the decision to pursue a Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation, and addresses the controversy surrounding the unprece-
dented use of Chapter 11 reorganization by companies that argua-
bly remain financially sound.
1. The Statutory Process of Chapter 11
A debtor may invoke the provisions of Chapter 11 by filing a
voluntary petition for reorganization. 16 8 Much controversy, how-
1612. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1613. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
1614. See id. § 1129.
1615. Elfin, Business Reorganization Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 12 PAC. L.J.
163, 164 (1980).
1616. All three manufacturers filed for Chapter 11 reorganization during the latter
half of 1982: UNR Industries and several subsidiaries, including Unarco, on July 29, 1982, in
the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, see ASBESTOS LrrMG. REP. (AN-
DREwS) 5321 (N.D. IIl. Aug. 13, 1982) (letter from Mr. Malcolm Gaynor, Counsel for Unarco,
to asbestos plaintiff attorneys); Manville Corporation and many of its subsidiaries on Aug.
26, 1982, in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, In re Johns-
Manville Corp., No. 82 B 11656, reprinted in ASBESTOS LrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5397 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1982); Amatex Corporation on Nov. 1, 1982, in the Bankruptcy Court for
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, In re Amatex Corp., No. 82-05220, reprinted in AsBSTOs LrrG.
REP. (ANDREWS) 5812 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 1982).
1617. This part of the Special Project does not discuss the Chapter 11 provisions ap-
plicable to individual debtors.
1618. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Creditors also may commence Chap-
ter 11 reorganizations by involuntary petitions. See id. § 303(a)-(b). Involuntary petitions
are beyond the scope of this part of the Special Project. This part discusses only those
Chapter 11 provisions pertinent to asbestos manufacturers-the automatic stay, creditors
committees, management of the debtor's business, and the reorganization plan. For a de-
tailed discussion of involuntary Chapter 11 reorganizations, see Elfin, supra note 1615;
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ever, has developed concerning the financial conditions and cir-
cumstances that properly should entitle a debtor to voluntary reor-
ganization.1 19  The controversy also extends to the legal
consequences of a voluntary petition under Chapter 11, which in-
clude a stay of all creditors' actions against the debtor, the ap-
pointment by the court of committees of creditors, the manage-
ment of the business during the reorganization period, and the
court's determination of a suitable plan for reorganization.
a. Stay of Actions
The filing of a petition for reorganization immediately stays
620
almost all actions 621 against the debtor. To allow time for the
debtor to create and implement a repayment or reorganization
plan, the stay halts all collection efforts, harrassment, and foreclo-
sure actions by creditors.16 2 2 The automatic stay also protects cred-
itors from a race for the debtor's assets: those creditors who act
fastest cannot obtain payment of claims in preference to and to the
detriment of others.16" The stay automatically enjoins the com-
mencement or continuation of judicial proceedings, 16 24 efforts to
enforce judgments,12 5 or efforts to create, perfect, or enforce
liens. 1'6 26 The stay, however, is not permanent: it continues until
the court closes or dismisses the case or until the court grants or
denies a discharge.1 627 In addition, a party in interest may institute
a proceeding in the bankruptcy court to obtain relief from the
stay. 1 628 One of the most controversial aspects of the automatic
Moller, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code or Whatever Happened to Good Old
Chapter XI?, 11 ST. MARY's L.J. 437 (1979); Trost, Business Reorganizations Under Chap-
ter 11 of the New Bankruptcy Code, 34 Bus. LAw. 1309 (1979).
1619. See infra notes 1700-42 and accompanying text.
1620. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1621. Actions excepted from the stay include criminal proceedings against the debtor,
id. § 362(b)(1), actions for alimony, id. § 362(b)(2), governmental proceedings to enforce a
police or regulatory power, id. § 362(b)(4), and the issuance to the debtor of a notice of tax
deficiency, id. § 362(b)(8).
1622. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6296-97.
1623. Id., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6296-97.
1624. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1625. Id. § 362(a)(2).
1626. Id. § 362(a)(4)-(5).
1627. Id. § 362(c). Actions against property of the estate continue until the property is
no longer property of the estate. Id.
1628. Id. § 362(d). A creditor may seek termination, annulment, modification, or con-
ditioning of the stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection of the interest of a
secured creditor. A court also may grant relief if the debtor does not have an equity interest
1983]
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stay provision concerns whether the stay affects only those por-
tions of cases relating to the debtor, or whether it halts entire cases
associated with the debtor.
6 29
b. Appointment of Committees
The Bankruptcy Code authorizes courts to appoint commit-
tees representing the various types and categories of creditors; for
example, the court must appoint a committee of unsecured credi-
tors as soon as practicable after the filing of a reorganization peti-
tion.18 30 The membership of the committees ordinarily is voluntary
and includes the creditors who hold the seven largest claims
against the debtor in a particular category.16s The Bankruptcy
Code authorizes these committees to take many of the actions nec-
essary to effect a reorganization, including the right to participate
in the formulation of a reorganization plan,'" 2 to request the ap-
pointment of a trustee if the court has not already appointed
one,'63 and to employ attorneys, accountants, or other agents to
represent or perform services for the committee.16 3 4 A committee
also may "investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and
financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's bus-
iness and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and
any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a
plan.,,116s5
in the property and if the property is not necessary for an effective reorganization. Id. The
party requesting relief has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in the
property, while the trustee or debtor has the burden of proof on all other issues. Id. §
362(g)(1)-(2). A preliminary hearing on the request for relief from the stay must be com-
menced within 30 days after the request, or the stay automatically will cease for the party
making the request. Id. § 362(e). If a reasonable likelihood exists that the party opposing
relief from the stay will prevail at the final hearing, which must begin within 30 days after
the preliminary hearing, id. § 362(e)(2), then the court must order the stay continued, id. §
362(e)(1). If the final hearing does not begin within the specified time, id. § 362(e)(2), then
the automatic stay will cease for the party requesting relief. Elfin, supra note 1615, at 174.
1629. See infra notes 1743-62 and accompanying text.
1630. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1976). As a result, a reorganization proceeding will have
at least one committee. The court may appoint additional committees of creditors or of
equity security holders at the request of a party in interest. Id. § 1102(a)(2). The United
States trustee also may appoint these committees. Id. § 1102(a).
1631. Id. § 1102(b)(1)-(2). If the membership of a committee is not representative of
the different kinds of claims appropriate to the committee, the court may change the com-
mittee's membership or size upon the request of a party in interest. Id. § 1102(c).
1632. Id. § 1103(c)(3).
1633. Id. § 1103(c)(4).
1634. Id. § 1103(a).
1635. Id. § 1103(c)(2).
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c. Management of Business
Since a business entity must continue to function during the
reorganization process, the Code presumes that the old manage-
ment will carry on the business'636 as the "debtor in possession" of
the property. 63 7 Otherwise, the court may appoint a United States
trustee638 to manage the business, 63 9 but only for cause, upon re-
quest of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing.'
°4 0 If
the court does not appoint a trustee upon the request of a party in
interest, then it must order the appointment of an examiner for
investigatory purposes.'
41
In Chapter 11 reorganizations, the automatic stay protections
alone do not ensure the survival of an insolvent corporation, for it
must obtain funds for ongoing operations. The court rarely inter-
cedes in the operation of the business and leaves this authority to
the creditors' committees, the United States trustee, and the credi-
tors themselves.' 4 2 The debtor's need to obtain funds and the con-
comitant lack of direct court supervision has led at least one com-
mentator' 4 3 to warn parties in interest to be very watchful for
abuses of these privileges to avoid dissipation of assets.'
4 4
1636. Moller, supra note 1618, at 460.
1637. Elfin, supra note 1615, at 171; see 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1976) (debtor in possession
has all the rights and powers of a trustee serving under Chapter 11).
1638. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 321 (eligibility to serve as trustee), 322 (qualification of trus-
tee), 323 (role and capacity of trustee) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
1639. See id. § 1108. The court may appoint a trustee if the appointment is in the
interest of the creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate. Id. §
1104(a)(2).
1640. Id. § 1104(a). Cause includes fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross misman-
agement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after com-
mencement of the case. Id § 1104(a)(1).
1641. "Investigatory purposes" include "investigation of any allegations of fraud, dis-
honesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of
the affairs of the debtor of or by current or former management of the debtor." Id. §
1104(b).
1642. See Moller, supra note 1618, at 447.
1643. Id.
1644. For example, under the old Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, a debtor
could not incur any secured or unsecured credit without court approval. Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, however, a debtor or trustee may obtain unsecured credit in the ordinary
course of business without court approval, and these debts automatically may become a first
priority as an administrative claim. 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (Supp. V 1981). To protect current
lienholders, the Bankruptcy Code stipulates that the debtor may obtain secured credit only
with court approval. See id. § 364(c). After notice and a hearing, the court may authorize
credit secured by a senior or equal lien, but only if the court provides adequate protection
for the affected lienholder. Id. § 364(d)(1).
Obtaining credit through the use of a secured party's collateral is beyond the scope of
this part of the Special Project. For discussions of this subject, see Elfin, supra note 1615, at
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d. Plan of Reorganization
The most crucial part of a Chapter 11 proceeding is the plan
by which the debtor will implement the reorganization. For 120
days after the date of the order for relief, the debtor in possession
has the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization. 1 4 5 If the
debtor files a plan within the 120-day period, no one else may file a
plan during an additional sixty-day period and the debtor may
seek the acceptances of each class of creditors affected by the
plan. 6 46 If the court appoints a trustee to carry on the business
operations, then any party in interest, including the debtor, may
file a plan of reorganization.
1647
To permit a smooth process of reorganization without ad-
versely affecting important creditor interests, the Bankruptcy Code
provides that the reorganization plan must classify claims1' 48 and
may group together substantially similar claims. e49 The plan must
treat all claims within each class equally, unless a particular credi-
tor agrees to different treatment.6 50 Although the plan must ac-
commodate priority claims, ea5 it may impair any class of secured
or unsecured claims or interests,' 65 even by providing for a total or
partial liquidation of the debtor's assets.6 58 Before the debtor so-
licits postpetition acceptance of the plan from creditors, the debtor
must submit a disclosure statement for court approval. 654 The dis-
closure statement must contain "adequate information," which the
174-76; Moller, supra note 1618, at 448-54.
1645. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1976).
1646. Id. § 1121(c)(3). Upon a showing of cause, the court may reduce or increase
these periods, but only upon request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing.
Id. § 1121(d).
1647. Id. § 1121(c)(1). When submitting a plan, parties in interest always should re-
member that the debtor in a voluntary case has the option to convert to liquidation under
Chapter 7. Id. § 1112(a). Although the creditors may petition to convert back to Chapter 11,
id. § 706(b), they will not necessarily elicit the debtor's cooperation. Elfin, supra note 1615,
at 177-78; Moller, supra note 1618, at 465.
1648. Id. § 1123(a)(1). The plan must specify any classes that it will not impair, id. §
1123(a)(2), and specify the treatment these classes will receive, id. § 1123(a)(3).
1649. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1976). Small, dissimilar unsecured claims may compose a
class if the court approves this treatment as reasonable and necessary for administrative
convenience. Id. § 1122(b).
1650. Id. § 1123(a)(4).
1651. Id. § 1129(a)(9). For a more detailed discussion of this requirement, see Moller,
supra note 1618, at 466-67. But cf. Elfin, supra note 1615, at 178-79 (the plan "may" accom-
modate priority claims).
1652. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
1653. Id. § 1123(b)(4). This section overrules the decision of In re Pure Penn Petro-
leum Co., 188 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1951).
1654. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (Supp. V 1981).
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court determines on a case-by-case basis.1 55
After the debtor discloses adequate information regarding the
plan, the Bankruptcy Code requires that each impaired class1656 of
creditors vote to accept the plan.6 57 A majority in number and at
least two-thirds in amount of the creditors in a particular class
1 5
must vote to accept the plan.1659 Thus, a majority of the creditors
can force the nonconsenting minority to accept less than full pay-
ment of their claims. If an impaired class refuses to accept the
plan, authors of the reorganization plan can use the "cram down"
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code provided that the plan is "fair
and equitable" with respect to any impaired class.1660 Additionally,
a court will deem an unimpaired class to have accepted the
plan,"61 but it will deem a class not receiving any payment or com-
pensation under the plan to have rejected the plan.1"e 2
In addition to a vote on the plan by the creditors, the Bank-
ruptcy Code requires a final confirmation of the plan by the court
after a formal hearing that allows all parties in interest to contest
confirmation.166" The Bankruptcy Code enumerates specific criteria
that the plan must meet before the court will grant confirma-
tion.16" ' For example, the court must find that liquidation or fur-
ther reorganization of the debtor will not follow confirmation 16 5
and that at least one class of claims accepts the plan, excluding
1655. See H.R. Rm,. No. 595, supra note 1622, at 301.
1656. 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1)-(3) (Supp. V 1981). Impairment of the class occurs unless
the plan "leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights" of the class of claims
or interests, cures any default that occurred before commencement of the case, or provides
for payment of the claim in cash.
1657. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (Supp. V 1981).
1658. A class of equity security holders has accepted the plan when two-thirds in
amount of the equity security holders actually voting accept the plan. Id. § 1126(d).
1659. Id. § 1126(c). Since a nonvote is no longer counted as a rejection of the plan,
acceptance is easier to obtain than under the old Bankruptcy Act of 1938. See Elfin, supra
note 1615, at 181; Moller, supra note 1618, at 468.
1660. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. V 1981). For a critical evaluation of this inordinately
complex provision, see Moller, supra note 1618, at 471. For brief attempts at explanation of
"cram down" provisions, see Elfin, supra note 1615, at 185-87; Trost, supra note 1618, at
1328-32. For an exhaustive analysis of "cram down," see Kee, All You Ever Wanted to
Know about Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR L.J. 133 (1979).
1661. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (Supp. V 1981).
1662. Id. § 1126(g).
1663. See 11 U.S.C. § 1128 (1976).
1664. Section 1129(a) contains eleven requirements for confirmation. See id. §
1129(a)(1)-(11); Elfin, supra note 1615, at 183; Moller, supra note 1618, at 469-70.
1665. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1976). The plan itself, however, expressly may provide
for such liquidation. Id.; see id. § 1123(b)(4).
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any acceptances by insiders. 6 6 Importantly, even if each class has
accepted the plan,67 the court must confirm that each member of
each class has accepted the plan or will receive under the plan
property of a value not less than the amount that the member
would receive under liquidation. 668
In confirming the plan, the court discharges all former obliga-
tions owed to creditors by the debtor, notwithstanding whether the
plan addressed those obligations or whether all the creditors par-
ticipated in the reorganization.66 9 Confirmation by the court also
vests all the property of the estate in the debtor, except as other-
wise provided in the plan or in the confirmation order.
670
2. Asbestos Manufacturers and Chapter 11 Reorganization
Several features of Chapter 11 reorganization might be attrac-
tive to asbestos manufacturers beset with thousands of asbestos-
related health suits. These attractions include temporary relief
from creditors, continued ordinary operation of the business by the
debtor, and attainment of public attention to encourage congres-
sional enactment of asbestos-related legislation.
The temporary relief from current creditors available through
the automatic stay provisions 1671 is the primary reason that an as-
bestos manufacturer attempting to survive as a viable, profit-pro-
ducing entity would fie for Chapter 11 reorganization. Since the
Borel 6 72  decision, asbestos-related litigation costs have esca-
lated. 6 73 By complying with Chapter 11, an asbestos manufacturer
1666. Id. § 1129(a)(10). This requirement is met if there is a class that is not impaired
under the plan. See supra note 1659 and accompanying text.
1667. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(A) (Supp V. 1981).
1668. Id. § 1129(a)(7).
1669. Id. § 1141.
1670. Id. § 1141(b).
1671. See supra notes 1620-29 and accompanying text.
1672. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); see supra part
I.
1673. Manville Corporation estimates that it presently faces approximately 16,500 as-
bestos-health lawsuits at an average disposition cost of $40,000 each. Manville also estimates
that it will face another 32,000 cases in the future, for a total disposition cost of approxi-
mately $2 billion. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 53"(Summary of Asbestos-Re-
lated Litigation Projection). Unarco estimates that it spent $7.5 million on asbestos litiga-
tion in 1980, and $14 million in 1981. ASBESTOs LMG. RP. (ANDREws) 4861, 5261 (July 23,
1982) (testimony of Mr. William C. McLaughlin, general counsel for Unarco, before the La-
bor Standards Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor). Amatex Corporation
estimates its asbestos litigation costs at $400,000 in 1980, $799,000 in 1981, and $487,000 in
1982. AsBnsTos LrrIo. RaP. (ANDREwS) 5765 (Nov. 12, 1982) (statement of Mr. Victor Drexel,
general counsel for Amatex Corporation).
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not only would relieve itself of these costs at least temporarily,
167"
but also it would curtail all collection efforts by successful asbestos
claimants and other creditors. 167 5 Arguably, this automatic stay
also would protect the rights of creditors by preventing a rush for
the assets of the manufacturer and the consequent inequitable dis-
tribution of its limited assets.1676 Moreover, any court-approved re-
organization plan will protect creditors because, unless they agree
otherwise, the plan at least must provide them the liquidation
value of their claims.16 77 Ostensibly, if the debtor spends less on
litigation expenses, more assets will be available to distribute to
creditors under a plan of reorganization. 
1 7 8
Additionally, an asbestos manufacturer may choose reorgani-
zation because generally it may continue the ordinary operation of
its businesses. 17 9 Besides obtaining relief from creditors, a manu-
facturer in reorganization may continue increasing assets and
strengthening its enterprises. The debtor-manufacturer must not
dissipate his assets or fail to operate responsibly.1680 The reorgani-
zation plan also may protect the manufacturer's assets directly
since a court cannot grant confirmation unless each creditor re-
ceives at least liquidation value of his claims or accepts less.16 81
The possibility exists, therefore, that some unsophisticated credi-
tors might accept less under the plan than they would acquire
under liquidation. Nevertheless, the financial standards of confir-
1674. The filing of the petition would halt all proceedings that claimants had brought
or could have brought against the manufacturer before the commencement of the case in
bankruptcy. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1622, at 340. Thus, the courts must decide
whether the reorganization plan governs claimants suffering from asbestos-related disabili-
ties at the time of the filing and thereby limits their claims to the plan's provisions, or
whether the claimants directly may sue asbestos manufacturers after the reorganization.
1675. Id.
1676. In fact, several asbestos manufacturers have advanced this argument. See id; see
also ASBESTOs LrrM. REP. (ANDREws) 5522 (Sept. 10, 1982) (Manville Corporation stated
that it must mortgage its assets if litigation continues unchecked; asbestos claimants conse-
quently would be subordinate to company creditors).
1677. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (Supp. V 1981).
1678. This argument might have the support of the plaintiffs who have suits pending
against asbestos manufacturers at the time the manufacturers filed their reorganization pe-
titions. Those plaintiffs who already have received large judgments, however, conceivably
could receive much less under a reorganization plan and, therefore, probably would not sup-
port this argument.
1679. See supra notes 1636-37 and accompanying text. Manville Corporation has told
its suppliers that it hopes to continue ordinary operations during its reorganization. ASBES-
Tos LrITI. Rz. (ANDREws) 5560-61 (Sept. 10, 1982) (letter from Mr. John A. McKinney,
chairman and president of Manville Corporation, to Manville Suppliers (Aug. 27, 1982)).
1680. See supra note 1644 and accompanying text.
1681. See supra note 1668 and accompanying text.
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mation are extremely complex, and determining any distribution
under a hypothetical liquidation is very difficult.""8 2 The chances of
confusion are real, and unsophisticated creditors must evaluate
carefully any plan before accepting it. Additionally, a court proba-
bly would not permit the intentional use of a reorganization plan
by a debtor to force a creditor to accept less than the amount he
deserves. 8 s
A final, compelling reason for asbestos manufacturers to pur-
sue reorganization is to draw public attention to the vast problems
associated with asbestos litigation. Currently, many insurance com-
panies refuse to indemnify asbestos manufacturers for asbestos liti-
gation costs,16 84 while the federal government protects itself from
asbestos litigation through sovereign immunity.1 85 Increased pub-
lic awareness creates enough public pressure on Congress to com-
pel enactment of federal compensation legislation requiring the
participation of insurance companies and the federal government.
In lobbying for federal compensation legislation, asbestos manufac-
turers emphasize the expense and delays inherent in judicially su-
pervised compensation of asbestos claims.686 At least two manu-
facturers have proposed the creation of a "superfund" to
compensate asbestos claimants' 68 7 Another proposal advocates a
1682. See Moller, supra note 1618, at 470.
1683. See In re Lake in the Woods, 10 Bankr. 338 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981). "The
sponsors of the new Code made it clear that under Chapter 11 a debtor would no longer be
permitted to force its creditors to accept its plan or face liquidation.... [The court holds
that 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) extentions] are impermissible if they are for the purpose of al-
lowing the debtor to prolong reorganization while pressuring a creditor to accede to its point
of view on an issue in dispute." 10 Bankr. at 345-46. See infra notes 1728-42.
1684. Courts have articulated two theories of insurance coverage regarding asbestos-
related disease: the "exposure" theory and the "manifestation" theory. For a discussion of
these theories of coverage and other issues concerning the insurance industry in asbestos
litigation, see supra part VIII.
1685. A government spokesman recently stated that the federal government will con-
tinue to deny all tort liability. See ASBESTOS LrrIG. REP. (ANDREws) 5523 (Sept. 10, 1982)
(testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. J. Paul McGrath before the House Subcomm. on Labor Stan-
dards). If an asbestos claimant was a government employee when exposed, the government
contends that his exclusive remedy is under the Federal Employees Compensation Act. If
the claimant was not a government employee when exposed, then the government will con-
tinue to assert its sovereign immunity. See id. For a discussion of United States liability, see
supra part X.
1686. ASBEsTos LmG. REP. (ANDREws) 5766 (Nov. 12, 1982) (summary of Asbestos
Litigation Group's testimony before Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on the Courts).
1687. Id. Raymark Corporation and Keene Corporation recently proposed to the Sen-
ate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Courts that Congress create a "superfund-type of pool".
This system would be no-fault in nature and operate as a claimant's exclusive remedy, but
the fund allegedly would assure swift and certain payments. Id.
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compensation trust funded by monies from all potentially liable
insurors, who contribute proportionately based on relevant criteria
such as the amount of premiums collected on issued insurance pol-
icies. 1688 Even some plaintiffs' groups have expressed an interest in
some type of compensation trust."1s Several Congressmen have in-
troduced dissimilar bills that attempt to address this problem. 1690
The proposed legislative solutions entail consideration of several
factors. The primary issues concern the extent of participation and
contribution of asbestos manufacturers,1 a91 insurance compa-
nies,1692 cigarette manufacturers, ass and the federal government""
1688. Lanzone, supra note 1603, at 26.
1689. The Asbestos Litigation Group (ALG), an association of plaintiffs' attorneys,
supports a reasonable system for handling asbestos litigation if it is voluntary, provides full
and adequate compensation on an individual basis, provides for speedy resolution of claims,
and does not require taxpayer funding. ASsBESTOS LIG. REP. (ANDREws) 5766 (Nov. 12,
1982) (summary of ALG's testimony before Senate Judiciary Subconun. on the Courts).
Other plaintiffs' attorneys vehemently have opposed any federal legislation because they
believe that asbestos manufacturers seek a "government bail-out bill." Transcript from
MacNeil-Lehrer Report, reprinted in AsBESTOs LrmG. REP. (ANDREws) at 5556 (Sept. 10,
1982).
1690. For a discussion of the various bills presented to the 97th Congress, see supra
part XI.
1691. Asbestos manufacturers generally admit some responsibility but understandably
insist that they are not solely liable. A Manville Corporation senior vice president best ex-
pressed the desire of manufacturers to enlist the federal government in a legislative solution
to the asbestos problem because of the government's sponsorship of shipbuilding during the
Second World War, when many of today's claimants became exposed to asbestos.
The government -has established generous benefit programs for veterans and their
families. Its obligation should be no less to the workers who gave their lives or their
health in the shipyards to support the national defense, simply because their injuries
appeared 20 years later .... [I]mplimentation of a legislative solution that deals fairly
with the tort claims should not be impeded by Manville's Chapter 11 proceeding ....
If Congress would enact a program to compensate victims of long-latent occupational
diseases including asbestos diseases, there is no impediment of which I am aware to
embodying Manville's participation in such programs in the reorganization plan to be
proposed by Manville, acceptance by its creditors and to the Court.
Oversight Hearing, supra note 16, at 21-22 (statement of Mr. G. Earle Parker, senior vice
president, Manville Corporation).
1692. At this time participation of insurance companies in asbestos compensation pro-
grams is problematic because these companies did not anticipate the huge manufacturer
liabilities that have materialized and, therefore, claim that the insurance policies issued dur-
ing the early years of asbestos exposure do not cover present liabilities. "It is certainly true
that insurance underwriters, in years past, did not foresee the magnitude of the asbestos
problem, but is is also true that they had no means of foreseeing the changes that have
taken place in American tort laws or in the judicial development of strict liability laws."
Lanzone, supra note 1603, at 25-26; see supra note 1684. Insurance companies also vigor-
ously debate whether insurance companies insuring the manufacturers at the time the
claimant was exposed or at the time the claimant discovered his injury were "at risk," and
therefore liable. Lanzone, supra note 1603, at 24-25. For a discussion of insurance issues, see
supra part VIII.
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in the proposed legislation. 1 9 5 Manville Corporation's filing for re-
organization drew widespread media attention169 " and spurred con-
gressional action concerning not only federal compensation legisla-
tion but also investigation of Chapter 11 procedures.
6 97
Asbestos manufacturers also should recognize the shortcom-
ings of reorganization. The corporation will acquire the stigma of
resorting to the bankruptcy courts, 6 98 and by filing for reorganiza-
tion, manufacturers effectively must open their financial records to
the public.1699 The advantages associated with reorganization are
great, however, and if Unarco, Manville Corporation, and Amatex
Corporation successfully reorganize, more companies likely will
choose this alternative in the future.
3. Controversies Concerning Recent Chapter 11 Proceedings
a. Insolvency and Good Faith Requirements
The recent filings of voluntary petitions for reorganization by
Unarco, Manville Corporation, and Amatex Corporation has
stirred a major controversy centering on (1) whether a voluntary
petitioner must be insolvent to qualify as a debtor under Chapter
11, and (2) whether these corporations have filed their petitions in
good faith.
(1) Insolvency Requirement
The Bankruptcy Code defines a debtor as a "person or munici-
1693. See supra part XI.
1694. The defendant manufacturers argue that federal government participation in
some type of compensation program is necessary. The proposed Miller bill, however, does
not include the federal government. For a discussion of proposed legislation, see supra part
XI.
1695. See id.
1696. See, e.g., An Asbestos Bankruptcy, NEwsWEEK, Sept. 6, 1982, at 54; AMERICAN
LABORATORY, Oct. 1982, at 6; Manville 'Bankruptcy' Is a Perversion of Justice, The Tennes-
sean, Sept. 5, 1982, at 5-B; Two Tales of Poison: How to End the Asbestos Nightmare, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4.
1697. Senator Robert Dole, who labelled Manville Corporation's Chapter 11 filing "du-
bious and unusual at best," heads the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary that
contemplates, among other bankruptcy law issues, a change in the current law to ensure
that other companies do not file Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings when faced with
products liability lawsuits. Wall St. J. Sept. 15, 1982, at 7, cols. 2-3.
1698. The stock market demonstrated the stigma of bankruptcy when the price of
Manville Corporation stock decreased 35% the day after Manville fied the voluntary peti-
tion for reorganization, and when Manville lost its 52-year-old position as a component of
the Dow Jones industrial average. An Asbestos Bankruptcy, supra note 1696, at 55.
1699. See supra notes 1654-56 and accompanying text.
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pality concerning which a case" has commenced under the Bank-
ruptcy Code;1 00 a corporation is a "person" under the Code.1701
Chapter 11 adopts practically the same standard for a debtor as
Chapter 71702_Since no exception excludes Unarco, Manville Cor-
poration, and Amatex Corporation, they arguably fall within Chap-
ter 11 debtor status. None of these definitions, however, require
insolvency. 17 0 3 In fact, the only mention of insolvency in the Bank-
ruptcy Code is in relation to Chapter 9, which requires a debtor to
be insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature. 7 04
No court yet has ruled on the insolvency issue regarding vol-
untary reorganization petitions. Some cases under the Bankruptcy
Act of 18981705 indicate that insolvency was not a requirement for
filing a voluntary petition, 7  but these cases are distinguishable
from the asbestos-related cases because they were simple voluntary
bankruptcy proceedings and did not concern Chapter 11-type reor-
ganizations. For any reorganization, however, the 1898 Act re-
quired a showing "that the corporation is insolvent or unable to
meet its debts as they mature and that it desires to effect a plan of
reorganization.' ' 707 In In re Cook 7 0  the court dismissed a pro-
ceeding for reorganization under section 77B of the 1898 Act be-
cause the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the
1700. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1976).
1701. Id. § 101(30) (" 'person' includes individual, partnership, and corporation, but
does not include governmental unit").
1702. Id. § 109(d). The Bankruptcy Code defines a Chapter 7 debtor negatively: a
person may be a debtor only if the person is not "a railroad, a domestic insurance company,
bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan association, building and loan associ-
ation, homestead association, or credit union;" or any such foreign institution engaged in
these activities in the United States. Id. § 109(b) (Supp. V 1981). Chapter 11 additionally
permits stockbrokers, commodity brokers, and railroads to be debtors under its provisions.
Id. § 109(d).
1703. But cf. id. § 303 (1976) (in involuntary proceedings a court may order relief only
if the debtor generally cannot pay his debts as they become due).
1704. Id. § 109(c)(3).
1705. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (current version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 1326 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)).
1706. See, e.g., In re Pyatt, 257 F. 362, 363 (D. Nev. 1918) ("The act does not require
that the bankrupt should be insolvent. A solvent person may have his property distributed
among his creditors in the manner provided by the statute, if he so desires."); In re Ann
Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1922) ("[A] voluntary adjudication in its very
nature is not dependent upon, and does not even tend to show, such insolvency, either at
the time of such adjudication or at any time prior thereto.").
1707. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912 (formerly codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 205(b)); see Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1935) (creditors hoped invol-
untary reorganization proceeding would force debtor to file voluntary plan).
1708. 104 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1939).
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debtor was insolvent or unable to pay its debts as they became
due.1709 Because the present Bankruptcy Code no longer explicitly
requires insolvency for voluntary reorganization, the cases under
the 1898 Act are not strong precedent, but they contrast the old
standard to the reformed Chapter 11 standard. Removal of the in-
solvency requirement indicates that Congress no longer intended
insolvency to be a prerequisite for voluntary reorganization.
Although the asbestos manufacturers presently seeking Chap-
ter 11 protection contend that insolvency is not a requirement for
reorganization,1710 if courts imply an insolvency requirement into
the Code, the three voluntary petitioners nonetheless would argue
that they are insolvent.1711 The Bankruptcy Code defines "insol-
vent" in Chapter 1 as a financial condition in which the sum of the
corporation's debts exceeds the fair valuation of all the corpora-
tion's property.1 71 2 The definition reflects a balance sheet concept
that comports with the layman's understanding of insolvency-the
entity's liabilities exceed the value of its assets. For involuntary
petitions, however, the Code adopts an equitable meaning of insol-
vency: "the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as
such debts become due. 171 s Although all asbestos manufacturers
and distributors have borne heavy financial burdens because of as-
bestos litigation costs, not one manufacturer has yet had its liabili-
ties completely exceed its assets. Instead, Unarco, Manville Corpo-
ration, and Amatex Corporation seek the temporary haven of
reorganization to forestall the possibility of insolvency from con-
tingent liabilities.
Unarco's financial position is closest to the balance sheet
meaning of insolvency. Overwhelmed with approximately 12,000
asbestos-related lawsuits filed by 15,000 plaintiffs, Unarco filed for
reorganization in 1982.1714 Spokesmen testified before a congres-
sional committee that Unarco's annual sales in 1980 were $316 mil-
lion, but Unarco nonetheless suffered a loss of $8.4 million while
1709. Id. at 984-85.
1710. See supra notes 1700-09 and accompanying text.
1711. Several commentators have disputed this insolvency argument and contend that
the corporations are solvent. See, e.g., Rowan, Manville 'Bankruptcy' Is a Perversion of
Justice, The Tennessean, Sept. 5, 1982, at 5-B, col. 1 ("Manville's lawyers have come up
with the slick idea that the 1978 federal law does not require that a company be insolvent to
declare bankruptcy"; labels Manville Corporation's filing a fraud).
1712. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) (1976).
1713. Id. § 303(h)(1).
1714. ASBESTOS LrIIG. REP. (ANREws) 5261 (July 23, 1982).
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incurring $7.5 million in asbestos litigation costs.17 1 5 In 1981,
Unarco's annual sales increased to $346 million, but its asbestos
litigation costs increased to $14 million." 6 A Unarco spokesman
stated that the company simply could not meet its obligations as
they accrued. 171 7 If the courts imply a requirement of insolvency
into the Bankruptcy Code, they may not accept Unarco's equitable
concept of insolvency.
1 7 18
Manville Corporation also has characterized its financial
problems as equitable insolvency.17 19 Manville Corporation argues
that under generally accepted accounting principles it must quan-
tify and reserve capital for its potential liability in asbestos litiga-
tion, 1 720 and that the establishment of these large reserves substan-
tially will eliminate the corporation's net worth.1 72 1 As a result,
Manville Corporation maintains that it will be unable to obtain
credit, must liquidate assets, and must defer normal maintenance
and capital expenditures.1 7 122  This "cannibalization" allegedly
would destroy the company.17 3 Opponents of the corporation's po-
sition, however, assert that when the corporation filed for reorgani-
zation its financial condition was sound,1724 and by the corpora-
tion's own admission it was not insolvent in a balance sheet




1718. If courts use 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) (1976) to define an insolvency requirement in
voluntary petitions, the legislative history apparently forecloses a claim of equitable insol-
vency because it states that the definition of "insolvent" in that paragraph "is the tradi-
tional bankruptcy balance sheet test of insolvency." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Seas.
25. If courts use 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1976), however, the legislative history indicates that
the first two tests for insolvency under that section-that the debtor generally cannot pay
his debts as they mature or that the debtor has failed to pay a major portion of his debts as
they become due-are variations of the equitable insolvency test. S. RE. No. 989, supra, at
34.
1719. ASBTs LrrM. REP. (ANDREWS) 5767 (Nov. 12, 1982). Amatex Corporation also
faces the issue of insolvency, because its annual sales for the fiscal year ending October 31,
1982, were $11 million, and its net profit was $82,000 even after spending $487,000 on legal
fees. See id. at 5765 (Nov. 12, 1982).
1720. Manville Corporation estimates this potential liability will be $2 billion. See
supra note 1673.
1721. Oversight Hearing, supra note 16.
1722. Id.
1723. AsBzsTos Lrrw. REP. (ANDREWS) 5561 (Smar. 10, 1982).
1724. Id. at 5761 (Nov. 12, 1982). The ALG and M.J. Whitman & Co., a broker-dealer
and holder of $457,000 worth of Manville Corporation notes, have filed motions to dismiss
Manville Corporation's reorganization proceeding. Id.
1725. The ALG's motion to dismiss states that Manville Corporation optimistically
has predicted that after resolution of pending litigation with its insurers, it will have ap-
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study upon which Manville Corporation bases its asbestos caseload
projections should disqualify Manville from claiming equitable in-
solvency because the study represents "not a present inability to
pay debt, but a future speculative inability over the next two de-
cades based upon what might happen. "1126
The legislative history offers no solution to the insolvency is-
sue. Because the Bankruptcy Code offers the privilege of reorganiz-
ing to financially troubled businesses, however, the courts should
maintain stringent qualifications for debtor status. If a court reads
an insolvency requirement for voluntary reorganization proceed-
ings into the Code, the court likely would use the balance sheet
definition contained in Chapter 1. Such a reading narrowly would
restrict those businesses eligible for reorganization protection, an
appropriate result given the extraordinary protections the legisla-
ture has offered through reorganization proceedings.
In summary, the Bankruptcy Code does not require insolvency
as a prerequisite for Chapter 11 reorganizations. As a result of
Manville Corporation's bankruptcy petition, however, Congress has
commenced an investigation concerning the bankruptcy filings. 2
The charges that the asbestos manufacturers-Manville Corpora-
tion in particular-have misused Chapter 11 since they were not
insolvent in a balance sheet sense at the time of their filings may
induce Congress to add an insolvency requirement to the Code. To
prevent financally viable corporations faced with large potential li-
abilities from seeking refuge in Chapter 11, however, Congress
must define narrowly any insolvency requirement. Without a nar-
row definition, corporations will argue that they will be unable to
meet projected liabilities, and therefore will be insolvent. A bal-
ance sheet definition of insolvency will obviate these "equitable"
insolvency arguments and will prevent financially sound corpora-
proximately $500 million in assets, and that the corporation recently reported a net income
of $24.4 million for the third quarter ending September 30, 1982, an increase of 94% over
the comparable period in 1981. Application for Dismissal of Cases or Abstention of the
Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors, In re Johns-Manville, Corp.,
Nos. 82 B 11656 BL - 82 B 11676 BL (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Application for Dismissal], reprinted in ASBESTOS Lrro. REP. (ANDRFWS) 5785, 5789
(Nov. 12, 1982).
1726. ASBEsTos LrrG. REP. (ANDREws) 5767 (Nov. 12, 1982). An indication that litiga-
tion expenses are not necessarily uniform over time is the history of Amatex Corporation,
whose legal costs dropped dramatically in 1982. The corporation's legal expenses were:
$400,000 in 1980, $799,000 in 1981, and $487,000 in 1982. Id. Thus, courts may not allow
asbestos manufacturers seeking Chapter 11 reorganization to ignore the possibility that
their future operating and financial condition will improve. Id. at 5791-92.
1727. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 16.
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tions from using Chapter 11 protection. Concerning the Chapter 11
petitions of Unarco, Manville Corporation, and Amatex Corpora-
tion, however, the Code does not require expressly or implicitly
that liabilities of these corporations exceed their assets before
filing. It appears, therefore, that because of the potential liabilities
the asbestos manufacturers face, the courts will not dismiss the
Chapter 11 petitions based on arguments that the corporations
were not insolvent.
(2) Good Faith Requirement
Attacking Manville Corporation's Chapter 11 petition on the
basis of lack of good faith, opponents not only charge that
Manville is solvent, but also allege that Manville intentionally con-
cealed knowledge of the danger of asbestos, that it tried to insulate
assets of the nonasbestos divisions from future judgments with an
internal corporate reorganization in 1981,1728 and that it has at-
tempted to prevent asbestos plaintiffs from obtaining full compen-
sation by filing for Chapter 11 reorganization. 1729 To evaluate these
allegations, the courts first must determine whether the Bank-
ruptcy Code requires good faith as a prerequisite to the filing of a
voluntary petition for reorganization. The Code does not state spe-
cifically that a debtor must file a voluntary petition in good
faith. 72 0 The only statutory reference to good faith is that a debtor
must file a reorganization plan in good faith.17 3 ' The Code, how-
ever, provides that the court after notice and a hearing may dis-
1728. During the summer of 1981, Johns-Manville Corporation reorganized into
Manville Corporation with various divisions or subsidiaries of Johns-Manville Corporation,
Manville Building Products Corporation, Manville Forest Products Corporation, Manville
Products Corporation, and Manville International Corporation. Application for Dismissal,
supra note 1725, reprinted in AsBnsTos LrrG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5789 (Nov. 12, 1982).
1729. ASBESTOs Lrrxo. Ran. (ANDRws) 5785-86 (Nov. 12, 1982).
1730. The Bankruptcy Code states only that a "voluntary case... is commenced by
the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under [the appropriate] chapter by an
entity that may be a debtor under such chapter." 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). But cf. In re
Victory Const. Co., 9 Bankr. 549, 558 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Northwest Recreational
Activities, Inc., 4 Bankr. 36, 38-39 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (The Bankruptcy Code provides
protection equal to a good faith requirement in § 1112, which allows a court to. dismiss for
cause.). The Victory Construction court stated,
It would be more than anomalous to conclude that... Congress intended to do away
with a safeguard against abuse and misuse of process which had been ... accepted as
part of bankruptcy philosophy... for almost a century. "Good faith" must therefore
be viewed as an implicit prerequisite to the filing or continuation of a proceeding under
Chapter 11 of the Code.
9 Bankr. at 558.
1731. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1976).
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miss or suspend all proceedings in a Chapter 11 case at any time if
the halt to the proceedings would advance the creditors' and the
debtor's interests.1732 The court also may dismiss a Chapter 11 pe-
tition for cause, including a continuing loss to the estate, an inabil-
ity to effect a plan of reorganization, and an unreasonable delay by
the debtor that prejudices creditors.1 733 The court may use its
power to dismiss sua sponte or upon motion of a party in interest
and it may "use its equitable powers to reach an appropriate result
in individual cases. 17 3 4 Courts recently have interpreted this
power to dismiss as creating an obligation to inquire into the
debtor's good faith at the time of filing.17 35 In In re G-2 Realty
Trust 730 plaintiff alleged that defendant changed from a nominee
trust to a business trust to become eligible as a Chapter 11 debtor
and that this nonbusiness purpose evidenced defendant's bad
faith. Although the court did not find bad faith, it recognized that
the power to dismiss a Chapter 11 proceeding for cause grants the
court wide discretion and concluded that "despite the absence of
any specific statutory language .. . requiring an examination of
the debtor's good faith at the time of filing, this Court has the in-
herent power and duty to make such an inquiry. 17 3 7 In In re
Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc.2738 plaintiff claimed that
defendant had attempted in bad faith to invoke the court's juris-
diction by transferring property to a corporation that on the same
day filed for Chapter 11 reorganization relief. The court did not
find bad faith but, like the court in In re G-2 Realty Trust, recog-
nized that "[g]ood faith, in the sense perceived by this court to
have continued relevance, is merged into the power of the court to
protect its jurisdictional integrity from schemes of improper peti-
tioners seeking to circumvent jurisdictional restrictions and from
petitioners with demonstrable frivolous purposes absent any eco-
nomic reality."173 9 Bankruptcy courts, then, probably will investi-
1732. Id. § 305(a)(1). The debtor may not appeal an order under this subsection. Id. §
305(c).
1733. Id. § 1112(b). The list of causes in the Bankruptcy Code is not exhaustive. See
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1718, at 117.
1734. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 1718, at 117, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5787, 5903.
1735. See, e.g., In re G-2 Realty Trust, 6 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980); In re
Northwest Recreational Activities, Inc., 4 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
1736. 6 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980).
1737. Id. at 552 (footnote omitted).
1738. 4 Bankr. 36 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
1739. Id. at 39.
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gate the good faith of asbestos manufacturers that file voluntary
reorganization petitions.
To seek dismissal of Manville Corporation's Chapter 11 peti-
tion, opponents have presented numerous allegations of bad faith
including: (1) that Manville Corporation is financially sound and
thus lacks the financial instability for Chapter 11 reorganization;
(2) that it intentionally concealed from its employees knowledge of
the dangers of asbestos; (3) that it reorganized its corporate struc-
ture to insulate the assets of nonasbestos divisions from future as-
bestos-related judgments; and (4) that it intended by filing to pre-
vent deserving asbestos claimants from obtaining full
compensation. 1740 Other plaintiffs 741 have alleged that Manville
Corporation's Chapter 11 petition perverts the purposes of the
bankruptcy laws and that the legislative history and purposes of
the Bankruptcy Code do not authorize its use to protect against
hypothetical claims.
17 42
Thus, courts have recognized good faith as an implicit prereq-
uisite for Chapter 11 reorganizations, although it is not expressly
required by the Bankruptcy Code. This good faith requirement is
the most appropriate method for courts to reject asbestos manu-
facturer's reorganization filings. Although the courts have wide dis-
cretion to dismiss bankrptcy petitions, G-2 Realty Trust and
Northwest Recreational Activities reflect a reluctance to invoke
this authority except in the most obvious instances of bad faith.
Given that the allegations against Manville Corporation are specu-
lative in nature and that the Code does not expressly require insol-
vency, the courts probably will not dismiss the Chapter 11 filings
of Unarco, Manville Corporation, or Amatex Corporation on the
1740. The ALG has filed for dismissal of Manville Corporation's petition and has used
these allegations for part of the basis of its motion. See Application for Dismissal, supra
note 1725, reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. RaP. (ANDREWS) 5785 (Nov. 12, 1982).
1741. M.J. Whitman & Co., a broker-dealer holding $457,000 worth of Manville notes,
has filed a motion seeking dismissal of Manville Corporation's petition. In addition, Whit-
man's clients hold $5 million worth of Manville notes. Id., reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP.
(ANDREWS) 5761 (Nov. 12, 1982).
1742. Id., reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5763 (Nov. 12, 1982). In an
affidavit supporting Whitman's motion to dismissal, Mr. Seymour H. Knox, a professor of
mathematical institutional economics at Yale University, stated three reasons supporting
the claim that Manville Corporation's filing was inappropriate: (1) the difficulties inherent
in projecting and forecasting claims and liabilities, and the need to exercise extreme caution
when using the projections; (2) the need to consider not only the potential risk of future
payments to claimants, but also the potential impact of the payments on expected earnings
and cash flow; and (3) economic purposes underlying bankruptcy relief. Id., reprinted in
AsBaSToS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5763 (Nov. 12, 1982).
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basis of bad faith.
b. Scope of the Automatic Stay
Attracted by the prospect of at least a temporary cessation of
asbestos litigation, 743 codefendant asbestos manufacturers who
have not filed under Chapter 11 argue that the automatic stay pro-
vision of Chapter 11 applies to all defendants when any defendant
has filed for reorganization. These codefendants rely on the Bank-
ruptcy Code provision that describes the automatic stay as "appli-
cable to all entities' 1744 and argue that because of the numerous
parties, claims, cross-claims, and claims for indemnity and contri-
bution entailed in asbestos cases, the courts should stay the entire
proceedings until resolution of the reorganizations. Codefendants
also emphasize that liability depends upon determinations of rela-
tive fault among the codefendants, because the reorganizing debtor
and its codefendants often are jointly and severally liable for dam-
ages. They conclude, therefore, that courts should apply the auto-
matic stay liberally. Some jurisdictions have accepted these argu-
ments. 17 45 The court in Clutter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.
746
stated that the term "all entities" is "pervasive, universally thor-
oughly exhaustive of all possible parties who may be involved in
the litigation on file"' 7 47 and granted a motion for a blanket
stay. 1 48 In In re White Motor Credit Corp.'749 the court stated
that "the stay operates as a windfall benefit to codefendants and
insurance companies who, along with the debtor, enjoy many of the
benefits of the moratorium.' ' 750 The court held that plaintiffs
could not move to dismiss a reorganizing debtor and continue the
action against the codefendants only.'
75'
1743. See supra notes 1620-26 & 1671-75 and accompanying text.
1744. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1976).
1745. See, e.g., Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 80-203-B (M.D. La. order issued
Sept. 28, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREws) 5816 (Nov. 12, 1982); In re
White Motor Credit Corp., 11 Bankr. 294 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981), rev'd on other grounds,
23 Bankr. 276 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Federal Life Ins. Co. v. First Fin. Group of Texas, Inc., 3
Bankr. 375 (S.D. Tex. 1980); ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5320 (Aug. 13, 1982) (summa-
rizing Clutter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. C 78-229 (E.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 1982)).
1746. ASBESTOS LMG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5320 (Aug. 13, 1982) (summarizing, No. C 78-
229 (E.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 1982)).
1747. Id. at 5426 (Aug. 27, 1982).
1748. Id. at 5320 (Aug. 13, 1982).
1749. 11 Bankr. 294 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 23 Bankr. 276
(N.D. Ohio 1982).




A majority of courts considering the extent of the application
of the stay however, have reached the opposite conclusion. 1752 The
legislative history regarding the automatic stay provisions in part
supports this conclusion. One congressional report states that the
purpose of the stay is to give "the debtor a breathing spell from his
creditors," and that the "commencement or continuation . . . of a
judicial . . . proceeding against the debtor . . . is stayed.' ' 17 5 In
Royal Truck & Trailer, Inc. v. Armadora Maritima Salvadoreana,
S.A.,1754 the court stated that "the language of the Code makes it
quite clear that, in Chapter 11, the protections afforded the bank-
rupt are designed for the debtor-bankrupt only. 1755 The court in
In re Rhode Island Asbestos Cases17 56 expressed the policy behind
this interpretation of the Code.
[This court] does wish to stress the importance of not letting the complexity
of these suits obscure the tragic nature of the claims that the plaintiffs seek
to vindicate. Whatever the ultimate result of these lawsuits, let it not be said
that the plaintiffs, many of whom are suffering severe financial hardship and
some of whom are dying, have also been victimized by being denied their day
in court.1
757
Therefore, these courts will overlook any difficulties arising from
the continuation of the action without the presence of the Chapter
11 debtors. The objective of these courts is to avoid further
prejudice to plaintiffs in their efforts to win fair compensation for
their injuries.
The bankruptcy court for the Southern District of New York
in In re Johns-Manville Corp. 75 8 ruled that the stay of pending
litigation against Manville Corporation does not apply automati-
1752. See, e.g., In re Rhode Island Asbestos Cases, RIML No. 1 P (D.R.I. Oct. 12,
1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrriG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5748 (Oct. 22, 1982); In re Massachu-
setts Asbestos Litig. M.B.L. Nos. 1 & 2 (D. Mass. Sept. 28, 1982); Fontenot v. Fibreboard
Corp., No. 79-0738, slip op. (W.D. La. Sept. 14, 1982); Kindle v. Fibreboard Corp., No. TY-
79-35-CA (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 1982); Oman v. Johns-Manville, 482 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Va.
1980); In re Smith, 14 Bankr. 956 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re Aboussie Bros. Constr. Co.,
8 Bankr. 302 (E.D. Mo. 1981); In re Larmar Estates, Inc., 5 Bankr. 328 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1980); Dellamo v. Keene Indus. Insulation, No. 100(1) (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia stay granted
Sept. 24, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5654 (Sept. 10, 1982).
1753. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1622, at 340 (emphasis added).
1754. 10 Bankr. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
1755. Id. at 490.
1756. RIML 1 P (D.R.I. Oct. 12, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP (ANDREWS)
5748 (Oct. 22, 1982).
1757. Id., reprinted in ASBEsTos LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5749 (Oct. 22, 1982).
1758. Nos. 82 B 11656 BL - 82 B 11676 BL (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1983), reprinted
in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 6093 (Jan. 14, 1983). The Manville Corporation reorgan-
ization presently is before this court.
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cally to Manville's codefendants. Stating that the automatic stay
language of the Bankruptcy Code "clearly refers only to actions
against the debtor,"1759 the court rejected codefendant's conten-
tions that Manville is an indispensable party, whose absence re-
quires the court to stay all actions against all codefendants. 170 The
court recognized that it conceivably could extend the stay "as part
of an eventual reorganization plan,' 176 1 but stated that rulings of
indispensability must be a case-by-case determination.
17 6 2
c. Manville Corporation's Reorganization Plan
Although Manville Corporation has not yet submitted its reor-
ganization plan to the court, the corporation has disclosed some
aspects of a working plan. Perhaps the most controversial provi-
sion of this working plan is that Manville proposes to limit the size
and number of asbestos-health claims the company must pay.
1 7 63
Manville considers this liability limit a crucial element of the plan,
not only because the company allegedly no longer can withstand
asbestos-related expenses,7 64 but also because the company pro-
poses to use retroactive insurance funds partially to pay the
claims.17 65 Manville's other creditors, specifically its lenders and
suppliers, probably will accept the provisions of the working plan
because it ensures the payment of most of their millions of dollars
in claims.7 6 Many plaintiffs doubtlessly will oppose a limitation
on liability. Those plaintiffs who already have won judgments
against Manville possibly could receive much less than their judg-
ments, while those who have begun suits against the corporation
also will be subject to the limitations when the courts remove the
stay on their actions. Reportedly, the reorganization plan calls for
1759. Id., reprinted in ASBESTOS LInG. REP. (ANDREWS) 6096 (Jan. 14, 1983).
1760. Id., reprinted in ASBESTOS LrM. REP. (ANDREWS) 6100 (Jan. 14, 1983). The
court reasoned that the only relationship demonstrated between the codefendants and
Manville Corporation is that of joint tortfeasors, and that federal law does not consider joint
tortfeasors indispensable parties. Id., reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 6100
(Jan. 14, 1983).
1761. Id., reprinted in ASbestos Litig. Rep. (Andrews) 6096 (Jan. 14, 1983).
1762. Id., reprinted in ASBESTOs LIG. REP. (ANDREws) 6101 (Jan. 14, 1983).
1763. Manville Plans, supra note 1389, at 31, col. 4.
1764. Id.
1765. Id. at col. 6. Retroactive insurance would require payment by Manville Corpora-
tion of premiums equal to the amount of anticipated claims. Manville would not save money
on the claims but would gain tax benefits. Manville contends that for it to get such insur-
ance, the court must set an absolute ceiling on the number and size of total asbestos-related
claims for which Manville would be liable. Id.
1766. Id. at col. 4.
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Manville to pay approximately $500 million to satisfy present and
future asbestos plaintiffs. 17 67 Some plaintiffs have expressed an in-
terest in this proposal because it might loosen the legal logjam of
claims against those manufacturers protected by Chapter 11.1768
Although the plan limits liability, another attractive element for
plaintiffs is that Manville has proposed binding arbitration.17"
This provision would allow Manville to challenge undeserving
claimants and would allow dissatisfied claimants to seek larger re-
coveries. 17 70 The working plan also indicates Manville's desire to
continue its efforts toward indemnification and contribution from
insurance carriers and the federal government. Manville has indi-
cated that it may seek to consolidate its insurance suits "under the
aegis of the bankruptcy court" to put pressure on the insurers "to
begin serious settlement negotiations," and Manville also envisions
government agreement to compensate those victims exposed to as-
bestos while working in government-related jobs.177 1
Two-thirds of the creditors in each class must accept
Manville's reorganization plan for it to become effective.
177 2 If
Manville could not gain enough support from creditor acceptances,
then it could resort to the use of the Bankruptcy Code's "cram
down" provisions.1 7 8 The bankruptcy court, however, must deem
the plan "fair and equitable" to any impaired class.17 74 Further-
more, if each member of each class has not accepted the plan, the
court must determine that the plan will provide each creditor with
property worth not less than the distribution to each creditor at
liquidation. 7 7 5 This determination would be extremely compli-
cated and requires much more information than is currently
available.
Perhaps the most important issue, however, concerns plaintiffs
beginning their actions against Manville when earlier plaintiffs
1767. Id. at col. 5.
1768. Id. at col. 4.
1769. Id. at col. 5.
1770. Id. One plaintiff's attorney has stated that he opposes any type of workers' com-
pensation program that would pay only a specified sum, but he might support a defined
benefits plan that would allow a certain amount of negotiation and arbitration. Id.
1771. Id. at col. 6.
1772. See supra notes 1657-58 and accompanying text.
1773. See supra note 1663 and accompanying text.
1774. For a thorough analysis of the "fair and equitable" element, see Blum, The
"Fair and Equitable" Standard for Confirming Reorganizations Under the New Bank-
ruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 165 (1980).
1775. See supra notes 1667-68 and accompanying text.
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have exhausted the limited amount of funds. Obviously, if the $500
million Manville proposes to pay is sufficient to satisfy all claims,
then this issue will never arise. Courts, however, rightly are cir-
cumspect regarding aspects of bankruptcy proceedings that may
deny asbestos victims, whose illness alone creates much hardship,
"their day in court. 17 7 6 Indeed, courts probably would find any
plan impermissible that would use reorganization to force a credi-
tor to accept less than the amount due him.1777 Thus, if Manville's
working plan fails to provide for all future plaintiffs, or the courts
determine it is merely a ploy to force current plaintiffs to accept
less than they deserve, the courts will reject the plan.
B. Successor Liability
The rule of successor liability, an important consideration in
tort law, states that a corporation acquiring all or substantially all
of another corporation's assets, may "inherit" tort liability from
the selling corporation. Several courts have applied this rule to as-
bestos cases.177 8 As more asbestos manufacturers go out of business
or sell their production facilities, plaintiffs increasingly win rely
upon successor liability to attempt to recover for their damages.
This section examines the creation of the rule, discusses its various
applications in current asbestos litigation, and attempts to predict
its possible application in future situations.
1. Creation of Successor Liability
The seminal .ase in the creation of the successor liability doc-
trine is Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp.,179 in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit awarded
damages to plaintiff who had injured his hand in a machine. Plain-
tiff sued North American Rockwell Corporation on the theory that
Rockwell had acquired substantially all the assets of the company
1776. See, e.g., In re Rhode Island Asbestos Cases, RIML No. 1 P (D.R.I. Oct. 12,
1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5748 (Oct. 22, 1982); see supra note
1756 and accompanying text.
1777. See supra note 1683 and accompanying text.
1778. See, e.g., Amader v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp., Civ. Action No. 79-4546 (E.D.
Pa. July 26, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5484 (Aug. 27, 1982); Davis
v. Johns-Manville Corp., Civ. Action No. 80 041 153 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 21, 1982),
reprinted in ASBESTOS Lrria. REP. (ANDREWS) 5360 (Aug. 13, 1982); ASBESTOS LmG. REP.
(ANDREWS) 5711 (Oct. 22, 1982) (summarizing Marano v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 108 (Pa.
C.P. Philadelphia Sept. 15, 1982)); ASBESTOS LrNG. REP. (ANDREWS 5336 (Aug. 13, 1982)
(summarizing Coyle v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 92 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia Sept. 10, 1978)).
1779. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974).
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that negligently had designed and manufactured the machine and
was, therefore liable for those injuries.17 80 Rockwell had purchased
the assets of the machine manufacturer, which dissolved eighteen
months later.17 81 The Knapp court recognized that "'a mere sale
of corporate property by one company to another does not make
the purchaser liable for the liabilities of the seller not assumed by
it.' ",1782 The court also recognized, however, several exceptions to
this rule. These exceptions, which constitute the successor liability
rule, impose liability upon a purchasing corporation for the obliga-
tions of a selling corporation if: (1) the purchaser expressly or im-
plicitly assumes the obligations; (2) the selling corporation and the
purchasing corporation consolidate or merge; (3) the purchasing
corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or
(4) the transaction is a fraudulent attempt to escape liability for
the obligations.1783
To determine if a merger, consolidation, or continuation has
occurred, the Knapp court stated that it must look past the form
of the transaction to see if "the selling corporation continued to
exist as a corporate entity and whether, after the transaction, the
selling corporation possessed substantial assets with which to sat-
isfy the demands of its creditors. ''17 4 Although Rockwell continued
to manufacture the machines, the court did not find a continuation
because the seller did not dissolve immediately-Rockwell merely
absorbed "'the nature of the manufacturing operations previously
engaged in . . . , not the corporate entity itself.' ,,"'1 The Knapp
court, however, acknowledged that courts have found mergers
when the transaction leaves the selling corporation without appre-
1780. Id. at 363. Plaintiff's suit against seller was barred by either Pennsylvania's two-
year statute of limitations on personal injury actions or the statute requiring that suits
against a dissolved corporation be commenced within two years of the date of dissolution.
Id. at n.3.
1781. The seller had entered into an agreement with Rockwell whereby it would ex-
change substantially all its assets for stock in Rockwell. Under the agreement, the seller
would change its name on the closing date, distribute the Rockwell stock to its shareholders,
and dissolve as soon as practicable after the last of these distributions. The closing took
place on August 29, 1968. The machine injured plaintiff on October 6, 1969. The seller dis-
solved on February 20, 1970, almost 18 months after it exchanged the bulk of its assets for
Rockwell stock. Id. at 363. Rockwell expressly had denied any assumption of the seller's
liability in the sale agreement, but the court never considered a charge of fraudulent avoid-
ance of liability.
1782. Id. at 363 (quoting Shane v. Hoban, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
1783. 506 F.2d at 363-64.
1784. Id.
1785. Id. at 366 (quoting McKee v. Harris-Seabold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 566, 264
A.2d 98, 104 (1970), af'd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (1972)).
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ciable assets to satisfy the claims of its creditors.17 "8 The court also
stated that it would follow "public policy considerations" rather
than "a mere procrustean application of formalities," and thus
look to the provisions of the agreement between the seller and the
purchaser, the consequences of the transaction, and the purposes
of the applicable corporation law.1787 Because plaintiff had no rem-
edy if he could not recover from Rockwell, Rockwell could absorb
the damages better than plaintiff, and the seller only nominally
existed as a corporation after its transaction with Rockwell, the
court held that it would deem the transaction a merger.
178 8
2. Asbestos Cases Concerning Successor Liability
Courts have reached varying results in applying the successor
liability doctrine to asbestos-related suits. The earliest decision,
Coyle v. Johns-Manville Corp.,178 9 concerned a plaintiff exposed to
asbestos prior to 1947.1790 The court held that a defendant, Pitts-
burg-Corning Corporation, could not be liable for plaintiff's dis-
eases because it did not produce asbestos products until 1962 when
it acquired many of the assets of Unarco. The court reasoned that
Pittsburg-Corning did not acquire "all or substantially all" of
Unarco's assets in the transaction and "the substantial injustice
which Courts have sought to avoid in holding successor corpora-
tions liable would be avoided in this instance because Unarco is
named a defendant in this action."17 1
The court in Marano v. Johns-Manville Corp.1 792 followed
Coyle despite Unarco's filing for Chapter 11 reorganization by the
time of the suit. In Marano plaintiff alleged that her husband died
because of his exposure to asbestos during his employment at the
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard from 1940-1943. Plaintiff added that
she feared she would contract an asbestos-related disease from her
1786. 506 F. Supp. at 367. See, e.g., Hoche Prods. v. Jayark Films Corp., 256 F. Supp.
291 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Jackson v. Diamond T. Trucking Co., 100 N.J. Super. 186, 241 A.2d
471 (1968); Ruedy v. Toledo Factories, 61 Ohio App. 21, 22 N.E.2d 293 (1939).
1787. 506 F.2d at 369.
1788. Id. at 368-70. Other considerations included the intact preservation of the
seller's business organization for the benefit of Rockwell, the availability of the offices and
employees of the seller to Rockwell, and the maintenance of the seller's customer and sup-
plier relationships. Id. at 369.
1789. ASBEsTos LING. REP. (ANRnEws) 5336 (Aug. 13, 1982) (summarizing Case No. 92
(Pa. C.P. Philadelphia Sept. 10, 1978)).
1790. Id.
1791. Id.
1792. Id. at 5711 (Oct. 22, 1982) (summarizing Case No. 108 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia
Sept. 15, 1982)). The same judge sat in both the Marano and Loyle cases.
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exposure to asbestos on her husband's work clothes. Plaintiff ar-
gued that Pittsburgh-Corning should be liable as the successor
owner of Unarco's Unibestos product line, but Pittsburg-Corning
moved for summary judgment because it did not manufacture as-
bestos products until 1962, when it acquired the Unibestos product
line, and therefore could not be liable for the deceased's earlier
exposure. The court dismissed the case and stated that plaintiff's
product line successor arguments were "without substance. 7 3
In Amader v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp.,17 94 concerning a prac-
tically identical set of facts as Marano, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied successor
liability. The Amader court granted recovery against Pittsburgh-
Corning based on its 1962 acquisition of Unarco's Unibestos prod-
uct line.1795 Applying Pennsylvania law, the court reasoned that
because Pittsburgh-Corning maintained the same product, name,
personnel, property, and many of the same clients of the purchased
entity, successor liability was appropriate. 17 96
The Amader court included an important aside regarding the
possibility of Unarco's contemplated bankruptcy. Defendant ar-
gued that since it did not purchase all assets of Unarco and since
Unarco still existed, the corporate acquisition had not extinguished
plaintiff's cause of action against Unarco1 79 7 Plaintiff contended
that Unarco's possible bankruptcy might extinguish his rights
against Unarco. 79  The court, however, ignored these arguments
1793. Id.
1794. Civ. Action No. 79-4546 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LIT.
REP. (ANDREWS) 5484 (Aug. 27, 1982).
1795. The court noted that although Unarco did not dissolve, it ceased to manufacture
Unibestos. Civ. Action No. 79-4546 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrG.
REP. (ANDREWS) 5487 (Aug. 27, 1982).
1796. Amader v. Pittsburgh-Coming Corp., Civ. Action No. 79-4546 (E.D. Pa. July 26,
1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LMr. REP. (ANDREWS) 5487 (Aug. 27, 1982). The court noted
that the "product line exception" had been adopted in New Jersey in Ramirez v. Amsted
Indus. Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981), in which the court stated:
[W]here one corporation acquires all or substantially all the manufacturing assets of
another corporation, even if exclusively for cash, and undertakes essentially the same
manufacturing operation as the selling corporation, the purchasing corporation is
strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in units of the same product line, even if
previously manufactured and distributed by the selling corporation or its predecessor.
Id. at 358, 431 A.2d at 825. The Amader court also noted that an intermediate Pennsylvania
appellate court in Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110-12 (1981), recently
adopted successor liability and the Amader court assumed that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court soon would adopt a similar stance.
1797. Civ. Action No. 79-4546 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrIG.




and stated that the contemplated bankruptcy did not form the ba-
sis for its decision to apply successor liability; in fact, the court
noted that defendant's interpretation inaccurately would restrict
the successor liability doctrine under Pennsylvania law.179
The court in Davis v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 00 also
adopted successor liability. Defendant had purchased certain as-
sets of the Industrial Products Division of Keasby & Mattison
Company, including: (1) buildings, fixtures, machinery, and equip-
ment; (2) records and equipment related to the seller's industrial
products business; (3) patents, tradenames, trademarks, and re-
lated goodwill; and (4) raw material, supplies, work in progress,
and finished goods inventories related to the seller's industrial
products business. 80' The seller dissolved approximately five years
after this transaction. 0 2 The court applied successor liability and
denied defendant's motion for summary judgment because it felt
that the transfer demonstrated "a basic continuity of the enter-
prise" between the Industrial Products Division of Keasby & Mat-
tison and defendant.8 03 Courts have reached different results in
successor liability cases because they emphasize or disregard com-
peting considerations, including the plaintiff's right to hold an en-
tity accountable for his injury and the defendant's right not to an-
swer for injuries in which he played no part.
3. Future Application of Successor Liability
a. Situation One
The divergent applications of the successor liability doctrine
have raised the issue of how courts will apply the doctrine to situa-
tions arising out of the business alternatives chosen by asbestos
manufacturers as a result of the inundation of asbestos cases.
In 1981, Johns-Manville Corporation internally reorganized
into Manville Corporation'i 0 4 and five wholly owned subsidiaries,
one of which continued under the name Johns-Manville Corpora-
1799. Id.
1800. No. 80 041 153 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 21, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrIG.
REP. (ANDREWS) 5360 (Aug. 13, 1982).
1801. Id., reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. RzP. (ANDREWS) 5361 (Aug. 13, 1982).
1802. Id.
1803. Id., reprinted in ASBESTOS LING. REP. (ANDREWS) 5364 (Aug. 13, 1982).
1804. See supra note 1728 and accompanying text. Although Manville Corporation's
Chapter 11 proceedings could render this discussion moot regarding Manville, the principles
may apply to other internal corporate reorganizations, or even to Manville if the courts
disallow its proposed Chapter 11 reorganization.
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tion and included the asbestos-related division of Manville Corpo-
ration. 80 5 Under Knapp,8 08 Manville's action arguably may not
qualify as a "mere sale of corporate property"'180 7 to which the ex-
ceptions of successor liability can apply. If courts do not consider
the internal reorganization a "sale," then two possibilities arise.
First, the court may characterize Manville's internal reorganization
as an attempt to shield assets if the court views these newly cre-
ated, supposedly separate legal entities as mere pretenses unrecog-
nized for purposes of tort law. On the other hand, a court may
characterize the reorganization as a clear legal split among the di-
visions of the corporation to effect a separation of income that
could protect any future assets acquired by the nonasbestos-pro-
ducing divisions.
If the court deems the technicality of whether Manville's ac-
tion was a "sale" to be irrelevant and therefore applies successor
liability, the court must consider the additional question of
whether the internal reorganization qualifies as a merger, consoli-
dation, or continuation. If the court applies a strictly form-ori-
ented analysis as the courts used in Coyle' 80 8 and Marano,1809 it
could conclude that none of these three transactions had occurred.
Neither merger nor consolidation is applicable because Manville
divided one large corporation into several lesser and separate cor-
porate entities. A continuation, as defined in Knapp,'8 0 however,
would be more difficult for a form-oriented analysis to discount.
Nonetheless, this analysis likely would find that, although the reor-
ganization created a new asbestos division, the same parent com-
pany still existed under a changed name, in this instance, from
Johns-Manville Corporation to Manville Corporation. Thus, the
court would find that no transaction had occurred and, therefore,
that successor liability would apply to impose liability upon the
parent company. Ironically, the same conclusion that absolved the
defendant from liability in Coyle and Marano would result in the
1805. Id.
1806. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974); see supra
notes 1779-88 and accompanying text.
1807. See supra note 1782 and accompanying text.
1808. ASBESTOS LrrIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5336 (Aug. 13, 1982) (summarizing Coyle v.
Johns-Manville Corp., Case No. 92 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia Sept. 10, 1978)); see supra notes
1789-91 and accompanying text.
1809. ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5711 (Oct. 22, 1982) (summarizing Marano v.
Johns-Manville Corp., Case No. 108 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia Sept. 15, 1982)); see supra notes
1792-93 and accompanying text.
1810. See supra notes 1784-88.
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imposition of liability in Manville's internal reorganization.
If the court applies successor liability notwithstanding
whether the internal reorganization was a "sale," and if it follows
Amader and Davis,"1 1 the court may find a continuation of the
former asbestos business in the new asbestos division. Neither the
Amader nor the Davis court attached any significance to continua-
tion of the old business. 1812 Moreover, the new asbestos division of
Johns-Manville generally has maintained the same product, name,
personnel, property, and clientele as the old corporation; although
the parent corporation still exists, it has ceased production of any
asbestos products."' s This situation is remarkably similar to the
facts of Amader,1 14 and arguably would qualify as "a basic con-
tinuity of the enterprise" under Davis.
8 15
A defendant in Manville's situation should advocate either a
substance-oriented analysis in hope that a merger, consolidation,
or continuation would be found, or carefully should structure an
internal reorganization to lead even a form-oriented court to find
that one of these transactions had occurred. Because the doctrine
of successor liability developed in Knapp requires a court not only
to look at the consequences of the transaction but also to weigh
public policy considerations as opposed to a "mere procrustean ap-
plication of formalities,"'8 1 6 a substance-oriented court, therefore,
may look to the intent of an internal reorganization. If it concludes
that the purpose of the transaction is to protect corporate assets, it
would impose successor liability on the parent corporation. This
conclusion, and the conclusion that a form-oriented court would
reach, 81 7 effectively would obviate the asset protection purpose of
an internal corporate reorganization such as Manville's. Knapp
1811. See supra notes 1794 and 1800.
1812. In Davis v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 80 041 153 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct. July
21, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LiTG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5360 (Aug. 13, 1982), the selling
corporation did not dissolve until approximately five years after the transaction had oc-
curred. See supra note 1802 and accompanying text. In Amader v. Pittsburgh-Corning
Corp., No. 79-4546 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 1982), reprinted in ASBEsTos LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS)
5484 (Aug. 27, 1982), the selling corporation continued to exist despite a contemplated
bankruptcy, and the court expressly stated that the possible extinction of a claim against
the corporation if it did file for bankruptcy had nothing to do with the court's decision to
find a continuation. See supra notes 1797-99 and accompanying text.
1813. See Application for Dismissal, supra note 1725, reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG.
REP. (ANDREWS) 5785 (Nov. 12, 1982).
1814. See supra notes 1795-96 and accompanying text.
1815. See supra note 1803 and accompanying text.
1816. See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1974).
1817. See supra notes 1808-10 and accompanying text.
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also imposes liability upon a purchasing corporation for the obliga-
tions of the seller if the transaction is a fraudulent attempt to es-
cape liability for the obligations.' 818 If the plaintiff cannot prove
fraud, each purchasing corporation, whether representing asbestos
or nonasbestos facets of the selling corporation, arguably could be
liable and thus fail to protect its assets.
b. Situation Two
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.1819 has developed another novel
attempt to survive asbestos litigation costs. Forty-Eight had been a
small producer of industrial insulation products, only a few of
which contained asbestos, since 1923.1820 Although it ceased asbes-
tos use in 1970, plaintiffs nevertheless have sued Forty-Eight as a
co-defendant in 13,000 asbestos actions and, as a result, the corpo-
ration could not acquire credit essential for continued operation
and expansion.18 2' Rather than undergo Chapter 11 reorganization,
Forty-Eight decided to cease its production business and suspend
most of its workers. Forty-Eight now maintains only four employ-
ees and its insurance company has hired it to act as its own claims
service center.182 2 Fibrex, Inc., a new, closely held company formed
by private investors, has rented Forty-Eight's former factories and
offices and has rehired the former employees of Forty-Eight to op-
erate the same factories and offices for the production of asbestos-
free insulation.' 23 Technically, Forty-Eight's income now consists
of only the compensation from its insurance company for Forty-
Eight's services and the rent paid to Forty-Eight by Fibrex.
This business alternative raises two issues: first, whether as-
bestos plaintiffs can recover against the assets of Forty-Eight, and
second, whether Fibrex is liable for judgments against Forty-Eight
under the successor liability doctrine. Clearly, plaintiffs can re-
cover against payments Forty-Eight receives from its insurance
company for services rendered and rent it receives from Fibrex be-
cause these payments obviously are Forty-Eight's assets. The com-
pany works for its insurance company in order to pay out insur-
1818. See supra note 1783 and accompanying text.
1819. A Small Firm's Answer to Suits Over Asbestos, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1982, at 37,
col. 3. Forty-Eight has settled 1000 cases at a cost of $9000 each, id. at 52, col. 4, and is







ance claims and defend against the 13,000 pending lawsuits,18
and the company hopes that its insurance will cover all these
costs. 1825 Because Forty-Eight did not have insurance coverage
before 1955,1826 if workers exposed to asbestos before 1955 sue and
recover in sufficient amounts to exhaust Forty-Eight's income, they
could attempt to extract their judgments by means of liens against
the factories and equipment still owned by Forty-Eight.
The most important question is the applicability of successor
liability to Fibrex. Plaintiffs would argue that Fibrex is liable as
the successor of the obligations of Forty-Eight, but no court has
yet applied the successor liability doctrine to this situation. One
problem with the application of successor liability to Fibrex is that
Fibrex technically is not a purchasing corporation, because it rents
the factories and offices of Forty-Eight for use in its own produc-
tion instead of having bought them. Since Knapp evidently con-
templated only situations concerning a sale of assets, a successful
application of the successor liability doctrine against Fibrex may
extend the theory beyond its intended limits. 18217 Fibrex has not in
any way absorbed Forty-Eight, which still exists to pay claims. 828
Alternatively, the court in Knapp recognized that courts had ap-
plied successor liability when the selling corporation had insuffi-
cient assets to satisfy the claims of creditors.8 29 A court may de-
cide, therefore, that the limited assets available from Forty-Eight's
insurance salary and rental money are insufficient and allow recov-
ery against the profits of Fibrex.
If a court considers allowing a recovery against Fibrex because
Forty-Eight's assets are insufficient to pay the claims, the court
still may find successor liability inapplicable since Forty-Eight
ceased production of asbestos products in 1970,180 and Fibrex has
produced only asbestos-free products.'18 3  Under a Coyle or
1824. Id.
1825. Id. at 52, col. 4.
1826. Id. The company admits it fears that it will not survive if enough plaintiffs from
the pre-1955 period sue, but the president of Forty-Eight is content that even if the com-
pany does not survive it has done its best to do so. See id.; supra part VIII.
1827. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974).
1828. "Still, [the president of Forty-Eight] believes the company should pay in some
cases. 'You see somebody thin, pale, finding it hard to breathe and using an oxygen mask,'
he says. 'These people have been hurt. We should meet the financial obligation the court
decrees.'" A Small Firm's Answer to Suits Over Asbestos, supra note 1819, at 23.
1829. See supra note 1786 and accompanying text.
1830. See supra note 1821 and accompanying text.
1831. See supra note 1823 and accompanying text.
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Marano'83 1 form-oriented analysis, a court would not find the nec-
essary continuation of production to hold Fibrex liable as a succes-
sor. Consequently, the court would not hold Fibrex liable for any
asbestos-related disease arising from pre-1970 exposure, and, in
addition, Fibrex would have no post-1970 exposure liability be-
cause it never produced any asbestos products. Under an Amader
or Davis1 88 3 substantive analysis, however, the court may find the
requisite continuity because Fibrex has maintained the same per-
sonnel, property, and clientele as Forty-Eight. The elements of
maintaining the same product and name are missing, however, and
since the transaction also is rental in nature, the continuity may be
too tenuous even for an Amader or Davis analysis.
Any attempts to resolve these issues must balance the policy
considerations of applying the successor liability doctrine against a
corporation such as Fibrex that entered into a rental agreement
with an admittedly liable corporation, and the legitimacy of dis-
abled asbestos worker's claim against a defendant that, had it con-
tinued its production, undoubtedly would have had to pay any
judgments out of its profits. Imposing successor liability upon les-
sees such as Fibrex encourages disabled asbestos workers to bring
more suits and further taxes the judicial system with claims, cross-
claims, and counter-claims. Applying the doctrine also may subject
innocent lessees to liability of which they had no knowledge and in
which they did not participate. If the courts refuse to apply the
doctrine to Fibrex, they would encourage many admittedly liable
defendants to protect future assets from legitimate claimants by
contrived rental agreements. Knapp provides a logical place for a
court to begin an analytical resolution of these issues. In Knapp
the court emphasized that a court should determine the nature of
complicated corporate transactions by examining the provisions of
the parties' agreement and the consequences of their actions. 83 4 If
the courts apply successor liability to the Forty-Eight/Fibrex situa-
tion or to similar circumstances, the courts may have to enlist an
intent standard to distinguish cases on an ad hoc basis-if the par-
ties entered into the transaction solely to escape liability and had
little or no other business purpose, the courts should impose suc-
cessor liability.
1832. See supra notes 1789 & 1792.
1833. See supra notes 1794 & 1800.




Several commentators have suggested defensive strategies to
help asbestos manufacturers and other defendants more efficiently
to bear rising litigation costs.18 5 These strategies have two
goals-reducing the costs inherent to asbestos litigation and ab-
solving, to some degree, the defendants from liability for asbestos-
related injuries.
One cost-reducing strategy most favorable to plaintiffs is an
admission by defendants that asbestos is a hazardous product; the
admission eliminates litigation of this threshold issue. Defendants,
however, concede that some of the exposed workers have devel-
oped asbestos-related illnesses, but they refuse to admit any blan-
ket liability for all of the claimed illnesses.18 6 Defendants also
have argued that plaintiffs' smoking tobacco products contributes
to and perhaps causes or exacerbates some diseases that plaintiffs
advance as asbestos induced. 83 7 Therefore, both sides will continue
to litigate the threshold issue of the hazardous nature of asbestos
in individual cases.
Another strategy for cost reduction more acceptable to defen-
dants consists of consolidating defense efforts. Five manufacturers
formed an alliance in an effort to provide a more unified defense
and to reduce the risk of any defendant "settling out" on the
others. 183 8 Such an agreement specifies that no signer "shall inde-
pendently settle any case," and that each signatory agrees to pay a
predetermined percentage of any- settlement or judgment.189 Man-
ufacturers hope that each signer will be more willing to proceed to
court and thereby force illegitimate plaintiffs either to withdraw
their complaints or lose in court.8 40 Manufacturers also can avoid
the expense of duplicative discovery, settlement, and other legal
fees by this consolidation of procedures. Plaintiffs' attorneys have
criticized these alliances as ploys to slow litigation and reduce se-
vere cash flow problems. Some manufacturers, however, refuse to
sign such an agreement because they view it as a waste of money
1835. E.g., Winter, Defendant Asbestos Firms Form an Alliance, 68 A.B.A. J. 137
(Feb. 1982); Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1983, at 31, col. 6.
1836. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1983, at 31, col. 5.
1837. Denver Post, Sept. 13, 1982.
1838. Winter, supra note 1835. The five companies were Celotex Corp., Eagle-Picher





and a possible violation of antitrust laws. 1841 Depending upon the
percentage of judgments or settlements that they must pay,
smaller companies that have incurred excessive asbestos litigation
expenses may benefit from these alliances by relying upon the dis-
covery procedures of the larger companies.184 2 Pursuing insurance
companies in court results in higher current costs but may indem-
nify defendants at a later date. The liability of the insurance com-
panies,1843 however, is unclear and asbestos manufacturers have
met with mixed results. To determine the practicality of pursing
such a course, each asbestos manufacturer must weigh the total
costs of this litigation against the likelihood of substantial
recoveries.
844
Potentially the most remunerative defensive strategy for man-
ufacturers, and therefore the one most eagerly sought by them, is
the participation of the federal government. Governmental partici-
pation may take two forms-government payments to asbestos
plaintiffs employed in government-related work during their expo-
sure to asbestos 84 5 and the assertion by manufacturers of the gov-
ernment specifications defense. Since the goverment continues to
assert sovereign immunity as its defense in suits by asbestos plain-
tiffs, 84 6 manufacturers probably will gain more protection with the
1841. Id. Johns-Manville Corporation, which drafted this particular agreement, ex-
cluded itself from the alliance because it wanted to lower its percentage of any verdicts or
settlements from 19% to 15%. Id.
1842. The president of Pacor, Inc., a small company that formerly purchased asbestos
products it custom-fitted and resold, stated that manufacturers such as Manville Corpora-
tion should carry part of the burden of suits against companies like Pacor that handled, but
never manufactured, asbestos products. See The Tennessean, Nov. 29, 1982, at 5-B, col. 2.
1843. See supra note 1684; supra part VIII.
1844. Johns-Manville Corporation has filed suit in the San Francisco Superior Court
asking $5 billion in punitive damages from its insurance carriers. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1983,
at 31, col. 6. Because of the large sums of money concerned, Manville Corporation likely will
incur the extra expense to litigate against the insurance companies.
1845. See supra notes 1685 & 1689-97 and accompanying text; supra part X. Manville
Corporation's working plan for reorganization envisions agreement by the federal govern-
ment to compensate victims of asbestos diseases exposed while working in federally con-
trolled shipyards during the Second World War, and Manville Corporation recently re-
quested permission from the bankruptcy court to hire additional lawyers to study the
possibility of further litigation against the government. Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1983, at 32, col.
6. Manville Corporation also notes that the government already has settled one case by
agreeing to pay $5.7 million of a $20 million settlement that benefits 445 workers at an
asbestos plant in Tyler, Texas. See Letter from Mr. Edward W. Warren of Kirkland & Ellis
to Mr. Earle Parker, senior vice president of Manville Corp., Sept. 8, 1982, at 9 (copy on file
with Vanderbilt Law Review) (citing Busisass WEEK, Dec. 26, 1977, at 42) [hereinafter cited
as Warren Letter].
1846. See supra note 1685.
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government specifications defense. This defense first arose in In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,8 4 7 in which the court
recognized that "a manufacturer who supplies equipment to the
United States Army in a time of war pursuant to government spec-
ifications may not be held liable for any inadequacy in the plans"
because the supplier has the right to rely on the government speci-
fications and need not withhold from the armed forces materials
that the supplier believes are imprudent or even dangerous.""'8 To
assert a government specifications defense successfully, the manu-
facturers must prove that they supplied the product to the govern-
ment pursuant to a contract, that the government promulgated
specifications for the product, that the manufacturer met those
specifications, and that the government knew as much as the man-
ufacturer about the hazards of the product. 8 4 9 The defense, if rec-
ognized, is a "complete defense to any action based on design,
whether faulty or not."'850 Plaintiffs distinguish the government
specifications defense in asbestos cases because the Agent Orange
contractors supplied the material as a weapon during wartime,
while asbestos manufacturers supplied insulation for ships used in
the war effort, and because recognition of this defense in asbestos
cases could result in every manufacturer of any component part
used to build the most routine government property arguing for
immunity.'8 5' The great level of participation by the federal gov-
ernment in Second World War shipyard activities' 2 presents a
strong argument for recognition of this defense for asbestos manu-
facturers, but even with this defense, asbestos victims still may be
unable to sue the federal government successfully.8 5 " Therefore,
1847. 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
1848. Id. at 794 (citing Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400
(Sup. Ct. 1980)).
1849. Winter, U.S. Contracts Asserted in Asbestos Defense, 68 A.B.A. J. 790 (1982).
1850. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(quoting Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (Sup. Ct.
1980)).
1851. Winter, supra note 1849. The United States Department of Defense requires
compliance with detailed specifications for almost everything it buys: "Twenty-four pages
are required to list the specs for T shirts, 15 pages for chewing gum, and 17 for Worchester-
shire sauce." High Specs, TnME, Mar. 7, 1983, at 23.
1852. Manville Corporation asserts that the government directed all aspects of the sale
and use of asbestos in wartime shipbuilding, that the government knew as much as the
asbestos industry about the health hazards of asbestos but lagged in providing protection to
workers, and that, therefore, technical legal defenses should not insulate the government
from bearing its fair share of the responsibility for diseased shipyard workers. See generally
Warren Letter, supra note 1845.
1853. Winter, supra note 1849.
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courts probably will be slow to recognize the government specifica-
tions defense, and manufacturers consequently will have no
recovery.
D. Summary
The Chapter 11 reorganization filings of Unarco, Manville
Corporation, and Amatex Corporation reflect an innovative use of
the Bankruptcy Code by asbestos manufacturers faced with enor-
mous future liabilities. The election of Chapter 11 reorganization is
highly controversial-critics have labeled Manville's filing a per-
version of justice and a patent fraud.18 "4 Opponents of reorganiza-
tion note the financial status of the manufacturers and conclude
that none of the filing corporations require Chapter 11 protection
to satisfy their present liabilities. Clearly, the three asbestos manu-
facturers were not insolvent when they filed for reorganization.
1855
The Bankruptcy Code, however, does not explicitly require in-
solvency for voluntary Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. Re-
quiring asbestos manufacturers to continue business-as-usual with-
out Chapter 11 protection would slowly, yet substantially,
deteriorate their financial condition. 8 6 Eventually, with dwindling
resources used to pay the judgments of numerous projected law-
suits, 85 7 creditors and lenders would intervene to demand pay-
ment before all assets become exhausted. Liquidation likely would
result. ' Alternatively, if courts allow manufacturers to utilize
Chapter 11 protection, the corporations could continue their opera-
tions, strengthen their financial position, and avoid future bank-
ruptcy. The study commissioned by Manville projects that future
claims and liabilities will exceed the corporation's assets.8 5 9 Al-
though critics challenge Manville's projections,1860 other studies in-
dicate that numerous victims of asbestos-related disease will
emerge before the end of the century. 88' Without some type of
1854. E.g., The Tennessean, Sept. 5, 1982, at 5-B, col. 1.
1855. See supra notes 1710-26 and accompanying text.
1856. See, e.g., Statement of G. Earle Parker, senior vice president, Manville Corpora-
tion, before the Senate Subcomm. on Courts (Nov. 10, 1982), reprinted in ASBESTOS LrrIG.
REP. (ANDREWS) 5799, 5804 (Nov. 12, 1982); Bulow, Jackson, & Mnookin, Winners and
Losers in the Manville Bankruptcy, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1982, at 30, col. 3 [hereinafter cited
as Winners and Losers].
1857. Winners and Losers, supra note 1856, at 30, col. 3.
1858. Id.
1859. See supra notes 1605, 1673, & 1719-23 and accompanying text.
1860. See supra notes 1724-26 and accompanying text.
1861. See supra part XI.
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comprehensive protection from large judgements in products liabil-
ity lawsuits, asbestos manufacturers face eventual bankruptcy.
Moreover, the protection provided by Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion can benefit future claimants as well as the manufacturers. The
cost to the manufacturers of the bankruptcy proceedings likely will
be less than the costs of defending the asbestos claims.1882 Further,
some of the inevitable losses will shift to classes of creditors other
than victims of asbestos-related disease. 1863 The result is that more
resources can be available for distribution to future claimants as
compensation. Reorganization, therefore, likely will benefit future
claimants and the economy by preventing the demise of these as-
bestos manufacturers. The use of Chapter 11 constitutes not a
fraud or abuse of the system, but an effective means of averting a
potential financial disaster. The unfortunate side-effect of Chapter
11, however, is that existing claimants once again become the
victims.
The inequities of the Chapter 11 filings fall squarely upon the
claimants who have either judgments against the manufacturers or
suits pending at the time of the reorganization filings. An asbestos
victim with a judgment against Unarco, Manville Corporation, or
Amatex Corporation probably will collect only a fraction of his
judgment. A deserving claimant with a suit pending against asbes-
tos manufacturers must sever the claims against the manufacturers
protected by reorganization before proceeding against nonbank-
rupt asbestos manufacturers. To proceed against a manufacturer
protected by Chapter 11, a claimant must await a court-approved
reorganization plan. The result in either situation is that the reor-
ganizations delay even further the slow-moving judicial process.
Thus, the potential advantages to future claimants provided by
Chapter 11 come, at least partially, at the expense of the present
asbestos victims.
The gravest danger associated with Chapter 11 reorganizations
concerns the reorganization plan. Absolute liability limits for man-
ufacturers in a court-approved reorganization plan could deny fu-
ture claimants adequate compensation. The proposed Manville re-
organization plan limiting its liability to $500 million presents this
danger of inadequate compensation. Courts facing proposed reor-
ganization plans placing an absolute limit on asbestos manufactur-
ers liability should exercise their power to reject such plans to en-




sure that all deserving claimants receive adequate compensation in
the future.
Clearly, the only effective long-term solution to the asbestos
problem is federal legislation. Given the judicial system's ponder-
osity, an alteration of the system to accommodate the burdens
placed upon it by asbestos litigation is unlikely. The furor sur-
rounding the Chapter 11 reorganization filings combined with the
associated disadvantages to existing claimants and the difficulties
inherent in creating a fair and effective reorganization plan further
buttress the need for a legislative solution. Procuring an equitable
legislative alternative, however, may not be possible in the current
political climate.
XIII. CONCLUSION
The issues and controversies surrounding the asbestos litiga-
tion and Chapter 11 filings of three asbestos manufacturers em-
phasize the need for a legislative compensation program for victims
of asbestos-related disease. One theme recurring throughout this
Special Project is the inability of the judicial system adequately to
cope with the volume and complexity of asbestos-related lawsuits.
Even if courts could restructure current products liabilty law to
resolve many of the problems presented by mass tort litigation, ex-
ternal factors such as Chapter 11 reorganizations and potential
bankruptcies would prevent the changes from becoming effective.
Maintaining the present system of victim compensation, however,
only benefits the attorneys." 4 Congress, therefore, immediately
must enact a legislative program removing asbestos victim com-
pensation from the judicial system to ensure a more equitable dis-
tribution of resources. Unfortunately, Congress has spent over
eight years "looking into this problem" without enacting a practi-
cal, equitable solution." 65 Although observers predict that the bill
1864. Mr. Victor E. Schwartz, a partner in the Washington D.C. law firm of Crowell
and Moring, has estimated that "for every six cents... paid to an asbestos victim seven
cents is paid to an attorney involved in the litigation." ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS)
4679 (Mar. 12, 1982). Keene Corporation estimates that 75 cents of every one dollar paid out
goes to lawyers (including defense attorneys) while only 10 cents actually goes to claimants.
The remaining 15 cents goes to insurance companies. H.R. 5735 Hearings, supra note 13, at
95 (statement of Mr. Glenn W. Bailey, chairman, Keene Corporation). Commercial Union
Insurance Companies believes that for every one dollar actually paid to a claimant, it pays
up to $3.40 in legal fees. Id. at 129 (statement of Mr. Harry Martens, executive vice presi-
dent, Commercial Union Insurance Companies, Inc.).
1865. H.R. 5735 Hearings, supra note 13, at 1 (introductory comments of Representa-
tive Miller).
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introduced by Representative Miller in the Ninety-eighth Congress
has a good chance of passing, the bill does not appropriately dis-
tribute the burden of compensating the victims. Congress must in-
clude the federal government in any compensation program to re-
flect its substantial role in the asbestos problem, particularly its
commissioning the construction of warships during the Second
World War. Congress also must include the tobacco industry in a
compensation plan to reflect the relationship between cigarette
smoking and lung cancer in asbestos workers.
This Special Project critically has examined the most impor-
tant issues concerning the asbestos problem. It has considered the
complex legal, legislative, and social questions that society must
confront in order to resolve this predicament. Only swift action by
Congress in the form of a fair and comprehensive compensation
scheme for victims of asbestos-related disabilities will initiate a so-
lution to this difficult and pervasive problem.
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